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2014—supported by a strengthening recovery in the major industrial economies and soft global 
commodity prices. 
The drop in international oil prices is taking pressure off of consumer prices. Inflation will slow from 3.1% 
in 2014 to 2.6% this year. As oil prices gradually rebound, inflation will pick up to 3.0% in 2016. 
As low oil prices are supporting growth in developing Asia, a sudden sharp reversal could undermine the 
outlook and require policy response. Similarly, while capital inflows to the region have been beneficial for 
growth, policy makers must carefully manage credit expansion to ensure that it does not lead to 
excessive leverage and asset price bubbles. 
Developing Asia needs a deep, robust financial sector to sustain growth. Policy makers will be challenged 
to ensure that financial sector development is inclusive, providing broad access to households and firms. 
Financial stability must also be maintained to enhance growth and equity. 
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Foreword
Developing Asia remained the main source of global economic growth 
in 2014. Domestic policy reform, benign commodity prices, and some 
strengthening of demand from the advanced economies supported the 
region’s growth. Asian Development Outlook 2015 forecasts that the 
6.3% rate of gross domestic product (GDP) expansion achieved in 2014 
will continue into 2015 and 2016. The steady outlook for the region sees 
growth picking up enough in India and most member economies of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to compensate for 
moderating growth in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). 
Low oil prices and accommodative monetary policy will support 
ongoing efforts in the euro area and Japan to achieve steady recovery. 
Meanwhile, the United States (US) is finally showing signs of 
more robust, sustainable growth momentum, to the extent that its 
normalization of monetary policy is now widely expected in mid-2015. 
Together, the major industrial economies are envisaged expanding by 
2.2% in 2015, up from 1.6% growth in 2014, and accelerating further to 
2.4% in 2016.
Continued reform implementation in the PRC and India—both 
of which expanded by 7.4% in 2014—provides the foundation for the 
region’s prospects. The PRC is forecast to achieve the government’s 
growth target of about 7.0% in 2015 and 2016, with reform helping 
to shift the economy toward a more balanced growth model. India is 
poised to expand by 7.8% in 2015 and 8.2% in 2016, as reform lifts 
investor confidence, monetary policy eases, and capital expenditure 
rises. Moreover, strengthening growth is anticipated in Southeast Asia, 
and regional economic integration there will gain further traction 
with the establishment of the ASEAN Economic Community at the end 
of 2015. 
To achieve the steady growth envisaged in this report, policy makers 
in developing Asia need to be vigilant of potential risks. Risks to Asia’s 
growth prospects could come from an unwieldy resolution of the 
Greek debt crisis, deepening recession in the Russian Federation, and 
possible capital outflows in response to the imminent rise in US interest 
rates. Falling oil prices have largely been a boon for the region’s outlook, 
supporting higher growth and low inflation. However, geopolitical 
tensions in the Middle East remain a real risk that could produce 
a sudden reversal of prices. Authorities need to be ready to deploy 
mitigating policy responses if any of these risks materialize. 
Asia has seen rapid credit growth in recent years as total domestic 
debt nearly doubled from $18 trillion in 2009 to $34 trillion in 2013, 
with private borrowing accounting for the bulk of new debt. Although 
debt remains at manageable levels, policy makers must carefully attend 
to credit growth to ensure the maintenance of sound financial systems 
that are efficient, well-regulated, and inclusive—and therefore able to 
help sustain regional growth momentum and stability, as well as foster 
greater equity.
Developing Asia may be somewhat more financially developed than 
Latin America, but it lags far behind the advanced economies. As a 
result, the region must bear relatively costly capital and suffer difficult 
access to finance, which may inhibit future growth. The positive effect 
of finance on growth is well documented, but its effect on income 
inequality is uncertain. In Asia, widening inequality remains a concern—
one that financial deepening can either worsen or improve. Financial 
development can enhance equity if it is accompanied by steps to ensure 
broad access to finance for households and firms. Further developing 
the financial sector to broaden access to finance and lower the cost of 
capital would set a cornerstone for inclusive growth. 
But such development requires vigilant monitoring of financial 
stability. Bank regulation provides the first line of defense against 
financial shocks, while macroprudential policies have potential to 
safeguard regional financial stability. For regulators, the challenge is 
to find the balance that convincingly strengthens the governance of 
financial institutions to protect stability, while exploring the benefits of 
flexible regulation able to promote investment, productivity, innovation, 
and economic growth.
TAKEHIKO NAKAO 
President 
Asian Development Bank
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Developing Asia will grow at a steady 6.3% in 2015 and 2016—the same 
pace as 2014—supported by a strengthening recovery in the major industrial 
economies and soft global commodity prices.
The drop in international oil prices is taking pressure off of consumer prices. 
Inﬂation will slow from 3.1% in 2014 to 2.6% this year. As oil prices gradually 
rebound, inﬂation will pick up to 3.0% in 2016.
As low oil prices are supporting growth in developing Asia, a sudden sharp 
reversal could undermine the outlook and require policy response. Similarly, 
while capital inﬂows to the region have been beneﬁcial for growth, policy 
makers must carefully manage credit expansion to ensure that it does not lead 
to excessive leverage and asset price bubbles.
Developing Asia needs a deep, robust ﬁnancial sector to sustain growth. 
Policy makers will be challenged to ensure that ﬁnancial sector development 
is inclusive, providing broad access to households and ﬁrms. Financial stability 
must also be maintained to enhance growth and equity. 
ADO 2015—Highlights
xii  Asian Development Outlook 2015
Oil in the gears of growth
Steady growth and stable prices in developing Asia
 box Growth in developing Asia maintains a steady pace. Gross domestic product (GDP) in 
the region is forecast to expand by 6.3% in 2015 and 2016, as in 2014. Soft commodity 
prices and recovery in the major industrial economies generally aid the region’s growth 
momentum. The expected pickup in India and in most members of the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) could help balance gradual deceleration in the 
region’s largest economy, the People’s Republic of China (PRC). 
 » Growth in the United States leads the major industrial economies. The US recovery 
seems to have turned a corner, with strengthening conditions allowing for the 
normalization of monetary policy from mid-2015. While signs are somewhat mixed 
in the euro area and Japan, soft oil prices and accommodative monetary policy will 
support growth there. The major industrial economies are collectively forecast to 
expand by 2.2% in 2015, up 0.6 percentage points from 2014, and accelerate further 
to 2.4% the following year.
 » Targeted support will guide the PRC gradually to its new normal. Growth 
decelerated in 2014 as investment in the PRC slowed, particularly in real estate. 
Weaker investment is expected to further curtail growth to 7.2% in 2015 and 7.0% in 
2016. This is a much more moderate rate than the average growth of 8.5% recorded 
in the period since the global ﬁnancial crisis but still in line with the government’s 
loose target of about 7.0%.
 » Structural reform is expected to boost India’s prospects. The initial phase of the 
government’s effort to remove structural bottlenecks is lifting investor conﬁdence. 
With the support of stronger external demand, India is set to expand by 7.8% in 
FY2015 (ending 31 March 2016), a sharp uptick from 7.4% growth recorded in 
FY2014. This momentum is expected to build to 8.2% growth in FY2016, aided by 
the expected easing of monetary policy in 2015 and a pickup in capital expenditure.
 » Growth picks up as the ASEAN Economic Community approaches. The combined 
GDP of the 10 ASEAN economies is forecast to expand by 4.9% in 2015, lifted from 
4.4% in 2014 by recovery in Indonesia and Thailand. Though outcomes vary widely 
among the economies in the subregion because of their diverse circumstances, 
collectively the group is expected to enjoy further growth acceleration to 5.3% in 
2016, the inaugural year of the ASEAN Economic Community. 
 box Developing Asia has been the main source of global growth since the crisis. From the 
trough of the global ﬁnancial crisis in 2009, the region contributed 2.3 percentage points 
to global GDP growth—nearly 60% of the world’s annual 4.0% pace. Eight economies in 
the region posted growth exceeding 7.0% in nearly every year of the post-crisis period, 
including the PRC, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, and Sri Lanka. However, the oil 
and mineral exporters among those with consistently rapid growth may see their fortunes 
turn in the coming years as commodity prices stumble.
Highlights  xiii
 box Falling international commodity prices have contained inﬂation. Regional inﬂation is 
forecast to slow from 3.1% in 2014 to 2.6% in 2015 before bouncing back to 3.0% in 
2016. Global commodity prices are expected to stay moderate in the forecast horizon, 
removing price pressure on consumer items. Tamed inﬂation provides space for monetary 
policy to shore up weak domestic demand if necessary. Central Asia is an exception, 
as depreciating currencies are expected to exacerbate inﬂation in the next 2 years.
 box Lower import bills will temporarily widen the current account surplus. The drop in 
commodity prices, for oil in particular, will enlarge developing Asia’s current account 
surplus by 0.2 percentage points to 2.5% of GDP in 2015. However, as food price 
declines ﬂatten out and the price of crude picks up, the current account balance will 
revert to 2.3% of GDP in 2016. While the trend reﬂects the region’s position as a net oil 
importer, oil exporters like those in Central Asia will see their surpluses whittled away, 
with Kazakhstan even falling into current account deﬁcit.
 box Reversals in an otherwise supportive environment could dampen growth. If the PRC 
falters as it adjusts to its new normal, or if India reforms less decisively than anticipated, 
their slower growth could spill over to others in developing Asia. Outside the region, 
the Greek debt crisis and deepening recession in the Russian Federation may have 
global consequences. The impending rise in US interest rates may reverse capital ﬂows 
to the region, requiring monetary responses to maintain stability. Finally, the beneﬁts 
ﬂowing from the low price of crude oil could evaporate if geopolitical tensions push it 
sharply higher. 
How lower oil prices affect Asia
 box Low oil prices have been a boon for the global recovery and growth in Asia. 
An environment of low oil prices fuels higher economic growth globally, particularly in 
the major industrial economies. It slows inﬂation and hence enhances the scope for lower 
interest rates that can continue stimulating economic activity. Policy makers should take 
advantage of this moment to pursue structural reform. For oil importers, falling oil prices 
present an opportunity for governments to eliminate costly fuel subsidies or even raise 
fuel taxes with minimal disruption to household and business budgets. Oil exporters may 
similarly ﬁnd that the time is ripe to pursue subsidy and tax reform to ease the strain on 
their public ﬁnances, as well as take steps to diversify their economies. 
 box A spike in oil prices could unsettle Asia’s stable growth prospects. Simulations using a 
global macroeconomic model show that the impact of a sharp rebound in oil prices would 
be stronger in Asia than elsewhere. Were the oil price to return to $100 per barrel in a 
year, growth in Asia could slow by as much as 1 percentage point in 2016. Differences 
between advanced economies’ interest rates—which remain low in the baseline—and 
those in developing Asia play a part in the region’s steeper slowdown. This suggests that 
monetary easing in the region could soften the blow to output.
 box How oil prices affect inﬂation differs widely across the region. The immediate impact 
of an oil price change on consumer price inﬂation is small in all economies across the 
region. It is largest in Thailand, where a 10% drop in the crude oil price slows inﬂation by 
less than 0.2 percentage points after 1 month. The impact is even lower in economies 
where prices at the pump are not determined by the market. While consumer prices in 
all economies adjust somewhat, eventually, if a change in the international price persists, 
the overall effect on inﬂation is lower in major oil-producing economies.
xiv  Asian Development Outlook 2015
Is Asia’s rising debt a threat to growth?
 box Asia has experienced rapid credit growth since the global ﬁnancial crisis. From 2009 to 
2013, proliferating bank loans and bonds in the 14 large economies of developing Asia almost 
doubled total domestic debt from $18.3 trillion to $34.1 trillion. While the banking sector 
remains the largest part of the ﬁnancial system, bonds have been gaining ground as sources of 
ﬁnance. A large portion of the growth in debt comes from rapid credit expansion in the PRC, 
which accounted for two-thirds of total debt in 2013. Most of the new debt is in the private 
sector, where indebtedness more than doubled from 2009 to 2013, while government debt 
increased by just 58%.
 box Credit expansion supports growth, but excessive debt exposes economies to ﬁnancial crises. 
Debt naturally grows as economies expand their ﬁnancial systems, which is a positive 
development for growth. However, when credit expands too quickly, lending standards can give 
way, potentially allowing excessive leverage and asset price bubbles. While some economies 
have experienced rapid credit growth recently, their debt remains manageable so far.
 box Policy makers need to carefully manage credit growth. The surge in capital inﬂows has 
helped to ease regional liquidity. Monetary policies in the region have been relatively 
expansionary in response to weaker global economic conditions and low inﬂation. These 
conditions have helped fuel rises in asset prices. Macroprudential policy can be applied to 
directly tackle excessive credit to certain sectors. For example, policy makers have slowed 
credit to the property sector by requiring higher down payment percentages for mortgages.
 box Macroprudential policy can mitigate risks to ﬁnancial stability from credit growth. 
More broadly, as explored in the theme chapter, a sound, efficient, and well-regulated 
ﬁnancial system can help sustain the region’s growth momentum without jeopardizing stability. 
Further, an inclusive ﬁnancial system that broadens access to ﬁnance is a cornerstone of more 
inclusive growth.
Outlook by subregion
 box Steady growth in developing Asia masks divergent paths in its subregions. As the PRC 
and India both pursue reform to square their economies for long-term growth, the upshot 
in the short run is very different for the two giants. The external environment supports 
growth in most subregions. The exception is Central Asia, a major oil and gas exporter, hit 
by soft commodity prices and recession in its common partner for trade and remittances. 
The prospects for individual economies across heterogeneous developing Asia differ as 
political tensions and reconciliation ebb and ﬂow, and as natural disasters follow their whims.
 box East Asia pauses as the PRC adjusts to its new normal of moderate growth. Economic 
growth in East Asia will slow from 6.6% in 2014 to 6.5% this year and 6.3% in 2016. 
The subregional average reﬂects growth moderation in the PRC to 7.2% and then 7.0% as 
the authorities implement reform and rein in credit growth to build a sounder foundation 
for future growth. Mongolia will see growth decelerate sharply in 2015 as foreign direct 
investment dries up and ﬁscal and monetary policies are tightened to resist pressure on the 
balance of payments, but growth should rebound somewhat in 2016 as restrictive policies 
are eased. Growth will be stable in Taipei,China but accelerate in the rest of the subregion, 
reﬂecting rising domestic demand and an improving global economy. Inﬂation will stay 
subdued in East Asia except in Mongolia, where it will remain high despite some relief. It is 
forecast to slow from 1.9% in 2014 to 1.7% this year and bounce back to 2.2% in 2016. 
Highlights  xv
 box South Asia advances steadily as economic policy reform bears fruit. Growth in the 
subregion accelerated to 6.9% in 2014 and is projected to trend higher to 7.2% in 2015 
and 7.6% in 2016. These ﬁgures reﬂect the heavy weighting of India, where a recently 
released GDP series suggests growth edging up to 7.8% this year and 8.2% in 2016 as 
reform to overcome long-standing structural inefficiencies begins to lift investment from 
its deep slump. Both Bangladesh and Pakistan are following through with wide-ranging 
economic reforms that include efforts to overcome power shortages, though the headwinds 
of street politics may limit progress in 2015. Postwar economic recovery in Sri Lanka is 
expected to moderate in 2015 as investors await clarity on the new administration’s plans 
for governance reform and economic policy. Inﬂation in South Asia fell sharply to 7.1% last 
year, reﬂecting strong monetary action in India and the large drop in prices for oil and other 
commodities. The subregion will continue to beneﬁt from soft commodity prices, with 
inﬂation projected to average 5.1% in 2015 and 5.6% in 2016.
 box Southeast Asia is poised for a growth rebound in 2015. The member economies of 
ASEAN experienced a second year of decelerating growth as 7 of the 10 recorded 
slowdowns that edged the subregional average down to 4.4% in 2014. Indonesia and 
Thailand, the two biggest members of ASEAN, were both among those decelerating for 
a second consecutive year, Indonesia weighed down by stabilization policy and sluggish 
exports and Thailand by political disruptions. By contrast, Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, 
and Viet Nam lifted their performances last year. Aggregate growth is seen rebounding to 
4.9% in 2015 and 5.3% in 2016 as recovery in Indonesia and Thailand leads the way, and 
with most of the subregion expected to trend up and beneﬁt from rising exports and lower 
inﬂation. However, Malaysia will see growth this year more subdued than last. Southeast 
Asia’s inﬂation rate in 2014 was, at 4.1%, little changed from the previous year. Inﬂation is 
forecast to subside to 3.1% in the next 2 years in line with lower global oil and commodity 
prices.
 box Central Asia is stymied by weak oil prices and recession next door. The factors that 
slowed average growth by 1.5 percentage points to 5.1% in 2014 are poised to affect 
2015 GDP as well. Growth will slacken in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan 
as lower petroleum exports constrain domestic spending. The weak economy in the 
Russian Federation will curb export and remittance ﬂows, slowing growth in Armenia, 
Georgia, the Kyrgyz Republic, and Tajikistan. Average growth in the subregion is expected to 
fall further to 3.5% in 2015 as a result. Expected recovery in the Russian Federation should 
restore average growth in the subregion to 4.5% in 2016. Inﬂation in Central Asia, which 
declined slightly to 5.7% in 2014 from 5.8% in 2013, is projected to jump to 6.7% in 2015 as 
local currencies sag along with the weakening ruble, worsening the consequences for prices 
in every economy except Kazakhstan. Inﬂation is projected to ease slightly to 6.6% in 2016.
 box The Paciﬁc picks up the pace as natural gas ﬂows from Papua New Guinea. Reaching 6.1%, 
average GDP growth accelerated in 2014 for the ﬁrst time in 3 years as natural gas exports 
began in Papua New Guinea (PNG), the subregion’s largest economy, and expansion picked 
up in most other economies. The notable exception was Solomon Islands, which suffered 
severe ﬂooding. In 2015, the ﬁrst full year of gas production in PNG, growth in the Paciﬁc is 
expected to peak at 10.7%. Lower commodity prices will support further expansion in most 
economies. However, output in Vanuatu will likely contract in the wake of a cyclone in March 
2015, and a drop in public spending will weigh on prospects in Timor-Leste. Subregional 
growth is expected to halve to 4.5% in 2016, with only a few economies growing faster than 
in the previous year. High inﬂation in PNG, driven by government spending and currency 
depreciation, lifted the subregional average in 2014 to 5.8% despite falling energy and 
commodity prices. Inﬂation should slow to 5.5% in 2015 and 4.1% in 2016.
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Financing Asia’s future growth
The case for further developing the ﬁnancial sector
 box Developing Asia needs a deep, robust ﬁnancial sector to sustain growth. After policy 
makers saw questionable ﬁnancial practices and products in the advanced economies 
snowball into the global ﬁnancial crisis of 2008–2009, many became cautious of expanding 
the sector, even in underleveraged emerging economies. Yet developing Asia’s bank deposits 
equal only 60% of regional GDP, compared with the average of 110% among members of 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and its bond markets equal 
less than half of GDP, a third of the 140% found in the advanced economies. Developing 
Asia may be somewhat more ﬁnancially developed than Latin America, but it still endures 
relatively costly capital and difficult access to ﬁnance. This may inhibit future growth.
 box Empirical evidence points to growth beneﬁts from closing the ﬁnance gap. For example, 
boosting developing Asia’s average ratio to GDP of liquid liabilities—currency plus checking 
and interest-bearing accounts in ﬁnancial institutions—from about 65% to 75% adds 
almost 0.4 percentage points to average annual GDP growth per capita. The evidence 
indicates that growth can come from developing either banks or capital markets.
 box Yet one cannot assume that all such growth will be inclusive. Worsening inequality has 
emerged as a concern for regional policy makers. Financial deepening can either widen the 
income gap, if its beneﬁts accrue largely to the wealthy by enhancing returns to capital or 
the earnings of senior ﬁnance professionals, or it can narrow the gap if the poor gain greater 
access to ﬁnancial services or jobs. Empirical evidence reﬂects this dichotomy. While 
ﬁnancial development tends to alleviate inequality in its early stages, inclusion does not 
come automatically as ﬁnancial development deepens.
 box Financial stability must be maintained to enhance growth and equity. However, beneﬁcial 
ﬁnancial development, innovation, and liberalization generally are, they sometimes 
destabilize ﬁnancial systems. Financial instability can seriously undermine economic growth, 
especially when ﬁnancial crises result. As the Asian ﬁnancial crisis peaked in 1998, for 
example, Indonesia suffered GDP contraction by 13%, Thailand by 11%, Malaysia by 7%, 
and the Republic of Korea by 6%. Further, the inclusiveness of growth depends on ﬁnancial 
stability because the poor are disproportionately defenseless against ﬁnancial crises. 
After the global ﬁnancial crisis, the unemployment rate doubled in many European Union 
economies—and tripled in the hardest hit. 
 box Financial sector reform priorities differ in developing and advanced economies. 
In ﬁnancially well-developed advanced countries, the key challenge is to safeguard ﬁnancial 
stability to prevent disruptions such as the global ﬁnancial crisis. Financially backward 
developing countries, on the other hand, must strive to leverage ﬁnancial development for 
growth while maintaining ﬁnancial stability.
Financial development for growth
 box High quantity and efficient ﬁnance boosts investment, productivity, and growth. 
Underdeveloped ﬁnancial sectors in the region, especially in lower-income economies, 
channel too little credit to ﬁrms. Inefficient sectors typically have high interest rate spreads 
that raise the cost of ﬁnance. In some cases, the over-allocation of credit to state-owned 
ﬁrms at the expense of the more dynamic private sector erodes the link between ﬁnance 
and growth.
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 box In developing Asia, banks underlie sound and efficient ﬁnancial systems. Banks 
continue to dominate the ﬁnancial landscape across the region despite the rapid growth 
of capital markets in middle-income countries. On average, a 10 percentage point 
increase in developing Asia’s average ratio of private credit to GDP is associated with 
higher growth in GDP per capita by about 0.3 percentage points per year. Therefore, a 
well-tuned banking subsector that efficiently channels resources to investment and other 
productive activities is indispensable for sustaining growth. 
 box Capital built by long-term ﬁnance is vital for productivity growth and innovation. 
Despite Asia’s large pool of savings, it offers only limited instruments for the long-term 
ﬁnance that is indispensable for building capital, both tangible and intangible. Top 
priorities to address barriers to long-term ﬁnance are to build deeper and more liquid 
capital markets, resist short-term biases when allocating the assets of investors willing 
to invest for the long term, and foster a long-term investor base that is broader and 
more diverse.
 box Bond market development in particular deepens the pool of long-term ﬁnancing. Asia 
leads other developing regions in bond market development, but with big differences 
across countries. While markets in the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, and some other 
countries are relatively well-developed—and others are expanding rapidly, notably in 
the PRC, India, and Thailand—markets remain largely underdeveloped in many other 
regional economies. Markets for corporate bonds are less developed than those for 
sovereigns. Local currency bond markets are developing rapidly, and this trend will reduce 
vulnerability to exchange rate shocks. Despite good progress, the current state of bond 
market development in Asia leaves substantial room for further growth.
 box The approach to developing the ﬁnancial sector must ﬁt each country’s 
circumstances. The region’s low-income economies have ﬁnancial systems based heavily 
on banks. They can beneﬁt from banking system reform that mobilizes domestic savings, 
lowers the cost of credit, improves access, and promotes the allocation of credit to the 
most productive sectors. The successful reform of state-owned banks in the PRC is a 
case in point. Middle-income economies can reap productivity gains by deepening their 
ﬁnancial markets. Policies that further develop their equity and bond markets can lower 
the cost of long-term capital to facilitate investment and innovation.
Financial access for inclusion
 box Growth from ﬁnancial development is inclusive only if the poor have access. Despite 
having a deeper ﬁnancial sector than other developing regions, Asia lags its peers in 
meeting the ﬁnancing needs of households and ﬁrms.
 » Personal bank accounts are rare in parts of Asia. While nearly all adults in the 
Republic of Korea and Singapore have an individual or joint account at a formal 
institution, fewer than 5% do in Cambodia, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, or 
Turkmenistan. Across developing Asia, fewer than 27% of adults have a bank account. 
This is well below the global median of 38%.
 » Asian ﬁrms lack bank services, especially credit. Only 84% of ﬁrms in developing 
Asia have a checking or savings account, which is comparable to Africa but trails 
Latin America’s 89% and emerging Europe’s 92%. Only 33% of ﬁrms in developing 
Asia have a line of credit or loan from a ﬁnancial institution—far fewer than Latin 
America’s 54% and emerging Europe’s 41%.
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 box A range of barriers impede Asian household and corporate access to ﬁnance. 
More than simply a lack of money holds Asian households back from opening bank 
accounts. Household surveys ﬁnd that account fees, difficult geographic access, and 
stiff documentation requirements get in the way. For Asian ﬁrms, the major deterrents 
to borrowing are unfavorable interest rates, complex application procedures, and high 
collateral requirements.
 box Innovations and policies to improve ﬁnancial inclusion in Asia must address cost and 
risk. The ﬁxed costs of extending traditional ﬁnancial services, such as establishing a 
branch in a rural area, often make it prohibitively expensive to reach the poor. More cost-
effective delivery channels, such as mobile phones and banking agents, can reduce costs 
by as much as 19%. Further, serving clients with no steady income ﬂow, formal property 
title, or even personal identiﬁcation entails high risk. However, biometric identiﬁcation 
initiatives such as India’s Aadhaar program, for example, can address the lack of proper 
identiﬁcation and facilitate access for the poor to ﬁnancial services.
Financial stability to safeguard inclusive growth
 box External and domestic risks demand vigilant monitoring of ﬁnancial stability. Asia’s 
ﬁnancial systems have become much healthier since reform following the Asian ﬁnancial 
crisis of 1997–1998. Even so, external shocks have the power to unsettle local markets, as 
they did in May 2013, when news of a possible change in US monetary policy decimated 
Asian stock prices and currency values in the so-called taper tantrum. Lurking in the 
background, meanwhile, are such homegrown risks as large shadow banking systems in 
some economies and unrestrained household debt expansion in others. 
 box Bank regulation is the ﬁrst line of defense against ﬁnancial shocks in Asia. 
International experience during the global ﬁnancial crisis provides valuable lessons for 
Asian bank regulators. Above all, the crisis underlined that sound and effective bank 
regulation is vitally important to ﬁnancial stability. The crisis reﬂected the failure of the 
regulatory authorities to keep pace with ﬁnancial innovation. The sobering lesson for Asia 
is that even ﬁnancially advanced economies are susceptible to risks from lax regulation 
and reckless lending. 
 box Macroprudential policies have potential for shoring up regional ﬁnancial stability. 
Macroprudential policies seek to mitigate risks that could undermine the entire ﬁnancial 
system by imposing, for example, capital requirements and limits on foreign currency 
borrowing that apply to all banks. They are designed to complement microprudential 
regulation, which monitors risks speciﬁc to individual institutions. Evidence indicates 
that macroprudential policies can indeed manage and mitigate macroeconomic risk in 
Asian economies. 
 box Foreign direct investment and diverse foreign funding can cushion external ﬁnancial 
shocks. The literature offers ample evidence that a higher share of foreign direct 
investment in foreign liabilities stabilizes ﬁnancial markets. Empirical analysis across 
economies further shows that those with more diversiﬁed foreign funding when the 
taper tantrum struck suffered less exchange rate depreciation. When borrowing foreign 
currency, it is prudent to minimize currency mismatch.
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Toward ﬁnance that fosters stable and inclusive growth
 box Financial sector development can foster inclusive growth in Asia. Finance has 
a generally positive effect on growth. The beneﬁts of growth will be even larger if 
ﬁnance promotes a more market-based allocation of resources. Experience in the PRC 
shows, for example, that the entry of private foreign banks can enhance the efficiency 
of state-owned banks. But the impact of ﬁnance on equity is uncertain. To safeguard 
inclusive growth, further sector development must be accompanied by steps to ensure 
broad access to ﬁnance for households and ﬁrms. 
 box Regulators will be challenged, however, to ﬁnd the right balance. The region’s ﬁnancial 
institutions are well placed to meet the more stringent regulatory standards being 
adopted globally, as many already surpass requirements under Basel III. Yet regulators 
must act to strengthen ﬁnancial institution governance and clamp down on inefficient 
and inequitable practices like crony lending and insider trading. They must appreciate 
how strong regulation protects stability by preventing the accumulation of systemic 
risks, but weigh it against the potential beneﬁts of ﬂexible regulation that promotes 
investment, productivity, innovation, and economic growth. 
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Growth rate of GDP (% per year)
Subregion/Economy 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Central Asia 5.6 6.6 5.1 3.5 4.5
Azerbaijan 2.2 5.8 2.8 3.0 2.8
Kazakhstan 5.0 6.0 4.3 1.9 3.8
East Asia 6.6 6.8 6.6 6.5 6.3
China, People’s Rep. of 7.7 7.7 7.4 7.2 7.0
Hong Kong, China 1.7 2.9 2.3 2.8 2.9
Korea, Rep. of 2.3 3.0 3.3 3.5 3.7
Taipei,China 2.1 2.2 3.7 3.7 3.6
South Asia 5.1 6.5 6.9 7.2 7.6
Bangladesh 6.5 6.0 6.1 6.1 6.4
India 5.1 6.9 7.4 7.8 8.2
Pakistan 3.8 3.7 4.1 4.2 4.5
Sri Lanka 6.3 7.2 7.4 7.0 7.3
Southeast Asia 5.8 5.1 4.4 4.9 5.3
Indonesia 6.0 5.6 5.0 5.5 6.0
Malaysia 5.6 4.7 6.0 4.7 5.0
Philippines 6.8 7.2 6.1 6.4 6.3
Singapore 3.4 4.4 2.9 3.0 3.4
Thailand 6.5 2.9 0.7 3.6 4.1
Viet Nam 5.2 5.4 6.0 6.1 6.2
The Pacific 6.0 4.1 6.1 10.7 4.5
Fiji 1.8 4.6 4.2 4.0 4.0
Papua New Guinea 7.7 5.1 8.0 15.0 5.0
Developing Asia 6.2 6.5 6.3 6.3 6.3
Major industrial economies 1.2 1.2 1.6 2.2 2.4
Notes: Developing Asia refers to the 45 members of the Asian Development Bank. Central Asia comprises Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. East Asia comprises the 
People’s Republic of China; Hong Kong, China; the Republic of Korea; Mongolia; and Taipei,China. South Asia comprises 
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Southeast Asia comprises Brunei 
Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand, and Viet Nam. The Pacific comprises the Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of 
Micronesia, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Palau, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.
(continued on the next page)
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Inflation (% per year)
Subregion/Economy 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Central Asia 5.1 5.8 5.7 6.7 6.6
Azerbaijan 1.1 2.4 1.4 6.0 5.5
Kazakhstan 5.1 5.8 6.7 6.0 6.2
East Asia 2.6 2.4 1.9 1.7 2.2
China, People’s Rep. of 2.6 2.6 2.0 1.8 2.3
Hong Kong, China 4.1 4.3 4.4 3.3 3.4
Korea, Rep. of 2.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 2.1
Taipei,China 1.9 0.8 1.2 0.5 1.0
South Asia 10.1 9.0 7.1 5.1 5.6
Bangladesh 8.7 6.8 7.4 6.5 6.2
India 10.2 9.5 7.0 5.0 5.5
Pakistan 11.0 7.4 8.6 5.8 5.8
Sri Lanka 7.9 6.9 3.3 2.0 5.0
Southeast Asia 3.8 4.2 4.1 3.1 3.1
Indonesia 4.0 6.4 6.4 5.5 4.0
Malaysia 1.7 2.1 3.1 3.2 2.9
Philippines 3.2 3.0 4.1 2.8 3.3
Singapore 4.6 2.4 1.0 0.2 1.5
Thailand 3.0 2.2 1.9 0.2 2.0
Viet Nam 9.1 6.6 4.1 2.5 4.0
The Pacific 4.3 3.4 5.8 5.5 4.1
Fiji 3.4 2.9 0.5 2.5 2.5
Papua New Guinea 2.2 4.0 8.3 7.0 5.0
Developing Asia 4.1 3.8 3.1 2.6 3.0
Major industrial economies 2.0 1.3 1.5 0.7 1.9
(continued from the previous page)
Major industrial economies comprise the United States, the euro area, and Japan.
Data for Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan are recorded on a fiscal-year basis. For India, the fiscal year spans the current 
year’s April through the next year’s March. For Bangladesh and Pakistan, the fiscal year spans the previous year’s July 
through the current year’s June. 

1
OIL IN THE GEARS 
OF GROWTH

Developing Asia will drive world growth in 2015 and 2016, as it has 
done for the past several years. Since the global ﬁnancial crisis, the 
world’s average annual growth rate has been 4.0%, with developing Asia 
contributing 2.3 percentage points, or nearly 60%. Resilient growth 
in the region has been underpinned by conscientious reform in many 
countries. The outlook for developing Asia is for steady growth to 
continue in the next 2 years. Tempered international 
commodity prices and the strengthening of major industrial 
economies, not only in the United States (US), but also in 
Japan and the euro area, should support the region’s growth 
momentum in the coming quarters. 
For developing Asia as a whole, growth is projected 
at 6.3% in 2015 and 2016, as in 2014. An expected pickup 
in India will partly balance gradual deceleration in the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC), the region’s largest 
economy (Figure 1.0.1). Reversals in an otherwise supportive 
environment could dampen prospects. Growth in the 
PRC or India that disappointed expectations would 
be a concern for the whole region because of the two 
giants’ economic weight—all the more so if the slowdown 
stemmed from failure to carry out current programs of 
reform. Other problems could arise if geopolitical tensions 
intensiﬁed or the US tightened monetary policy faster than 
is now anticipated. Further economic deterioration in the 
Russian Federation would weaken economies in Central Asia. 
Policy makers in the region have the tools they need to respond if 
any of these shocks materialize. Governments in developing Asia should 
nevertheless continue to pursue structural reform toward strengthening 
resilience to shocks. The drop in oil prices provides an opportunity 
for many governments to take action now by, for example, reining in 
or eliminating counterproductive energy subsidies. But the window of 
opportunity is expected to be fairly short, as a gradual rise in oil prices 
is expected in 2015 and 2016. Similarly, moderating growth in the PRC 
highlights the need for closely linked economies to diversify. Besides 
diversifying industrial bases and export markets, the crucial steps 
toward a steady growth path to continue include adopting more prudent 
ﬁscal framework and developing sounder and more efficient ﬁnancial 
systems. 
Oil in the gears of growth
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Steady growth and stable 
prices in developing Asia
Steady growth is forecast for developing Asia. 
After expanding by 6.5% in 2013, aggregate growth in region 
slowed to 6.3% in 2014 (Figure 1.1.1). In 2015 and 2016, 
growth in the region is expected to continue at this pace 
as opposing developments in some of the region’s larger 
economies balance out at the regional scale. That said, 
expected moderation in the PRC offsets some of the positive 
momentum in many economies in developing Asia that are 
supported by lower commodity prices and recovery in global 
economic activity (Box 1.1.1). Average inﬂation in the region 
slowed to 3.1% in 2014 and is expected to slow further to 
2.6% in 2015, because of lower oil prices, before rising to 3.0% 
in 2016 (Figure 1.1.2). The region’s aggregate current account 
surplus is forecast to continue expanding to 2.5% of GDP in 
2015 from 2.3% in 2014 as lower oil prices reduce import bills. 
This trend is expected to reverse, however, in 2016 with the 
expected upturn in global commodity prices (Figure 1.1.3).
Factors underlying growth
Developing Asia lost some growth momentum in 2014 but nevertheless 
remained the main source of global economic growth. 
Various reforms introduced last year to resolve infrastructure 
deﬁcits, remove structural bottlenecks, and rebalance 
national economies played a great role in the region’s 
expansion last year, though to varying degrees in different 
economies. In India, reform to ease regulation and encourage 
investment has proven to be a successful ﬁrst step toward 
resolving the economy’s persistent infrastructure problems, 
boosting growth in the process. Meanwhile in the PRC, 
targeted reform to guide the economy to a so-called new 
normal of slower, sounder growth have calmed jitters in the 
real estate market. This eased growth in investments in the 
PRC and, with them, GDP growth, as ﬁnancing conditions 
for developers and home buyers tightened and home prices 
declined. 
In other economies, the success of reform has been mixed, 
sometimes stymied by market rigidity, implementation delay, 
or structural challenges. Fuel subsidy reform in Indonesia, 
following the inauguration of a new government in October 2014, 
helped boost government ﬁnances last year and freed up signiﬁcant 
resources for social and physical infrastructure. Although new reforms 
to ease regulation and encourage private investment in Indonesia have 
yet to gain momentum, improvement already achieved in the business 
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1.1.1 Industrial economies gradually recovering
Lower prices for oil and other commodities continue to 
underpin the growth prospects of the major industrial 
economies. The combined economies of the US, the euro 
area, and Japan are expected to gain momentum during 
the forecast period. Collectively, the weighted growth rate 
of these economies is expected to accelerate from 1.6% in 
2014 to 2.2% in 2015 and 2.4% in 2016 (box table). Inflation 
is projected to be muted, as international commodity prices 
remain soft and industrial economies continue to operate 
below their potential. 
US economic activity accelerated during the second 
half of 2014, bringing expansion to 2.4% for the year as a 
whole. Solid growth in private consumption contributed 
1.7 percentage points to growth, while higher investment 
beginning in the second quarter further strengthened the 
year’s growth momentum. Net exports subtracted from 
growth, however, as imports grew faster than exports. 
The labor market improved as the average duration of 
unemployment gradually declined throughout the year and 
the unemployment rate improved from 6.6% in January 
2014 to 5.7% in December, and further to 5.5% in February 
2015. Inflation remained subdued, with minimal risk of 
taking off. 
As the economic recovery picks up speed, the Federal 
Reserve is expected to move gradually to normalize its 
monetary policy, but only in the second half of this year. 
Liquidity is expected to remain loose in 2015 and will 
continue to encourage commercial banks to lend. Positive 
indications from investment, employment, credit, housing, 
and consumption indicate that the US economy is on track 
for continued gradual strengthening. GDP growth in the US 
is forecast to accelerate to 3.2% in 2015 and ease back to 
3.0% in 2016.
In the fourth quarter of 2014, euro area GDP recorded 
its largest expansion since the first quarter of 2011, growing 
at a seasonally adjusted annualized rate of 1.4% over the 
previous quarter. This raised annual growth to 0.9%, 
reversing the 0.4% contraction in 2013. Although growth 
rates varied across economies, expansion in the fourth 
quarter was broadly based. Recovery in investment added 
to the steady rise in private and government consumption. 
Net exports improved on lower import bills. 
The outlook for the euro area is generally positive, with 
GDP growth forecast at 1.1% in 2015 and 1.4% in 2016. 
Recent indicators are somewhat mixed. Although industrial 
production was still soft in the last quarter of 2014, the 
purchasing managers’ index is rising. Consumption appears 
to be strengthening, and consumers are more optimistic 
about the region’s prospects. However, the outlook has 
some downside risks. Strong deflationary pressures 
could slow growth and hinder some countries’ efforts 
to consolidate debt. Fallout from a possible Greek debt 
default is a risk, as is a possible Greek exit from the euro 
area (dubbed Grexit). Nevertheless, low global oil prices 
may boost investment and consumption, and expansionary 
monetary policy should support growth. 
Japan’s GDP contracted sharply following the April 2014 
hike in its value-added tax (VAT). Disappointing recovery 
in the fourth quarter spelled zero growth in 2014 as a 
whole. Seeing the output gap widen from 0.4% of GDP 
at the start of the year to 2.8% by year-end prompted the 
government to postpone the planned second VAT hike 
to April 2017, to avert another drop in consumption and 
a return to deflation. Private consumption rebounded 
from the sharp drop in the second quarter but was unable 
to offset the decline in residential investment. Business 
conditions are generally seen as improving, but the 
recovery has not yet been fully transmitted to business 
investment and wage increases. 
The growth outlook for Japan appears generally 
positive, but uncertainties remain over the forecast period. 
Postponing the second VAT increase, from 8% to 10%, will 
support growth momentum in the short run but at the cost 
of temporarily halting fiscal consolidation. As prudence 
is expected to guide fiscal expenditure, growth will have 
to rely on private sector demand. Domestic consumption 
and investment are assumed to recover gradually in 2015, 
while external demand, particularly from the euro area, 
will strengthen during the second half of 2015. Housing 
investment and private consumption of durable goods are 
assumed to pick up somewhat in 2016 in anticipation of 
the second round rise in the VAT on 1 April 2017. GDP 
growth in Japan is projected at 1.1% in 2015 and in 1.7% 
in 2016.
GDP growth in major industrial economies (%)
Area
2013 2014 2015 2016
Actual ADO projection
Major industrial economies 1.2 1.6 2.2 2.4
United States 2.2 2.4 3.2 3.0
Euro area –0.4 0.9 1.1 1.4
Japan 1.6 0.0 1.1 1.7
ADO = Asian Development Outlook.
Notes: Average growth rates are weighted by gross national income, Atlas method. 
More details in Annex table A1.1. 
Sources: US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, http://
www.bea.gov; Eurostat, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu; Economic and Social 
Research Institute of Japan, http://www.esri.cao.go.jp; Consensus Forecasts; 
Bloomberg; CEIC; Haver; World Bank, Global Commodity Markets, http://www.
worldbank.org; ADB estimates.
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1.1.4  Demand-side contributions to growth, 
selected economies
Percentage points
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climate is providing impetus for growth in the next 2 years. 
Meanwhile, 10 member economies of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are pushing various 
reforms toward forming the ASEAN Economic Community to 
improve the business environment. They include signiﬁcant 
tariff liberalization, simpliﬁcation of customs procedures, and 
allowed skilled professionals to move across the subregion to 
maximize the value of their labor. 
Slight deceleration in developing Asia last year largely 
reﬂected slower growth in the PRC and the larger economies 
of Southeast and Central Asia. The PRC expanded by 7.4%, 
down from 7.7% in 2013, as the pace of investment was 
tempered by tighter ﬁnancing conditions for developers and 
homebuyers, declining house prices, and housing oversupply 
in some small and medium-sized cities, which halved growth 
in real estate investment in 2014. Declining exports from 
Indonesia and the slump in investment in the Philippines, 
Singapore, and Thailand tamped down average growth in 
Southeast Asia from 5.1% in 2013 to 4.4% in 2014. Oil-rich Kazakhstan 
also faltered in 2014, hit by the economic slowdown in the Russian 
Federation, the country’s major export market, and by cuts in the 
production of oil and metals. This accounted for much of Central Asia’s 
growth slowdown to 5.1% from 6.6% in 2013. 
However, moderation in the PRC was offset by faster 
growth elsewhere, notably India, as lower oil prices and 
higher investment in manufacturing boosted domestic 
demand. More than half of the economies in the region saw 
faster expansion in 2014, a third of them accelerating for 
at least a second year in a row. Growth in the Republic of 
Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Taipei,China beneﬁtted from 
higher private consumption, and Malaysia and Taipei,China 
from stronger exports. All South Asian economies except 
Afghanistan grew faster in 2014 than 2013. This reﬂected 
higher consumption, stronger income, continued remittance 
inﬂows, and steady recovery in the region’s dominant 
economy, India, which boosted trade in the subregion.
Looking at the 10 economies in developing Asia for which 
a demand-side GDP breakdown is available, domestic demand 
generated by private and government consumption remained 
the major source of expansion, contributing more than half 
of overall growth in most of these economies (Figure 1.1.4). 
External demand recovered in most economies, boosting 
exports and compensating for slack in domestic demand 
in some economies. Oil exporters, particularly those in 
Central Asia, lost heavily from the drop in oil prices and the 
slowdown in the Russian Federation. 
Industrial production indices conﬁrm that growth 
has been generally stable. In ﬁve of the Southeast Asian economies 
examined, industrial production picked up slowly toward the end of 
2014, while it weakened somewhat in the Philippines and Singapore 
as the production of electronic and electrical machineries declined. 
1.1.3 Current account balance in developing Asia
% of GDP
Forecast
0
1
2
3
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
 
Source: Asian Development Outlook database.
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Output in Thailand fell for the second consecutive year as 
the manufacture of furniture, motor vehicles, and other 
transport equipment has not yet recovered. The industrial 
production index was softer in East Asia, particularly in 
Hong Kong, China, because of weak external demand. The 
index has steadily improved since the second quarter of 2013 
in Taipei,China, boosting industrial activity as global demand 
strengthened for mobile phones and other information 
technology products, particularly in the US and the euro area 
(Figure 1.1.5). 
Consumer conﬁdence in the region last year was generally 
bleak, as most of the economies in East and Southeast Asia 
experienced drops in some quarters (Figure 1.1.6). Consumer 
sentiment improved in the PRC and Taipei,China, reﬂecting 
better income prospects, and in Indonesia on heightened 
expectations after the presidential election. It started weak 
in Malaysia and Thailand but improved signiﬁcantly toward 
the end of the year. In Malaysia, sentiment weakened in 
response to cuts in subsidies for fuel and electricity, but the 
announcement of a new goods and services tax to take effect 
later this year lifted sentiment as consumers brought forward 
purchases to avoid the higher tax. In Thailand, consumer 
conﬁdence slowly recovered from a trough in April in 
anticipation of a calmer political situation after the military 
intervened to end a year-long political struggle.
Elsewhere in the region, consumer conﬁdence ﬂuctuated 
for various reasons. Conﬁdence in the Philippines took a 
hit in the third quarter of 2014 from high prices for basic 
commodities and political issues surrounding government 
funds for infrastructure projects, but brisker business activity toward 
1.1.6 Consumer confidence and expectations, selected developing Asia
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1.1.5 Industrial production index, selected developing Asia
% change, year on year
3−month moving average
% change, year on year
3−month moving average
2013 2014 2015
−8
−4
0
4
8
12
−6
−3
0
3
6
9
Jan July Jan July Jan
Hong Kong, China 
Republic of Korea Taipei,China
East Asia
% change, year on year
3−month moving average
% change, year on year
3−month moving average
2013 2014 2015
−5
0
5
10
15
−20
0
20
40
60
Jan July Jan July Jan
Indonesia
Malaysia
Philippines Thailand
East AsiaSoutheast Asia
Sources: CEIC Data Company; Haver Analytics (accessed 5 March 2015).
8  Asian Development Outlook 2015
the end of the year improved sentiment in the fourth quarter. 
In Hong Kong, China, sentiment weakened in the third 
quarter of 2014 during the height of disruptions to public 
order, but rebounded toward the fourth quarter, as the PRC 
economy stabilized. The blow to sentiment in the Republic of 
Korea caused by the April 2014 Sewol ferry disaster lingered 
to the end of the year. 
As consumer sentiment weakened, retail sales tumbled 
in a few of the larger economies in East and Southeast Asia 
but remained resilient in most (Figure 1.1.7). Growth in 
retail sales slowed but remained strong in the PRC, and it 
accelerated for most of the year in Taipei,China thanks to 
higher incomes and the continued rise in tourist arrivals 
from the PRC. Retail sales began at a healthy rate in 2014 in 
the Republic of Korea but worsened toward the end of the 
year as low consumer conﬁdence and rising service payments 
for household debt tempered spending. In Hong Kong, China, 
retail sales were volatile, declining in the second quarter of 
2014 after a good start, then falling again toward the end of 
the fourth quarter after a rebound in September. The trend 
mainly reﬂects cautious spending by locals but also subdued 
spending by tourists from the PRC. 
Retails sales were stable for most of the year in Malaysia 
and Viet Nam. They slid in June in Indonesia as monthly 
consumption of motor fuels, food, and beverages declined, 
then recovered from July as spending for Ramadan and other 
religious festivities rose. In Singapore, retail sales fell initially 
but recovered by mid-July as lower gasoline prices boosted 
spending. In Thailand, retail sales continued to shrink until 
the end of the year as political turmoil continued to affect 
consumer spending. 
In East Asia, investment was positive overall, slowing 
a bit in the PRC and Hong Kong, China but rising in the 
Republic of Korea and Taipei,China (Figure 1.1.8). Private 
investment grew convincingly in the latter two economies, 
as ﬁrms continued to enhance manufacturing capacity 
to meet stronger external demand. In the Republic of 
Korea, investment for manufacturing rose but investment 
for construction slowed as building construction and 
government capital spending declined. Meanwhile, cautious 
business sentiment caused investors to delay machinery and 
equipment acquisitions in Hong Kong, China, and growth 
in real estate investment in the PRC halved as ﬁnancing 
conditions tightened in a market for homes with falling prices 
and oversupply.
While investment remained resilient in East Asia, it 
slowed in Southeast Asia, reﬂecting steep inventory decline 
and, in two of the region’s larger economies, investment 
decline. Investment fell the most in Thailand, on large 
drawdowns of inventory. However, Thailand’s destocking 
was in line with improving economic activity and possible 
1.1.7  Retail sales, selected developing Asia
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1.1.8  Contributions to investment growth, 
selected developing Asia
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1.1.9  Merchandise exports and purchasing managers’ index 
in Asia’s giants
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Sources: Bloomberg; Haver Analytics (both accessed 5 March 2015).
recovery in production this year. Some planned investment was 
hampered by continued political disruption and legal challenges, while 
uncertain business conditions constrained private ﬁrm expansion. In 
Singapore, the drop came mainly from a decline in private investment 
that reﬂected private construction hamstrung by weak government 
land sales and limited stock of office space, along with lower 
government spending on upgrading programs for public housing. In the 
Philippines, huge destocking in the ﬁrst half of the year constrained 
total investment. The slow implementation of infrastructure projects 
hampered by budget controversies and delays in project execution 
contributed to the decline, but total investment remained positive. 
Similarly, investment slowed but remained positive in Malaysia as public 
investment decelerated. Investment increased marginally in Indonesia 
as inventories expanded. 
Reform aims for healthy growth  
in the PRC and India 
Growth in the PRC and India diverged but remained 
strong in 2014. Both showed signs of deterioration in 
manufacturing at the start of this year, indicating a likely 
slackening of economic activity in the immediate quarters 
ahead (Figure 1.1.9). Otherwise, growth in developing Asia’s 
two giants looks set to diverge again in 2015 and 2016. 
The PRC is likely to slow further to 7.2% in 2015 and 7.0% in 
2016, while India looks set to expand by 7.8% and then 8.2%. 
The differences largely reﬂect contrasts in each government’s 
reform program. Policy makers in the PRC will use such tools 
as targeted credit restriction and general monetary easing, to 
avoid a sharp deceleration and shore up growth, if necessary, 
but they aim for a rate of around 7.0%, which is more 
moderate than the historical average of 8.5% since the global 
ﬁnancial crisis. The government has emphasized attaining 
high-quality growth by rebalancing the economy, stabilizing 
the housing market, and eliminating excess capacity. Indian 
policy makers are working to unclog structural bottlenecks 
that have hampered investment over the past 2 years. Reform 
looks promising at this stage, but signiﬁcant challenges remain as some 
planned actions require parliamentary ratiﬁcation.
Low oil prices should boost domestic demand in the PRC and India. 
Although net imports of crude oil in 2013 equaled to only about 2.4% 
of GDP in the PRC and 7.9% in India, both economies could proﬁt by 
global oil prices remaining low until 2016. In India, wholesale inﬂation 
eased by 0.5% in the fourth quarter of 2014, and consumer price 
inﬂation by 4.8%, and in January 2015 both measures stayed well below 
their 2014 averages. The consumer price index trend is the same in the 
PRC, reaching a 5-year low of 0.8% in January 2015. The lower cost 
of production should raise PRC corporate proﬁts and thereby boost 
growth. In India, the beneﬁts for households may not be large because 
the government continues to raise excise duties on retail fuel. 
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India’s manufacturing purchasing managers’ index 
reached a 3-year high of 54.5 in December 2014. It later 
fell in February 2015 to 51.2, which is still above the 50.0 
line between growth and decline. New orders from abroad 
continued to rise in February for the 17th consecutive month, 
indicating a positive environment for business expansion. 
Electricity production also continued to rise and contribute 
to industrial production, though it stabilized in the last 
quarter of 2014 (Figure 1.1.10). In the PRC, by contrast, the 
manufacturing purchasing managers’ index fell below 50.0 
for a second straight month in February on unsteady exports 
and slowing investment, reﬂecting the PRC’s new normal 
of slower but better-quality growth. Exports are expected 
to remain healthy in both economies, as lower commodity 
prices continue to reduce import bills and invigorate global 
demand exports.
Perspectives on growth 
in developing Asia 
Developing Asia contributed 2.3 percentage points to the 4.0% average 
global GDP growth since the global ﬁnancial crisis (GFC), or nearly 60%. 
This raises the question which economies contributed the most to this 
impressive result and can they sustain their pace?
Considering growth performance since 2000, the nine best 
performers in developing Asia in real GDP terms, measured by the 
number of years with growth faster than 7.0%, were the PRC, Mongolia, 
the four oil and mineral exporters in Central Asia, and the three 
lower-income members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(Table 1.1.1). All of these economies posted growth at above 7.0% in at 
1.1.1 Top 10 performers in developing Asia
Average growth rate
Number of 
years with 
>7% growth
Number of 
years with 
>7% growth
Number of 
years with 
>5% growth
2000–2008 2009 (GFC) 2010–2014 2015–2016 2000–2014 2010–2014 2010–2014
People’s Republic of China 10.4 9.2 8.5 7.0 15 5 5
Turkmenistan 15.2 6.1 11.1 9.5 14 5 5
Uzbekistan 6.3 8.1 8.2 7.1 11 5 5
Mongolia 7.1 -1.3 11.1 4.0 10 4 5
Lao People’s Democratic Republic 6.8 7.3 7.7 7.1 10 5 5
Cambodia 9.4 0.1 6.9 7.4 10 3 5
Myanmar 10.9 5.1 6.8 8.3 10 3 5
Kazakhstan 9.4 1.2 6.0 2.8 10 2 3
Azerbaijan 16.6 9.3 3.2 2.9 10 0 1
GFC = Global financial crisis.
Note: Sorted on the number of years with 7%+ growth during 2010-2014 and average growth rate for 2010-2014.
Source: ADB estimates. 
1.1.10  Industrial production and electricity generation 
in Asia’s giants
% change, year on year
2012 2013 2014
−5
0
5
10
15
Q1 Q3 Q1 Q3 Q1 Q3
Industrial production, India
Electricity production, India
Industrial production, People’s Republic of China
Electricity production, People’s Republic of China
Q = quarter.
Source: CEIC Data Company (5 March 2015).
Oil in the gears of growth  11
1.1.2 Seven developing Asian economies with growth <7.0% since 2000
Average growth rate
Number of 
years with 
>7% growth
Number of 
years with 
>7% growth
Number of 
years with 
>5% growth
2000–2008 2009 (GFC) 2010–2014 2015–2016 2000–2014 2010–2014 2010–2014
Micronesia, Fed. States of 0.3  0.9 –0.4 5.1 0 0 0
Brunei Darussalam 1.8 –1.8   0.7 0.3 0 0 0
Tonga 1.2   3.2   1.8 2.3 0 0 0
Marshall Islands 2.2 –1.8   1.9 2.5 0 0 1
Fiji 1.2 –1.4   3.3 4.0 0 0 0
Nepal 3.8   3.9   4.3 4.9 0 0 1
Indonesia 5.1   4.6   5.8 5.8 0 0 4
GFC = global financial crisis.
Note: Sorted on the number of years with 7%+ growth during 2010-2014 and average growth rate for 2010-2014.
Source: ADB estimates. 
least 9 years during 2000–2014. More recently, four of these economies 
met the growth minimum every year in the post-GFC period of 2010–
2014, and were joined by two large energy exporters in the Paciﬁc: 
Papua New Guinea and Timor-Leste.
Several economies grew more slowly, never posting above 7.0% 
growth since 2000 (Table 1.1.2). In these seven economies, average 
annual growth rates since 2000 ranged from zero to just 
above 5.0%. More than half of them have populations of 
less than 1 million and are in the Paciﬁc, where economic 
opportunities are largely limited to tourism, ﬁsheries, and 
the public sector. The notable exception is Indonesia. Unlike 
others in the list, it grew by more than 5.0% in 7 years, or 
about half of the time since 2000, but never above 7.0%. 
Except for Indonesia, however, the picture does not change 
even if the threshold is changed to 5.0% growth.
Using per capita GDP growth would not change the 
broad trend in GDP growth performance across economies 
(Figure 1.1.11). Mongolia, Turkmenistan, the Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic, and the PRC are still the top 
performers, but Uzbekistan ranks lower because of its rapid 
population growth of more than 2% annually. 
Growth performance measured in terms of gross 
national income (GNI) does not alter the broad picture 
either (Figure 1.1.12). However, there are notable differences 
across economies because GNI includes net ﬁnancial income 
from abroad, such as dividends, interest, and proﬁt. During 
the post-GFC period (in which GNI data are available to 
2013), GNI is smaller than GDP in more than 60% of the 
26 economies in developing Asia that have comparable 
data on GDP and GNI. The reason is that many of these 
economies rely on foreign capital in the form of foreign 
direct investment. The repatriation of proﬁts earned by 
foreign ﬁrms subtracts from GDP, causing GNI to be smaller. 
1.1.11 GDP growth versus GDP growth per capita 
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However, GNI and GDP grew at similar rates in each of 
these economies. 
Meanwhile, in nine economies, or 35% of the 26, 
GNI exceeded GDP. The gap as a percentage of GDP is 
particularly large in Timor-Leste, reaching more than 270% 
of GDP on average during the post-GFC period. The reason 
is that its major industry, oil and gas, operates offshore, and 
payment to the Government of Timor-Leste from production 
is counted as ﬁnancial income from abroad, adding to its 
GDP. In other economies, the larger GNI seems to come 
from signiﬁcant compensation of workers abroad, as in the 
Philippines, where GNI has averaged 120% of GDP during 
the post-GFC period. Other economies with large GNI–GDP 
gaps are Bangladesh at 7.9%, Pakistan at 4.5%, and Armenia 
at 4.2%. 
The recent trend in soft commodity prices is adversely 
affecting some of the economies that are rich in natural 
resources and had been performing well. In Azerbaijan, GDP 
growth dropped from a robust 16.6% during the pre-GFC 
years to a mere 3.2% in the post-GFC period and could slow further 
during the forecast period. Others such as Kazakhstan and Mongolia 
are following suit. As a result, about half of the economies in developing 
Asia, including all of the best-performing economies in Table 1.1.1 except 
Myanmar and Cambodia, are expected to grow at less than their average 
rate during the post-GFC period (Figure 1.1.13).
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1.1.13 Economies in developing Asia that expect deceleration or acceleration
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Meanwhile, many economies in the Paciﬁc are expected 
to see faster growth in the forecast period, making it the 
fastest growing subregion in 2015. Papua New Guinea 
expects a hefty 15% growth this year on new production 
of liqueﬁed natural gas. Smaller Paciﬁc economies such as 
the Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, and Palau are 
also expecting to grow faster than in the past several years, 
on rising public infrastructure spending and robust tourist 
arrivals. 
Continuing modest trade growth
Export growth remained weak in developing Asia in 2014, 
slipping to 3.4% from 4.5% in the previous year, below recent 
historical levels (Figure 1.1.14). Export growth last year was 
the lowest since the global ﬁnancial crisis and just a third of 
the 10-year average of 11.6%. 
Exports from developing Asia contracted by 0.2% in 
the ﬁrst quarter of 2014, as shipments fell from the PRC 
and India, which together account for half of the region’s 
exports. Growth in exports from Southeast Asia recovered in 
this period and was stronger than elsewhere in developing 
Asia, but momentum had dissipated by the second half of 
the year. Exports slid in Indonesia, the largest economy in 
Southeast Asia, as the investment slowdown in the PRC 
helped crimp demand for Indonesia’s commodity exports. 
Exports from Central Asia also declined, by 5.4%, with sharp 
reductions in petroleum shipments and sluggish demand 
from the Russian Federation. Deceleration in the Paciﬁc 
resulted largely from downturns in Papua New Guinea’s 
traditional mineral commodity exports: gold, copper, and oil. 
Exports gradually recovered in the second half of 2014—in 
East Asia led by the PRC, and in South Asia as India picked 
up the slack in shipments elsewhere in the region—but not 
enough to lift exports for the whole of developing Asia 
(Figure 1.1.15). 
Merchandise imports in 2014 similarly registered the 
smallest increase since the global ﬁnancial crisis in 2009, 
which, at 0.7%, were far below the 10-year average of 11.5% 
(Figure 1.1.16). Imports to the Paciﬁc plunged by 47.5%, 
and to Central Asia by 9.4%, mainly because of lower 
commodity imports to the dominant economies in the two 
subregions: Papua New Guinea and Kazakhstan. Imports of 
machinery and equipment to Papua New Guinea declined 
as the construction phase of liqueﬁed natural gas (LNG) 
development ended. The next largest decline occurred in 
Southeast Asia, as imports to Indonesia fell by 4.5% and to 
Thailand by 8.5%. These declines in the subregion’s two 
largest economies came from weak investment demand and 
hence lower demand for raw materials and capital goods. 
1.1.14 Exports growth by subregion
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1.1.15  Monthly export growth in developing Asia
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Import growth slowed as well in East Asia, to 1.5%, the 
lowest rate since the global ﬁnancial crisis and just one-third 
of the rate in 2013. This result reﬂected the low import 
bill for the PRC because of slowing investment and lower 
oil prices, for the most part. Growth in imports to South 
Asia turned positive, after decelerating in 2013, as renewed 
optimism in India boosted spending on imports of capital and 
consumer goods (Figure 1.1.17). India’s imports of base metals 
and precious metals such as gold rose sharply, making gold 
the country’s second-biggest import item after oil in 2014. 
Export and import growth are both expected to remain 
moderate in 2015 and pick up only gradually in 2016. 
The regional current account surplus should improve to 2.5% 
of GDP in 2015 as growth in exports outpaces growth in 
imports—however modest growth will be in both cases—and 
as prospects improve in the major industrial economies. In 
2016, the regional current account surplus is expected to 
return to 2.3% of GDP, as in 2014, as imports outpace exports, 
partly because of rising oil prices. 
Central Asia is expecting a small current account deﬁcit in 2015, 
rising to a small surplus in 2016. The surplus will be smaller than the 
3.8% of GDP average in the past 5 years, in view of the forecast recession 
in the Russian Federation. The surplus will contract to 3.0% of GDP in 
the same period in Southeast Asia, as the deﬁcit in Indonesia lingers and 
the surplus in Malaysia narrows to just half of the 7.4% average of the 
past 5 years. 
The current account surplus in East Asia remains driven by 
trends in the PRC and is expected to widen by 0.3 percentage points 
in 2015 before returning in 2016 to the 2014 level of 3.0% of GDP. 
The 2015 forecast for the Paciﬁc is a surplus equal to 5.0% of GDP, 
reversing a deﬁcit of 10.7% in 2014, mostly on account of the ﬁrst full 
year of LNG production in Papua New Guinea. The surplus should rise 
to 6.3% in 2016, as LNG production continues.
1.1.16 Import growth by subregion
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1.1.17 Monthly imports, selected developing Asia
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Although stronger domestic demand in the US may 
enlarge that economy’s contribution to the world current 
account deﬁcit, the expansion is seen to be limited. The 
surplus in the Middle East is shrinking on the soft oil price, 
while the surplus of the PRC is expanding slightly, in line 
with the increasing size of the economy in the world. The 
world account balance is expected to remain at around 1% of 
global GDP, which is a half of the peak recorded in 2007, just 
before the global ﬁnancial crisis (Figure 1.1.18). 
Subregional trends in growth, inﬂation, 
and current account balance
Moderating growth in East and Central Asia in 2015 and 
2016 will offset the rebound in the other subregions, keeping 
the rate of expansion for the region as a whole at a solid 6.3% 
this year and next (Figure 1.1.19). The regional average thus 
reﬂects a merging of two different trends in 2015, as growth 
accelerates in half of the economies and slows in the other half. Most of 
the economies with faster growth are in South Asia, Southeast Asia, and 
the Paciﬁc. Growth in East Asia will slow somewhat, mostly reﬂecting 
slower growth in the PRC, while growth in Central Asia will halve 
as the Russian Federation slides into recession this year, crimping 
remittances and trade across Central Asia. More economies will see 
improvements in 2016, mainly in Central Asia, as oil prices slowly climb 
back and the Russian Federation begins to recover. 
Inﬂation is forecast to slow regionally to 2.6% in 2015 
before picking up slightly in 2016, as many economies beneﬁt 
from lower prices for oil and other commodities (Figure 1.1.20). 
The exceptions are the Paciﬁc and Central Asia. The Paciﬁc is 
expected to see lower inﬂation in both 2015 and 2016, 
primarily because of weaker domestic demand in Papua New 
Guinea. The lack of demand outside of the LNG industry in the 
subregion’s largest economy will reduce inﬂation in the next 
2 years. Central Asia, on the other hand, is likely to experience 
higher inﬂation as local currencies suffer devaluation because 
of economic turmoil in the Russian Federation. 
The outlook for the current account balance also 
features divergent paths across subregions in 2015 and 2016 
(Figure 1.1.21). Oil price developments are affecting the 
outlook, with net exports improving in net resource 
importers—mostly in East and South Asia, and some 
economies in Southeast Asia—and net exports weakening in 
the natural resource exporters of Central and Southeast Asia. 
The exception is the Paciﬁc, where the current account 
balance is forecast to move into a surplus this year from the large 
deﬁcit in 2014, despite the subregion’s status as a net exporter of 
resources. This reﬂects the end of capital goods imports for LNG plant 
construction in Papua New Guinea and the ramping up this year of LNG 
exports that began in 2014. 
1.1.18 World current account balance
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Risks to the regional outlook
The risk that a major global shock will affect the regional outlook, for 
better or worse, is considered remote at this time. However, policy 
makers in the region must be ready to introduce appropriate measures to 
smooth any negative impacts in case underlying assumptions 
prove far off the mark. Developments that could challenge 
several underlying assumptions for developing Asia’s outlook 
demand close attention. These include unexpected changes 
in the growth trajectory of important trade partners in the 
region or beyond, possible reversals in capital ﬂows from 
changes in US monetary policy, and uncertainty in crude oil 
markets. 
Potentially large shocks to economies in developing 
Asia can come from within the region. Steady economic 
activity in major trading partners, particularly dominant 
export destinations, underpin the growth outlook for many 
economies. The two regional giants, the PRC and India, are 
important to many of their neighbors, with whom they have 
tight trade links. The PRC and India are both expected to 
post healthy growth—but growth that is slowing somewhat 
in the PRC as the government pursues an ambitious reform 
agenda. Meanwhile, growth prospects can be disrupted 
if governments in the region have difficulty correctly 
implementing planned reform. In the PRC, for example, 
overly abrupt efforts to cool the real estate sector could cause liquidity 
shortages and interest rate spikes, as they did in June 2013. Likewise, 
India’s ability to carry out reform to remove investment bottlenecks, 
an important factor affecting the regional growth outlook, 
is being tested. 
One possible upside risk derives from the 10 Southeast 
Asian economies of ASEAN forming a regional economic 
community at the end of this year. Although the net impact is 
far from certain, particularly in the short-run, the advent of 
the ASEAN Economic Community is assumed to help sustain 
steady economic growth in the medium term. One possibility 
is that the economies of Southeast Asia may accelerate more 
than anticipated if the business environment receives an 
immediate boost from reform affecting customs, tariffs, or 
the movement of skilled labor.
Outside the region, the US recovery is generally 
considered on track, but the euro area remains fragile. 
The decision to extend Greece’s bailout program has 
forestalled the risk of the euro area breaking up. Still, 
concerns remain about Greece’s short-term solvency and 
long-term debt, and about the risk of default. Greece’s exit 
from the euro would cause volatility in global ﬁnancial 
markets, but the direct impact on the global economy 
might be small. A Grexit would nevertheless cause political 
and economic turmoil in the euro area and undermine its growth 
outlook. This would adversely affect the global economy, including 
developing Asia to some extent.
1.1.20 Inflation by subregion
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1.1.21 Current account balance by subregion
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Economic distress in the Russian Federation continues to be a 
concern in Central Asia, the only subregion of developing Asia to 
experience signiﬁcant spillover. Central Asia’s outlook assumes that 
growth returns to the Russian Federation by 2016. But if the sharp 
depreciation of the ruble, slowing remittances, and weakened demand 
for imports continue during 2016, Central Asia’s growth trajectory 
would become more negative. 
One large risk follows from developing Asia having enjoyed steady 
capital inﬂows as the major ﬁnancial markets, the US in particular, 
pursued monetary easing. Given the anticipated normalization of US 
monetary policy later this year, narrowing differentials in interest rates 
between the US and Asia could prompt outﬂows of funds from the 
region. Weaker growth and lower interest rates in some economies in 
developing Asia make them less attractive as investment destinations. 
These economies could see lower inﬂows of funds or even outﬂows, 
causing liquidity to tighten and credit growth to slow.
Finally, oil prices are expected to rise gradually through the 
forecast period, but this projection assumes that global demand for 
energy increases somewhat with the gradual recovery in global growth 
rates. Meanwhile, uncertainty is the one constant in crude oil markets, 
and oil prices could deviate signiﬁcantly from current projections 
under different conditions of supply and demand. The slowdown 
in infrastructure and manufacturing activity poses a risk that 
future economic growth may fall below projections and hollow out 
consumption of crude oil and petroleum products. On the other hand, 
supply disruptions from geopolitical tensions in the major oil producing 
countries could raise prices beyond what the outlook envisions.
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How lower oil prices 
affect Asia
The low price of oil is propping up economic growth in Asia and 
other regions around the globe, excluding the major oil-exporting 
countries. Because the decline in oil prices has supported growth and 
contained inﬂation, it has considerable implications for macroeconomic 
management. At a minimum, the low oil price has lowered inﬂation 
globally, particularly in the US, the euro area, and Japan, and provided 
room for maintaining low interest rates to stimulate growth. Although 
the impact on growth may differ between economies that are net 
importers of oil and those that are net exporters, the net effect on global 
growth is perceived to be positive. In addition, the decline in oil prices 
has provided an opportunity for governments to institute reform that 
will beneﬁt their growth prospects over the longer term. For example, 
it has opened up opportunities for countries that still heavily subsidize 
their energy sectors to rationalize their expenditures to make them 
more productive. To the oil-producing countries, the decline in oil prices 
provides further incentive to diversify their economies.
This outlook projects that oil prices, as measured by the Brent crude 
price, will gradually recover from their current lows but remain below 
their highs of the past 4 years. While it is unlikely that supply will 
grow quickly, demand is projected to pick up following the expected 
recovery in the global economy. The baseline assumes that gradual 
improvement in the global economy will revive demand for energy 
and push the Brent crude price to an average of $65 per barrel in 2015, 
before it picks up further to $75 in 2016. Despite this rising trend, the 
price of oil in 2016 will still be less than three-quarters of its average 
price in 2014. Over the long run, however, supply constraints should put 
upward pressure on the price of oil, though energy-saving technological 
advances may slow the increase.
Uncertainties surrounding  
the oil price projection
A lot of uncertainty surrounds the oil price, as risks threaten 
any assumption from both sides. Supply disruptions from 
heightened geopolitical tensions could push up the price, and 
slower economic growth could hold down oil consumption, 
demand, and prices. Such high uncertainty makes oil prices 
volatile and forecasts prone to error. 
Figure 1.2.1 shows how the price of Brent crude has moved 
in the past 15 years. The price has been volatile historically, 
generating a quarterly standard deviation of about $33 per 
barrel. Volatility has worsened in the past decade, with sharp 
movements taking place in a 2–3 year cycle—but nothing 
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1.2.2  Alternative trends in Brent crude price:  
baseline vs. high-price scenario
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regular enough to make volatility any less of a risk to the outlook. 
While a lower global price for oil mostly promotes economic growth, 
steep falls and rapid rebounds can be detrimental. A rebound to pre-2014 
prices is unlikely but possible within the forecast horizon, as a positive 
shock within the standard deviation is enough to drive Brent crude price 
back to above $100 per barrel by 2016.
Probable implications of a  
steep rebound in oil prices 
To illustrate how a sharp and quick rebound in oil prices 
could affect growth in the region, this analysis considers a 
high oil price scenario in which Brent rises slightly higher 
than the baseline assumption to $70 per barrel in 2015 and 
jumps to an average of $100 in 2016 (Figure 1.2.2). A price 
hike to $100 per barrel is seen as consistent with the average 
Brent price over almost 4 years before the price collapse 
in the second half of 2014. The price is considered to be 
within the price range desired by the Organization of the 
Oil Exporting Countries (OPEC) in the past few years, as the 
OPEC secretary general referred to it as a a level that makes 
everyone happy (OPEC 2014). To see how such shocks play 
out in the global economy, the scenario is simulated using 
the framework of the global projection model GPM7, which 
divides the global market into seven blocks, one of which is 
the PRC and another comprising Hong Kong, China; India; 
Indonesia; the Republic of Korea; Malaysia; the Philippines; 
Singapore; Taipei,China; and Thailand (Blagrave et al. 2013). 
The model is calibrated to reﬂect ADO 2015 baseline 
projections.
Applying the high oil price scenario in Figure 1.2.2 on top of the 
underlying outlook, forecasts in a GPM7 environment suggest that a 
sharp and quick rebound in oil prices would likely be detrimental to 
global economic growth, as higher energy costs would limit consumption 
and investment. This implies that a return of oil prices to their average 
in the past 4 years could arrest progress in global economic recovery and 
deﬂect the global output gap away from its closing trend. The widening 
output gap would exert downward pressure on interest rates, which is 
determined endogenously in the model.
Table 1.2.1 suggests that a steeper rebound in oil prices, if imposed 
on trends of relatively soft growth momentum like those in the baseline, 
could be substantial but not uniform across the sample economies. 
A return of oil prices to $100 per barrel could shave as much as 
1 percentage point off of average growth in developing Asia in 2016, while 
the growth slowdown in the US, the euro area, and Japan would be less 
severe on average, at about 0.6 percentage points. This difference in the 
severity of the growth slowdown derives mainly from the interest rate 
differential between the two blocs and the inﬂationary impact of the 
rise in oil prices on these economies. As interest rates in Europe and 
Japan are practically glued to the ﬂoor, the inﬂationary impact of higher 
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1.2.1 Macroeconomic implications of higher path of oil prices
Economy
ADO 2015 baseline Changes from the baseline
2015 2016 2015 2016
GDP growth     
Major industrialized economies:     
United States 3.2 3.0 –0.1 –0.6
Euro area 1.1 1.4 –0.1 –0.6
Japan 1.1 1.7 –0.1 –0.7
PRC 7.2 7.0 –0.2 –0.9
Emerging Asia excluding the PRC 5.4 6.1 –0.2 –1.1
     
Inflation     
Major industrialized economies:     
United States 0.8 2.3 0.2 0.7
Euro area 0.1 1.1 0.1 0.2
Japan 1.2 1.3 0.0 0.1
PRC 1.8 2.3 0.0 0.2
Emerging Asia excluding the PRC 3.9 4.1 0.0 0.5
ADO = Asian Development Outlook, PRC = People’s Republic of China.
Source: ADB estimates.
energy costs would mean negative real interest rates in these economies. 
A negative real interest rate would also be the case in the US, but not 
in Asia. Given Asia’s relatively high nominal interest rates, positive 
real interest rates would still prevail in Asian economies, appreciating 
currencies in real effective terms, which could adversely affect 
competitiveness and export performance. This additional effect explains 
most of the growth differential seen in Table 1.2.1.1
Under normal circumstances, an oil price shock would stoke 
inﬂation, at least to the extent of raising the energy component of 
domestic prices. The impact would depend, however, on the weight 
of the energy component in the price index and the degree of pass-
through from oil to domestic inﬂation. In addition, the impact would 
depend on the economy’s aggregate demand–supply balance before the 
shock. Economies with negative output gaps to begin with—economies 
performing below their potential, like most of those in Table 1.2.1—
would see the gap worsening after the oil price increase, which would 
weaken inﬂationary pressure. The simulation suggests that core inﬂation 
(which strips out food and energy) would be lower after a shock that 
widened the output gap. These two competing effects play a crucial role 
in determining the way inﬂation responds to an oil price shock. The 
simulation suggests that the economies with relatively high nominal 
interest rates before the shock would ease their monetary policy 
somewhat to soften the blow to growth. This would mean monetary 
policy easing in Asia, and US interest rates rising less quickly than in the 
baseline. Although positive, the impact on aggregate inﬂation is generally 
seen to be manageable (Table 1.2.1).  
Oil in the gears of growth  21
1.2.3  Transmission of world oil prices to domestic fuel prices
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Pass-through to domestic inﬂation
Prices at the pump
Domestic fuel prices fell sharply in many economies with 
the decline in world oil prices. Figure 1.2.3 examines 
how much the world oil price change transmitted to 
domestic retail fuel prices by ranking economies in order 
of the change in domestic diesel prices relative to world 
prices. It also includes information on changes in prices 
for low-grade and high-grade gasoline where available.2 
The survey of 25 economies found that domestic fuel prices 
did not decline by as much as the fall in crude oil prices.3 
The average transmission to domestic fuel prices in 
the sample period was 32%. Within the region, the highest 
pass-through was in East Asia, followed by Southeast Asia, 
South Asia, and ﬁnally Central Asia. Taipei,China showed 
the highest relative decline in fuel prices, while Bangladesh 
recorded a negligible drop. In Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and 
Indonesia, average prices at the pump increased because of 
government intervention. In Uzbekistan, the government 
raised in January 2015 a fuel consumption tax on transport 
vehicles that use gasoline, diesel, or liqueﬁed petroleum gas. 
In Indonesia, the government raised gasoline and diesel 
prices in November 2014 to rein in subsidies, then reduced 
prices in January 2015 to reﬂect falling world oil prices. In 
Azerbaijan, only high-grade gasoline, which is not regulated, 
rose in price, while there was no change in the prices of 
low-grade gasoline or diesel, which the government controls. 
More generally, in economies where the market typically 
determines domestic fuel prices—such as Georgia, the 
Philippines, Singapore, and Hong Kong, China—the pass-
through to fuel prices was larger than in economies where 
the government controls the prices. Price transmission in 
these economies was comparable to that of the advanced 
countries, where prices are also typically determined by the 
market, as in the US, Japan, and Germany.
Retail prices may not fully reﬂect world oil price changes 
for various reasons, such as when the oil was bought, the effects of 
trade agreements, the inclusion of ﬁxed costs in prices, and different 
domestic pricing policies involving taxes and subsidies, which need not 
necessarily move with world price changes. For example, in the sample, 
many governments did not implement any changes in subsidies or taxes 
between June 2014 and January 2015, when world oil prices declined a lot. 
Others, such as India, Nepal, Turkmenistan, Timor-Leste, Indonesia, and 
Thailand, took advantage of the price fall to reduce subsidies on energy.
Aggregate consumer price index
A fall in prices at the pump can affect the consumer price index (CPI) 
directly by bringing down the cost of the energy-related items that 
contribute to CPI, such as household fuel, motor fuel, and electricity. 
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Households and ﬁrms may shift consumption away from 
other energy sources into oil-based energy sources, likely 
lowering prices for close substitutes and, hence, the CPI. 
These pass-through effects from a change in international 
oil prices may be seen in CPI inﬂation in the short term and 
depend on, among other factors, the weight of the energy 
component in the economy’s CPI basket. Over a longer period 
of time, falling oil prices can affect non-energy components 
of CPI through lower production costs, which producers may 
pass on to consumers, and through other second-round effects 
such as lower transport costs.
In economies where the domestic price of oil is determined 
by the market, the pass-through of an oil price change into 
CPI inﬂation can be expected to be larger. The extent of 
transmission will be based on, among other factors, oil self-
sufficiency, intensity of oil use, energy efficiency, and the 
persistence of the oil price shock. On the other hand, when 
domestic fuel prices are administered or regulated by the 
government through price caps, adjustments to subsidies and 
taxes, or other indirect interventions, the oil price change passes through 
to domestic fuel prices incompletely, which limits direct inﬂationary or 
deﬂationary effects. The impact on domestic inﬂation may also differ in 
an economy that is a net oil importer from the impact in a net exporter, 
depending again on the extent to which the government controls 
fuel prices.
Empirically, the impact on inﬂation in each economy was assessed by 
estimating the pass-through of oil price change to CPI inﬂation (Box 1.2.1). 
The estimation controlled for the following lagged changes: rates of 
inﬂation, to capture its persistence; output gap, to represent inﬂationary 
pressures from the real economy; oil prices, to reﬂect direct inﬂationary 
pressures from world oil price volatility; and the real exchange rate, to 
capture the inﬂationary implications of relative price change in an open 
economy, as spillover to other sectors from declining oil prices changes 
the price of the domestic goods compared with world prices. 
The immediate pass-through of an oil price change into CPI inﬂation 
was small in all economies, with only some coefficients positive and 
signiﬁcant: Thailand, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, and the 
Philippines (Figure 1.2.4). These are economies where the domestic price 
of fuel is mostly determined by the market, so it makes intuitive sense 
that the world oil price transmitted to domestic prices. For example, 
if the world oil price decreased by 10%, the pass-through to CPI inﬂation 
in Thailand would be 0.17% after 1 month. The impact was smaller in 
other economies, and this result was consistent with prices not adjusting 
instantly. Summarizing the results for all economies in the sample, the 
absolute pass-through was, on average, highest in South Asia and lowest 
in Central Asia, and the magnitude of pass-through was slightly larger in 
economies where the market determined domestic fuel prices than where 
prices were administratively set.
If the oil price change persists, the pass-through to inﬂation is positive 
in all economies and higher than the immediate impact (Figure 1.2.5). 
The magnitude of the impact still varies across the region, with major 
1.2.4  Immediate oil price pass-through to inflation 
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1.2.1 Estimating the pass-through of oil price change to consumer price index inflation
Analyzing the pass-through of oil prices to inflation starts 
with the following equation: 
 (1)
where t represents CPI inflation, the change in the log of 
CPI (pt), and poilt is the log of world average price of oil. 
The coefficient 1 is the total immediate effect of the oil 
price change in period t–1 on inflation in period t.
As inflation is also determined by output gap, the lagged 
value output gap, defined as the difference between log 
of output yt and its Hodrick-Prescott filtered trend ~yt is 
included. Apart from the direct effect, oil price volatilities 
can be transmitted to other sectors, which may affect a 
country’s relative competitiveness and separately affect 
inflation. Hence the change in the real effective exchange 
rate (reer) is included to represent changes in relative 
foreign prices. REER is the exchange rate against a basket 
of currencies and an increase indicates appreciation. 
The augmented model is as follows:
 (2)
As these series are typically not stationary, an equilibrium 
relation may exist between prices, output, oil prices, and the 
exchange rate in levels, which is given by the following:
 (3)
If the series are cointegrated, then ECTt is the error 
correction term that represents the short-term deviation 
of the system from equilibrium. Hence, the following can 
estimate the model
 (4)
to assess the immediate pass-through of oil prices to 
inflation. The coefficients of interest for oil prices are 
interpreted as follows: 1 is the partial short run pass-
through to inflation of an oil price change. The total 
short run pass-through is given by 1+oil to include the 
adjustment back to equilibrium after a deviation. So, if oil 
prices change by 1%, the pass-through to inflation in the 
next month is 1+oil%. oil is the coefficient representing the 
pass-through in the equilibrium relation, and  is the speed 
of adjustment after a deviation. 
The analysis includes 16 economies for which data on all 
series are available (for the time periods in the box table). 
Analysis uses monthly data for the CPI, industrial production 
index, and real effective exchange rate obtained from CEIC 
Data. Oil price is the average spot price, weighted according 
to global trading volume, of West Texas intermediate, Brent 
crude, and Dubai crude, the series obtained from World 
Bank Commodity Price Data. 
All series are expressed in logarithms. For each economy, 
analysis uses the Augmented Dickey Fuller test to check 
for stationarity. The Johansen cointegration test enables 
determination that a cointegration relation exists as 
described in equation (2). Optimal lags are chosen based on 
the Schwarz Information Criteria. Equations (2) and (4) are 
then estimated, and the standard errors are computed using 
the Newey-West HAC matrix to account for autocorrelation 
and heteroskedasticity in the error terms.
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Time period for each economy
Economy Period
Central Asia
Armenia Jan 2006–Nov 2014
Azerbaijan Jan 2009–Nov 2014
Georgia Jan 2001–Sep 2014
Kazakhstan Jan 2002–Aug 2013
East Asia
People’s Republic of China Jan 1994–Oct 2014
Hong Kong, China Jan 2005–Sep 2014
Republic of Korea Jan 1994–Nov 2014
Taipei,China Jan 1994–Dec 2014
South Asia
India Jan 1994–Oct 2014
Pakistan Jan 1990–Oct 2014
Sri Lanka Jan 2009–Oct 2014
Southeast Asia
Indonesia Jan 1994–Dec 2014
Malaysia Jan 1979–Sep 2014
Philippines Jan 2000–Oct 2014
Singapore Jan 1997–Nov 2014
Thailand Jan 2000–Dec 2014
Sources: CEIC Data Company; Haver Analytics.
oil producers—Malaysia, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan—passing through 
lower rises on average. Among the other economies, most of which are net 
importers of oil, Indonesia has the highest estimated pass-through, and 
India, whose coefficient is insigniﬁcant, the lowest. In both, as in many 
other economies in developing Asia, the government used price controls to 
limit the effect of oil price volatility on domestic consumer prices over the 
sample period. 
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1.2.6 LPG and kerosene prices in Delhi, 2004–2015 
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LPG = liqueﬁed petroleum gas.
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1.2.5 Oil price pass-through to inflation over time 
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Why is the pass-through in Indonesia much higher than 
elsewhere? Large increases and volatility in world oil prices 
have forced the Government of Indonesia to reduce and 
reintroduce subsidies, causing large changes in domestic fuel 
prices. Looking back to 2005, Indonesia raised domestic fuel 
prices by 29% in March and then doubled them in October 
of that year in response to the increases in the world prices. 
In May 2008, the government cut the fuel subsidy further, 
raising average domestic fuel prices by 30%. However, in 
December 2008, the government reacted to the decline in 
world oil prices by once again increasing its fuel subsidy 
contribution, which caused domestic fuel prices to fall by an 
average of 15% (Ramayandi and Rosario 2010). The immediate 
and longer-term impact of these changes on CPI inﬂation 
is possibly reﬂected in the high pass-through coefficient for 
the time period under analysis. In India, before the reform 
of gasoline and diesel subsidies, retail fuel prices were stable 
(Figure 1.2.6). For example, the government froze gasoline 
and diesel prices between February 2007 and February 2008, 
and similarly the prices of other domestic fuels like subsidized 
liqueﬁed petroleum gas and kerosene (Kojima 2009, 2012), 
possibly limiting pass-through to CPI.
Lessons for policy
Many domestic policy decisions should be informed by 
the extent to which world oil price ﬂuctuations are passed 
through to CPI inﬂation. On the ﬁscal side, depending on 
whether an economy is a net exporter or net importer of oil, 
the government decides on the magnitude of subsidies to 
offer and tariffs to impose on producers and consumers. For 
example, when faced with an unprecedented rise in oil prices 
to over $100 a barrel, several governments in oil-importing 
economies in Asia increased oil subsidies (Baig et al. 2007) 
or used targeted subsidies or other price controls to protect 
domestic consumers from the price rise (Kojima 2009). 
The insights from the estimation show that, over a period 
of time, the pass-through to CPI inﬂation is positive in all 
economies. Governments can take advantage of the steep fall 
in oil prices to implement tax reform and reduce or eliminate 
subsidies, thereby boosting their future ﬁscal ﬂexibility with 
only minimal disruption to household and business budgets. 
Similarly, tame inﬂation and current account improvement 
can allow monetary policy to be eased.
In oil-exporting countries, the oil price fall can force 
down export earnings and ﬁscal revenue, thereby straining public 
ﬁnances. Governments in these economies have to consider reforming 
the structure of taxes and subsidies in the energy sector and diversifying 
their economies. As current account deterioration can bring inﬂation 
and pressure on the currency, monetary policy has to balance these 
considerations against growth objectives.
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1.3.1  Bank loans and local-currency bonds outstanding 
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Is Asia’s rising debt  
a threat to growth?
Following the global ﬁnancial crisis of 2008–2009, total debt 
has risen in developing Asia. Plentiful global liquidity and 
expansionary monetary policy in advanced economies have 
supported the surge in credit. The rapid rise in debt has 
raised concern about the risk of a credit slowdown or bust 
that could affect the economy. The risk has intensiﬁed now 
that the US Federal Reserve is on the cusp of raising interest 
rates. The region had a brush with the impact of a Fed policy 
reversal—or talk of such a reversal—when liquidity tightened 
during the so-called taper tantrum in the second half of 
2013. At that time, interest rates went up and new bond 
issuances stalled. While 2014 saw funds return to the region 
and liquidity improve, tighter liquidity looms in 2015 as the 
US stands poised to raise interest rates. 
As much as total debt has risen in Asia, it is not clear that 
its growth has been excessive. Some of the rise in debt is a 
natural consequence of ﬁnancial development and reﬂects 
the progress regional economies have made in improving 
their ﬁnancial systems. As such, growth in debt can be seen 
as supporting economic growth. However, a rapid rise in 
debt could also worsen macroeconomic vulnerability. When 
lending rises quickly, lending standards tend to become 
relaxed, potentially allowing excessive leverage and asset 
price bubbles. There have been several times in the past 
when ﬁnancial crises followed on surges in domestic lending. 
Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012) showed that domestic credit 
growth and real currency appreciation robustly predict 
crises. Worryingly, Taylor (2012) found that those economic 
downturns that followed rapid expansion of credit tended to 
be more severe. 
Trends in Asian debt
Asia has experienced rapid credit growth since the global 
ﬁnancial crisis. To chart the rise in total debt in the region, 
data were assembled on domestic bank loans and bonds 
outstanding in 14 larger Asian economies: Bangladesh; the 
PRC; Hong Kong, China; India; Indonesia; Kazakhstan; 
the Republic of Korea; Malaysia; Pakistan; the Philippines; 
Singapore; Sri Lanka; Thailand; and Viet Nam. From 
2009 to 2013, total debt in the region almost doubled, climbing from 
$18.3 trillion to $34.1 trillion (Figure 1.3.1). The banking sector remains 
the dominant part of the ﬁnancial system in the region, accounting for 
more than half of total debt, but bonds have been gaining popularity as 
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1.3.3  Bank loans and local-currency bonds outstanding in Asia 
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sources of ﬁnancing. A large portion of the growth in total 
debt has been driven by the rapid credit expansion in the 
PRC. Debt in the PRC accounts for two-thirds of debt in the 
region. Excluding the PRC, the amount of debt in the region 
is lower but the rapid buildup of debt presents a similar 
picture (Figure 1.3.2).
Most of the debt has been accumulated by ﬁrms and 
households, their debt more than doubled from 2009 to 2013. 
In the same period, government debt increased by just 58%. 
Companies in the PRC are responsible for a large share of 
the rise in private debt. Excluding the PRC, company and 
household debt has still outpaced government debt, but the 
difference is smaller, with company and household debt rising 
by 54% and government debt by 40%. 
As some of the rise in debt was needed to ﬁnance 
expanded economic activity, it may be useful to look at 
the trend in debt as a share of GDP. Growth in debt has 
convincingly outpaced that of GDP, pushing the ratio of debt 
to GDP from 195% in 2009 to 214% in 2013, a jump of almost 
20 percentage points (Figure 1.3.3). While some of that reﬂected ﬁnancial 
development, the largest increases in debt as a share of GDP have 
occurred in economies with relatively well developed ﬁnancial sectors. 
The rapid rise reﬂected an especially strong increase in debt in the PRC. 
Excluding the PRC, the ratio of debt to GDP in the rest of the region still 
increased but by only half the magnitude, slightly less than 10 percentage 
points, from 172% to 181% (Figure 1.3.4).
Individual economies display considerable divergence. The largest 
increases in debt as a share of GDP since 2009 have been, in descending 
order, in Hong Kong, China; Malaysia; Singapore; and Thailand 
(Table 1.3.1). In fact, the rise in debt from 2009 is mostly in 
East and Southeast Asia. These are all economies with highly 
developed ﬁnancial sectors by regional standards and strong 
economic track records. Singapore and Hong Kong, China are 
regional ﬁnancial hubs with global standing. Their possession 
of highly developed ﬁnancial sectors made these economies 
the most capable in the region of ramping up lending after 
the global ﬁnancial crisis. These economies are likely to have 
beneﬁted the most from the increased ﬂow of funds into 
the region.
Some of the increase in total debt has been fueled by the 
increased use of bonds for ﬁnancing. The development of 
local-currency bond markets can been seen as a positive sign, 
as they provide alternative sources of funding for companies 
in the region. Growth in bonds outstanding has been faster 
than that of bank loans, albeit from a much smaller base. 
Local currency bonds outstanding in Asian economies 
grew from around $6.6 trillion in 2009 (70% of GDP) to 
$13.2 trillion in 2014 (79% of GDP). Most of the increase was 
in bonds issued by corporations, and it was mostly driven by 
strong growth in the PRC bond market, which accounted for 
80% of the increase in corporate bonds. 
Oil in the gears of growth  27
1.3.5  Foreign-currency bond issuance in developing Asia,
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1.2.2 Debt as a share of GDP, selected Asian economies (%)
Economy 2009 2013
Percentage point 
change 
(2009–2013)
Hong Kong, China 234 307 72
Malaysia 242 277 36
Singapore 201 233 32
Thailand 193 224 31
Pakistan 64 86 22
People's Republic of China 215 235 20
Philippines 91 99 8
Bangladesh 67 74 7
Indonesia 57 64 7
Republic of Korea 274 277 4
Viet Nam 125 129 4
India 164 161 –3
Sri Lanka 92 89 –3
Kazakhstan 85 65 –20
Sources: International Monetary Fund. International Financial Statistics; Bloomberg ; CEIC Data Company 
(all accessed 6 March 2015).
In some economies, governments were the main borrowers. 
The governments of both Malaysia and Pakistan increased 
their bond issuance substantially following the global ﬁnancial 
crisis. One concern is that excessive public debt can be a drag 
on the economy and even precipitate a loss of conﬁdence in it. 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) warned that high public debt could 
hurt growth prospects. The research found that when public 
debt exceeded 90% of GDP, growth performance tended to 
decline. However, more recent research by Pescatori, Sandri, 
and Simon (2014) did not ﬁnd a clear threshold at which public 
debt had this association. 
In addition to the rise in domestic debt, the region has 
seen an increase in foreign currency borrowing. With US 
interest rates close to zero and liquidity plentiful, foreign 
investors have ﬂocked to the region in search of higher 
yields. Corporations have responded to the increased appetite for bonds 
by issuing a record amount. Total foreign-currency bond issuance 
reached a record of $271 billion in 2014, nearly 3 times the 2009 level 
(Figure 1.3.5). 
Almost all of the shift toward foreign-currency borrowing has been 
by corporations. Governments have continued to ﬁnance themselves 
almost entirely in local currency. The share of foreign-currency bonds 
in all corporate bonds has risen to about 11% in 2014 from 9% in 2009 
(Figure 3.1.6). This means that the region’s companies are becoming 
more exposed to risk from exchange rate ﬂuctuation, but it is important 
to emphasize that the vast majority of the region’s bonds are still in local 
currency. While exchange rate risk is rising, it is still small. 
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1.3.6  Share of foreign-currency bonds in all bonds in 
developing Asia, 2009–2014 
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Has debt been rising too quickly?
Asia’s ratio of debt to GDP has increased dramatically. 
One concern is that the debt level may have risen too high 
for the region. This is difficult to judge because some of 
the increase reﬂects progress in developing the ﬁnancial 
systems of regional economies. In addition, economies with 
better ﬁnancial systems are better able to manage higher 
debt and ensure that it contributes to their development. 
These caveats suggest that it would be difficult to establish 
a threshold for the ratio of debt to GDP beyond which debt 
is considered too high, because the economies of developing 
Asia are too diverse.
In addition to concerns about the level of debt are 
concerns about the speed at which debt has grown. Policy 
makers tend to be concerned about any rapid rise in debt, as 
excessive growth in credit has been linked with increased 
probability of crisis. In addition, it is a vexing problem to 
determine when credit growth is too high. One indicator 
suggested by Mendoza and Terrones (2012) to classify credit 
booms compares the debt level to the historical trend to see 
if growth exceeds a certain threshold. This allows analysts 
to take into account ﬁnancial deepening in each economy. Using this 
methodology, deviation from trend in each economy is calculated from 
2000 to 2013 using the Hodrick–Prescott ﬁlter with a smoothing factor of 
100. Following Mendoza and Terrones (2012), any deviation that exceed 
1.65 times the standard deviation of the cyclical component is considered 
to be excessive. This threshold identiﬁes six episodes of excessive credit 
growth: in the PRC in 2003, India in 2003, Kazakhstan in 2007 and 
2009, Sri Lanka in 2003, and Viet Nam in 2010. 
In Kazakhstan, the credit boom was fueled by banks’ large external 
borrowings, which dried up during the global ﬁnancial crisis. The 
devaluation of the Kazakh tenge in 2009 further weakened the banks’ 
positions. The government was forced to step in to rescue the three 
largest banks. Since then, Kazakhstan has been deleveraging, and the 
ratio of debt to GDP fell by 20 percentage points from 2009 to 2013. 
Viet Nam did not experience a banking crisis following its recent credit 
boom episode. However, the rate of credit expansion dropped, and there 
are concerns about the rising prevalence of nonperforming loans in the 
banking system since the boom. 
More recently, Malaysia, Singapore, and Pakistan have experienced 
rapid credit growth that brought their ratio of debt to GDP close to the 
threshold that deﬁnes a credit boom. If the trend of rapid growth were 
to continue, these economies could face increased risk of ﬁnancial crisis. 
While the large increase in debt in the PRC in 2009 brought it close to 
the threshold, slower credit growth since then has brought its ratio of 
debt to GDP close to the trend. 
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1.3.7  Change in total debt and housing price, 2009–2013
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What can governments do  
to manage credit growth?
While the rapid rise of debt causes some concern to policy makers, no 
clear consensus exists on what should be done. It is difficult to separate 
out episodes of excessive surge in credit. One factor contributing 
to the rapid rise in debt in the region is the spat of capital inﬂows. 
Immediately following the global ﬁnancial crisis of 2008–2009, the 
region witnessed a swift resumption of capital inﬂows. These where 
used both to ﬁnance bank lending and to generate demand for bond 
issuance. Easy liquidity has been partly driven by expansionary 
monetary policies in the advanced economies and arguably threatens 
to undermine lending standards. As capital ﬂows into the region have 
continued to grow, concerns rise that they could inﬂate asset bubbles 
and destabilize asset prices and domestic ﬁnancial markets. 
While the rise in debt can help facilitate faster growth in the 
region, it could also deepen any crisis. Monetary policies in the region 
have been relatively expansionary, partly in response to weak global 
economic conditions. But governments have been quite reluctant to raise 
rates. One reason has been that inﬂationary pressures have 
been muted in the region, revealing little sign of overheating 
in the economy. This calm makes it more difficult for policy 
makers to use monetary policy to slow down growth in credit. 
And interest rate hikes are not without risk. They could 
push vulnerable companies into default, and higher domestic 
interest rates could encourage domestic borrowers to seek 
funds in foreign currency. To a certain extent, this is already 
reﬂected in the increased issuance of foreign-currency bonds 
by property companies in the PRC in response to difficulty in 
obtaining funds domestically. 
More recently, macroprudential policy has been touted 
as a more targeted tool for directly tackling the problem 
of excessive credit. Its advantage is that it can be aimed at 
a speciﬁc sector and implemented without wide-ranging 
side effects on other sectors. Traditional macroprudential 
measures include capital and liquidity requirements, limits on 
the growth and composition of credit, and restrictions on the 
type of borrowers allowed access to loans. 
Policy makers are concerned that the rise in debt has 
been fueling an asset bubble. Housing price data are limited, 
but where available they show the rise in debt accompanied 
by rising property prices (Figure 1.3.7). Zhang and Zoli (2014) found 
that policy makers in Asia have been addressing higher property prices 
with such macroprudential measures as requiring higher down payment 
percentages for mortgages. 
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Conclusions
While total debt has risen quickly in Asia, it does not pose a threat to 
growth in the near term. However, experiences in individual countries 
are quite diverse, with debt having even fallen in a few economies. 
As rapid growth in credit has been concentrated in economies with 
more developed ﬁnancial sectors, they are likely to be relatively well 
prepared to manage it. Policy makers in these economies have actively 
applied macroprudential measures to target excessive lending to 
particular sectors. 
Endnotes
1 Under the baseline scenario, output gaps are mostly negative to 
begin with, so negative real interest rates can spur growth, at least 
in the short-term. If persistent, however, negative real interest rates 
would tend to promote excessive credit growth and consumption, 
stoking high inflation that could harm growth. 
2 Following International Monetary Fund (2008), the pass-through is 
calculated as the change between two periods in the domestic fuel 
price, valued in dollars at prevailing exchange rates, divided by the 
change in the world oil price.
3 The numbers are based on an informal survey conducted by regional 
offices of the Asian Development Bank. Some governments also 
publish detailed retail price survey data (see Kojima 2012). Another 
source of cross-country information on fuel price data is https://
energypedia.info/index.php/International_Fuel_Price
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Annex: Low oil price  
supports recovery
Benefitting from lower oil prices, the major industrial economies of the 
United States (US), the euro area, and Japan are expected to maintain 
growth momentum in the next 2 years. Combined GDP growth for these 
economies will reach 2.2% in 2015 from 1.6% in 2014. Expansion will 
continue in 2016, when growth is expected at 2.4%. With the decline 
in commodity prices, inflation is expected to be muted in 2015 and stay 
below 2.0% in 2016 (Table A1.1).
Recent developments in the 
major industrial economies
United States
The US economy expanded by 2.4% in 2014. GDP growth has 
accelerated since the second quarter, following a severe winter that 
caused a contraction in the first quarter. The economy continues to 
A1.1 Baseline assumptions on the international economy
2013 2014 2015 2016
Actual
ADO 2015 
projection
GDP growth (%)
Major industrial economiesa 1.2 1.6 2.2 2.4
United States 2.2 2.4 3.2 3.0
Euro area –0.4 0.9 1.1 1.4
Japan 1.6 0.0 1.1 1.7
Prices and inflation
Brent crude spot prices (average, $ per barrel) 108.9 98.9 65.0 75.0
Food index (% change) –7.1 –7.1 –6.0 0.0
Consumer price index inflation  
(major industrial economies’ average, %)
1.3 1.5 0.7 1.9
Interest rates
United States federal funds rate (average, %) 0.1 0.1 0.4 1.7
European Central Bank refinancing rate (average, %) 0.5 0.2 0.0 0.0
Bank of Japan overnight call rate (average, %) 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
$ LIBORb (%) 0.2 0.2 0.5 1.8
a Average growth rates are weighted by gross national income, Atlas method.
b Average London interbank offered rate quotations on 1-month loans.
Sources: US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, http://www.bea.gov; Eurostat, http://
epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu; Economic and Social Research Institute of Japan, http://www.esri.cao.go.jp; 
Consensus Forecasts; Bloomberg; International Monetary Fund, Primary Commodity Prices, http://www 
.imf.org; World Bank, Global Commodity Markets, http://www.worldbank.org; ADB estimates.
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A1.2  Business activities and consumer confidence indicators, 
United States
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Sources: CEIC Data Company; Haver Analytics (both accessed 4 March 2015).
benefit from solid growth in private consumption, which contributed 
1.7% to the annual growth rate. A jump in investment in the second 
quarter strengthened growth momentum and increased investment’s 
contribution to annual growth (Figure A1.1). Net foreign trade and 
services acted as a drag, as imports grew much faster than exports, 
consistent with the strengthening of domestic demand and a 
stronger US dollar.
GDP grew at a solid seasonally adjusted annualized 
rate (saar) of 5.0% in the third quarter of 2014 and a lower 
but still solid 2.2% in the fourth. Despite slower expansion 
in the fourth quarter overall, the growth rate of private 
consumption was actually the strongest during the year, 
having accelerated in each quarter (Figure A1.1). The US 
consumer confidence index rose continuously in 2014 and 
returned to its pre-recession level in January 2015. The trend 
appears likely to continue this year (Figure A1.2). Somewhat 
echoing this trend is retail sales, which generally increased 
during the period. Retail sales weakened somewhat in 
December 2014 and January 2015, but this appears to be a 
temporary setback. Retail sales should turn upward again as 
suggested by strong consumer confidence and rebounding 
hourly earnings for workers in January 2015.
Investment generally increased during 2014. Investment 
growth rebounded sharply in the second quarter and 
contributed positively to growth in the following quarters. 
Fixed investment continued to expand, driven mainly by 
strong growth of 6.3% in real nonresidential fixed investment, 
reflecting a continuing rise in spending for equipment. 
Purchasing managers’ index values remained solid despite 
the fall from 58.7 in November 2014 to 56.3 in both December 
2014 and January 2015, as the value well above 50 indicates 
that manufacturing continued to expand. The industrial 
production index rose steadily throughout 2014, from 101 in 
the beginning of the year (2007 = 100) to 106 in December. 
These trends in manufacturing and industrial production 
reaffirm last year’s conjecture on the increasingly important 
role of investment in supporting the US economic recovery.
The labor and housing markets continued to underlie 
improvement in the US economy in 2014. The unemployment 
rate declined persistently, dropping from 6.6 % in January 
2014 to 5.5% in February 2015. The average duration of 
unemployment has also shortened gradually, from 36 days 
at the beginning of the year to 33 days toward the end. The 
growth in nonfarm employment, supported by the addition 
of jobs in industry, has also shown a gradually strengthening 
trend (Figure A1.3). The housing price index extended its 
upward trend that began in 2012. Housing starts showed a 
similar trend, suggesting continued recovery in residential 
construction. 
Inflation, both headline and core, remained below the 
Federal Reserve’s target, as low energy prices continued to 
A1.1 Demand-side contributions to growth, United States
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limit inflation throughout the year (Figure A1.4). The risk of 
inflation taking off before this year is negligible in view of the 
prospects for international commodity prices, and the Federal 
Reserve projects inflation to approach its 2% target only in 
2016. In January 2015, US consumer prices fell. This decline 
does not signal a turn to deflation, however, as it mainly 
reflected very low food and oil prices. Core inflation stayed at 
its December rate in January as headline inflation fell.
In 2014, the Federal Reserve ended its program of monthly 
asset purchases (so-called quantitative easing) but it has been 
cautious about normalizing policy rates. While the Federal 
Reserve is expected to begin raising policy rates this year as US 
economic performance improves, it will likely adopt a gradual 
approach beginning in the second half of this year in light of 
inflation remaining muted and despite the strengthening labor 
market. The US policy rate is forecast to average 0.4% in 2015 
before increasing to around 2.0% by the end of 2016. Thus, 
overall liquidity should remain loose in 2015, continuing to 
encourage growth in credit from commercial banks.
Looking ahead, relatively strong growth momentum will 
continue to support gradual economic recovery in 2015 before 
picking up further in 2016 as the economy closes more of the 
output gap. Expanding private sector activity appears likely to 
continue leading the measured economic recovery. Continued 
positive signs in investment, consumption, housing, 
employment, and credit suggest that the economy should 
continue to strengthen gradually. GDP in the US is forecast to 
grow by 3.2% in 2015 and 3.0% in 2016. Inflation is projected 
to remain low at 0.8% in 2015 before picking up further to 
2.4% in 2016, partly reflecting the low base. 
Euro area
The euro area showed signs of a mild pickup toward the end 
of 2014 and into the current year, aided by falling oil prices 
and a weak euro. Positive business and consumer sentiment 
has buoyed the recovery, despite turmoil from the Greek 
crisis. However, industry in the euro area is struggling, and 
cross-country differences in GDP growth persist. High unemployment, 
a drop into deflation, and uncertainty surrounding Greece’s future in the 
currency union are major concerns for European policy makers and could 
stymie growth in the region.
GDP in the fourth quarter of 2014 grew by a saar of 1.4% over the 
previous quarter, the highest since the first quarter of 2011. This raised 
growth for the year to 0.9%, reversing the 0.4% contraction in 2013 
(Figure A1.5). Among the major economies, Germany and Spain achieved 
relatively high growth rates of 2.8%, while GDP in France increased by a 
slight 0.3% and Italy stagnated. Among the peripheral economies, Greece 
recorded a drop of 0.8% in the fourth quarter.
Disaggregating the area’s GDP growth shows a relatively balanced 
contribution from all components, suggesting that the recovery extends 
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A1.3  Unemployment rate and growth in nonfarm 
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A1.5 Demand-side contributions to growth, euro area
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beyond private consumption. In particular, gross fixed 
capital formation added 0.3 percentage points to growth 
in the fourth quarter of 2014, compared with none in the 
previous quarter. Net exports contributed 0.9 percentage 
points to growth, as exporters may be starting to benefit 
from the depreciation of the euro since June of last year. 
The contributions of consumption were similar to those 
in the previous quarter, at 1.0 percentage point for private 
consumption and 0.1 percentage points for public.
Despite the rebound in investment, industrial production 
in the euro area stagnated, with average growth of 0.2% 
month on month in the last quarter of 2014 and a decline 
of 0.1% in January 2015. However, the sector may improve, 
albeit at a slow pace, as the purchasing managers’ index 
rose in December, January, and February to a 7-month high 
of 53.3. A value above 50 indicates expansion in economic 
activity, and the consecutive increases in the index bode well 
for GDP growth in the first quarter of 2015. The European 
Commission’s economic sentiment index also improved 
in January. 
Consumption in the euro area appears to be strengthening. 
Retail sales rose steadily from October 2014 to January of this year, 
growing by 1.1% in January. February’s rise in the consumer confidence 
index, on the back of the previous few months’ improvements, suggests 
that consumers are more optimistic about Europe’s prospects than in 
the past (Figure A1.6).
Supporting stronger consumption demand, unemployment fell in 
January for the third consecutive month to reach its best level since 
April 2012. Nevertheless, the rate is still historically high at a seasonally 
adjusted 11.2%, and labor market conditions vary considerably across 
countries. The highest unemployment rates—in double digits—were 
in Greece at 25.8% in November, Spain at 23.4%, and Cyprus at 16.1%. 
At the better end of the scale were Germany at 4.7%, Austria 
at 4.8%, and Luxembourg at 5.9%.
Inflation in the euro area has remained under the 2% 
target of the European Central Bank for almost 2 years. 
Inflation turned negative early in 2015, with the harmonized 
index of consumer prices recording –0.6% in January and 
–0.3% in February (Figure A1.7). While the bank has kept 
its policy rate unchanged at 0.05% since September 2014, in 
January 2015 it announced an expanded asset purchase program 
to include the purchase of sovereign bonds, with the aim of 
reviving the economy and hoisting inflation close to the target 
rate (Box A1.1).
Recent indicators suggest that growth will accelerate in 
2015. Lower oil prices may boost consumption and investment 
and, together with an expansionary monetary policy, can 
support growth. The forecast for growth in the euro area is 
1.1% in 2015 and 1.4% in 2016.
But risks to the outlook persist, mainly from two sources. 
One is that deflationary pressures are strong, as suggested 
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by the drop in core inflation (which omits energy and food) 
to a low of 0.6%. With spare capacity in the region and 
demand subdued by high unemployment, a prolonged period 
of deflation can slow growth as well as hinder countries’ 
debt-consolidation efforts.
Second, the potential of Greece defaulting on its debt and 
exiting the euro (dubbed Grexit) poses a risk to the area’s 
growth prospects. The other euro area countries, along with 
the European Central Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund, agreed to a 4-month extension of the current bailout 
program along with a loan equivalent to €240 billion. 
The program was extended on the condition that Greece 
would implement economic reforms and austerity measures 
to control its debt. While this reduces the immediate risk 
of Grexit, the long-term unsustainability of Greece’s fiscal 
position remains a source of uncertainty for the euro area.
Japan
The Japanese economy contracted sharply in the 2 quarters following 
the April 2014 rise in the value-added tax (VAT) rate. Disappointing 
recovery in the fourth quarter meant no growth for the whole of 2014. 
The Cabinet Office estimates that the negative output gap widened 
to 2.8% of GDP, or ¥15 trillion, by the end of 2014—substantially 
greater than the 0.4% of GDP recorded at the beginning of the year. 
The government decided to postpone the second VAT hike by 18 months, 
to April 2017, to avoid another drop in consumption and return to 
deflation. 
While boom and bust in domestic demand around the time of the 
VAT hike was anticipated, the magnitude and duration of the swings 
were not. Private consumption rebounded from the second quarter’s 
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A1.1  European Central Bank quantitative easing 
On 22 January 2015 the European Central Bank (ECB) 
announced a quantitative easing program starting on  
9 March and extending at least until September 2016. It 
involves purchases of euro-denominated sovereign bonds 
on top of the existing purchases of asset-backed securities 
and covered bonds. The ECB plans to purchase a total of 
€60 billion in public and private bonds every month in this 
period, for a total of about €1.1 trillion in purchases. In 
line with its objective of raising the rate of inflation in the 
euro area from –0.2% in February to something near the 
central bank’s target of 2.0% in the medium term, the ECB 
kept the program’s deadline potentially open-ended until 
it sees, as the ECB president stated when announcing the 
program, “a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation.”
National central banks will purchase securities 
according to their share of ECB capital, which reflects 
their country’s share in the combined population and 
gross domestic product of the European Union. Under 
the program, national central banks can buy assets 
with residual maturities of 2–30 years at the time of 
purchase. Purchases of debt with negative yield are 
allowed so long as the yield is above the ECB deposit 
rate (currently –0.2%). According to the program, the 
national central banks will assume most of the risk, with 
only 20% of the purchases subject to risk-sharing by the 
ECB. This arrangement addresses the concerns of some 
core euro area countries that the ECB bond purchases 
will discourage debt-ridden peripheral countries from 
limiting their debt. In addition, the ECB will buy not 
more than 25% of each issue and only up to 33% of 
each issuer’s outstanding debt, to avoid becoming the 
dominant creditor
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record drop by a saar of 18.7% to a mild increase at a saar of 
1.6% in the second half of 2014 (Figure A1.8). The recovery 
in consumption could not offset the correction in residential 
investment or private destocking, which subtracted 
4.4 percentage points from growth during the same period. 
However, business conditions are generally considered to be 
improving. Moreover, the labor market is tightening, with 
the unemployment rate declining to 3.6% from the peak of 
5.5% recorded in July 2009. However, the recovery has not 
yet passed through fully to business investment or wages, 
which returned to positive growth only in the fourth quarter, 
reaching 0.1% and 0.4%, respectively.
The accelerating US economic recovery and the Bank of 
Japan’s continued monetary easing weakened the Japanese 
yen in 2014. The currency depreciated by almost 14% against 
the US dollar and by 5.9% in real effective terms from January 
2014 to January 2015. While the depreciation has not boosted 
exports, the fall in imports more than halved the deficit in 
trade of goods and services to $12.6 billion over the year. 
Imports of both capital goods and consumer goods declined, 
but the contraction in imports of consumer durable goods was particularly 
severe at 7.3%, reflecting a correction from the advance purchase of 
durables before the VAT hike. Primary income from financial assets offset 
the trade deficit sufficiently to allow a current account surplus of 0.5% of 
GDP for 2014 as a whole. The external sector’s contribution to GDP was 
nil this year, which improved on being a drag on growth in 2013. 
When the government hiked the VAT rate from 5% to 8% in 
April 2014, headline consumer price inflation jumped from 
1.5% in the first quarter to 3.6% in second. However, the 
collapse of oil prices in the second half of last year slowed 
inflation to 2.4% by January 2015. The GDP deflator finally 
stopped falling in 2014 and rose by 1.6%, after the decline of 
0.6% in 2013. The rise in the GDP deflator was the first since 
1997, similarly coinciding with an increase in the VAT rate 
from 3% to 5% (Figure A1.9).
Japan’s growth outlook is generally positive but faces 
uncertainties. With higher VAT revenues, the primary fiscal 
deficit is estimated to have narrowed to 3.6% of GDP in 
FY2014 from 5.2% in the previous fiscal year. Postponing 
the second phase of the VAT increase will support growth 
momentum in the short run but halt fiscal consolidation 
on the revenue side. The government is expected to pursue 
prudent measures on the expenditure side to arrive at 
primary budget balance by 2020. Hence, public demand, both 
consumption and investment, should be muted during the 
forecast period. Growth will have to rely on private demand 
that is still somewhat fragile. 
Private consumption started rising in the second half of 
last year but not enough to reverse the drop in the first half, 
thus subtracting 0.7 percentage points from growth in 2014. Recovery is 
expected to remain slow in view of weak price pressures expected this 
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year. Investment is expected to pick up as corporate profits 
improve, but again only gradually, as production is well under 
full capacity and inventories remain high relative to sales in 
most industries, except perhaps electronic parts and devices 
(Figure A1.10). Construction weakened sharply after the 
VAT hike. Housing and building starts, both residential and 
nonresidential, have continued to decline since the second 
quarter of last year (Figure A1.11).
One positive development is an agreement, reached in 
February of this year, to reshape the historically protected 
and uncompetitive agriculture sector. The agreement to 
weaken the authority of the Central Union of Agricultural 
Cooperatives—Japan’s powerful farm lobby—is expected 
to help advance within this year Trans-Pacific Partnership 
negotiations with the US on agricultural products. This may 
improve sentiment toward investment in agriculture to help 
the government reach its goal of doubling food exports by 
2020, though the short-run impact may be limited.
The baseline scenario for 2015 assumes that domestic 
consumption and investment will recover gradually, while 
external demand, particularly in the euro area, will strengthen in the 
second half of the year. The rise in the GDP deflator will decelerate 
somewhat but remain positive. For 2016, the baseline assumes that 
private consumption of durable goods and investment in housing will 
rise somewhat in anticipation of the further rise in the VAT from 8% to 
10% on 1 April 2017. In sum, Japan’s growth rate in 2015 is forecast at 
1.1%, rising to 1.7% in 2016.
The Bank of Japan estimates that low oil prices will 
reduce consumer price inflation by 0.7–0.8 percentage points 
in 2015 but add 0.1–0.2 percentage points in 2016. Meanwhile, 
monetary policy is expected to remain accommodative, with 
the possibility of an additional boost if inflation is weaker 
than expected. With potential output estimated to grow by 
0.7% in 2015 and 0.8% in 2016, the output gap is likely to 
remain negative during the forecast period. If the global oil 
price rises only gradually, as now expected, and the negative 
output gap remains, headline inflation is likely to hover just 
above 1% during the forecast period. 
Australia and New Zealand
In the fourth quarter of 2014, Australia’s economy expanded 
by a saar of 2.2%, faster than the 1.4% growth in the previous 
quarter. The increase came mainly from consumption, 
which contributed 2.3 percentage points to growth, while 
fixed capital investment reversed from contraction to mild expansion 
but changes in inventories dragged growth down by 2.5 percentage 
points (Figure A1.12). Seasonally adjusted retail sales grew by 0.2% in 
December, marginally above the 0.1% growth in November. Consumer 
sentiment returned to positive territory in February, rising to 100.7 
points from January’s 93.2 points. However, the seasonally adjusted 
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A1.11 Housing and building starts, by floor area, Japan
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unemployment rate increased to 6.4% in January from 6.1% 
in December, reflecting 12,200 jobs lost. The Australian 
Industry Group’s performance of manufacturing index, where 
50 is the threshold for growth, fell to 45.4 from January’s 49, 
indicating a further slowdown in manufacturing. Inflation 
slowed to a seasonally adjusted 1.6% in the last quarter of 
2014 from 2.2% in the third. Declining oil prices and lower 
interest rates should boost household consumption, so a 
pickup in consumer spending should buoy the economy. The 
consensus forecast is for GDP to grow by 2.6% in 2015 and 
pick up to 3.0% in 2016.
New Zealand’s GDP accelerated to a saar of 5.5% in the 
third quarter of 2014 from 0.7% in the second. The expansion 
reflected strong private consumption, which contributed 3.6 
percentage points to growth, and fixed investment, which 
contributed 3.5 points (Figure A1.13). In the fourth quarter, 
seasonally adjusted retail sales rose by 1.6%, higher than the 
previous quarter’s 1.1%. Manufacturing continued to expand, 
with the performance of manufacturing index above the threshold 
of 50. That said, it fell to 50.9 in January 2015 from 57.1 in December. 
Business confidence recovered in October to 26.5 from a low 13.7 in 
the previous month, and in February 2015 it improved further to 34.4. 
Consumer confidence remained positive, though the index decreased by 
1.6% in the fourth quarter to 114.8 points. Inflation slowed to 0.8% in the 
last quarter from the third quarter’s 1.0%, but the seasonally adjusted 
unemployment rate increased to 5.7% from 5.4%. Rising 
construction, higher net migration, a robust labor market, and 
strong private consumption are expected to sustain growth. 
Following growth estimated at 3.2% in 2014, Consensus 
Forecasts panelists foresee the economy expanding by 2.9% in 
2015 and 2.6% in 2016. 
Commodity prices
Supply factors will continue to dominate the outlook for 
commodity prices. The sharp decline in oil prices will leave 
Brent crude well below its 2014 price in both 2015 and 2016. 
However, with growth forecast to pick up in the major 
industrial economies and some adjustments to supply likely, 
oil will rise somewhat. With low oil prices restraining input 
price pressures and supply providing enough cushion for 
changes in demand, food prices will continue to decline in 
2015. In 2016, though, the expected pickup in fuel prices will 
likely leave food prices generally flat.
Oil price movements
Oil prices plunged in the second half of 2014, ending almost 4 years of 
relatively stable but elevated prices that averaged around $110 per barrel 
(Figure A1.14). From its peak of $115 per barrel on 19 June 2014, oil 
prices fell by more than half to end the year below $60. While dramatic, 
A1.12 Demand-side contributions to growth, Australia
2012 2013 2014
Percentage points, seasonally adjusted annualized rate
−6
0
6
12
Q1 Q3 Q1 Q3 Q1 Q4
Consumption
Gross ﬁxed capital formation
Change in inventories
Net exports
Gross domestic product
 
Source: Haver Analystics (accessesd 9 March 2015)..
A1.13 Demand-side contributions to growth, New Zealand
2012 2013 2014
Percentage points, seasonally adjusted annualized rate
−10
−5
0
5
10
15
Q1 Q3 Q1 Q3 Q1 Q3
Consumption
Gross ﬁxed capital formation
Change in inventories
Net exports
Gross domestic product
 
Source: Haver Analystics (accessesd 9 March 2015)..
40  Asian Development Outlook 2015
the decline was not unprecedented. The market has 
experienced six episodes of sharp price decline since 1980, 
the most severe of which coincided with the sudden onset of 
the global financial crisis in 2008 (Figure A1.15). The most 
recent decline was the longest by far, but its 60% drop from 
peak to trough was not nearly as steep as the July–December 
2008 decline, when oil prices plummeted by 77% from $146 
per barrel to $34. 
The recent price-drop episode was mainly supply driven. 
Spurred by the high oil prices that prevailed for more than 3 
years before the current drop, companies in North America 
invested in new technologies to open up hard-to-extract 
resources. Crude oil production in the US alone soared from 
an average of 5.6 million barrels per day in 2011 to an average 
of 8.3 million in the first half of 2014. 
Initially, the increased US production was largely offset by 
production declines caused by civil war in Libya, an offensive 
by Sunni militants in Iraq, and sanctions on Iran imposed by 
the US and the European Union. The US Energy Information 
Administration reported that these and other conflicts removed 3.2 
million barrels per day from the market in the first half of 2014. But 
many of these disruptions started easing in the second half of 2014. Libya 
surprised markets by producing 900,000 barrels per day in October 
amidst political turmoil, while Iran was able to sustain production 
despite sanctions. Supply disruptions in Iraq from the ongoing Islamic 
State incursion eased, and oil production there bounced back by 600,000 
barrels per day from August to December. 
With global GDP growth relatively slow, world oil supply 
growth has outpaced demand growth, pushing crude oil 
prices down. As international oil transactions are settled in 
US dollars, the appreciation of the dollar has kept the local 
currency price of oil from falling as much as international 
prices, tempering demand from countries that do not peg 
to the dollar. Moreover, improved energy efficiency and 
developments in natural gas and renewable energy have 
lowered the oil intensity of global GDP. According to the 
International Energy Agency, demand for oil in member 
economies of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development fell from an average of 46.1 million barrels 
per day in 2013 to 45.6 million in 2014. The gap between 
production and use has lifted oil inventories, which had been 
run down prior to the 2008 price drop (Figure A1.16).
Another factor causing a faster decline in oil prices 
was a change in the policy objective of the Organization 
of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Markets 
had expected OPEC to cut production to stabilize oil prices and were 
surprised by the announcement after the 27 November 2014 policy 
meeting that it would maintain current production to defend market 
share. Thus the combined effect of increased US production, revived 
Middle East production, subdued global GDP growth, and the change 
in OPEC policy caused oil prices to plummet from a peak of $115 per 
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barrel in June 2014 to $45 in late January 2015, though it 
bounced back to trade closer to $60 per barrel in February. It 
is currently trading in the narrow band of $54–$61.
Oil price prospects
With the forecast improvement in the world economy, 
global oil consumption is forecast to strengthen but remain 
fragile. The International Energy Agency forecasts global 
consumption to increase slightly by 1 million barrels per 
day in 2015 and 2016. The diminishing role of oil in the fuel 
mix  as economies become more energy efficient and shift to 
renewable sources of energy will weaken the ability of lower 
oil prices to revive oil demand.
On the supply side, the wide variance in estimates of 
the breakeven price for US oil production make it difficult 
to predict how much extended low oil prices will affect 
production there. Although estimates of North American 
production have been reduced, the Energy Information Administration 
still expects US crude oil production to grow by 7.8% in 2015 and by 
another 2.4% in 2016, making North America the foremost contributor 
to global oil supply growth. Oil supply outside of OPEC is forecast to rise 
by 900,000 barrels per day in 2015 and 700,000 barrels per day in 2016.
As for OPEC, the November 2014 meeting called for continued 
production of 30 million barrels per day for 6 months. In the intervening 
3 months, there has been no sign that OPEC will change its current 
stance, as some key member countries continue to defend their market 
share by offering discounts to Asian consumers (Figure A1.17). 
Although threats to oil production and exports remain, the Energy 
Information Administration noted that continuing growth in 
non-OPEC production and strong Saudi Arabia production 
have made the current volume of supply disruption less 
important. Supply disruptions will still affect oil prices, but 
the severity of disruption that the market can tolerate has 
risen in light of robust global production.
With the lag between capital investments and the price 
changes that come in response, supply factors will continue 
dominate price movements through 2015. However, because 
shale oil has a shorter investment cycle than conventional oil, 
the lag in response has become shorter, making non-OPEC 
supply more responsive to price swings than suppliers 
were during past price declines. With rising demand and 
weakening supply, the market will be more balanced towards 
the latter part of 2015. Current futures prices suggest that the 
Brent crude oil price will stay within the range of $60–$70 
per barrel for the remainder of 2015 (Figure A1.18). As faster 
global growth raises demand, prices will likely rise in 2016 
but remain below the highs of the last 4 years. Barring 
additional major supply disruptions and weaker-than-
expected global demand growth, the Brent crude oil price is 
forecast to average $65 per barrel in 2015 and $75 in 2016.
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Food price movements and prospects
Along with transportation and some manufacturing 
industries, agriculture would be a major beneficiary of 
lower oil prices. Lower oil prices usually coincide with low 
agricultural commodity prices (Figure A1.19). Agriculture 
commodity prices are linked to oil prices through the 
cost of inputs such as chemical fertilizer and hauling, and 
increasingly through demand for grains and oilseeds to 
produce biofuels.
Agricultural commodity prices, especially for food, 
remained weak in 2014 (Figure A1.20). The overall 
agricultural commodity price index fell by 3.4% in 2014, with 
the sub-indexes for both food and raw materials declining. 
The edible oil price index declined by 6% in 2014, mainly 
reflecting record increases in global soybean production on 
unprecedentedly large yields in the US and South America. 
At the same time, the slump in crude oil prices depressed 
demand for palm oil and soybeans for use as biodiesel 
feedstock. The only sub-index posting an increase was the 
“other food” index, which rose by 4.3% in 2014 as tight supply and 
soaring demand for meat products supported prices.
Global food prices fell by 7.2% in 2014 as supply growth exceeded 
growth in demand for major crops, and as bumper crop harvests 
tempered price expectations. Increased wheat production in the US, 
Argentina, and the Commonwealth of Independent States pushed 
estimates of global production in the 2013/2014 crop year to an all-time 
high. The benchmark wheat price declined by 8.8% in 2014, 
its third consecutive year of decline (Figure A1.21). Similarly, 
sharp maize production increases in the European Union, 
the US, South Africa, Canada, and the Commonwealth of 
Independent States pushed international maize prices down 
by 26% in 2014. While supply increases pushed up the stock-
to-use ratios for both wheat and maize—from 25.8 to 26.6 for 
wheat and from 16.0 to 18.2 for maize—the opposite was true 
for rice. The ending stock for rice declined in 2013/2014 as 
growth in consumption exceeded growth in supply. However, 
prices still declined in 2014 after their run-up in 2013 because 
of irregularities surrounding the paddy pledging scheme of 
the Government of Thailand. 
The decline in food prices has continued into 2015, with 
the index dropping by 11.8% in the first 2 months. Prices 
for wheat, maize, and rice were all lower, but the decline 
was most pronounced for wheat. This reflects continued 
improvement in the prospects for wheat production in 2015, 
with world inventories already large. 
The decline in food prices will continue this year, 
assuming no major production setback. A mostly favorable outlook for 
2015 crop production provides a good backdrop for softer prices. The US 
Department of Agriculture forecasted in its March 2015 report that 
2014/2015 grain production would reach 2,475 million tons, up from an 
estimated 2,473 million in the previous crop year. The report envisages 
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a 1.2% increase in wheat production, and maize production 
essentially unchanged. As adverse weather in Thailand and 
Cambodia have weakened rice production prospects, rice 
production is forecast to decline by about 1% in the 2014/2015  
crop year. 
Concern over heavy flooding in Malaysia, the second-
ranked palm oil producer and exporter, put upward pressure 
on vegetable oil prices in late January. However, low crude 
oil prices continue to temper increases in palm oil prices, as 
they raise concern about weak demand for palm for biofuel. 
Forecasts for soybean production in 2014/15 have been raised, 
reflecting prospects for good harvests in Argentina, Brazil, 
and the US. The downward pressure on prices induced by 
production increases will be offset by upward pressure from 
some policy changes pertaining to biodiesel. For example, 
France raised the concentration of biodiesel sold to the public 
from 7% to 8% from January 2015, and Brazil raised the 
mandatory amount of ethanol to be blended into commercial 
gasoline in March 2015. The higher ethanol blending mandate 
will provide major support for Brazilian ethanol demand and 
the sugar price. 
With low oil prices holding back input price pressures, 
and supply providing enough cushion for changes in 
demand, and assuming no adverse weather or upshot from 
protectionist food policies, food prices are forecast to decline 
by 6% in 2015 and remain flat in 2016.
External environment in sum
The external environment should support steady GDP growth 
and muted inflation in developing Asia. The pickup in the 
pace of recovery in the major industrial economies should 
boost demand for the region’s exports. The baseline forecasts 
assume monetary expansion in both the euro area and Japan 
to keep these economies from falling into extended deflation. 
Lower international oil prices should prove beneficial for 
global growth. While the dampening effect on inflation from 
relatively cheap oil will be short-lived, with prices expected to 
bounce back somewhat in the remainder of 2015 and through 
2016, declining global food prices will keep inflation in check.
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Why worry about ﬁ nancial development? The remarkable story of 
growth in developing Asia is well known. Yet, other than in the ﬁ nancial 
centers of Singapore and Hong Kong, China, the region’s ﬁ nancial 
systems—its commercial banks and its bond and equity markets—remain 
relatively backward. Despite considerable widening and deepening since 
the Asian ﬁ nancial crisis of 1997–1998, developing Asia’s ﬁ nancial sector 
lags well behind the advancing frontier of global ﬁ nance. The stark 
contrast between Asia’s dynamic real sector and its backward ﬁ nancial 
sector begs the question why now is the time for policy makers to turn 
their attention toward the sector. 
Moreover, the global ﬁ nancial crisis of 2008–2009 
made many suspicious of unfettered ﬁ nancial development 
and innovation. To many observers, the global crisis was 
the result of too much ﬁ nancial innovation and too many 
sophisticated products like mortgage-backed securities and 
collateralized debt obligations that proﬁ ted only a narrow 
group of ﬁ rms while exposing the entire ﬁ nancial system—
and ultimately the real sector—to excessive risk. Although 
developing Asia is a long way from that state of ﬁ nancial 
sophistication, the extent of the global crisis has engendered 
a certain caution toward the sector. 
Yet there are a number of reasons why a sound and 
effi  cient ﬁ nancial system matters more than ever for 
developing Asia. First, Asia’s growth slowed in the wake of 
the global crisis (Figure 2.1.1), but a robust ﬁ nancial sector 
can help allocate resources more effi  ciently, fostering a 
dynamic private sector to reignite growth. Second, ﬁ nancial 
development can be inclusive, but this outcome cannot be 
taken for granted. Action is needed to ensure that ﬁ nancial development 
aligns with social equity goals. Finally, safeguarding ﬁ nancial stability 
must be a cornerstone of the ﬁ nancial development agenda. Financial 
instability, especially ﬁ nancial crisis, can derail growth and harm the 
poor, wiping out the beneﬁ ts from ﬁ nancial deepening.
Thus the convergence of three strategic challenges—reigniting 
economic growth, tackling rising inequality, and maintaining ﬁ nancial 
stability—adds urgency to the long-standing task of building sound and 
effi  cient ﬁ nancial systems in developing Asia.
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The case for ﬁnancial sector 
deepening 
The region’s ﬁnancial system appears to be in much better 
shape today than it was during the Asian ﬁnancial crisis of 
1997–1998. While that crisis had multiple causes, inefficient 
ﬁnancial systems that failed to allocate capital inﬂows 
to productive uses lay at the heart of it. The consequent 
deterioration in the quality of investments eventually 
precipitated capital outﬂows and the outbreak of the crisis. 
Extensive reform and restructuring greatly improved the 
health of the region’s banking system after that ﬁnancial 
debacle (Figure 2.1.2). 
The impression remains that ﬁnance is relatively 
backward in developing Asia, but the data suggest otherwise. 
The ﬁnancial sector in the region compares well with those 
of its developing economy peers outside Asia. Yet it clearly 
lags far behind ﬁnancial sectors in the advanced economies. 
Should policy makers be concerned about this gap? 
The answer depends on the extent that ﬁnancial development 
supports the economy’s broader development goals. Turning 
to the evidence will help make the case that closing the gap is 
important for future growth in the region. 
The state of Asian ﬁnancial systems 
Evaluating the state of developing Asia’s ﬁnancial systems entails 
benchmarking the region against ﬁnancial development in other parts 
of the world. To get a clear view of the issues, one must factor in 
wide heterogeneity within the region. Using the latest data from the 
World Bank’s ﬁnancial structure database, Table 2.1.1 shows the size of 
banking system deposits, stock markets, and public and private bond 
markets, all measured as a percentage of GDP for each region of the 
world and each subregion within Asia. 
Developing Asia has on average a banking system that equals 60% of 
GDP, stock market capitalization at 71% of GDP, public bond markets at 
26% of GDP, and private bonds markets at 20%. Comparing developing 
Asia with other developing regions around the world, its ﬁnancial 
system—whether measured by bank deposits or stock and bond market 
size—is larger than those of other developing regions, and also larger 
than those of high-income economies that are not members of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 
On the other hand, compared with OECD members, developing Asia has 
a banking system and especially bond markets that are quite small.
Asia has two subregions whose ﬁnancial systems are quite 
underdeveloped: Central Asia and the Paciﬁc. More speciﬁcally, the 
ﬁnancial systems of these economies are heavily dominated by banks, 
2.1.2  Bank capital to total assets in crisis-hit Asian countries
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and the bond and stock markets remain underdeveloped (Annex table, 
page 102). Thus, funding in Central Asia and the Paciﬁc comes largely 
through the banking system. Within Central Asia, Kazakhstan has 
the largest ﬁnancial system, with a banking system amounting to 27% 
of GDP and a stock market at 28%. The ﬁnancial systems of other 
economies in the region are much smaller by comparison. 
In the Paciﬁc, Papua New Guinea is the only economy with a stock 
market, which is large relative to GDP, at 80%. Banking systems in the 
region are rather small except in Vanuatu, where it equals 73% of GDP. 
The ﬁnancial sectors in the three other Asian subregions—East Asia, 
Southeast Asia, and South Asia—are much more developed. Variation 
exists within each region, but on average ﬁnancial sectors are larger 
than those in Central Asia and the Paciﬁc.
As the comparison in Table 2.1.1 shows, developing Asia’s ﬁnancial 
sectors compare well with those in other parts of the developing world. 
However, much of this comes from the relatively advanced state of 
ﬁnancial institutions in East Asia and Southeast Asia—especially those 
in Singapore and Hong Kong, China, which have become global ﬁnancial 
centers. Cross-country variation reveals that some economies in the 
region suffer a ﬁnancial sector gap in comparison with even other 
developing economies (Annex table, page 102). 
Relative ﬁnancial backwardness has consequences for the cost of 
capital. Businesses in economies with lower ﬁnancial development 
generally have to pay a higher premium over the deposit rate than 
those operating in ﬁnancially advanced economies. Looking at the 
2.1.1 Financial structure around the world, 2011
Economy/Subregion Banking system Stock market Public bonds Private bonds
Developing Asia 60.0 71.0 25.7 20.4
Central Asia 23.1 25.0 0.0 0.0
East Asia 60.1 73.4 25.9 27.8
South Asia 57.0 60.3 27.0 4.0
Southeast Asia 67.9 77.7 28.3 11.8
The Paciﬁc 44.5 54.1 0.0 0.0
Rest of the developing world 43.5 50.2 18.4 8.5
Europe and Central Asia 42.7 25.4 17.5 0.8
Latin America and the Caribbean 41.9 47.3 25.2 13.5
Middle East and North Africa 67.4 40.1 1.9 0.0
Sub-Saharan Africa 38.4 103.5 8.7 5.2
High income 104.3 82.0 78.7 53.0
OECD members 110.2 84.7 85.3 57.6
Others 41.2 49.3 2.8 0.0
OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
Notes: Banking systems are measured by the amount of deposits, stock markets by capitalization, and public and private bond markets by bonds outstanding, all expressed 
as a percentage of GDP. Regional averages are weighted by GDP.  The OECD consists of Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States. Other high-income economies cover Antigua and Barbuda; Aruba; Bahamas; Bahrain; Barbados; Bermuda; Croatia; 
Cyprus; Equatorial Guinea; Kuwait; Latvia; Lithuania; Macau, China; Malta; Monaco; Oman; Puerto Rico; Qatar; Russian Federation; Saudi Arabia; Trinidad and Tobago; 
United Arab Emirates; and Uruguay.
Source: ADB estimates based on data from Beck et al. (2000, 2009) and Cihak et al. (2012).
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average interest rate spread, developing Asia again compares 
well with Latin America but faces a considerable funding 
disadvantage against the advanced economies (Figure 2.1.3).
Somewhat contrary to the conventional wisdom of 
ﬁnancial backwardness, the review above ﬁnds Asia’s 
ﬁnancial development comparing favorably with that of other 
parts of the developing world, though it is still well behind 
the advanced economies. But purely quantitative measures of 
ﬁnancial development—such as the ratio of bank deposits or 
liquid liabilities to GDP—are far from perfect, as comparisons 
of sector size do not always capture differences in quality 
or efficiency. For example, Dekle and Pundit (forthcoming) 
points out ﬁnancial development indicators should ideally 
encompass access and efficiency in addition to depth. 
And, according to Aizenman, Jinjarak, and Park (2015), the 
quality of ﬁnance, evident in the direction of credit to the 
most productive sectors of the economy, matters at least as 
much as the quantity of ﬁnance. However, greater liquid 
liabilities (a measure of ﬁnancial development) often mean 
a tighter lending–deposit spread (a measure of ﬁnancial 
efficiency), suggesting a positive relationship between the two 
(Figure 2.1.4). 
As noted above, the case for a sound and efficient 
ﬁnancial sector in Asia rests on three pillars. First, ﬁnancial 
sector development can yield a growth dividend in light 
of the large gap that still separates the region from the 
advanced economies. Second, ﬁnancial access must be 
expanded and broadened to achieve more inclusive growth. 
Third, the region must safeguard its ﬁnancial stability even 
as it develops its ﬁnancial sector. The next three sections 
examine each pillar in turn.
Financial development and growth
A robust and efficient ﬁnancial system promotes growth by 
channeling resources to their most productive uses, thereby fostering 
more efficient resource allocation. A stronger and better ﬁnancial 
system can buoy growth by boosting aggregate savings and investment 
rates, thereby speeding the accumulation of physical capital. Financial 
development further promotes growth by strengthening competition 
and stimulating innovation, thereby fostering dynamic efficiency.
Does the evidence support a positive link between ﬁnance and 
growth? Many studies have shown—using cross-country data, panel data 
that span time and economies, corporate data, or country case studies—
that ﬁnancial system depth signiﬁcantly facilitates growth. In particular, 
higher growth is often associated with having a bigger ﬁnancial system, 
as measured by liquid liabilities, private credit, and stock market 
capitalization.
Revealing cross-country regression studies include King and 
Levine (1993), which ﬁnds that ﬁnancial depth positively inﬂuences 
growth in income, capital stock, and productivity in a sample of 
2.1.4  Liquid liabilities and lending–deposit spread
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2.1.3  Lending–deposit spreads, 2011
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77 countries during 1960–1989; Levine and Zervos (1998), which ﬁnds 
that banking development and stock market liquidity positively predict 
these same three variables even after controlling for political factors; 
and Beck and Levine (2004), which reexamines the issue by applying 
panel econometric techniques to new data and ﬁnds stock markets 
and banks positively inﬂuencing economic growth. More recently, 
Cihak et al. (2013) replicates the model of King and Levine (1993), using 
an updated version of the World Bank Global Financial Development 
Database and conﬁrms the growth-enhancing effects of ﬁnancial 
development previously cited.
Despite numerous studies that have explored the relationships 
between ﬁnance and growth, weaknesses remain in measures 
of ﬁnancial development (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 2008). 
Unfortunately, no existing indicator adequately captures these ﬁnancial 
services, so empirical studies continue to rely on traditional measures 
of ﬁnancial development (Levine and Zervos 1998, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Levine 2008).
Like measures of ﬁnancial development, causality is the other issue 
that clouds understanding of the ﬁnance–growth relationship. Because 
fast-growing economies require more ﬁnance, it may be that growth 
promotes ﬁnance, rather than the other way round. A seminal study by 
Rajan and Zingales (1998) is one of the very few papers that effectively 
addresses causality. To mitigate the issue of endogeneity, or two-way 
causality, the empirical analysis in this section generates estimates using 
generalized method of moments.
Analysis in this section further assesses the empirical relationship 
between ﬁnancial development and economic growth. Building upon 
the large body of existing research, it has three noteworthy features. 
First, it updates the sample period to 2011. Second, it looks at how 
country characteristics—such as advanced versus developing status—
affect the ﬁnance–growth nexus. Third, it incorporates new variables, 
distinguishing in particular between ﬁxed and ﬂexible exchange rate 
regimes. Box 2.1.1 explains the data and methodology used for the 
econometric analysis.
Several interesting ﬁndings emerge from the empirical analysis 
(Table 2.1.2). The most important is that, regardless of the structure of 
the ﬁnancial system, ﬁnancial development beneﬁts economic growth 
(model 1). The results clearly show that, regardless of the relative 
importance of banks versus capital markets (as the ﬁnancial system 
in some economies may be dominated by banks, while capital markets 
play a bigger role in others), the development of the ﬁnancial system 
as a whole has a positive and signiﬁcant effect on economic growth. 
Larger shares of banking sector (model 2) and stock market activity 
(model 3) relative to GDP are both positively associated with higher 
economic growth. The positive effect of ﬁnancial development on 
growth is especially evident in developing economies, and even more 
so in developing Asia. This ﬁnding is consistent with studies that ﬁnd 
ﬁnancial development having an effect on growth that is not linear 
(e.g., Ju and Wei 2011). Estrada, Park, and Ramayandi (forthcoming) 
offers a comprehensive discussion of all empirical results, including 
those pertaining to developing countries. 
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2.1.1 Data and methodology for analyzing the relationship between ﬁnancial development and economic growth
A new study by Estrada, Park, and Ramayandi (forthcoming) 
explores the impact of ﬁnancial development on economic 
growth. Following the general approach in the literature, 
econometric techniques are applied to examine the 
relationship between ﬁnancial development and growth, 
with the following basic structure:
xi,t =  + 1[FD]i,t + [ER] + 	[Other]i,t + 
i,t
where a number of ﬁnancial sector development indicators 
[FD], the exchange rate regime [ER], and a number of 
ﬁnancial and nonﬁnancial control variables [Other] are 
assumed to affect economic growth (x).
For measures of economic growth, the paper uses a series 
of non-overlapping 5-year averages of GDP growth per 
capita for each of the sample countries. 
Three indicators of ﬁnancial development are used in this 
study: 
(i)  Total liquid liabilities relative to GDP. This measures 
the relative size and depth of the ﬁnancial sector, 
consisting of currency plus demand and the interest-
bearing liabilities of banks and nonbank ﬁnancial 
intermediaries. This is the broadest measure of 
ﬁnancial intermediation activity, as it covers all 
banks, central banks, and nonﬁnancial intermediary 
activities. 
(ii)  Private credit from deposit money banks relative 
to GDP. This measure isolates the impact of the 
banking sector.
(iii)  Stock market capitalization relative to GDP. 
This gauges the size of an equity market relative to 
the economy. 
Data on liquid liabilities are obtained from the 
Financial Development and Structure Dataset of Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2000, 2009) and Cihak 
et al. (2012), updated in November 2013. Data on private 
credit and stock market capitalization are taken from 
the World Bank’s World Development Indicators online 
database.
Representation of exchange rate regimes considers both 
the de facto classiﬁcation and the International Monetary 
Fund official classiﬁcation constructed by Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2004) and updated by Ilzetski, Reinhart, and 
Rogoff (2011). 
A number of variables are included to control for other 
factors affecting growth, represented by [Other] in the 
behavioral equation. The choice of these variables closely 
follows those used in many growth regression analyses done 
previously (Beck, Levine, and Loayza 2000; Edison et al. 
2002; Levine and Zervos 1998). 
In addition, the present study includes three measures of 
ﬁnancial openness, two de facto and one de jure. Financial 
openness is included because it is related to ﬁnancial 
development yet distinct from it, and it may inﬂuence 
growth.
The full sample of the GDP per capita growth 
regression is a cross-country panel data set covering 108 
economies (of which 20 are in developing Asia) with ﬁve 
non-overlapping 5-year periods from 1977 to 2011. A full 
treatment of data and methodology is in Estrada, Park, and 
Ramayandi (forthcoming). 
2.1.2 The impact of ﬁnancial development on growth
Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ilzetski, Reinhart, and Rogoff de facto International Monetary Fund de jure
Total ﬂows L and M-F Chinn and Ito Total ﬂows L and M-F Chinn and Ito
Model 1            
Liquid liabilities, % of GDP  2.723** 2.778* 3.033** 2.612** 2.854* 2.797*
(1.360) (1.534) (1.484) (1.296) (1.485) (1.434)
Model 2      
Private credit, % of GDP  1.509* 1.507* 1.608** 1.525* 1.748** 1.745**
(0.821) (0.774) (0.715) (0.837) (0.832) (0.729)
Model 3      
Stock market capitalization, % of GDP  1.485* 1.341* 2.252*** 3.028*** 2.400*** 3.516***
(0.796) (0.792) (0.752) (0.530) (0.439) (0.656)
Note: Total ﬂows, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (L and M-F, 2007), and Chinn and Ito (2008) refer to different measures of ﬁnancial openness. Ilzetski, Reinhart, and Rogoff 
(2011) de facto and International Monetary Fund de jure refer to different deﬁnitions of foreign exchange rate regime. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, 
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Estimations were done through the generalized method of moments, with the following control variables: initial income per capita, government spending, 
inﬂation, years of schooling, trade openness, foreign exchange rate regime, and period indicators. 
Source: Estrada, Park, and Ramayandi (forthcoming).
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The results for the example of developing Asia illustrate the 
potential size of the effect on economic growth. For example, boosting 
developing Asia’s average ratio to GDP of liquid liabilities—currency plus 
checking and interest-bearing accounts in ﬁnancial institutions—from 
65% to 75% adds almost 0.4 percentage points to average annual GDP 
growth per capita.1 Also, on average, an increase of 10 percentage points 
in developing Asia’s average ratio of private credit to GDP (an alternative 
measure of ﬁnancial depth) is associated with higher growth in GDP per 
capita by 0.3 percentage points per year. These numbers are far from 
deﬁnitive but do give us a rough, ﬁrst-order indication of the effect of 
ﬁnance on growth.
Interestingly, analysis does not yield any robust results about the effect 
of the exchange rate regime on growth or the ﬁnance–growth nexus. 
While many Asian economies have moved toward more ﬂexible exchange 
rates since the Asian ﬁnancial crisis, evidence suggests that more ﬂexible 
exchange rates do not necessarily promote economic growth.
The ﬁnance–inclusion link 
The role of ﬁnancial development in tackling inequality has received 
much less attention than, say, that of ﬁscal policy. So how exactly does 
ﬁnancial development inﬂuence income inequality? Economic theory 
provides conﬂicting predictions.2 On the one hand, by making ﬁnancial 
services more available to the poor, ﬁnancial development can narrow 
income inequality. Financial services can enhance opportunities for the 
poor to pursue more education, for example, or start a new business. 
On the other hand, if ﬁnancial development largely beneﬁts senior 
ﬁnance professionals and other wealthy individuals, with little beneﬁt 
for the poor, it may exacerbate income inequality.
The relationship between ﬁnancial development and income 
inequality can be through indirect channels. Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Levine (2009) argue that ﬁnancial development can affect income 
inequality indirectly by changing the composition of labor demand. 
If expanded ﬁnancial services boost demand for low-skilled workers, 
wages for low-skill workers increase, mitigating income inequality. 
On the other hand, if increased ﬁnancial services raise demand for high-
skilled workers and hence their wages, income inequality can worsen.
As conceptual grounds exist for both beneﬁcial and adverse effects, 
the nexus between ﬁnancial development and inequality is ultimately 
an empirical issue that must be settled by empirical analysis. Such an 
exercise is performed here, analyzing the factors possibly affecting the 
extent to which ﬁnancial development inﬂuences income inequality, 
using the data and methodology outlined in Box 2.1.2.
From the empirical analysis, ﬁnancial development has a U-shaped 
effect on income inequality (Table 2.1.3). As the ﬁnancial system 
develops, inequality improves until it approaches the mean level of 
ﬁnancial development, but then tends to deteriorate as the ﬁnancial 
system continues to develop. To test the robustness of the results, two 
additional analyses—instrumental variables estimation and growth form 
regression—are performed to address possible endogeneity issues. By and 
large, the results of both analyses are consistent with earlier results. 
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2.1.2 Data and methodology for analyzing the relationship between ﬁnancial development and income inequality
This box describes the data and econometric methodology 
used to explore the impact of ﬁnancial development and 
income inequality. Financial development is measured using 
three ratios: liquidity liabilities to GDP, private credit from 
deposit money banks to GDP, and stock market capitalization 
to GDP. The analysis applies data obtained from the World 
Bank’s Global Financial Development Database for ﬁnancial 
development indicators. The summary statistics are reported 
in Park and Shin (forthcoming a). 
The exercise uses panel regression with ﬁxed effects 
because it is essential when investigating the causal effect 
of ﬁnancial development to control for unobserved variables 
speciﬁc to individual economies. The analysis experiments 
with two alternative measures of income inequality: the 
Gini coefficient of market income and the Gini coefficient 
of disposable income. In light of the well-known nonlinear 
relationship between per capita GDP and income inequality—
the Kuznets curve—the linear, square, and cube terms of per 
capita GDP are included in the regressions. Nonlinearity in 
ﬁnancial development is similarly taken into account.
A number of other factors expected to affect income 
inequality have likewise been added: economic openness, 
the share of high technology exports in manufacturing 
exports, the share of agriculture in employment, and 
government size. 
Two signiﬁcant drivers of income inequality are 
globalization (here interpreted as trade openness and 
measured by the ratio of the sum of exports and imports 
to GDP) and progress in acquiring and deploying 
technological skills (see for example, Jaumotte, Lall, and 
Papageorgiou [2013] and the literature surveyed in the paper). 
Trade inﬂuences income inequality by widening the wage 
gap between high- and low-skilled workers. Skills-biased 
technological progress raises the wages of highly skilled 
workers more than of low-skill workers, which widens income 
inequality. A higher share of agriculture in employment is 
expected to worsen income inequality as agricultural workers 
tend to earn low wages. Finally, government size, measured as 
the share of government expenditure in GDP, is included as 
some government expenditure redistributes wealth. 
While the panel regression results are suggestive, 
they do not prove causal relation running from ﬁnancial 
development to income inequality. To overcome this 
problem, two additional analyses are performed. The ﬁrst 
uses instrumental variables estimation. The second entails 
transforming regression into its growth form. As the 
regressions are based on panel regression with ﬁxed effects, 
one cannot use legal origins or latitude as an instrumental 
variable because they do not vary over time. Analysis 
uses, instead, data on law and order collected from the 
International Country Risk Guide, which assesses law 
separately from order, each with a score of 0–3 points. 
The law score captures the strength and impartiality of 
the legal system, while the order score considers popular 
observance of the law. 
Factors that inﬂuence how much ﬁnancial development 
affects income inequality are investigated, with the following 
being of particular interest: 
(i)  Ratio of primary schooling. A main channel by 
which ﬁnancial development inﬂuences income 
inequality is through the provision of opportunities 
for the poor to build human capital. If the rich and 
the poor had similar stocks of human capital, the 
impact of ﬁnancial development on equity would be 
lower.
(ii)  Institutions. Stronger institutions and better 
governance encourage ﬁnancial institutions to 
lend on the basis of commercial merit rather than 
personal or business connections, which provides 
more opportunities to the poor.
(iii)  Macroeconomic stability. Macroeconomic stability 
multiplies the beneﬁts of ﬁnancial development.
To get the ratio of primary schooling, average years of 
primary schooling is divided by average years of total 
schooling, based on data collected from Barro and 
Lee (2013). While this ratio does not directly capture the 
education gap between the rich and the poor, a high ratio 
implies there is more scope for the poor to receive additional 
education. The quality of institutions is measured by law and 
order. Finally, macroeconomic stability is measured by the 
inﬂation rate. Park and Shin (forthcoming a) explain in more 
depth the data and methodology. 
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With respect to the impact of ﬁnancial development 
on income inequality, an interesting and natural follow-up 
question is to ask what factors inﬂuence the degree of the 
impact. That is, what are the factors that determine whether 
or not ﬁnancial development will have a signiﬁcant effect 
on income inequality? To answer this, one needs to look 
at three factors for which there are conceptual grounds 
for an effect on the ﬁnance–inequality nexus: the ratio of 
primary schooling to total schooling, law and order, and 
macroeconomic stability. 
As expected, the empirical evidence indicates that when 
the ratio of primary schooling increases and law and order 
improves, ﬁnancial development becomes more effective 
at reducing inequality. On the other hand, macroeconomic 
stability does not affect the relationship. The ﬁndings imply 
that an important channel for the pro-equity effect of 
ﬁnancial development is education, reaffirming the potential 
of education as an equalizing force. The education channel 
can be strengthened by policies that make it easier for the 
poor to ﬁnance their education by borrowing from ﬁnancial institutions. 
The salient policy implication of the empirical analysis for 
developing Asia is that ﬁnancial development per se does not 
automatically reduce income inequality. In fact, the empirical evidence 
is mixed and does not point to a clear, deﬁnite relationship between the 
two. Empirical ambiguity thus mirrors theoretical ambiguity. Intuitively, 
reduced inequality is more likely the product of ﬁnancial inclusion than 
of ﬁnancial development. It would therefore be worthwhile to include 
ﬁnancial inclusion as an additional independent variable in the empirical 
analysis—if only the data were available. There is, however, negative 
correlation between the Gini coefficient and ﬁnancial inclusion, which 
supports the conjecture (Figure 2.1.5). Financial development must be 
accompanied by ﬁnancial inclusion to foster inclusive growth.
2.1.3 Gini coefficient and ﬁnancial development
Variables
GINI index (market income) GINI index (disposable income)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Liquid liabilities –0.080 –0.209** –0.224 –0.107* –0.251*** -0.234*
 (% of GDP) [0.050] [0.099] [0.138] [0.059] [0.091] [0.128]
Square of liquid liabilities 0.012 0.027* 0.034* 0.015* 0.034** 0.034**
 (% of GDP) [0.008] [0.014] [0.018] [0.009] [0.013] [0.017]
Observations 3,475 1,961 1,524 3,475 1,961 1,524
Adjusted R-squared 0.034 0.161 0.107 0.009 0.091 0.074
Number of groups 153 131 121 153 131 121
Note: In columns 1, 2, and 3, the dependent variable is the Gini index of market income, while in columns 4, 5, and 6 the dependent variable is the Gini index of disposable 
income. Each column refers to a different speciﬁcation, with a different set of independent variables. The ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP is used as a proxy for ﬁnancial 
development. The regression results are from a panel regression with ﬁxed effects. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. The statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels is denoted by ***, **, and *. Control variables not reported above are openness, share of agriculture in total employment, government expenditure, and 
high technology exports.
Source: Park and Shin, forthcoming a.
2.1.5  Income inequality and financial inclusion, 2011
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Issues surrounding ﬁnancial stability 
However beneﬁcial ﬁnancial development, innovation, and 
liberalization generally are, they sometimes destabilize 
ﬁnancial systems. While these virtues strengthen and 
improve the ﬁnancial system in the long run, they may 
jeopardize stability in the short run. Yet ﬁnancial instability 
in general and ﬁnancial crisis in particular can have huge 
repercussions on growth. The global ﬁnancial crisis of 
2008–2009 quickly spilled over from the ﬁnancial sector 
into the real economy and almost brought the world to 
its knees. In 2009, global output stood virtually still—its 
worst performance in the postwar era—and the volume 
of world trade fell by over 10%. The global crisis sparked 
widespread fears of a repeat of the Great Depression, which 
also had its origins in the ﬁnancial markets. Furthermore, 
the damage that a ﬁnancial crisis inﬂicts on growth can be 
long lived. The world economy did not fully recover from the 
Great Depression until World War II; it is still struggling to 
shake off the effects of the global economic crisis more than 
half a decade later. 
Closer to home, the devastating Asian ﬁnancial crisis 
of 1997–1998 brought the East Asian Miracle to a rude halt. 
The result of a toxic combination of large capital inﬂows 
and ﬁnancial underdevelopment that eroded the quality of 
investment, the Asian ﬁnancial crisis inﬂicted on several 
high-ﬂying miracle economies real GDP contraction as it 
peaked in 1998: Indonesia by 13%, the Republic of Korea by 
6%, Malaysia by 7%, and Thailand by 11%—in each case a 
sharp drop from the period immediately before the crisis 
(Figure 2.1.6). While the sky-high pre-crisis growth rates 
may have partly reﬂected unsustainably high investment 
rates, the legacy effects of the crisis itself may have 
contributed to the long-term decline in growth since then. 
It is therefore of paramount importance for Asia that the 
ﬁnancial system itself does not generate growth-crippling 
instability or crisis. 
Financial instability not only harms growth but also 
exacerbates poverty and inequality. Intuitively, ﬁnancial 
instability adversely affects inclusive growth because the 
poor are disproportionately defenseless against ﬁnancial 
crises. For example, the sharp increase in the unemployment rate 
that often accompanies crisis-induced recessions has a bigger impact 
on the poor because, by deﬁnition, they have less ﬁnancial and real 
wealth to tide them over the hard times. After the global ﬁnancial 
crisis, the unemployment rate doubled in many European Union 
economies—and tripled in the hardest hit (Figure 2.1.7). During the 
Asian ﬁnancial crisis, many households were hurt by unemployment 
and reduced earnings made all the worse by rising prices. Lacking in 
assets and social protection, the poor and near-poor were the worst 
hit. Suryahadi, Sumarto, and Pritchett (2003) showed that the poverty 
rate in Indonesia more than doubled from about 15% at the onset of the 
2.1.6  Growth rates before and after the Asian financial crisis, 
selected Asian economies
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2.1.7  Unemployment rates before and after the global 
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crisis in mid-1997 to a high of 33% near the end of 1998, pushing some 
36 million into poverty. Knowles, Pernia, and Racelis (1999) showed 
that income distribution worsened during the crisis in Thailand and 
the Philippines.
The need for ﬁnancial development 
To sum up, developing Asia now compares favorably with other parts 
of the developing world in terms of ﬁnancial depth, but it still lags the 
advanced economies by a wide margin. Because ﬁnancial depth has a 
signiﬁcant and positive effect on economic growth, this ﬁnding suggests 
that the region can reap a growth dividend from further ﬁnancial 
development. But ﬁnancial development does not necessarily promote 
more inclusive growth. Further, the region does not visibly outperform 
other developing regions in terms of ﬁnancial inclusion. This means that 
developing Asia has scope for extending access for the poor to ﬁnancial 
services, which currently leave them underserved. Finally, the high costs 
of ﬁnancial crises on growth and equity calls for continued vigilance 
against ﬁnancial instability—all the more so as external and homegrown 
risks to stability lurk in the background, notwithstanding the improved 
health of the region’s ﬁnancial system. 
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Financial development 
for growth
Four key areas of Asia’s ﬁnancial development will matter greatly 
for sustaining growth in the coming years. First, the region will 
require efficient ﬁnance to continue channeling affordable credit to 
ﬁrms in adequate amounts and support much-desired investment. 
Second, banks in particular have to be kept well-tuned, as they remain 
an essential component of robust ﬁnancial systems in the region. 
Third, the mounting importance of productivity growth as a driver of 
growth in Asia highlights the need to knock down barriers to long-term 
ﬁnance, especially for infrastructure and innovation. Finally, to deepen 
the pool of long-term capital, it is important that the region continue to 
develop domestic bond markets, building on the considerable progress 
already made in this area.
Credit, investment, and growth in Asia
High rates of investment, fueled by high saving rates, helped developing 
Asia rapidly build up its stock of productive capital. This capital 
contributed greatly in turn to the region’s outstanding growth record 
in recent decades. Today, productivity growth is due to take a bigger 
role in sustaining the region’s growth. Even so, investment remains an 
important factor. The distinction between the two is in truth sometimes 
blurred. Investment in infrastructure such as roads, ports, and power 
plants, for instance, can improve the productivity of all ﬁrms and 
industries. 
The most immediate and direct contribution of the ﬁnancial system 
to economic growth in Asia would therefore be to channel credit to 
ﬁrms and industries for investment and productivity. In this regard, the 
biggest challenges would be to increase the availability of funds and 
to lower their cost. To date, the region still struggles with inefficient 
ﬁnance, especially in lower-income economies, where ﬁnancial sectors 
are largely underdeveloped (see Banking sector development, credit, and 
investment on next page). The narrow availability and high cost of credit 
traces largely to inefficiency in the ﬁnancial sector, which is indicated by 
high interest rate spreads and sometimes excessive allocation of credit to 
state-owned ﬁrms at the expense of the more dynamic private sector. 
Financial sector efficiency and credit
As ﬁnancial systems become more efficient, the availability of credit 
rises and its cost goes down. A widely used indicator of ﬁnancial sector 
efficiency is the interest rate spread, or the gap between the lending rate 
and the deposit rate. While it is an imperfect measure, affected by such 
factors as government-imposed interest rate controls, it nevertheless 
indicates comparative efficiency, with a narrower spread showing 
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greater competitiveness and, therefore, efficiency. Data for 
developing Asia show a tighter interest rate spread associated 
with a higher share of private credit in GDP (Figure 2.2.1) 
and credit at lower cost (Figure 2.2.2). This suggests that 
a more efficient ﬁnancial sector can indeed unlock more 
affordable credit in the region.
Credit for state and private enterprise
In some Asian economies, the government directs banks 
to funnel a substantial share of credit to state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs). This is especially true if the banks 
themselves are owned by the state. But SOEs tend to be less 
efficient than private ﬁrms. They are subject to government 
interference and are less driven by the proﬁt motive. As 
credit to SOEs siphons credit away from the more efficient 
private sector, it weakens productivity across the entire 
economy. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is perhaps 
the most widely recognized example of an economy facing 
such problems. 
Several studies provide evidence that resource 
misallocation by imperfect ﬁnancial markets can substantially 
reduce productivity and growth in the PRC. One by Hsieh and 
Klenow (2009) ﬁnds that reallocating capital and labor within 
the manufacturing sector to equalize marginal products (or 
make the most efficient use of inputs) to the extent observed 
in the US could increase total factor productivity by 30%–50% 
in the PRC and by 40%–60% in India. Another study by 
Dollar and Wei (2007) ﬁnds that transferring some of the 
capital employed by SOEs to the private sector to equalize the 
marginal revenue product of capital could raise GDP by 5%, 
and still others by Brandt, Tombe, and Zhu (2013) and Song, 
Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2011) ﬁnd that credit extended to 
SOEs signiﬁcantly retards economic growth. 
Banking sector development, 
credit, and investment
Banks underlie sound and efficient ﬁnancial systems in 
developing Asia. Even with the rapid growth of capital 
markets in middle-income countries, they continue to dominate the 
ﬁnancial landscape across the region. For that reason, a well-functioning 
banking sector that efficiently channels resources to investment and 
other productive activities remains indispensable for economic growth. 
Vibrant capital markets complement sound and efficient banks 
but do not substitute for them. Financially advanced economies such 
as the US and United Kingdom have large and sophisticated banks in 
addition to deep and liquid equity and bond markets. It therefore makes 
sense for middle-income Asian countries to continue developing their 
banking sectors even as they nurture their bond markets. However, for 
2.2.1  Private credit and lending–deposit spread, 
developing Asia
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2.2.2  Real lending rate and lending–deposit spread, 
developing Asia
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2.2.1 Banks in the Paciﬁc
The availability of commercial banking services in the Paciﬁc 
is generally low, and customers in most countries have few 
choices. Kiribati and Tuvalu have only one commercial bank 
each, while in the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the 
Federated States of Micronesia have two, one domestic bank 
and one a branch of a US bank. No commercial bank has 
operated in Nauru since 2006, when the Bank of Nauru went 
bankrupt. 
Bank coverage in the Paciﬁc appears to be in line with 
that found in other less-developed regions. The Paciﬁc 
banking system’s total assets as a proportion of GDP is 
comparable with the proportion in low-income economies in 
Asia, and banks are generally well capitalized. Rising mobile 
phone usage has opened up opportunities for mobile banking 
and is expanding ﬁnancial inclusion, particularly in remote 
rural areas.
The number of depositors is more or less comparable 
with numbers found in other low- and middle-income 
economies. However, the relatively small number 
of borrowers suggests there may be excess liquidity 
(box ﬁgure). Large public institutional investors—provident 
or trust funds—provide a large portion of deposits in many 
banking systems in the Paciﬁc, which may partly explain the 
gap between bank deposits and lending in the region. 
Lending in the Paciﬁc is hindered by the difficulty of 
using land as collateral because of customary systems 
of communal land ownership. To alleviate this, Paciﬁc 
governments are working with development partners on 
reform to secured transactions that will facilitate the use of 
such movable property as crops, machinery, vehicles, and 
future earnings as collateral for commercial loans. 
Meanwhile, limited opportunities for productive 
private investment constrain demand for credit. Another 
constraint on demand is the high cost of credit, as interest 
rate spreads in the Paciﬁc are generally wider than in 
other developing regions. High lending rates reﬂect not 
only heightened political and macroeconomic risks, but 
also the high transaction costs of catering to a small and 
dispersed clientele. 
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lower-income Asian countries such as the Paciﬁc island states, where 
banks are the predominant form of ﬁnance, bank reform remains the 
overriding challenge of ﬁnancial sector development (Box 2.2.1).
In Asian economies where banks and capital markets are currently 
underdeveloped, more efficient ﬁnance can ratchet up investment by 
channeling cheaper credit to ﬁrms and thereby boosting productive 
capacity and growth potential. Data from a sample of major countries 
in developing Asia and Latin America, where banks are often the main 
source of ﬁnancing for ﬁrms, highlight the nexus between ﬁnance and 
investment as well as that between investment and growth. Figure 2.2.3 
shows a positive relationship between the ratio of bank assets (and 
particularly loans) to GDP and the ratio of investment to GDP, and 
Figure 2.2.4 displays a positive relationship between the investment rate 
and economic growth. Together, the two ﬁgures show that countries 
with larger banking sectors invest more and grow faster. 
When comparing Asian and Latin American economies, an interesting 
and signiﬁcant pattern emerges. The positive relationship between the 
banking sector and investment on the one hand, and between investment 
and economic growth on the other, appears more pronounced in Asia. 
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This suggests that ﬁnancial development matters more 
for economic growth in Asia than in the rest of the world. 
Figure 2.2.5 shows the relationship between private credit and 
investment, and it conﬁrms the tighter link between ﬁnancial 
sector development and investment in developing Asia than 
elsewhere. An important caveat, however, is that the evidence 
presented are correlations that do not necessarily indicate 
causation, so it is possible that countries that invest more have 
greater demand for ﬁnancing.
Long-term ﬁnance for  
productivity-led growth 
Developing Asia’s strong economic growth over the past 
3 decades has been the envy of the world, dented only during 
the Asian ﬁnancial crisis of 1997–1998 and the global ﬁnancial 
crisis of 2008–2009. The impressive growth record, largely 
credited to investment and capital accumulation, not only 
raised incomes and reduced poverty but also expanded the 
region’s global inﬂuence. While capital deepening continues 
to be important, the region will need to rely increasingly on higher 
productivity growth to sustain rapid growth (Box 2.2.2).
Reform offers, however, no single path to productivity growth. Rather, 
reform needs to create a mix of virtues, including better infrastructure 
and human capital, more open trade, an efficient and well-developed 
ﬁnancial system, and economic institutions that promote competition 
and encourage entrepreneurship and innovation.3 Only an appropriate 
set of targeted and interlocking reforms can achieve structural change, 
improve resource allocation, and increase technology transfer. Reform 
priorities will have to vary depending on income group targeted and how 
technologically advanced the economy is. 
2.2.4  Investment and economic growth, 2000–2013
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2.2.3  Banking sector and investment
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2.2.2 Asia’s long-term growth prospects and the role of productivity
Asia’s admirable economic growth and transformation has 
been the subject of many empirical studies. Lee and Hong 
(2010) and Park and Park (2010) apply a growth accounting 
framework to ﬁnd that growth in capital accumulation 
has been a key factor behind developing Asia’s remarkable 
economic expansion, especially in the 1980s and 1990s. 
The analysis in Lee and Hong (2010) and Park and Park 
(2010) covers the People’s Republic of China; Hong Kong, 
China; India; Indonesia; the Republic of Korea; Malaysia; 
Pakistan; the Philippines; Singapore; Taipei,China; Thailand; 
and Viet Nam, which together account for 95% of developing 
Asia’s GDP, thus making this group representative of regional 
trends. Their results show as well the other side of the coin: 
that the contribution of labor, education, and total factor 
productivity to real GDP growth has been only moderate. 
The Park and Park (2010) study, however, ﬁnds an important 
structural shift in the pattern of developing Asia’s economic 
growth in around 2002, when total factor productivity began 
to play a larger role in regional growth. 
Projections by Lee and Hong (2010) address the central 
question of whether developing Asia’s rapid growth can 
continue in the next 2 decades. They suggest that, without 
signiﬁcant reform, future growth will tend to be lower than 
historical performance in most of the Asian economies 
analyzed. In particular, as these economies have already 
registered high rates of capital accumulation in the past 3 
decades, the marginal productivity of capital appears set to 
decline. Furthermore, for many economies the demographic 
dividend is projected to wane, constraining the contribution 
to growth from labor. Park and Park (2010) reaches a similar 
conclusion and highlights the importance of policy makers 
pursuing supply-side policies that foster productivity growth 
to sustain developing Asia’s future growth. 
The common conclusion of various studies of Asia’s 
historical growth record and future prospects is that 
growth will need to rely increasingly on improvements in 
productivity growth and less on capital deepening. Although 
investment and factor accumulation will still be important 
drivers of growth in low-income countries, and in middle-
income countries with large infrastructure gaps, productivity 
will need to become a more important driver of growth in 
developing Asia. Although there is no single reform path 
to spur productivity growth, and though policy needs vary 
across income groups, ﬁnancial system deepening remains 
central to a more efficient allocation of capital across sectors 
and crucial for facilitating innovation and technology transfer. 
2.2.5  Investment and private credit, 2012 
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Yet, despite differences between economies in the set of productivity-
enhancing reforms they need, the common need is to build a strong 
domestic ﬁnancial system, one able to provide long-term ﬁnance to 
match the long-term investments desired (see Chopra, forthcoming). 
As developing Asia has an infrastructure deﬁcit that hampers productivity, 
particular attention has to be placed on funding infrastructure needs. 
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When ﬁnance and investment are for the long term, they enhance 
the productive capacity of an economy. They cover a wide range of 
tangible assets—energy, transport and communication infrastructure, 
factories, commercial buildings, hospitals, and new housing—that 
generates returns for society, as well as intangible assets such as 
education and research and development, which store up prospects for 
future innovation and competitiveness (Asian Development Bank 2015, 
European Commission 2013, Group of Thirty 2013). 
Being less procyclical than short-term ﬁnance, long-term ﬁnance 
exerts a stabilizing inﬂuence on the ﬁnancial system and may be more 
supportive of sustained long-term growth.4 This improves the quality of 
intermediation, not just its quantity. Long-term capital is important for 
ﬁnancing innovation in particular, as innovation is inherently uncertain 
and hard to keep to deadline. 
Long-term ﬁnance ﬂows from the providers—households, corporations, 
and governments—through the intermediation process to the end users 
(Figure 2.2.6). Except in the case of self-ﬁnancing, ﬁnance ﬂows through 
ﬁnancial institutions such as banks, insurance companies, and pension 
funds, or else it gets channeled through capital markets. Under this 
framework, investors with long time horizons and ﬁnancial instruments 
with long maturities are evidently needed for long-term investment. 
But even with the large pool of savings in developing Asia, the 
region’s range of instruments for long-term ﬁnancing remains narrow 
(Didier and Schmukler 2014). Banks still dominate the ﬁnancial sector 
in Asia, as they do in Europe—and in contrast with the US, where equity 
and bond markets play a larger role. However, commercial bank loan 
2.2.6  Framework for the provision of finance for long-term investment
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2.2.7  Debt financing of nonfinancial corporations by region, 
year-end 2011 
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maturities average only 2.8 years in emerging economies and 
4.2 years in developed economies, which is much shorter 
than bond maturities (Group of Thirty 2013). Moreover, 
although many countries in developing Asia have improved 
the size and liquidity of their bond markets in recent 
years, these markets remain dominated by low-risk issues, 
especially from governments. 
In addition to a lagging corporate bond market, 
developing Asia has underdeveloped securitization and equity 
markets despite possessing a rising share of the world’s 
wealth (Figure 2.2.7). Long-term institutional investors 
such as pension funds and insurance companies, whose 
liabilities have long dates, do not contribute sufficiently to the 
development of local markets, preferring to put the bulk of 
their portfolios in government bonds and deposits.5
This “trap,” as it is decried in Didier and Schmukler (2014), 
keeps Asian investors out of local capital markets and keeps 
the markets underdeveloped. The situation in Asia leaves 
considerable scope for policy action to help channel available 
funds and foster local markets for long-term ﬁnancing. Policy 
requirements to address barriers to long-term ﬁnance are 
inevitably multifaceted, but the following are worth highlighting for Asia.6
First, policy should help investors adopt a long-term horizon for 
their investment decisions. This will require national and international 
regulatory bodies to remove short-term biases when allocating the assets 
of investors willing to invest for the long term. National regulatory 
and accounting treatment that favors short-term horizons should be 
reconsidered, weighing the pros and cons of gradually removing from 
insurance and bank regulations the preferential treatment accorded 
sovereign debt (Group of Thirty 2013). 
Second, policy should further efforts to develop debt and equity 
capital markets to widen the spectrum of ﬁnancing instruments. 
Although local-currency bond markets have grown in Asia over the past 
decade, the region’s continued heavy reliance on bank ﬁnancing tends 
to make long-term investment decisions dependent on risky and volatile 
maturity transformation, or the funding of longer-term commitments 
with shorter-term deposits or investments. Policies should therefore aim 
to build deeper and more liquid bond markets, especially for corporate 
bonds, as this could reduce risk premiums and lower the cost of capital, 
as well as enhance ﬁnancial stability.7
Third, policy should facilitate the building of a broader and more 
diverse long-term investor base, in part by promoting institutional 
investors and foreign participation. It is essential to generate stable 
sources of ﬁnance. The region lags the advanced economies by a wide 
margin in its development of long-term institutional investors such as 
pension funds (Figure 2.2.8). Long-term pension and insurance-based 
savings could be fostered by, for instance, setting up compulsory auto-
enrollment saving programs (Group of Thirty 2013). Such institutions 
would aggregate more savings into funds with long investment horizons, 
especially where household wealth is concentrated in bank deposits and 
other short-term instruments. 
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Finally, policy needs to take into account how important 
cross-border capital ﬂows are for the efficient allocation of 
capital to long-term investment on a global scale. Policy makers 
should enhance their understanding of the regional and global 
perspectives they will need to effectively address stiffening 
regulatory and supervisory challenges as ﬁnancial systems 
deepen and become more integrated and complex (Group 
of Thirty 2013, Zhu 2014). In particular, as regulators and 
supervisors encourage prudent ﬁnancial innovation, they will 
need to ensure that they have good cross-border cooperation 
and adequate regulatory powers to act and stay alert to risks. 
Bond market development in Asia
Bond markets are important features of diversiﬁed ﬁnancial 
systems and have an important role in building a pool of 
long-term ﬁnancing to beneﬁt the wider economy. On a macro 
level, ﬁnancial development has been consistently linked to 
higher economic growth and greater poverty reduction (Levine 
2005, 2008). In the context of emerging market economies 
(EMEs), including those in developing Asia, the growth of 
local-currency bond markets has improved ﬁnancial stability by 
reducing currency mismatches and vulnerability to currency crises. 
The positive effect likely extends to the global economy, as it was 
the lack of reliable ﬁnancial instruments in EMEs that drove capital 
to developed markets and helped spark the global ﬁnancial crisis 
(Caballero, Fahri, and Gourinchas 2008). The development of local-
currency bond markets thus strengthens ﬁnancial stability not only in 
individual countries, but also globally. Bond market development also 
supports ﬁnancial inclusion, as the factors that enable debt markets are, 
at core, the same as those that enable borrowing and lending within an 
economy (Burger and Warnock 2006). 
Bond market structure in developing Asia and the world
Global bond markets have seen impressive growth over the past decade, 
almost tripling in size from $30 trillion in 2001 to $83 trillion in 2011. 
Although rapid progress has been seen across regions, bond markets 
in advanced economies remain much larger than those in developing 
Asia, equaling 164% of GDP in advanced economies but only 41% in 
developing Asia (Table 2.2.1). 
A fundamental change in global ﬁnancial structure has been the 
growth of local-currency bond markets in EMEs. As a result, the share 
of EME bonds denominated in foreign currency more than halved 
from 25% in 2001 to 13% in 2011 (Table 2.2.2). The trend has been 
particularly striking in Latin America. In 2001, slightly more than half 
of Latin American bonds were denominated in foreign currency, but by 
2011 local currency bond markets had grown such that only a quarter 
of bonds in the region were issued in foreign currency. Improvement 
in macroeconomic stability and institutional factors such as rule of law 
have contributed to bond market development in EMEs (Box 2.2.3).
2.2.8  Ratio of pension assets to GDP in 
selected economies, 2013
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2.2.1 Bond market characteristics: summary statistics by region, 2011
Total Local currency denominated
$ billion $ billion % of GDP % of total Government share (%)
Advanced economies Total 74,371 67,912 164 91 49
Euro area 22,106 20,147 157 91 39
Other 22,857 19,134 140 84 72
US 29,409 28,630 191 97 40
Emerging market economies Total 8,119 7,070 32 87 59
Europe 699 500 24 72 89
Latin America 1,406 1,053 22 75 80
Asia 5,667 5,260 41 93 50
Other 347 255 11 74 75
Source: Burger, Warnock, and Warnock (forthcoming).
2.2.2 Bond market development
Local currency denominated
Total  2011 2006 2001
$ billion $ billion % of GDP % of total % of GDP % of total % of GDP % of total
Advanced economies 74,371 67,912 164 91 134 91 107 93
Euro area advanced economies 22,106 20,147 157 91 133 91 94 89
Other advanced economies 22,857 19,134 140 84 104 81 84 87
United States 29,409 28,630 191 97 158 96 131 98
Emerging market economies 8,119 7,070 32 87 31 83 26 75
Europe 699 500 24 72 30 77 25 76
Latin America 1,406 1,053 22 75 20 70 19 54
Asia 5,667 5,260 41 93 39 90 33 88
China, People’s Republic of 2,956 2,938 40 99 27 98 18 95
Hong Kong, China 116 45 18 39 19 53 15 54
India 515 489 26 95 30 95 25 97
Indonesia 113 84 10 74 15 87 27 96
Korea, Republic of 1,265 1,117 100 88 94 91 85 91
Malaysia 260 233 81 90 59 79 57 77
Pakistan 34 32 15 94 15 90 22 96
Philippines 101 63 28 62 26 50 21 48
Singapore 130 90 37 69 40 60 35 69
Thailand 175 170 49 97 37 89 28 80
Other emerging market economies 347 255 11 74 11 69 10 50
Russian Federation 156 91 5 59 3 41 2 13
South Africa 191 164 40 86 39 90 32 87
Source: Burger, Warnock, and Warnock (forthcoming).
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2.2.3 Why some emerging markets have bigger bond markets
The development of local-currency bond markets in EMEs 
has clearly been remarkable, but each economy varies in 
its ability to develop its bond markets. Why is it that some 
EMEs have larger local-currency bond markets than others? 
If the answer were “original sin,” then the reason would 
simply be that some countries are naturally larger than 
others. If nothing other than sheer country size distinguishes 
one economy from another, bond markets in smaller 
economies would be inconsequential forever. 
But the original sin hypothesis falls apart in the real 
world. As some studies have shown, economies can put in 
place institutions and policies that foster the development 
of debt markets, and have done so (e.g., Burger and 
Warnock 2006). Economies with better historical inﬂation 
performance—an outcome of creditor-friendly policies—have 
generally more developed local bond markets, both private 
and government, and rely less on foreign currency debt. 
Creditor-friendly laws seem to matter. Strong rule of law 
correlates with deep local bond markets, while countries 
with better creditor rights have been able to issue a higher 
share of bonds in their local currency. 
Stronger institutions, less volatile exchange rates, 
and more competitive banking sectors have positively 
inﬂuenced bond market development (Eichengreen and 
Luengnaruemitchai 2006). The size of government bond 
markets in particular positively associates with deeper 
domestic ﬁnancial systems, low inﬂation, larger ﬁscal 
deﬁcits, stronger legal origin, and more open capital 
accounts (Claessens et al. 2007).
An updated study on local-currency markets in EMEs 
conﬁrms earlier ﬁndings that economies with less volatile 
inﬂation and stronger legal rights tend to have more 
developed local bond markets (Burger, Warnock, and 
Warnock 2012; see box ﬁgure). Over the past decade, some 
countries with historically high and volatile inﬂation, such 
as Mexico and Brazil, have made the necessary policy 
adjustments to bring inﬂation under control, allowing local-
currency bond markets to ﬂourish. Other EMEs, including 
Argentina, the Russian Federation, and Pakistan, have had 
less success in bringing inﬂation under control. As a result, 
their local-currency bond markets continue to be less 
developed and attractive.
1  Some determinants of local bond market development
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2.2.4 Lessons for Asia from Thailand’s bond market
Concerted efforts in Thailand to develop its bond markets 
after the Asian crisis have met success and may offer lessons 
for the region (box ﬁgure). The crisis caused businesses 
and ﬁnancial institutions to fail across Thailand. To ﬁnance 
the losses and sustain the economy, the Ministry of Finance 
needed to swiftly issue B500 billion worth of government 
bonds, then equal to about 10% of its GDP. While tackling 
the urgent need to place these issues, the ministry 
recognized a clear opportunity to develop a local currency 
bond market in Thailand. 
In 1999, the ministry established the Domestic Bond 
Market Committee to focus on the bond market. Within 
its bureaucracy, the ministry mobilized the participation of 
the Fiscal Policy Office, Comptroller General’s Department, 
Office of Insurance Commission, and Revenue Department. 
In the initial phase, parts of Fiscal Policy Office and the 
Comptroller General’s Department were carved out and 
merged to form the Public Debt Management Office, which 
subsequently played a leading role in the effort of the 
Domestic Bond Market Committee, particularly while the 
emphasis was placed on the government bond market.
The committee drew up a comprehensive roadmap to 
concentrate the efforts of members around the following 
pillars:
(i)  building comprehensive public debt management 
capacity;
(ii) enhancing the primary bond market;
(iii) enhancing the secondary bond market;
(iv)  enhancing the clearance and settlement of bond 
trades;
(v) rationalizing bond taxation;
(vi)  enhancing bond market information technology 
infrastructure; and
(vii) standardizing bond market business practices.
Policy actions have to be appropriately sequenced, as 
certain reforms and developments must take place ﬁrst for 
other reforms to be effective. The committee focused on 
the government bond market, which differs signiﬁcantly 
from a corporate bond market in terms of credit, liquidity, 
instrument design and diversity, and prudential rules—and, 
therefore, the investor base.
Over time, the committee revised the pillars to shift 
the focus toward a corporate bond market. However, 
the establishment of a well-functioning government 
bond market clearly laid a solid foundation for market 
sustainability and facilitated the subsequent development 
of a corporate bond market. Success came partly because 
the government bond market was large, liquid, and able 
to generate transaction volume high enough to ensure the 
viability of sophisticated market infrastructure such as 
trading and settlement systems. A corporate bond market 
can beneﬁt from such market infrastructure, though it 
cannot by itself support them because it is too diverse, 
fragmented, and illiquid. Banks also gained experience in 
investing in ﬁxed income instruments while managing their 
liquidity and interest rate risks.
Thailand still needs to work on further developing its 
corporate bond market. With a signiﬁcant and growing 
contractual savings and asset management sector, 
Thailand should be prepared to tackle this challenge even 
in the face of the tighter prudential requirements for 
banks today.
1  Thailand’s local currency bonds outstanding
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Among Asian EMEs, improvement in the currency structure of bond 
markets has been rapid, with the proportion of foreign-currency bonds 
falling from 10% around 2000 to just 4% in 2013. In the PRC, India, 
Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand, more than 90% of bonds are now 
denominated in local currency. However, some economies still have a 
high proportion of foreign-currency bonds, such as the Philippines with 
38% and Indonesia with 26%.
 It should be noted that big differences exist across Asia, and 
bond markets in many ﬁnancially underdeveloped countries are still 
 Financing Asia’s future growth  69
embryonic or nonexistent (Annex table). Further, in the region as a 
whole, the market for corporate bonds remains less developed than the 
market for sovereign bonds. This remains true in economies such as 
Thailand that have made good progress in bond market development 
(Box 2.2.4). On the whole, the region has made a lot of progress, but 
considerable scope remains to further develop bond markets, especially 
corporate bond markets.
Country-speciﬁc paths to ﬁnancial development 
Policies to improve productivity and growth performance must be 
designed to speciﬁc contexts. They must take into account on an 
economy’s distance from the global technology frontier, which deﬁnes 
its productivity gap with the rest of the world (Aghion and Howitt 2006 
and 2009). In a recent empirical study, Dabla-Norris, Ho, and Kyobe 
(2013) conﬁrmed that reforms to drive productivity growth operate with 
differing force across groups of economies depending on their distance 
from the technology frontier, as approximated by a country’s real per 
capita GDP or productivity gap with the US. In the area of ﬁnancial 
sector reform to spur productivity growth, the general policy priorities 
they highlight are as follows for different income groups (see also Dabla-
Norris et al. 2013).
Low-income and lower-middle-income countries. As economies 
in this group tend to have ﬁnancial systems heavily based on banks, 
they stand to beneﬁt most from further bank reform.8 Reform in these 
economies should aim to mobilize domestic savings, lower the cost 
of credit to improve access, and promote the allocation of ﬁnancial 
resources to the most productive sectors. In addition, where ﬁnancial 
repression is still present, reducing restrictions on the price or quantity 
of credit can help resources ﬁnd the most productive uses within and 
across sectors. To prevent excessive risk taking and to promote the 
quality of intermediation over its quantity, however, reform must be 
complemented by strong prudential policies. Batten et al. (forthcoming) 
discusses the key challenges to ﬁnancial sector development in ﬁve 
low-income and lower-middle-income Asian countries. 
Upper-middle-income countries. Empirical results suggest that 
upper-middle-income countries can reap signiﬁcant productivity gains 
by further deepening their capital markets (Dabla-Norris, Ho, and 
Kyobe 2013).9 Policies that encourage the formation and development 
of markets for equity, securities, and bonds, particularly local-
currency bonds, can be particularly effective at increasing total factor 
productivity and labor productivity by lowering the cost of capital and 
facilitating the ﬁnancing of new capital and innovation. Although many 
large EMEs have achieved signiﬁcant capital market development in 
terms of generating a larger menu of ﬁnancial instruments, improving 
market infrastructure, and diversifying their investor base, capital 
markets in upper-middle-income countries still lag those in advanced 
economies in size, turnover, liquidity, and the development of 
institutional investors. 
The need to tailor ﬁnancial sector development to the country 
context is especially evident in developing Asia, home to a great deal 
70  Asian Development Outlook 2015
of diversity in stages of development, both ﬁnancial and economic. 
In particular, the more ﬁnancially developed economies of the region 
have a good mix of banks and capital markets, while the less ﬁnancially 
developed ones remain heavily reliant on banks. Nevertheless, regardless 
of the development and composition of their ﬁnancial systems, all Asian 
economies must strengthen the governance of both banks and capital 
markets toward maximizing the positive impact of ﬁnance on growth.
Governance for banks and capital markets 
that promote growth
The glue that links ﬁnance and growth is good governance in ﬁnancial 
institutions and markets. Good governance makes capital more likely to 
ﬂow to productive investments that contribute to growth and reduces 
the risk that it will be wasted or misallocated to unproductive ventures. 
Banks and capital markets alike are susceptible to bad governance. 
Owners, managers, and directors can breach their ﬁduciary duties 
to depositors and shareholders by using their positions to beneﬁt 
themselves at the expense of their institutions and those who rely on the 
institutions ﬁnancially. Owners, directors, and managers of banks, for 
example, can arrange loans for themselves, family members, or friends 
on unusually favorable terms or disregard norms for prudent lending. 
Similarly, bank holding companies and industrial combines that 
include banks can instruct wholly owned bank subsidiaries to ﬁnance 
projects that would otherwise fail to meet lending standards. In capital 
markets, owners, managers, and shareholders can use inside information 
to buy or sell company shares to their own advantage at the expense 
of others. They can manipulate corporate rules to restrict the rights 
of minority shareholders or fail to disclose material information when 
issuing bonds or stock.
Experience has shown repeatedly that neither companies nor 
markets can be expected to police themselves sufficiently to ensure 
satisfactory governance at banks and other ﬁnancial institutions. 
Appropriate regulations are therefore needed to limit governance 
problems. For banks, regulations can limit or prohibit so-called 
“connected lending” to owners, directors, and managers. In addition, 
many countries limit the maximum size of individual loans to a certain 
percentage of the bank’s paid-in capital. Regulations can bar banks from 
lending to other ﬁrms in a conglomerate or bank holding company. 
For capital markets, regulations can prohibit owners and managers 
from trading shares on the basis of inside information. They can 
stipulate certain rights for minority shareholders. In addition, 
regulations can require the disclosure of key information for ﬁrms 
listed on stock markets or attempting to issue stock or bonds. They can 
establish rules for trading shares and bonds on exchanges, including 
regulations designed to limit how much a market may move up or down 
during a single trading day. 
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Financial access for inclusion 
Policy makers around the world have placed ﬁnancial 
inclusion—or ready access for households and ﬁrms to 
reasonably priced ﬁnancial services—at the top of the 
development agenda. This policy direction is backed by a 
growing body of research that shows signiﬁcant beneﬁts 
from ﬁnancial systems that cater to the low end of the 
market. Although ﬁnancial development generally promotes 
growth, it does not necessarily promote equality. Growth 
from ﬁnancial development can be inclusive only by meeting 
the ﬁnancing needs of households and ﬁrms, even the 
underprivileged. 
In the absence of inclusive ﬁnancial systems, poor 
people must rely on their own resources to meet their 
ﬁnancial needs and cope with income shocks, while small 
enterprises rely on their earnings to pursue promising 
growth opportunities (Demirguc-Kunt et al. 2008). 
However, the poor in developing Asia have limited access to 
ﬁnancial services (Figure 2.3.1). Unfortunately, the broader 
consequences are the perpetuation of income inequality and 
slower economic growth.
Financially developed economies generally provide 
ﬁnancial access to a greater number of households and ﬁrms, 
but not always. While developing Asia performs better than 
other developing regions in terms of ﬁnancial development, 
it does not do so regarding ﬁnancial inclusion, either for 
households or ﬁrms. 
Household access to ﬁnance
One indicator of ﬁnancial inclusion is household access to 
ﬁnance. This can be measured by account penetration, deﬁned 
as the percentage of adults who have an individual or joint 
account at a formal ﬁnancial institution such as a bank, credit 
union, cooperative, post office, or microﬁnance institution. 
Based on the Global Findex database, which culls information 
from survey interviews, the median worldwide for this 
measure is 36.7% (Demirguc-Kunt and Klapper 2013).10 With 
account penetration of 26.7%, developing Asia fares better 
than other developing areas, such as sub-Saharan Africa and 
the Middle East and North Africa, but still falls below the 
global median (Figure 2.3.2). 
Wide diversity exists within developing Asia 
(Figure 2.3.3). While account penetration is nearly universal 
in Singapore and the Republic of Korea, it is much lower in 
other economies: less than 1% in Turkmenistan, and less than 
5% in Cambodia, the Kyrgyz Republic, and Tajikistan.
2.3.1  Adults with an account at a formal financial 
institution, bottom 40 percentile by income, 2011
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2.3.2  Formal account penetration across the world, 2011
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Household access varies across economies in developing 
Asia as well by  demographic detail (Figure 2.3.4). In South 
Asia, where the gender gap is widest, 43% of men are likely 
to have an account but only 30% of women. In East Asia, 
where account penetration is highest, 85% of adults in the 
top 60 percentile of the income distribution report having an 
account but only 67% do in the bottom 40 percentile. The gap 
by income is smallest in Central Asia, where 22% of the top 
group and 16% of the bottom group report having an account. 
Meanwhile, across developing Asia, adults with at least 
secondary education, and adults aged 25 and older, are more 
likely to have access to ﬁnance than adults with primary 
education or less and those aged 15–24.
A complementary picture emerges if one looks at 
indicators from the supply side of ﬁnance such as the number 
of commercial bank branches per 100,000 adults and the 
number of ATMs per 100,000 adults. Based on a survey 
on ﬁnancial access conducted in 2011 by the International 
Monetary Fund, the median in developing Asia is the 
lowest except in sub-Saharan Africa (Figure 2.3.5). Within 
the region, again, large differences exist across countries. 
The number of ATMs per 100,000 adults ranges from over 
75 in Brunei Darussalam and Thailand to fewer than 5 in 
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, the Marshall Islands, Pakistan, and 
Uzbekistan (data are unavailable for the Republic of Korea).
2.3.3  Formal account penetration in developing Asia, 2011
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2.3.4  Account penetration in developing Asia by demographic variable, 2011
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2.3.5  ATMs and bank branches per 100,000 adults
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Barriers to households’ use of ﬁnance
Multiple barriers limit ﬁnancial inclusion across the world, 
some of them supply factors such as physical distance and 
high transaction costs for banks when operating in remote 
locations, and others demand factors such as lack of ﬁnancial 
literacy, erratic cash ﬂow, or low income. 
In developing Asia, the most frequently mentioned 
reasons for not having a bank account, according to the 
Global Findex Survey, are the lack of money at 76.2%, cost 
at 21.9%, and travel distance at 21.8% (Figure 2.3.6). Clearly, 
the ﬁxed costs associated with opening and maintaining an 
account impede access to ﬁnance. This helps explain the 
success of social banking programs such one in India from 
1969 to 1990 that aimed to improve for the poor physical 
access to ﬁnance by emphasizing branch expansion into 
unbanked rural locations. Physical barriers have been quite 
high in developing Asia, which is at the low end of the 
spectrum in terms of bank branching and ATM density. 
Lack of documentation is a reason cited by 17.5%. In other 
parts of the world, these barriers are overcome by technology 
and such alternative delivery channels as mobile banking, 
e-ﬁnance, and phone ﬁnance, but such channels do not 
seem to be very prevalent in developing Asia. For instance, 
the median percentage of respondents who paid bills used 
wire transfers or online payment, or shopped online using 
money from their accounts, was only 2.1% in developing 
Asia, compared with 44.8% in the high-income group. 
Table 2.3.1 shows the relative importance of physical access, 
affordability, and eligibility as barriers to deposit services in 
selected Asian economies.
Firms’ access to ﬁnance
Financial constraints affect ﬁrms in developed and 
developing countries alike, and this is an active area of 
research in corporate ﬁnance. Research has shown that the 
lack of access to ﬁnance is a critical constraint on growth 
and innovation. As small ﬁrms are the most adversely 
affected, they are likely to beneﬁt the most from ﬁnancial and 
institutional deepening.
World Bank Enterprise Surveys from 2006 to 2014 
sampled ﬁrms formally registered in over 100 economies to 
study business climate constraints on private sector growth 
and performance.11 Regional comparisons show that the 
proportion of ﬁrms in developing Asia with a checking or 
savings account is 84.2% (Table 2.3.2). This is comparable to 
the percentage of ﬁrms with a checking or savings account in 
sub-Saharan Africa (83.9%), but lower than in Latin America 
and the Caribbean (88.8%) or emerging Europe (92.1%). 
Similarly, the proportion of ﬁrms that have a credit line 
or loan from a ﬁnancial institution in developing Asia is 
2.3.6  Barriers to account penetration in developing Asia, 2011
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2.3.1 Barriers to deposit services in selected  Asian economies
 
Physical access Affordability Eligibility
Locations to open 
deposit account 
(score 1–3)
Minimum amount to 
open a checking account 
(% of GDPPC)
Annual fees for a 
checking account 
(% of GDPPC)
Number of documents 
to open a checking 
account (1–5)
Armenia 1.8 11.0 0.4 2.9
Bangladesh 2.0 2.3 0.0 4.6
China, People’s Republic of 3.0 0.0 0.0 1.0
Georgia 2.6 0.0 0.3 1.7
India 2.0 8.9 0.0 2.7
Indonesia 2.5 9.5 2.8 3.2
Korea, Republic of  2.1 3.3 0.1 1.9
Pakistan 2.0 1.6 0.0 2.6
Philippines 2.0 14.5 0.0 3.2
Sri Lanka 1.8 15.8 0.7 2.6
Thailand 2.5 6.7 1.3 1.2
Median 2.0 6.7 0.1 2.6
Average 2.2 6.7 0.5 2.5
GDPPC = gross domestic product per capita.
Note: Locations to open deposit account take the value 1 if an account can be opened at headquarters only, 2 if at headquarters or a branch, and 3 if at headquarters, 
branches, or a non-branch outlet. The minimum amount to open or maintain a checking or savings account is the minimum balance required to open or maintain a checking 
or savings account. Annual fees for checking or savings accounts are the fees associated with maintaining the account. Documents needed to open a checking or savings 
account consist of identiﬁcation, payment slip, letter of reference, proof of domicile, and any other document a bank requires. This indicator varies from 1 to 5 depending on 
the number of documents required.
Source: Ayyagari and Beck (forthcoming) based on a bank-level survey in Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Martinez Peria (2007).
2.3.2 Financial use and access across ﬁrms in developing countries
Developing countries in 
Percentage of enterprises that have a 
checking or savings account (%)
Percentage of enterprises that have a line of credit or 
loan from a ﬁnancial institution (%)
Middle East and North Africa 54.4 13.9
Developing Asia 84.2 33.0
Central Asia 88.2 29.7
East Asia 91.8 35.6
South Asia 79.7 31.2
Southeast Asia 77.2 35.5
The Paciﬁc 94.6 39.4
Sub-Saharan Africa 83.9 19.0
Latin America and Caribbean 88.8 53.7
Emerging Europe 92.1 40.9
Source: Ayyagari and Beck (forthcoming) based on data from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys, 2006–2014.
33.0%, which lags 53.7% in Latin America and the Caribbean and 40.9% 
in emerging Europe. Within developing Asia, East Asia and the Paciﬁc 
perform better than the other regions in terms of both access to a credit 
line or loan and ﬁrms’ use of savings or checking accounts. While a large 
percentage of ﬁrms use a checking or savings account, ﬁrms’ access to 
external ﬁnance is limited. 
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2.3.7  Percentage of firms with a line of credit or loan 
in developing Asia, by firm size
% of ﬁrms with access to a line of credit or loan
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Kazakhstan
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Kyrgyz Republic
Philippines
Bangladesh
Fiji
Georgia
Sri Lanka
Nepal
Armenia
FSM
Bhutan
Viet Nam
Vanuatu
Samoa
Mongolia
Tonga
Small (<20)
Medium (20−99)
Large (100+)
FSM = Federated States of Micronesia, Lao PDR = Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic, PRC = People’s Republic of China.
Source: Ayyagari and Beck (forthcoming) based on data from the World Bank 
Enterprise Surveys, 2006–2014.
2.3.8  Sources of working capital in developing Asia,  
by firm size
%
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Source:  Ayyagari and Beck (forthcoming) based on data from the World Bank 
Enterprise Surveys, 2006–2014.
Focusing on ﬁrm size, one ﬁnds that in each of the 
countries in developing Asia, the percentage of small ﬁrms 
with 5–19 employees that report having a line of credit or 
loan from a ﬁnancial institution is much lower than the 
percentage of medium-sized ﬁrms with 20–99 employees 
or large ﬁrms with more than 100 employees (Figure 2.3.7). 
Across ﬁrm size, retained earnings ﬁnance over 75% of 
working capital on average (Figure 2.3.8). The share of 
working capital sourced from banks is another important 
indicator and varies from 8.2% for small ﬁrms to 17.1% for 
large ﬁrms. The ﬁndings suggest that, in developing Asia, 
small ﬁrms’ access to credit is particularly constrained.
Barriers to ﬁrms’ use of ﬁnance
 In developing Asia, weak access to ﬁnance is not the only 
obstacle to ﬁrms’ growth, but it is the most constraining 
(Figure 2.3.9). As shown above, bank ﬁnance is the largest 
external source of working capital in the region, yet a large 
percentage of ﬁrms have no access to bank loans or credit 
lines. The data suggest that, while some ﬁrms in the region 
are excluded from bank ﬁnance because of high interest 
rates, collateral requirements, and/or onerous paperwork, 
a majority of 55.4% simply have no need to borrow because 
they have no good projects to ﬁnance (Table 2.3.3). Other 
reasons ﬁrms cite for not applying for loans are unfavorable 
interest rates at 14.8%, complex application procedures at 
10.8%, and collateral requirements at 8.2%.
These numbers hide a great deal of variation across 
countries. For instance, the percentage of ﬁrms that report 
stringent collateral requirements is as high as 18% in 
Indonesia and Afghanistan. Secured loans are the most 
common type of loans in the formal ﬁnancial sector across 
the world, with three-fourths of ﬁrms reporting that their 
most recent loan or credit line required some form of 
collateral. This number is highest in developing Asia, at 88% 
(Figure 2.3.10).
A complementary picture arises from the supply side 
using bank data collected in 2005–2006 (Beck, Demirgüc-
Kunt, and Martinez Peria 2008). The data on physical access 
to loans (operationally, the number of locations where a 
loan application can be submitted, with a maximum of ﬁve) 
suggest that banks in developing Asia do not encourage the 
use of alternative channels, as the median across the sample 
of developing countries in Asia is way below ﬁve (Table 2.3.4). 
With regard to affordability, the fees associated with loans 
are as high as 6.5% for a typical business loan and 2.6% for 
a typical loan to a small- or medium-sized enterprise (SME) 
in Bangladesh. However, the median in the sample of 12 
economies for which data are available is only 0.9% for a 
typical business loan or SME loan.
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2.3.3 Why ﬁrms not apply for loans
  Developing Asia Emerging Europe
Latin America and 
the Caribbean
Middle East and 
North Africa
Sub-Saharan 
Africa
No need 55.4 64.8 65.4 48.3 37.2
Unfavorable interest rates 14.8 19.8 12.3 11.7 19.3
Complex application procedures 10.8  7.1  5.8  9.6 17.4
Collateral requirements  8.2  4.9  4.6  7.6 11.6
Size of loan and maturity are insufficient  3.4  1.1  1.1  3.8  2.3
Did not think it would be approved  3.2  0.4  2.4  3.0  6.1
Other  4.3  1.8  8.4 15.9  6.3
Source: Ayyagari and Beck (forthcoming) based on data from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys, 2006–2014.
2.3.9  Constraints faced by firms in developing Asia
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
Business constraint
Labor regulations
Courts
Business licensing and permits
Customs and trade regulations
Street crime
Transportation
Access to land
Tax administration
Inadequately educated workforce
Informal sector competitors
Corruption
Access to ﬁnance
Political instability
Tax rates
Electricity
Note: The ﬁgure shows the mean response of ﬁrm managers who were asked to 
what extent various issues constitute an obstacle to the growth and operation of 
their businesses, on a scale of 0 (no obstacle) to 4 (very severe obstacle). 
Source: Ayyagari and Beck (forthcoming) based on data from the World Bank 
Enterprise Surveys, 2006–2014.
2.3.10  Financing requiring firms to pledge collateral
% of ﬁrms reporting that
ﬁnancing required collateral
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LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean, MENA = Middle East and North Africa, 
SSA = sub-Saharan Africa.
Source: Ayyagari and Beck (forthcoming) based on data from the World Bank 
Enterprise Surveys, 2006–2014.
Policy options to improve 
ﬁnancial inclusion 
Fixed costs and high risk are the two main hurdles 
to expanding access to ﬁnancial services to rural and 
low-income segments of the population. The ﬁxed costs that 
come with traditional ﬁnance often make ﬁnancial services 
for the poor prohibitively expensive. High risk is inherent 
for those who would provide credit and insurance to clients 
who do not have formal or steady income, are subject to high 
income shocks, or lack formal property titles or often even 
personal identiﬁcation. Innovations and policies have to 
address these two barriers. 
Microcredit. Microcredit has long been seen as 
an important tool for ﬁnancial inclusion and poverty 
reduction. Bangladesh was one of the ﬁrst countries to 
see a large expansion of microcredit institutions, several 
of which, notably BRAC, Grameen Foundation, branched 
out beyond ﬁnancial services. Distinguishing themselves 
from conventional banks, microﬁnance institutions have 
introduced such innovations as joint liability for a group 
of borrowers to facilitate their outreach to the poor and 
marginalized, especially women. The evidence indicates that 
microcredit has a positive but limited effect on household 
welfare and enterprise growth.
Microsavings. Experience across Asia and the rest of 
the developing world has shown the importance of looking 
beyond credit to other ﬁnancial services, including savings, 
insurance, and payments. As discussed in the survey by 
Karlan, Ratan, and Zinman (2014), low-income individuals 
and households face different barriers to formal savings 
services, some of which mirror similar barriers to other 
ﬁnancial services and some more speciﬁc to savings. 
Having a savings account appears to help a household 
manage its resources better and prioritize expenditure 
categories such as education and food consumption more 
effectively.
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2.3.4 Indicators of barriers to business and SME loans
  Physical access Affordability Eligibility
Locations to submit 
loan applications 
(out of 5)
Fee business loan
 (% of minimum 
loan amount)
Fees SME 
  loan (% of minimum 
loan amount)
Days to process 
business loan 
applications
Days to process  
SME loan 
applications
Armenia 2.0 0.2 0.0 9.9 7.6
Bangladesh 2.1 6.5 2.6 34.6 43.3
PRC 2.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 40.0
Georgia 2.5 1.0 1.1 5.0 5.6
India 2.4 0.9 0.8 20.0 10.8
Indonesia 3.1 0.9 1.5 16.6 9.7
Korea, Republic of 3.8 0.3 0.3 2.7 2.7
Pakistan 3.1 0.1 0.2 32.0 33.6
Philippines 2.4 1.4 1.4 44.1 33.3
Sri Lanka 3.0 2.3 2.1 15.6 10.0
Thailand 2.0 0.6 0.9 22.5 23.7
Median 2.4 0.9 0.9 20.0 10.8
Average 2.6 1.3 1.0 23.0 20.0
PRC = People’s Republic of China, SME = small or medium-sized enterprise.
Note: Data are weighted by country averages. Locations to submit loan applications take the value 1 if the application can be submitted at headquarters only; 2 if at 
headquarters or a branch; 3 if at headquarters, branches, or non-branch outlets; 4 if at headquarters, branches, non-branch outlets, or electronically; and 5 if at headquarters, 
branches, non-branch outlets, electronically, or over the phone. Fees for business or SME loans are expressed as a share of gross domestic product per capita. The last two 
columns show the number of days banks take to process a typical business or SME loan application.
Source: Ayyagari and Beck (forthcoming) based on a bank-level survey in Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Martinez Peria (2007).
Microinsurance. Many households and enterprises in developing 
countries face signiﬁcantly higher risks and volatility than their peers 
in more developed countries. Insurance that can cushion income or 
expenditure shocks and their effects on consumption are therefore 
important. The provision of formal insurance products is hampered by 
high risks and costs, including costs to screen prospective policyholders 
and to verify claims. Products need to be designed to pay out fairly soon 
and often to engender trust in potential users. To create trust, rapid 
payouts are important, as clients’ liquidity constraints are often binding. 
Other policies and innovations. One important constraint on 
ﬁnancial inclusion is physical access to bank outlets. One important 
policy tool has been regulations on branches as in India, where such 
regulations caused 30,000 new rural branches to open from 1977 to 
1990 and thereby increased deposit and credit volume. Financial literacy 
programs have so far had only very limited effect on ﬁnancial behavior, 
including savings, but ﬁne-tuning such programs may allow them to 
reach out to individuals, especially the young, as they make ﬁnancial 
decisions. Finance that complies with sharia restrictions can attract 
Asian Muslims who are averse to conventional ﬁnance. Meanwhile, 
biometric identiﬁcation initiatives, such as Aadhaar (foundation) in 
India, can provide to the poor the proper identiﬁcation they need to 
open an account and conduct ﬁnancial transactions.
Financial institutions in general have made few efforts to reach 
low-income segments of the population because the transactions they 
require are too small to be proﬁtable. A response has been a trend 
78  Asian Development Outlook 2015
toward delivery channels that are more cost-effective—famously mobile 
phones but also banking agents, who are local retailers that handle 
banking services on behalf of banks. The focus has been mostly on 
providing payment and savings services, which may explain their 
successful proliferation. Using data across 10 countries, McKay and 
Pickens (2010) report that so-called branchless banking is 19% cheaper 
for clients on average than comparable banking products offered 
through traditional channels. Saving can be even larger—half of costs—
for medium-term savings and paying bills. Another policy option to 
expand access to formal ﬁnancial services is public–private partnership, 
which has allowed the digitalization of government payments in 
Pakistan.
Policy focus on small and  
medium-sized enterprises
Transaction costs and information asymmetries hinder access to 
external ﬁnance for SMEs. Fixed transaction costs for credit assessment 
and loan processing and monitoring fall per unit as the size of the 
loan increases, which makes small loans to SMEs relatively costly. 
Meanwhile, managing risk is a greater challenge in lending to SMEs 
because, compared with larger ﬁrms, their dealings are opaque, their 
collateral poor, and their ﬁnancial statements rarely audited. Moreover, 
if a given sector has few participating SMEs, ﬁnancial institutions 
cannot beneﬁt from economies of scale or risk diversiﬁcation. Some 
policy reforms to ease SMEs’ ﬁnancing constraints are discussed below.
Credit registries or bureaus. Constraints on SME ﬁnancing demand 
general reform to the business environment and institutions, not 
necessarily speciﬁc to the SME lending market. One institution that can 
have a positive impact on lending to SMEs is a credit registry or bureau. 
Brown, Jappelli, and Pagano (2009) found in a sample of economies 
in transition in Central and Eastern Europe that the introduction or 
upgrade of credit registries in the 2000s signiﬁcantly eased constraints 
on SME ﬁnancing. Credit registries can expand bank outreach by either 
increasing competition among them or facilitating the entry of new 
players. As with policies that help push the ﬁnancial system toward the 
frontier, improved access to external ﬁnance for SMEs has only indirect 
effects on economic growth and poverty reduction, so beneﬁts should 
not be expected in the short term.
Roles of foreign banks and relationship banking. One controversial 
issue in SME ﬁnance has been the role of foreign-owned banks. 
The empirical evidence is mixed. Firms of all sizes report lower barriers 
to ﬁnance in economies with a higher share of foreign banks (Clarke, 
Cull, and Martinez Peria 2006). This positive effect can be direct 
or indirect. Foreign banks can bring in the knowhow and scale that 
encourage the introduction of new transaction and lending techniques. 
Further, by competing with domestic banks for a limited ﬁeld of large 
corporate clients, they can force domestic banks to go down market to 
serve smaller companies, where they enjoy a local advantage catering 
to SMEs (de Haas and Naaborg 2005). The ﬂip side of this is the 
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evidence that foreign banks are less likely than domestic banks to lend 
to small companies with opaque operations (Mian 2006, Gormley 2010). 
This observation echoes the traditional view that SME ﬁnance revolves 
around relationships and long-term connections between a bank and its 
borrowers.
Partial credit guarantees. To address the problem of many SMEs 
being able to offer only poor collateral, partial credit guarantees 
feature prominently in activist policies for the credit market. While 
private guarantees exist, governments and their development partners 
in particular have been aggressively pushing to establish guarantees 
to widen SME access to bank credit. In this regard, issues of pricing, 
funding, and institutional structure are important. While such schemes 
can be self-sustainable, they often require signiﬁcant subsidies and 
contingent ﬁscal liabilities to cover losses. While it is difficult to 
compute such costs in advance, it is even more difficult to measure the 
beneﬁts, which include adding new borrowers that would not have 
gained access to ﬁnance if not for partial credit guarantees. Only a few 
studies have rigorously assessed the impact of the guarantees, but those 
few point to a somewhat positive effect.
Equity ﬁnance. Equity ﬁnance has not received sufficient emphasis 
as a source of ﬁnancing for SMEs. This form of ﬁnance can be beneﬁcial 
when debt ﬁnance is not an option or a ﬁrm has reached its leverage 
limit. Although some developing countries have set up second-tier 
stock exchanges for SMEs, most such exchanges lack the necessary 
scale, demand, and infrastructure. For example, the over-the-counter 
exchange of India was established in 1992 as a platform to allow SMEs 
to generate equity capital, but it had only 60 companies listed as of 
March 2012. One barrier is the lack of institutional participation (Nair 
and Kaicker 2009). Private equity might therefore be a more promising 
route than public toward providing SMEs with access to equity ﬁnance. 
Private equity funds and venture capitalists, including angel ﬁnanciers, 
can help. The main constraint on private equity investment in many 
developing countries, however, is limited scale.
Final thoughts on ﬁnancial access for inclusion 
The lessons from the recent literature on ﬁnancial inclusion have 
important policy repercussions for developing Asia. While external 
ﬁnance is critical for SME development, credit might not be the most 
urgent ﬁnancial service for previously unbanked individuals. Payment 
and savings services can help low-income households smooth the 
effects of income shocks, income ﬂuctuation, and sudden or lumpy 
consumption needs—and, ultimately, help them better integrate into 
the modern market economy. In terms of policy repercussions, the 
message therefore favors the careful expansion of credit with a greater 
focus on innovation to extend access to savings and payment services 
to the previously unbanked population. Competition and a favorable 
regulatory framework are critical. Finally, as Mylenko and Park 
(forthcoming) point out, more and better data on ﬁnancial inclusion 
will help inform and guide the efforts of policy makers to broaden 
ﬁnancial access.
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Financial stability to safeguard 
inclusive growth
While ﬁnancial development can contribute to economic growth, it 
can also pose risks to ﬁnancial stability, undermining both growth and 
equity. Liberalizing tightly regulated ﬁnancial systems—as, for example, 
the PRC is attempting as it moves from a state-controlled system to 
a more competitive and market-oriented system—ultimately leaves 
sounder and more efficient ﬁnancial intermediation. However, in the 
short run, it may acerbate volatility.
The challenge for the region is therefore to maintain ﬁnancial 
stability even as it develops and liberalizes its ﬁnancial system. 
During the global ﬁnancial crisis of 2008–2009, the world saw 
the importance of strong and effective prudential regulation. 
In developing Asia, the regulatory challenges seem even more 
daunting, as regulators have to maintain ﬁnancial stability 
while also encouraging growth-promoting ﬁnancial 
development. 
Asia’s ﬁnancial systems are fortunately much healthier 
today, owing largely to reforms that followed the Asian 
ﬁnancial crisis of 1997–1998. Even so, external shocks can 
unsettle local markets. Such an event happened in May 2013, 
during the so-called taper tantrums, when news of a possible 
change in US monetary policy decimated Asian stock prices 
and currency values (see Figure 2.4.1). Home-grown risks still 
lurk in the background, in the form of large shadow banking 
systems in some economies and unrestrained household debt 
expansion in others. 
The point of departure for a ﬁnancial regulatory 
framework that is strong yet nimble must be adequate 
prudential regulation and supervision of banks, which still 
dominate ﬁnancial systems in developing Asia. Banking 
regulation is the primary safeguard against ﬁnancial 
instability, but it should be supplemented by macroprudential 
policies and other new policy instruments now available to 
regulatory authorities.
Banking regulation in Asia
 As economies in developing Asia are quite diverse in population, 
demographics, and per capita GDP, it is no surprise that they vary 
widely in the size, structure, and complexity of their banking systems. 
They all have a common need, however, for supervision and regulation 
to keep their banking systems safe and sound. This means ensuring that 
their inevitable problems are manageable and that their bank failures, 
when unavoidable, are not large or systemic. Meanwhile, banks must 
remain able to meet credit needs.
2.4.1  Nominal rate changes against the US dollar during the 
taper tantrum, 23 May–30 June 2013
%
−6
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−2
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India Indonesia Republic
of Korea
Malaysia Philippines Thailand
Note: Decline means depreciation.
Source: Estrada, Noland, Park, and Ramayandi (forthcoming).
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Given the huge role of banks in Asia and the crippling effect of 
banking crises on growth, regulatory authorities’ ﬁrst line of defense 
against ﬁnancial stability is naturally the sound prudential supervision 
and regulation of these institutions (Table 2.4.1). In addition, regulatory 
authorities in the region need to follow guidelines set by Basel III 
core principles for bank regulation, which were recently introduced to 
strengthen global regulatory standards in the aftermath of the global 
ﬁnancial crisis.
Southeast Asia in particular has unique regulatory and supervisory 
challenges arising from ongoing regional ﬁnancial integration. The past 
20 years have seen the emergence and expansion of many large banking 
conglomerates throughout the region. Some of these conglomerates 
operate banks that are systemically important in more than one economy. 
Conglomerate interconnectedness poses potential contagion risk—the 
possibility that problems arising in one affiliate can spread to other 
affiliates through various mechanisms such as intercompany transactions. 
Bank supervisory authorities in jurisdictions where conglomerates 
operate subsidiary banks need to ensure timely and effective two-way 
communication and information-sharing with their foreign counterparts. 
Coordination among supervisors enables better understanding of the 
risks and ﬁnancial soundness of the conglomerate parent and its bank 
and other subsidiaries, as well as the risks posed by transactions between 
affiliated organizations.
Basel III in developing Asia
Those who set international standards, such as the Financial Stability 
Board and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, pursue reform 
agendas intended to reduce the risks of bank failure and to mitigate 
the cost of failures and thereby preserve public conﬁdence in the 
banking system when they occur. In particular, Asian banks are now 
confronted with Basel III and the tightening of the Basel Committee’s 
core principles for bank supervision agreed in 2011–2012 in response 
to the global ﬁnancial crisis. That crisis resulted partly from a serious 
failure of bank regulation in the advanced economies. Basel III presents 
voluntary regulatory standards on bank capital adequacy, stress testing, 
2.4.1 Banking crisis outcomes, 1970–2011
Output 
loss
Increase 
in debt
Monetary 
expansion Fiscal costs Fiscal costs Duration
Peak 
liquidity
Liquidity 
support Peak NPLs
Medians
Country % of GDP
% of ﬁnancial 
system assets Years
% of deposits and foreign 
liabilities
% of total 
loans
All 23.0 12.1 1.7 6.8 12.7 2.0 20.1 9.6 25.0
Advanced 32.9 21.4 8.3 3.8 2.1 3.0 11.5 5.7 4.0
Emerging 26.0 9.1 1.3 10.0 21.4 2.0 22.3 11.1 30.0
Developing 1.6 10.9 1.2 10.0 18.3 1.0 22.6 12.3 37.5
NPL = nonperforming loan.
Source: Laeven and Valencia (2012), Table 2, p. 17: data are from authors’ calculations.
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and market liquidity due to be implemented by March 2019. The initial 
Basel principles were agreed in 1988 and revised in 2004 (Basel II). 
Table 2.4.2 compares Basel II and Basel III, and Table 2.4.3 outlines the 
implementation table for Basel III.
Adherence to the more stringent Basel III standards will further 
strengthen Asian banks’ balance sheets and mitigate their vulnerability 
to shocks. The regulatory framework reduces opportunities for 
regulatory arbitrage and harmonizes regulatory standards. However, 
the region must ensure that tightened regulations do not seriously 
compromise banks’ capacity to fulﬁll their core function of channeling 
credit to households and ﬁrms for investment and production. 
2.4.2 Comparison of Basel II and Basel III capital requirements
% of risk 
weighted assets Capital requirements Additional macroprudential overlay
Common equity Tier 1 capital Total capital
Counter-cyclical 
buffer
Additional 
loss-absorbing 
capacity for 
systemically 
important 
ﬁnancial 
institutionsMinimum
Conservation 
buffer Required Minimum Required Minimum Required Range
Basel II 2.0 4.0 8.0
Memo:
Equivalent to about 1% of an 
average international bank under 
the new deﬁnition
Equivalent to about 
2% of an average 
international bank
Basel III 
New deﬁnition 
and calibration
4.5 2.5 7.0 6.0 8.5 8.0 10.5 0.0–2.5 1.0–2.5
10.5–15.5
Source: ADB estimates.
2.4.3 Basel III implementation timetable
Leverage ratio (%)
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
As of 1 January 
2019
Supervisory 
monitoring Parallel run with disclosure starting 2015 Migration to Pillar 1
Minimum common equity capital ratio 3.5 4.0 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5
Capital conservation buffer 0.625 1.25 1.875 2.5
Sum of the above 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.125 5.75 6.375 7.0
Phase-in of deductions from common 
equity tier 1 capital
20 40 60 80 100 100
Minimum tier 1 capital 4.5 5.5 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0
Minimum total capital 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0
Minimum total capital + conservation buffer 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.625 9.25 9.875 10.5
Capital instruments that no longer qualify 
as non-core tier 1 or 2 capital
To be phased out over 10 year period starting 2013
Liquidity coverage ratio Observation begins Introduce minimum standard
Net stable funding ratio Observation begins Introduce minimum 
standard
Source: ADB estimates.
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Banks in Asia appear sound today even under the new stricter 
standards of Basel III thanks to earlier efforts to strengthen their 
capital base, reduce nonperforming loans, and bolster loan loss 
provisions, especially after the Asian ﬁnancial crisis of 1997–1998. 
However, another reason is that the region’s ﬁnancial markets are 
underdeveloped and not as exposed to sophisticated instruments as 
their counterparts in more ﬁnancially advanced economies. Bank 
capital, for instance, is mostly held as simple paid-in capital and 
retained earnings.
Although they preserve ﬁnancial stability and improve transparency 
among banks, the new, stringent regulatory standards raise the cost 
of ﬁnancial intermediation and limit the availability of bank credit. 
In upper-middle-income countries, relatively scant and expensive 
bank ﬁnance will encourage the development of bond markets, as their 
economies already have a core bond market and a growing institutional 
investor base such as insurance companies. The tight leverage ratio 
under Basel III will likely limit the supply of bank ﬁnance, as banks in 
these countries often stretch their balance sheets. Moreover, capital 
requirements will likely constrain the provision of bank ﬁnance for 
SMEs unless efforts are made to enhance secured and unsecured 
lending and promote nonbank ﬁnance for SMEs.
For lower-middle-income countries, the challenges that Basel III 
pose are somewhat different and more challenging. The new ﬁnancial 
standards, particularly liquidity requirements, are likely to constrain 
the generation of medium- to long-term bank ﬁnance because ﬁnancial 
systems are heavily dominated by banks. While solvency policies 
are designed to encourage very long-term investment by insurance 
companies, insurance industries are often too small in these economies 
to compensate for the loss of medium- to long-term ﬁnance from banks. 
Therefore, in addition to developing a base of long-term institutional 
investors such as insurance companies and pension funds, regulators 
must, in the meantime, induce banks to meet their capital adequacy 
requirements by expanding their capital, not cutting back their lending.
Lessons from the global ﬁnancial crisis
According to Zamorski and Lee (forthcoming), international experience 
during the global ﬁnancial crisis provides some valuable lessons for 
Asian bank regulators. Above all, the crisis underlined that sound 
and effective bank regulation is vital to ﬁnancial stability. The crisis 
reﬂected the failure of regulatory authorities to keep pace with ﬁnancial 
innovation. The sobering lesson for Asia and the rest of the developing 
world is that even ﬁnancially advanced economies are susceptible to 
risks from lax regulation and reckless lending. 
Assessments of the global ﬁnancial crisis of 2008–2009 invariably 
point to ineffective ﬁnance regulation and supervision as the main 
reasons for the onset of the crisis and its severity. In particular, lapses in 
banking regulation contributed signiﬁcantly to the outbreak. Regulators 
allowed banks to operate with excessive leverage and failed to curtail 
risky lending, primarily mortgages to subprime homebuyers who were 
inadequately screened for creditworthiness.
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Bank supervision had been weak by any measure. Supervisors did 
not conduct regular onsite bank inspections or examinations of sufficient 
depth. They did not properly implement risk-based supervision, and they 
failed to identify shortcomings in banks’ risk-management methods, 
governance structures, and risk cultures. 
Instead, overemphasis on banks’ historic operating results and 
static ﬁnancial conditions in assessing risk, failed to reveal potential 
vulnerabilities. Meanwhile, offsite surveillance systems rely too heavily 
on banks’ self-reported data to effectively monitor risk. Regulators failed 
to understand the risk and policy implications of new bank products and 
services and changing business models, or to establish effective lines of 
communication with their counterparts in other economies, through 
which they could have shared vital information.
Post-crisis analysis by the International Monetary Fund, Financial 
Stability Board, and Basel Committee on Banking Supervision identify 
additional aspects of bank supervision that could have helped avoid the 
global ﬁnancial crisis:
(i) adequately monitoring and controlling macroprudential 
risk, and not just individual bank risk, as a buildup of 
such vulnerabilities could hit a number of institutions 
simultaneously, posing systemic risk; 
(ii) conducting comprehensive stress testing of the banking system 
and other economic sectors, taking into account highly risky 
scenarios even if they seemed unlikely;
(iii) paying attention to concentrations of risk and to 
interdependencies, including cross-border risks; and
(iv) considering risks in the shadow banking industry or cross-sector 
risks posed by nonbank ﬁnancial intermediaries.
The last major episode of cross-border ﬁnancial instability and 
banking crisis in developing Asia occurred more than 17 years ago. 
To extend this impressive record of relative calm, bank supervisory 
authorities in the region need to assess their supervisory systems, 
infrastructure, and actual practices. The lessons learned in the global 
ﬁnancial crisis will be useful to this process. If the assessment reveals 
that changes, enhancements, or remedial action are needed, a deﬁnitive 
plan should be crafted and implemented in a timely way.
Macroprudential policies in developing Asia
Before the global ﬁnancial crisis, bank monitoring focused primarily on 
prudential risks to individual institutions and failed to consider that a 
buildup of macroeconomic risks and vulnerabilities could pose systemic 
risk by severely affecting a number of institutions simultaneously. 
The global ﬁnancial crisis highlighted the need for national bank 
supervisory authorities to improve surveillance systems and better 
detect early on the buildup of macroeconomic risks that could threaten 
the ﬁnancial system. This requires strong macroprudential policy that 
includes measures to prevent periods of instability or crisis, as well as 
a rich set of instruments to alleviate ﬁnancial risks that stem from 
vulnerabilities building up in the broader ﬁnancial system, be they 
related to credit, liquidity, or capital. 
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The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is 
increasingly guided by the need for a macroprudential 
perspective on ﬁnancial regulation. Although much progress 
has been made on the regulatory front—especially with Basel 
III tightening of the rules on the quantity and quality of 
bank capital, requiring for example a countercyclical capital 
buffer—regulations apply to only some ﬁnancial institutions. 
In contrast, macroprudential policy aims to limit the 
buildup of risk in the entire ﬁnancial system and enhance 
its resilience following shocks. Efforts are mainly to identify 
systemic threats to ﬁnancial markets that could affect the 
real economy, and so avoid another ﬁnancial crisis. 
Macroprudential policy measures fall into the following 
three broad categories (Lim et al. 2011): 
(i) credit controls, including caps on ratios of loan to 
value and of debt to income and on foreign currency 
lending, as well as ceilings on credit or credit 
growth; 
(ii) liquidity regulations, which place limits on net open 
currency positions or currency mismatches and on 
maturity mismatches, while establishing reserve 
requirements; and 
(iii) capital requirements, including countercyclical 
capital requirements, time-varying/dynamic 
provisioning, and restrictions on proﬁt distribution. 
Macroprudential tools such as minimum capital ratios 
and loan-to-value ratios have been used for some time. 
Compared with some other regions, Asia has long experience 
in implementing a variety of macroprudential measures to 
prevent or address asset price bubbles or other threats to 
ﬁnancial stability. This experience is derived primarily from 
dealing with previous threats to ﬁnancial stability, especially 
arising from volatile capital ﬂows. 
Can macroprudential policies keep  
Asian ﬁnancial systems stable?
In theory, macroprudential measures can safeguard the 
stability of the banking system and the broader ﬁnancial 
system by mitigating risks that affect the entire ﬁnancial 
system and therefore the economy. The question is, as always, 
whether they actually work in practice. This section presents 
the basic framework of an empirical analysis to gauge how 
effectively macroprudential policies control credit growth, 
leverage growth, and housing price appreciation. The broad 
contours of the methodology and data are described in 
Box 2.4.1.
Two signiﬁcant ﬁndings emerge. Broadly, 
macroprudential policies can indeed promote ﬁnancial 
stability in Asia. More speciﬁcally, different types of 
macroprudential policies are more effective against different 
2.4.2  Responses to selected macroprudential policies in 
selected economies
Source: Lee, Asuncion, and Kim (forthcoming).
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types of macroeconomic risks. For example, the results suggest that 
credit-related macroprudential policy dampens credit growth in India, 
liquidity-related macroprudential policy reins in leverage growth in 
Indonesia, and credit-related macroprudential policy helps to control 
housing price escalation in the Republic of Korea (Figure 2.4.2). 
The general pattern across the region suggests that credit-related 
macroprudential policies can effectively dampen credit expansion 
and housing price inﬂation, while liquidity-related macroprudential 
2.4.1 Methodology and data
A major innovation of this analysis is deﬁning 
macroprudential policy as a continuous variable rather 
than as a binary variable. Tillmann (2014) and Meinusch 
and Tillmann (2014) recently extended a multivariate 
dynamic probit model—the qualitative vector autoregression 
model that Dueker (2005) originally applied to forecast 
business cycle turning points—to uncover the latent 
propensity to macroprudential policy tightening from the 
observed binary policy data. This modiﬁed methodology 
can examine the dynamic effectiveness of macroprudential 
policy and unconventional monetary policy by addressing 
the exogenous treatment of binary macroprudential policy 
indicators that are likely endogenous and by tracing out the 
dynamic adjustment of the endogenous variables following 
different macroprudential policy shocks. 
The binary macroprudential policy indicators often do not 
properly represent policy stance that leans toward tightening, 
easing, or maintaining a neutral stance. One advantage of using 
the qualitative VAR is to uncover latent and unobservable 
propensity for macroprudential tightening from the observed 
binary policy data, which provides an endogenous continuous 
series reﬂecting the business cycle. A standard VAR with the 
generated latent series can provide estimates and dynamic 
impulse response functions for macroprudential policy shocks. 
Lee, Asuncion, and Kim (forthcoming) comprehensively 
describe the empirical methodology.
Data came from varied sources such as the International 
Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics, 
CEIC Data Company, the Bank for International Settlements, 
the Economic Intelligence Unit, and government sources. 
A database of macroprudential policy instruments draws 
from Lim et al. (2011, 2013), Shim (2013), Zhang and 
Zoli (2014), documents posted on the websites of central 
banks such as annual reports and ﬁnancial stability 
reports, the Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and 
Exchange Restrictions database, and research papers on 
macroprudential policy in individual economies and the 
region. The sample period is from the ﬁrst quarter of 2000 
to the fourth quarter of 2013.
The box table shows information about macroprudential 
instruments that 10 economies have most actively applied 
in developing Asia during the sample period. In the sample, 
credit-related macroprudential policy instruments such as 
ratios of loan to value and of debt to income were used most 
frequently in Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, 
and Thailand, while liquidity-related macroprudential 
policy instruments such as reserve requirements and 
limits on net open currency positions were employed most 
commonly in the PRC, India, and Indonesia. Capital-related 
macroprudential policy tools were rarely applied except in 
India. The tools implemented most often were credit-related 
macroprudential policy measures. 
Speciﬁc use of macroprudential policy instruments by economy, 2000–2013
Policy Type
Economy
Total %HKG IND INO KOR MAL PHI PRC SIN TAP THA
Credit-relateda 5  6 11 23 6 1 8 13 3 15 92 49.2
Liquidity-relatedb 0 18  7  3 3 10 31  0 6  1 79 42.2
Capital-relatedc 1 4  1  2 0  6  1  1 0  0 16  8.6
Total 6 28 19 28 9 17 41 14 9 16 187 100.0
HKG = Hong Kong, China; IND = India; INO = Indonesia; KOR = Republic of Korea; MAL = Malaysia; PHI = Philippines; PRC = People’s Republic of China; 
SIN = Singapore; TAP = Taipei,China; THA = Thailand.
a Caps on ratios of loan to value and debt to income, caps on foreign currency lending, and ceilings on credit and credit growth.
b Limits on net open currency positions and currency mismatch, limits on maturity mismatch, and reserve requirements.
c Countercyclical and time-varying capital requirements, time-varying/dynamic provisioning, and restrictions on proﬁt distribution.
Source: Lee, Asuncion, and Kim (forthcoming).
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policy tools moderate leverage growth and housing price escalation. 
The salient implication for Asian ﬁnancial regulators is that, while they 
should explore the use of macroprudential policies, they should assess 
which exact policies are appropriate for the particular macroprudential 
risk they face.
Further issues on ﬁnancial stability for growth
This section discusses three additional approaches relevant for ﬁnancial 
stability in Asia. Bank stress tests, which the US and European Union 
have used extensively since the global ﬁnancial crisis, offer Asian 
regulators another potentially useful tool for safeguarding stability. 
Foreign direct investment and the diversiﬁcation of external funding 
sources can reduce the vulnerability of Asian countries to external 
ﬁnancial shocks. Finally, the PRC’s efforts to liberalize its ﬁnancial 
system without upsetting its ﬁnancial stability is of historic importance 
for the PRC and provides some valuable lessons for the rest of Asia.
Bank stress tests and their implications for Asia
Bank stress tests assess whether a bank or group of banks are adequately 
capitalized for stressed economic scenarios. More speciﬁcally, stress 
tests evaluate whether banks have sufficient self-insurance to withstand 
adverse economic shocks so that a costly banking crisis can be avoided. 
Bank stress tests have been conducted by the International Monetary 
Fund since the late 1990s, by central banks and other national 
regulatory authorities since before that, and even earlier by commercial 
and investment banks themselves. 
What has put bank stress tests in the headlines around the world, 
however, is of more recent revival. Both the US and European Union 
have vigorously implemented bank stress tests in the aftermath of the 
global ﬁnancial crisis. Although it is difficult to assess the impact of 
the stress tests because the crisis management effort had many other 
elements, some evidence suggests that they helped calm the markets.
Three policy implications can be drawn for Asia from the stress 
tests conducted in the US and the European Union (see Goldstein, 
forthcoming). First, the credibility of such tests depends in good 
measure on their institutional framework and design: the legal authority 
for the test, the independence of the supervisor conducting the tests, 
and the resources applied. Second, capital shortfalls revealed by stress 
tests should be remedied in a way that is friendly to economic growth. 
A higher desired capital ratio should be translated into an absolute 
amount of capital, rather than allowing banks to achieve the higher 
capital ratio by cutting back on loans, disposing of assets in ﬁre sales, 
or manipulating risk weights. Third, because capital ratios that use an 
unweighted measure of bank assets in the denominator, or leverage 
ratios, do a much better job from the start of distinguishing sick banks 
from healthy ones than do risk-based measures of bank capital, a 
leverage ratio test should be included in all future supervisory-led bank 
stress tests. Over time, a leverage ratio should become the primary 
metric for bank stress tests.
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Global shocks and diverse external funding
Limited regional ﬁnancial integration in Asia means not only that 
Asians invest relatively little in the region but also that they borrow 
less from it. The lack of intraregional borrowing had particularly 
important implications during the global ﬁnancial crisis because it 
originated in global ﬁnancial centers outside of Asia. If the global 
ﬁnancial center pulls capital from an economy that is heavily dependent 
on it for ﬁnancing, the dependent economy can become unstable even 
though its fundamentals are sound. For an economy with 
little diversity in its external funding sources, the impact 
of a global ﬁnancial crisis could be especially large, as most 
external funding will dry up. On the other hand, if funding 
sources are more diversiﬁed—for example, if an economy 
relies much more on other regional economies—then the 
other funding sources can be tapped during a global crisis. 
Therefore, if regional ﬁnancial integration is strengthened, 
the member economies can become less vulnerable to 
global shocks.
To investigate the possibility that diversifying external 
sources of funding mitigates the impact of shocks originating 
from the global ﬁnancial markets, the empirical approach of 
Eichengreen and Gupta (2013) is applied (Box 2.4.2).
For all four measures of external portfolio liability—
total portfolio liability and its three components: equity, 
long-term debt, and short-term debt—the coefficients of the 
diversiﬁcation of external liabilities are negative, indicating 
that economies with more diversiﬁed external funding 
experienced less currency depreciation. In particular, the 
coefficient of diversiﬁcation in short-term debt liabilities is 
negative and signiﬁcant (Figure 2.4.3). 
2.4.2 The relationship between funding diversiﬁcation and vulnerability to global shocks
In May 2013, Ben Bernanke, then the chair of the US Federal 
Reserve, mentioned the possibility of the US tapering its 
quantitative easing. This had knock-on effects globally, 
triggering sharp depreciation of the currencies of many 
emerging economies. To explore this event, Eichengreen 
and Gupta (2013) proposed an innovative approach to ﬁgure 
out which countries were more likely to be hit by the Fed’s 
talk of tapering quantitative easing. To understand why 
some countries were hit harder than others, the authors 
investigated what factors were responsible for the negative 
impact of the tapering announcement. 
 The basic regression equation estimated by Eichengreen 
and Gupta (2013) took the following form: 
ERDi = Xi  + 
i
where ERDi is exchange rate depreciation experienced by 
country i between the end of April and the end of August 
2013, and Xi is a vector of country-speciﬁc factors for 
country i that are expected to be responsible for currency 
depreciation. The factors considered were deterioration in 
the current account deﬁcit and currency appreciation in real 
exchange rate terms, measures of the size of the ﬁnancial 
market, and other variables related to economic fundamentals. 
The study of Park and Shin (forthcoming b) extends the 
analysis by considering diversiﬁcation of liability, another 
possibly important factor, to test whether economies with 
more diversiﬁed holdings of liability were less vulnerable to 
the tapering announcement. For each economy, the shares 
of liability to all partner economies are calculated, with the 
standard deviation of these shares serving as the proxy for 
the diversiﬁcation of liabilities. Regressions are then run for 
four cases in 2012, measuring diversiﬁcation on the basis of 
total portfolio securities, equity securities, long-term debt 
securities, and short-term debt securities. Park and Shin 
(forthcoming b) explains the data and empirical framework 
in depth.
2.4.3  Diversification of external liability in short-term debt 
and currency depreciation
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Liability related to bank borrowing, as opposed to portfolio liability, 
also plays an important role in triggering crises. In emerging markets, 
crises are frequently characterized by twin crises as banking and 
currency crises occur simultaneously. Performing the type of empirical 
analysis described in Box 2.4.1 on bank lending data from the Bank for 
International Settlements, Park and Shin (forthcoming b) found that 
economies with more diversiﬁed sources of bank lending were generally 
less vulnerable to the tapering announcement.
Just as diversifying foreign asset holdings has beneﬁts, so does 
diversifying foreign liability holdings. In particular, the analysis 
indicates that it helps to mitigate ﬁnancial instability caused by shocks 
from global ﬁnancial markets. This implies that excessive global 
ﬁnancial integration can be undesirable. Deeper regional ﬁnancial 
integration can replace excessive dependence on global ﬁnancial 
markets for external funding and thus vulnerability to global shocks. 
The evidence therefore provides some support for the efforts of Asian 
governments to further deepen regional ﬁnancial integration.
Foreign direct investment and 
other determinants of vulnerability
There are, of course, other determinants of vulnerability that have been 
more extensively tested in the literature. In particular, a higher share 
of foreign direct investment (FDI) in total foreign liability seems to 
help reduce vulnerability to external ﬁnancial shocks (e.g., Tong and 
Wei 2010, Prasad, Rajan, and Subramanian 2007). Intuitively, this is 
because FDI is geared more toward the long term and hence 
more stable than other private capital ﬂows. In fact, FDI 
proved to be remarkably resilient in East Asian economies 
during the Asian ﬁnancial crisis of 1997–1998. In sharp 
contrast, portfolio equity and debt ﬂows—the more short-
term ﬂows—suffered large reversals and thus became major 
causes of volatility. On the other hand, FDI turned out to 
be less resilient during the global ﬁnancial crisis, especially 
in Eastern Europe, where FDI collapsed as sharply as other 
capital ﬂows. Currently, signiﬁcant variation exists in the 
share of FDI in the liabilities of economies in developing Asia 
(Figure 2.4.4). 
Turning from liabilities to assets, currency and maturity 
mismatches in the balance sheets of banks and other 
ﬁnancial institutions can cause ﬁnancial vulnerability. In 
fact, the twin mismatches were central catalysts of the Asian 
ﬁnancial crisis. Before the crisis struck, banks in some East 
Asian economies borrowed short-term in US dollars to make 
long-term loans in their national currencies. Park (2011) 
found that both mismatches were markedly less pronounced 
before the global ﬁnancial crisis than before the Asian 
ﬁnancial crisis, which helps to explain much greater resilience during 
the global crisis. One indicator that broadly captures these types of risks 
is the ratio of short-term foreign debt to foreign exchange reserves, 
2.4.4  Share of foreign direct investment in the foreign 
liabilities of selected economies, 2012
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where a lower ratio indicates reduced vulnerability. Across 
Asia, the ratio is well below the informal but widely used 
Greenspan–Guidotti threshold of 1 (Figure 2.4.5).
Yet another indicator is the growth of the ratio of the 
money supply measure M2 to GDP. In the PRC, rapid growth 
of the ratio has caused some concern about excessive reliance 
on bank lending. Overall, though, most indicators suggest 
that the region’s ﬁnancial system is in relatively good health, 
though this is no cause for complacency.
Lessons from the PRC on  
ﬁnancial development and stability
A huge strategic challenge confronting the PRC is how to 
transition toward a more market-based and efficient ﬁnancial 
system without disrupting ﬁnancial stability. Drawing lessons 
from the PRC experience for the rest of Asia is difficult 
because of its unique ﬁnancial system. In particular, the 
PRC ﬁnancial system is set apart by having grown very large 
relative to GDP at an early stage in economic development 
(Figure 2.4.6). 
Nevertheless, as many other Asian economies share 
with the PRC a quest for smooth and stable ﬁnancial 
development, its experiences hold valuable lessons for the 
rest of the region. And, like the PRC, some Asian economies 
have achieved relatively high ﬁnancial development as 
measured by quantitative indicators but now face the more 
difficult challenge of improving the quality of ﬁnancial 
intermediation.
 Several useful lessons can be drawn from the PRC 
experience to inform other Asian economies implementing 
ﬁnancial reform. The ﬁrst is that it is possible to rapidly 
improve the efficiency of state-owned banks, which 
remain important in many Asian countries (Figure 2.4.7). 
State-owned banks in the PRC went from being 
technically bankrupt in the late 1990s to earning large proﬁts 
less than a decade later. The turnaround required a large 
injection of capital from the central government and indirect 
support to offload bad loans to asset management companies. 
But reform went much further than a simple bailout. State-
owned banks dramatically retrenched their staff and branches 
to boost efficiency. An independent banking regulator was 
established, and a separate body was created to manage the 
state’s equity interests. The banks brought in strategic foreign 
investors and sought listings on international exchanges 
to reinforce improved corporate governance. The result of 
reform was a dramatic increase in the operational efficiency 
and proﬁtability of commercial banks in the PRC (Table 2.4.4).
The second lesson from the experience of ﬁnancial 
reform in the PRC is that an incremental approach can 
2.4.5  Short-term foreign debt to foreign exchange reserves 
in selected Asian economies, 2013 
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have unintended consequences. The authorities in the PRC soundly 
rejected the big bang approach to ﬁnancial reform advocated to many 
developing countries in the 1990s. In the wake of the collapse of many 
economies following the dissolution of the Soviet bloc, and the turmoil 
in Asia during the Asian ﬁnancial crisis, the PRC approach of slow and 
incremental ﬁnancial reform seemed vindicated. However, the slow 
progress of many ﬁnancial reforms, most notably on exchange rates 
and the liberalization of interest rates on deposits, has created adverse 
side effects. The glacial pace of interest rate liberalization has given rise 
to an unsustainably large increase in credit and the creation of a large 
shadow banking system. Measured and incremental ﬁnancial reform 
may be preferable to overnight liberalization. However, the lack of 
reform can also create risks within the ﬁnancial system.
The ﬁnal lesson to be drawn from the experience of the PRC is 
the difficulty of rooting out implicit guarantees and moral hazard in a 
ﬁnancial system that is dominated by state-owned actors. The PRC has 
one of the largest banking systems in the world, yet it is only now in 
the process of creating a deposit insurance system. The Government of 
the PRC therefore faces a large implicit liability. Even worse, depositors 
assume that banks will guarantee returns on a variety of other ﬁnancial 
products, such as trust and wealth management products, without 
regard for whether the issuing bank has any legal responsibility to 
guarantee anything. The government is therefore the ultimate guarantor 
of these products as well. What is required to meaningfully reduce 
moral hazard is a paradigm change in the approach of regulators and 
the introduction of private ﬁnancial institutions that are allowed to fail.
Final thoughts on safeguarding inclusive growth
As they develop their ﬁnancial systems, Asian economies must be 
vigilant about ﬁnancial stability, as instability harms both growth 
and equity. Heightened global ﬁnancial instability since the global 
crisis—and homegrown risks such as shadow banking in particular—
strengthen the case for vigilance. That said, tighter regulations under 
Basel III complicate the task of Asian bank regulators by potentially 
limiting ﬁnance in bank-dominated economies. Fortunately, the healthy 
balance sheets of Asian banks give cause for optimism about their 
ability to balance ﬁnancial stability and economic growth. Moreover, 
macroprudential policies and other new tools will help bolster the 
defense of the region’s ﬁnancial stability. 
2.4.4 Bank performance in the PRC versus the G-20 Aaverage (%)
Return on assets Net interest margin Return on equity Cost/income ratio
PRC 1999 0.7 1.9 9.8 65.5
PRC 2011 1.1 2.9 18.3 38.3
G-20 2011 (Average) 1.2 3.0 13.5 59.3
G-20 = Group of Twenty, PRC = People’s Republic of China.
Source: Borst and Lardy (forthcoming). 
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Financing Asia’s future growth
Financial sector development can make a signiﬁcant, positive 
contribution to economic growth. The effect of ﬁnancial development 
on growth is larger in developing countries and especially pronounced 
in developing Asia. Moreover, it is the development of the ﬁnancial 
system as a whole, rather than any particular component of the ﬁnancial 
system, that has a signiﬁcant, positive effect on economic growth. While 
Asia compares favorably with other parts of the developing world in 
ﬁnancial development, it still lags advanced economies, which suggests 
scope for further progress and hence a growth dividend. Therefore, at a 
time when Asian policy makers are seeking new engines of growth, one 
overlooked engine may be a sounder and more efficient ﬁnancial system. 
The growth beneﬁts of ﬁnance will be even larger if a more 
competitive ﬁnancial system better allocates resources according to 
market principles. The PRC experience suggests, for example, that 
the participation of foreign banks can enhance both competition and 
the lending quality of state-owned banks and others in the system. 
The end result will be lending decisions made to a greater degree on 
commercial considerations that therefore allocate capital to more 
productive investments and activities. A closely related point is that 
sustaining growth ultimately requires a vibrant private sector, and 
access to adequate, reasonably priced capital is essential to a vibrant 
private sector. Innovation and productivity growth, which will loom 
larger as the region becomes increasingly middle income, require a well-
developed ﬁnancial system, especially one with adequate sources of 
long-term capital. 
Financial development generally promotes economic growth, but its 
impact on equity is uncertain. Financial deepening can either widen the 
income gap, if its beneﬁts accrue largely to senior ﬁnancial professionals 
and other wealthy individuals, or narrow the gap if the poor gain 
greater access to ﬁnancial services. Empirical evidence reﬂects this 
dichotomy. While ﬁnancial development tends to alleviate inequality 
in its early stages, inclusion does not come automatically as ﬁnancial 
development deepens. Therefore, since ﬁnancial development does not 
necessarily promote equity, Asian policy makers must make a concerted 
effort to advance ﬁnancial inclusion by expanding access for the poor to 
ﬁnancial services. Doing so will improve the odds of ﬁnance becoming 
an engine of inclusive growth.
The global ﬁnancial crisis underlined the importance of sound and 
effective ﬁnancial regulation to safeguard ﬁnancial stability, which is 
vital for both growth and equity. The region’s ﬁnancial institutions 
are well placed to meet the more stringent regulatory standards being 
adopted globally, as many already exceed requirements under Basel 
III. Regulators will be challenged, however, to ﬁnd the right balance. 
They must appreciate how strong regulation protects stability by 
preventing the accumulation of systemic risks, but they must weigh 
it against the potential beneﬁts of ﬂexible regulation that promotes 
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investment, productivity, innovation, and economic growth. For both 
banks and capital markets, the key regulatory challenge is to strengthen 
governance and thereby minimize crony lending, insider trading, and 
other inefficient and inequitable practices. Good governance tightens the 
link between ﬁnance and growth by directing capital toward productive 
investments and activities.
In sum, as the region grapples today with the slowdown of growth 
momentum since the global ﬁnancial crisis, the case for further ﬁnancial 
sector development in developing Asia has never been stronger. A sound 
and efficient ﬁnancial sector is simply an indispensable ingredient 
for the region’s ongoing quest for a brighter future achieved through 
growth that is rapid but also stable and inclusive.
Endnotes
1 This follows from the multiplication of the log difference of 
the liquid liabilities ratio and its relevant coefficient obtained 
from the regression. See Table 2.1.2. That is 2.72*[ln(63.9+1)-
ln(63.9)]=2.72*0.016=0.04, and 0.04*10=0.4.
2 Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2009) survey the literature on theory 
and evidence on the relationship between financial development and 
inequality. 
3 ADB (2014) has a comprehensive discussion of innovation-led 
growth in Asia.
4 By contrast, short-term horizons and procyclical investment 
strategies, such as bank lending that relies on imprudent short-
term funding and excessive maturity transformation (or the 
funding of longer-term commitments with shorter-term deposits 
or investments) is more prone to instability, as demonstrated by the 
global financial crisis of 2008–2009. 
5 In most East Asian economies, insurance companies are the largest 
institutional investors, their investments equaling 26% of GDP, 
while mutual funds average 17% and pension funds 15% (Didier and 
Schmukler 2014). 
6 Group of Thirty (2013) offers a more comprehensive list of policy 
proposals for advanced and emerging market economies globally. 
European Commission (2013) details policy proposals more specific 
to Europe, which, like Asia, has financial sectors heavily dependent 
on banks. Ding, Lam, and Peiris (2014), Felman et al. (2014), Walsh 
(2014), and Zhu (2014) offer policy proposals more specific to Asia. 
7 A number of initiatives are already under way on this front, including 
the Asian Bond Fund and the ASEAN+3 Bond Market Initiative, 
which joins seven members of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations with the People’s Republic of China (including Hong Kong, 
China), Japan, and the Republic of Korea.
8 Christensen, Schindler, and Tressel (2013) provides empirical 
evidence that banking system reform is positively and significantly 
associated with growth in total factor productivity in low- and 
middle-income countries.
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9 For evidence at the level of the firm of a positive relationship 
between the use of external finance (both debt and equity) and 
future productivity growth, see Levine and Warusawitharana (2014), 
which analyzes data from advanced European economies. The 
study provides evidence against a reverse-causality explanation. 
For one economy in their sample, the United Kingdom, direct 
evidence indicates that firms use financing to invest in productivity 
enhancement. 
10 A new version of the database, based on surveys in 2013 and 2014, is 
expected to be released in April 2015.
11 The data used in this paper were downloaded in September 2014. 
Several economies have more than 1 year of survey data, and all years 
of data on each economy were pooled for this analysis.
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Subregion/Economy Banking System Stock Market Public Bonds Private Bonds
DEVELOPING ASIA 60.0 71.0 25.7 20.4
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A
Armenia 18.1 0.3 0.0 0.0
Azerbaijan 11.7 ... 0.0 0.0
Georgia 21.9 6.8 0.0 0.0
Kazakhstan 27.5 28.5 0.0 0.0
Kyrgyz Republic ... 2.1 0.0 0.0
Tajikistan ... ... 0.0 0.0
Turkmenistan ... ... 0.0 0.0
Uzbekistan ... ... 0.0 0.0
EA
ST
 A
SI
A China, People’s Republic of 49.9 58.8 22.4 23.1
Hong Kong, China 301.6 396.8 36.0 15.3
Korea, Republic of 72.1 96.2 44.8 59.3
Mongolia 46.5 15.9 0.0 0.0
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IA
Afghanistan 15.7 0.0 0.0 0.0
Bangladesh 49.5 17.3 0.0 0.0
Bhutan 60.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
India 62.0 69.7 29.6 4.9
Maldives 79.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
Nepal 58.7 25.3 0.0 0.0
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Brunei Darussalam 60.4 0.0 0.0 0.0
Cambodia 32.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Indonesia 32.0 45.1 10.8 1.4
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Myanmar ... 0.0 0.0 0.0
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Tuvalu ... 0.0 0.0 0.0
Vanuatu 73.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
… = data not available.
Note: Reported are the size of the banking system (measured as the amount of deposits), stock market capitalization, and public and private bonds outstanding, all expressed 
as a percentage of GDP. Regional averages are GDP-weighted.
Source: ADB estimates based on data from Beck et al. (2000, 2009) and Cihak et al. (2012).
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Armenia
Expansion moderated further in 2014 to 3.4%, and the current account weakened because of 
deteriorating conditions in the Russian Federation, Armenia’s main trading partner. The outlook is 
for slower growth, higher inflation, and a still weaker external position. The challenge ahead is to 
boost domestic demand to sustain growth.
Economic performance 
Growth slowed to 3.4% in 2014 from 3.5% in 2013. On the supply side, 
growth was led by agriculture and services (Figure 3.1.1). 
Despite gains in food, beverages, and tobacco, industry 
(excluding construction) contracted by 0.1% as falling prices for 
nonferrous metals in world markets helped cut output in mining and 
metallurgy. Construction fell by 3.3% as the government and households 
curtailed capital outlays. Agriculture expanded by 7.8% in 2014 despite 
an unseasonably cold spring that destroyed major fruit crops. Much of 
the growth came from expansion in the area cultivated and higher 
livestock production. Services rose by 5.2%, driven by gains in trade, 
food service, ﬁnance, insurance, recreation, and health care.
On the demand side, a large statistical discrepancy clouds the 
analysis, but private consumption appears to have continued as the main 
source of growth, though expansion slowed to an estimated 0.5% in 2014 
from 0.9% in 2013 as remittances from the Russian Federation declined. 
Higher government spending contributed to a 6.8% rise in public 
consumption. Investment, as measured by gross ﬁxed capital formation, 
fell by an estimated 5.0%, reﬂecting deﬁciencies in the investment 
environment and structural weaknesses. 
Average annual inﬂation almost halved to 3.0% in 2014 from 5.8% in 
2013 on account of higher food production, favorable global prices, and 
slackening domestic demand (Figure 3.1.2). 
Inﬂation came mainly from services, where prices rose by 5.1%. 
The 12-month inﬂation rate, from December to December, declined to 
4.6% from 5.6% in 2013, staying within the 2.5%–5.5% target band of 
the Central Bank of Armenia. To counter intense pressures on prices 
and the exchange rate from problems in the Russian Federation, the 
central bank tightened interest rates, raising the benchmark reﬁnancing 
rate by 375 basis points to 10.5% in three steps from December 2014 
to February 2015. This reversed a rate decline from 8.50% to 6.75% 
between November 2013 and August 2014 (Figure 3.1.3). 
3.1.1 Supply-side contributions to growth
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The sharp weakening of the ruble fueled a 15% depreciation of the 
Armenian dram in October toward the end of 2014. The central bank 
intervened daily during December 2014 to restore balance in the 
exchange market and to soften ﬂuctuations. In addition, it doubled the 
reserve ratio for foreign exchange deposits, from 12% to 24%, at the 
end of 2014 before easing it to 20% in January 2015 while requiring 
banks to hold the reserves in local currency. Nevertheless, central bank 
sales of foreign exchange during November and December caused gross 
international reserves to fall sharply to $1.5 billion at the end of 2014 
(equivalent to an estimated 3.5 months of imports) from $2.2 billion a 
year earlier (5.5 months) (Figure 3.1.4).
Fiscal policy remained in line with the government’s medium-term 
budgetary objectives, which aim to keep the deﬁcit and debt manageable 
for macroeconomic stability. Revenue rose by 6.1% in 2014, primarily 
reﬂecting higher tax receipts. Expenditure rose by 7.5% on higher social 
outlays and a pay hike for public servants in July 2014. The ﬁscal deﬁcit 
is estimated to equal 2.0% of GDP (Figure 3.1.5). This is less than the 
official target of 2.3% in the 2014 state budget, because capital spending 
fell short and matching pension contributions were below budget 
following pension reform. 
Despite the low deﬁcit, dram depreciation caused the ratio of public 
debt to GDP to rise from 44.1% in 2013 to 46.6% at the end of 2014, 
not much below the official ceiling of 50.0% (Figure 3.1.6). In nominal 
terms, public and publicly guaranteed external debt increased by 13.7% 
to AMD1.8 trillion (39.7% of GDP), and domestic public debt climbed by 
11.5% to AMD312 billion (6.9% of GDP).
The current account deﬁcit widened to an estimated 8.5% of GDP 
from 8.0% in 2013, reﬂecting lower remittance inﬂows and a larger trade 
deﬁcit (Figure 3.1.7). 
Growth in general merchandise exports slowed to an estimated 1.2% 
in 2014 from 8.6% in 2013, mostly because exports to the Russian 
Federation declined. Import growth rose to 0.7% from 0.2% in 2013, 
as consumption barely increased. Consequently, the trade deﬁcit was 
estimated to have narrowed to 18.4% of GDP in 2014 from 19.1% in 
2013. Remittances, measured as noncommercial transfers through 
banks, declined by 10% to $1.4 billion in 2014, reversing a rising trend 
since 2010 (Figure 3.1.8). As the deprecation of the ruble accelerated, 
it triggered a similar drop in remittances beginning in August 2014. 
Although debt data for the end of 2014 are not yet available, external 
debt likely exceeded 80% of GDP, as government debt has consistently 
been less than half of total foreign debt. 
Economic prospects 
Regional geopolitical developments leave the economic outlook 
highly uncertain. The slowdown in the Russian Federation, caused in 
particular by sanctions and lower oil prices, will likely further depress 
the Armenian economy. Growth is thus expected to slow again, to 1.6% 
in 2015, before recovering to 2.3% in 2016 (Figure 3.1.9). 
On the supply side, growth is expected to come mostly from 
agriculture and services. Expansion in agriculture will be underpinned 
3.1.3  Dynamics of indirect monetary policy 
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3.1.5  Fiscal indicators
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by state assistance that subsidizes farm loans and prices for fuel 
and fertilizer. Programs to establish agricultural cooperatives and 
associations, and to strengthen links between agricultural producers 
and the food-processing industry, will be crucial for sector growth. 
Industry is unlikely to grow as strongly as in the past, mostly due to 
depressed demand for exports. Domestic factors essential for promoting 
industry growth include the government’s export-led industrial 
development strategy for 11 selected subsectors, approved in 2012; 
investment and export promotion by the Armenia Development Fund, 
which was recently created by merging overlapping agencies; and 
accelerated structural reform to improve the environment for private 
sector development. Services are projected to expand primarily on 
gains in tourism and information and communication technology. 
Construction is projected to remain depressed before returning to slow 
growth in 2016. 
On the demand side, private consumption and increased public 
spending are seen as supporting growth, albeit modestly and at a 
slower pace. 
Tight ﬁscal policy is likely to continue, given the risk to public debt 
from external shocks. The 2015 budget aims for a deﬁcit equal to 2.3% 
of GDP, with a moderate rise in revenue and outlays remaining focused 
on the social safety net. Armenia’s 1.13% share of customs duties derived 
from imports of goods into the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), which 
includes several republics of the former Soviet Union, will provide 
additional revenues for the state budget. 
Despite slowing growth, annual inﬂation is seen rising by half 
to 4.6% in 2015 before subsiding to 4.1% in 2016. Assuming normal 
weather, inﬂationary pressures will intensify signiﬁcantly in 2015 as 
ruble depreciation weakens the Armenian currency and as tariffs are 
harmonized with the new customs regime following Armenia’s joining 
the EEU in January 2015. In the short run, monetary policy is expected 
to remain tight to combat these pressures before gradually returning to 
a neutral stance over the medium term. 
The current account deﬁcit is projected to widen to 9.2% in 2015 
before narrowing to 8.3% in 2016 (Figure 3.1.10). This forecast is 
subject to signiﬁcant risks stemming from Armenia’s exposure to the 
Russian Federation, which accounts for a quarter of its imports and 
exports, more than 80% of remittances, and more than 50% of foreign 
direct investment. 
Armenia may succeed in spurring industrial growth by promoting 
exports; by exempting imported gas, raw oil, and diamonds from 
customs fees; and through lower nontariff barriers within the EEU. 
However, the beneﬁts of EEU membership may be limited by the 
Russian Federation’s geopolitical difficulties and the limited capacity 
of Armenian agriculture, as 60% of the country’s agricultural exports, 
mainly processed foods and beverages, already go to the Russian 
Federation (exports of aluminum, copper, and molybdenum products 
and concentrates go mainly to the European Union). The EEU’s 
relatively high weighted average tariffs on imports into the union may 
reduce Armenia’s exports outside the EEU, though the government 
negotiated transition periods of 1–8 years for imposing higher tariffs 
3.1.6  Public and publicly-guaranteed debt
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on more than 750 goods. Further, Armenia will have to renegotiate its 
customs duties with members of the World Trade Organization, which it 
joined in 2003. Taking these factors into account, imports are projected 
to rise by 1.5% in 2015 and 1.6% in 2016, as exports grow by 1.6% in 2015 
and 2.2% in 2016. A recent tax incentive, designed to boost exports, cuts 
proﬁ t tax by 90% (to 2%) for foreign enterprises not in mining whose 
exports exceed AMD50 billion. 
Policy challenge—maintaining growth momentum
Armenia saw remarkable economic growth and poverty reduction in 
the period preceding the global ﬁ nancial crisis of 2008–2009. However, 
growth has slowed steadily since then, and the economy remains 
vulnerable to new setbacks. To minimize the impact on Armenia of the 
slowdown in the Russian Federation and to leverage the beneﬁ ts of EEU 
membership, domestic sources of growth need attention. Requirements 
include broader eff orts to develop the private sector, a stronger emphasis 
on agriculture and rural development, and higher capital investment 
in infrastructure. Growth will be more inclusive and sustainable if 
development objectives are pursued with the private and public sectors 
assuming complementary roles.
Helping the private sector adjust production to the changing 
economic situation is critical for sustaining growth. Armenia is well 
positioned to attract investment into its areas of competitive advantage, 
thanks to reforms that have improved the business environment over 
the past several years, a relatively favorable regulatory framework, 
the customs-free regime within the EEU, and access to an enlarged 
market—despite a lack of direct overland links to other EEU members. 
Maintaining competitiveness depends on accelerated and deepened 
structural reform, especially to improve investor protection and 
economic competition. Tax reform and better access to credit for 
small and medium-sized enterprises would also promote growth. 
Reinvigorating programs that support innovation, scientiﬁ c discovery, 
and applied research and development could accelerate growth and 
speed Armenia’s transformation into a knowledge economy. Higher 
capital investment in economic and social infrastructure would boost 
output and employment in the near term and expand productive 
capacity over the longer term. 
Agriculture provides 35% of Armenia’s jobs, 20% of its GDP, and 
30% of its exports. Augmenting existing programs to facilitate farmers’ 
use of modern inputs and boost agricultural productivity could expand 
Armenia’s already substantial agricultural exports to partners in the 
EEU. Sector development would further beneﬁ t from the promotion 
of farmers’ groups and value-added chains with improved access to 
ﬁ nancial services. Stronger agriculture and rural development are 
needed to diversify the incomes of rural households, strengthen local 
economies, and facilitate job creation, thereby narrowing the gap in 
living standards between the capital and the rest of the country. 
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Azerbaijan 
Growth halved to 2.8% in 2014 from 5.8% a year earlier as oil output declined. Higher public 
spending in 2015 is projected to lift growth marginally to 3.0% before it reverts in 2016 to 2.8%, 
as the expansion of public investment slows. Inflation was subdued in 2014 but will likely return 
following currency devaluation, while the current account surplus remains sizable. Government 
spending needs to rely less on oil revenue. 
Economic performance
Economic expansion slowed to 2.8% in 2014 from 5.8% in 2013, mainly 
because the petroleum sector contracted by 2.9% (Figure 3.2.1). Oil 
production declined by 3.7%, reversing a slight pickup in 2013, as one 
of the main oil wells at the principal oil ﬁeld was shut for maintenance. 
Largely dependent on public investment, the economy outside the oil 
sector expanded by 7.0%, down from 10.0% in 2013 as spending on 
infrastructure was constrained.
On the supply side, construction and services were the main sources 
of growth in 2014. The construction growth rate nevertheless plunged 
to 9.1% from 23.0%, reﬂecting slower expansion in infrastructure 
projects and declining demand for real estate. However, growth in 
services edged up to 7.4% from 7.2% in 2013, driven by gains of 10.0% in 
wholesale and retail trade, 4.7% in transport and warehousing, 18.2% in 
tourism, and 15.1% in communications. Growth in industry, excluding 
construction, slowed to 1.7% as mining contracted by 2.7%—and despite 
a 4.1% rise in manufacturing, with notable contributions from food, 
construction materials, and machinery. Agriculture declined by 2.6%, 
reversing a 4.9% rise in 2013, as bad weather held down the production 
of wheat and barley (Figure 3.2.2). 
On the demand side, cuts in consumer lending held private 
consumption growth to 9.6% during the ﬁrst 9 months of 2014, down 
from 17.2% in the same period of 2013, despite higher incomes and 
pensions. Investment contracted by 1.7%, after the 15.1% increase in 2013, 
because of lower public spending, which contributes more than 70% of 
the total. 
Slower economic activity and strict controls over consumer lending 
helped trim average annual inﬂation to 1.4% from 2.4% in 2013. Despite 
the poor harvest, a slowdown in food price inﬂation to 1.0% offset a 3.2% 
rise in other prices. 
The ﬁscal deﬁcit declined from 1.2% of GDP in 2013 to 0.5%. 
This was less than the planned 2.4% deﬁcit because public spending was 
3.2.2 GDP growth by sector
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3.2.3 Monthly inflation
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constrained for almost all items, especially wages, salaries, and social 
expenditure. Revenue fell to 31.2% of GDP from 32.9% in 2013, while 
expenditure declined to 31.7% from 34.1%. Transfers from the sovereign 
State Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan (SOFAZ) continued to 
provide about half of all revenue despite being cut by 17.7% in 2014. 
Declining oil prices had minimal ﬁscal impact, as the state budget was 
based on an oil price of $100 per barrel, which the average price of Azeri 
Light exceeded for most of 2014.
Monetary policy emphasized sustaining growth. In response to lower 
inﬂation (Figure 3.2.3) and the economic slowdown, the Central Bank 
of Azerbaijan cut its policy rate to 3.50% from 4.75% in May 2014, the 
ﬁrst cut since mid-2012. In August, to buoy credit growth and domestic 
demand, it eased reserve requirements from 3% to 2% on all deposits. 
Ruble depreciation fueled demand for foreign currency, causing foreign 
currency deposits to rise by 7.7% in December 2014, while local currency 
deposits declined by 2.0% after rising earlier in the year. Broad money 
grew by 11.4%, down from 15.4% a year earlier, and credit to the economy 
grew by 17.9% versus 7.9% in 2013. 
Almost all banks complied with the central bank’s higher capital 
requirement of AZN50 million. Banking risks were moderate as 
nonperforming loans, at 5.2% of the lending portfolio, barely rose from 
5.1% in 2013. The Azerbaijan manat remained at a stable peg to the 
US dollar throughout the year but appreciated against the euro by 12%. 
The central bank intervened in the market, sterilizing $1.2 billion during 
the ﬁrst 9 months of 2014 to prevent manat appreciation. After November 
2014, facing downward pressure, it used $1.5 billion in reserves to limit 
depreciation. In mid-February 2015, it repegged the manat to a basket 
comprising the US dollar and the euro and then, on 22 February, devalued 
the currency, leaving it 25% lower against the US dollar. It did so in part 
to make local goods more competitive and to promote non-oil exports. 
Oil price declines beginning in late 2014 narrowed the current 
account surplus slightly to 16.0% of GDP from 16.6% in 2013, as slowing 
oil production (Figure 3.2.4) and lower prices reduced export earnings by 
4.7%. Strict control over consumer lending and the introduction of Euro 
4 standards for imported cars helped cut imports by an estimated 17.6%, 
following a 9.4% increase in 2013. Foreign direct investment—more than 
85% of which went to the petroleum sector—rose by an estimated 18.7%. 
Gross international reserves fell by 7.9% in December from the previous 
month, as the central bank intervened to maintain its then-current 
peg to the US dollar. Because of earlier currency purchases, however, 
international reserves ended the year 1.7% higher, at $14.6 billion. 
Including sovereign wealth assets, external reserves amounted to $53.2 
billion, equal to 6 months of imports (Figure 3.2.5).
Economic prospects 
Despite a continuing slowdown in the petroleum sector, growth is 
projected to recover slightly to 3.0% in 2015 before reverting to 2.8% 
in 2016 as public investment moderates (Figure 3.2.6). Industry is 
expected to contract by 2.5% in 2015, as lower oil prices may curtail oil 
output, and then contract again in 2016, but only by 1.6%, as recovering 
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prices revive oil output. Planned investment in infrastructure should 
offset declines in the oil sector, aiding non-oil growth in 2015 and 2016. 
However, growth could be less if declining oil revenue constrains budget 
outlays more than anticipated. 
Subsidized lending to farmers should help agriculture grow by 4.0% 
in 2015 and 5.0% in 2016. Services are forecast to grow by 8.0% in 2015 
and 6.5% in 2016, driven largely by trade and tourism as Azerbaijan 
hosts the First European Games in 2015 and the Baku European Grand 
Prix, a Formula 1 race, in 2016. Large infrastructure projects, including 
road rehabilitation and the reconstruction of water supply, sanitation, 
and energy facilities, should boost construction in 2015 and 2016. 
However, infrastructure spending could be trimmed, cutting growth, 
if oil prices decline further and transfers from SOFAZ fall short of 
current projections. On the demand side, rising incomes and a salary 
increase for public sector workers will buoy private consumption. 
Public expenditure will allow for some growth in investment in 2015, 
but probably less so in 2016. 
Higher public spending, lower interest rates, rising domestic demand, 
higher prices for imports other than food, and currency depreciation 
against the US dollar will stoke inﬂation, despite some decline in foreign 
prices for food imports. The central bank raised its inﬂation target 
from 3% to 5%–7% after adjusting the exchange rate. It will strive to 
keep inﬂation in check by raising the policy rate and banks’ reserve 
requirements while enforcing consumer lending regulations to prevent 
overheating in consumer markets. Average annual inﬂation is forecast at 
6.0% in 2015 and 5.5% in 2016 (Figure 3.2.7). 
The budget will remain heavily dependent on oil revenues, and 
SOFAZ is projected to provide 53.4% of budget revenue in 2015, 
12% more than the amount transferred in 2014. The state budget for 
2015 anticipated an oil price of $90 per barrel, but currency devaluation 
will help offset much lower oil prices by boosting oil revenue in local 
currency terms, and the government may draw additional funds from 
SOFAZ if revenue falls below budget. Revenue is forecast to reach 31.9% 
of GDP, and expenditure 34.7%, widening the 2015 deﬁcit to 2.8% of 
GDP (Figure 3.2.8). However, expenditure could be cut if oil prices 
remain low and revenue falls short of projections. Public and publicly 
guaranteed debt will likely remain around 8%–9% of GDP in 2015 
and 2016.
Hydrocarbons are projected to provide as much as 95% of exports. 
Even with lower oil prices, the current account is forecast to attain a 
surplus of 12.0% in 2015 and, with a slight rebound in oil prices, 13.4% 
in 2016 (Figure 3.2.9). With lower oil prices, exports are projected to 
decline by 15.0% in 2015 and recover by 6.0% in 2016. Imports are 
forecast to decline by 16.7% in 2015 and a further 7.0% in 2016, as they 
will be constrained by higher excise taxes, currency depreciation against 
the US dollar and the euro, and stricter rules on consumer lending. 
Workers’ remittances—a marginal item in the balance of payments but 
important income for rural households—are expected to decline further 
because of ruble depreciation. With regular and SOFAZ reserves totaling 
more than $50.0 billion, however, the external position should remain 
healthy over the next few years.
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3.2.8 Fiscal balance
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Policy challenge—reducing reliance 
on oil revenue 
Azerbaijan’s growth has come largely from government spending funded 
by hydrocarbon revenues. High oil prices enabled the government to 
accumulate substantial savings and use them to support growth in 
the broader economy. However, the recent decline in oil prices and oil 
revenues has slowed the expansion of industry and shrunk the current 
account surplus. 
Sustaining growth in this environment will require additional 
withdrawals from SOFAZ, but weak oil prices could worsen Azerbaijan’s 
ﬁscal position and dampen economic growth over the long run. Low oil 
prices will force the government to budget carefully and probably limit 
expenditure in line with lower oil revenue. The quandary is that lower 
expenditure will curb non-oil expansion, which relies heavily on public 
spending, and slow GDP growth. 
Transfers from SOFAZ provide more than half of budget revenue 
and determine the scope of public investment. Construction is a key 
economic driver and would contract if oil-funded public investment 
declined. Over time, the economy must become less reliant on oil by 
diversifying into other industries and strengthening the private sector. 
A self-supporting non-oil sector will require structural reform to 
improve the business climate. The World Bank’s Doing Business 2015 
report on 189 economies ranks Azerbaijan at a very low 150 for obtaining 
construction permits, 159 for getting electricity, 166 for trading across 
borders, and 104 for securing credit. The Global Competitiveness Report 
2014–2015 of the World Economic Forum gives Azerbaijan a fairly high 
ranking except for its lagging ﬁnancial market development. Addressing 
these problems and leveling the playing ﬁeld for business would improve 
the investment climate and make it easier for the private sector to expand.
Given the outlook for oil revenue, public investment in other 
sectors should increasingly be ﬁnanced through taxes, not transfers 
from SOFAZ. This will require continued reform of tax and customs 
administration and possibly higher tax revenue. In addition, better 
management is needed to make expenditure more productive and 
efficient. Transfers from SOFAZ should thus be channeled toward more 
productive projects that support industrial growth, particularly outside 
the oil sector.
This chapter was written by George Luarsabishvili of the Georgia Resident Mission, ADB, 
Tbilisi.
Georgia
Growth recovered to 4.7% from 3.3% in 2013, though the current account deficit widened to 
9.5% of GDP. The depressed economies of major trading partners will halve growth to 2.0% 
in 2015 but allow some recovery in 2016 as the external outlook improves slightly. Currency 
depreciation could raise inflation to 5.0% in 2015 and 2016, as falling exports and remittances 
expand the current account deficit to 12.0% of GDP before narrowing somewhat in 2016. 
Economic developments 
GDP expanded by an estimated 4.7% in 2014, up from 3.3% in 2013. Data 
through the third quarter of 2014 indicated that the recovery reﬂected 
mainly gains of 8.5% in industry, particularly in construction, and 
5.4% in services, in particular for ﬁnancial intermediation and tourism 
(Figure 3.3.1). In the same period, agriculture expanded by only 1.3%. On 
the demand side, growth came from a 5.5% expansion in consumption 
and, in particular, a 21.2% rise in investment, mainly in the private 
sector. However, a major slowdown began in the fourth quarter and 
continued into 2015 as the drop in oil prices and the impact of economic 
sanctions on the Russian Federation triggered recession there and much 
slower growth in other key trading partners. As a consequence, their 
imports from and remittances to Georgia plunged. Declining prices 
for ferroalloys, which represent 10% of Georgia’s exports, also reduced 
export earnings. The decline in foreign exchange inﬂows put downward 
pressure on the Georgian lari, which depreciated by about 6% against 
the US dollar from October 1 to year-end and a further 15% by March 
2015 (Figure 3.3.2).
Reversing reported deﬂation in 2013, annual average inﬂation 
reached 3.1% in 2014, driven by increases of 5.5% for health care, 
5.2% for food, 4.3% for utilities, and 3.5% for services. December over 
December, though, inﬂation slowed to 2.0% in 2014 from 2.4% a year 
earlier (Figure 3.3.3). 
The ﬁscal deﬁcit amounted to an estimated 3.0% of GDP, which was 
less than budgeted because revenue exceeded the budget by 1.1% while 
expenditure reached only 95% of planned outlays (Figure 3.3.4). Revenue 
and grants together amounted to 28.0% of GDP, while expenditure 
equaled 31.0%. Total revenue rose by 8.3% and tax revenue by 8.7%, 
reﬂecting higher receipts from excise tax on tobacco and value-added 
tax. Public expenditure rose by 9.8%, reﬂecting a 14.5% increase in 
current expenditure, in particular a 13.1% rise for goods and services 
and 9.1% from higher compensation for government employees. Public 
debt was estimated at 35.0% of GDP at the end of 2014.
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Monetary policy remained accommodative, the policy rate 
unchanged at 4.0% until February 2015, when it was raised to 4.5% 
in response to exogenous shocks. Credit expansion accelerated to 
25.4% from 21.2% in 2013, mainly reﬂecting higher consumer and 
mortgage lending in line with increased consumption and output. Loans 
denominated in US dollars grew by 20.4% but decreased as a percentage 
of all loans to 60.8%, from 62.4% at the end of 2013. Broad money (M3) 
increased by 13.8%, less than in 2013, as net foreign assets declined and 
the growth in net claims on government slowed (Figure 3.3.5). 
Banks remained well capitalized, their capital adequacy ratio at 
18.0% and liquidity ratio at 39.1%. Nonperforming loans stayed modest at 
3.6% of all loans with the timely restructuring or writing off of problem 
loans. However, lari depreciation against the US dollar helped foreign 
currency deposits rise to 57.1% of all deposits. 
To reduce dollarization and improve the monetary transmission 
mechanism, the National Bank of Georgia started accepting for its 
reﬁnancing facility a wider range of securities in local currency and 
promoted loans in local currency with variable interest rates. Average 
lending rates in lari fell by 1.4 percentage points to 17.5%, while average 
rates on loans denominated in foreign exchange fell by 1.2 percentage 
points to 10.5%. Excess bank liquidity helped reduce deposit interest 
rates by 0.9 percentage points to 5.3%. 
The current account deﬁcit widened to an estimated 9.5% of 
GDP from 5.7% in 2013. Higher growth fueled a 7.1% rise in imports, 
while exports declined by 1.6%, reﬂecting a 3.5% drop in the fourth 
quarter that erased increases in the two previous quarters. Steep 
currency depreciation in its main trading partners eroded Georgia’s 
competitiveness despite lari depreciation against the US dollar. In 
addition, Azerbaijan’s adoption of Euro 4 automobile standards in April 
2014 cut Georgia’s exports of secondhand vehicles. The fourth quarter 
drop in exports—followed by the 30.0% decline year on year recorded 
in January 2015—also reﬂected weakening in the economy of the 
Russian Federation, which by 2014 had become Georgia’s third-largest 
export destination, taking nearly 10.0% of all exports. Tourism receipts 
declined, and remittances fell by 2.5%, with a notable drop of 16.3% in 
the fourth quarter and an even heftier decline of 22.5% in January—
February 2015 compared with the same period a year earlier. Higher 
remittance inﬂows from southern Europe did not offset the drop from 
the Russian Federation, where remittances to Georgia plunged by 30.1% 
in the fourth quarter. 
Despite a slow recovery in Europe, foreign direct investment 
performed well, exceeding $1.2 billion by official estimates. Gross 
international reserves amounted at the end of 2014 to $2.7 billion, 
down only slightly from $2.8 billion in 2013 and equivalent to 3 
months of imports. External debt totaled an estimated 64.0% of GDP, 
excluding intercompany loans equivalent to about 20% of GDP. In 
July 2014, Georgia entered into a 3-year standby arrangement with 
the International Monetary Fund that provides a $155 million cushion 
against external shocks and sets a framework to discipline macro-ﬁscal 
policies.
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Economic prospects 
Growth is expected to slow to 2.0% in 2015 in tandem with slowdowns 
in the European Union and neighboring Azerbaijan and a projected 
recession in the Russian Federation (Figure 3.3.6). Some recovery in 
growth, to 2.5%, is forecast in 2016 as manufacturing strengthens and 
services pick up. The European Union Association Agreement with 
Georgia includes provisions for a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade 
Area that, along with expected improvement in the global environment, 
should support exports and remittances during 2016 while boosting 
foreign direct investment from Europe. Higher public spending and a 
stable political situation following peaceful parliamentary elections in 
2016 would support growth by strengthening consumer and investor 
conﬁdence. 
Despite projected reductions in international prices, domestic food 
price inﬂation could worsen if demand increases for Georgian food 
exports, especially from the Russian Federation. Inﬂation is forecast to 
reach 5.0% in 2015 and 2016, in part because of further lari depreciation. 
The policy interest rate may well be raised further in 2015 and 2016 if 
the authorities decide to limit currency depreciation, particularly if US 
interest rates rise from mid-2015. 
The ﬁscal deﬁcit is likely to expand to at least 4.0% of GDP in 2015 
as slowing growth squeezes revenue. The 2016 deﬁcit will depend on 
the macroeconomic environment and the tradeoff between promoting 
growth and containing the current account deﬁcit. The government 
has an ambitious reform agenda to improve its management of revenue, 
expenditure, debt, and ﬁscal risk. After a 44% rise in social spending 
from 2012 to 2014, social beneﬁts may level off in 2015. Public debt is 
projected to climb to 40.0% of GDP at the end of 2015 before subsiding 
to 38.5% at the end of 2016 (Figure 3.3.7).
After widening in 2014, the current account deﬁcit is projected to 
expand further to 12.0% of GDP in 2015 before narrowing to 10.5% in 2016 
(Figure 3.3.8). Merchandise exports are projected to decrease by 15.0% in 
2015, reﬂecting the slowdown that began in late 2014, before recovering 
by 5.0% in 2016 as the external environment improves and the positive 
effects of the free trade area with the European Union are increasingly 
felt. Imports are projected to decrease by 3.0% in 2015, reﬂecting 
the slowdown in growth and remittances, and to increase by 3.0% in 
2016 with some improvement in growth. Remittances are expected 
to decline in 2015 with the sharp deterioration in regional economies 
before recovering in 2016 as the external environment improves. Gross 
international reserves are projected to remain low at $2.5 billion at the 
end of 2015, equivalent to about 3 months of imports, before increasing to 
$2.6 billion in 2016 (Figure 3.3.9). External debt excluding intercompany 
loans is projected to reach 75.0% of GDP in 2015 and 74.0% in 2016.
The growth forecast is subject to multiple downside risks: lower 
exports and remittances from slower European growth or a recession 
in the Russian Federation that exceeds expectations, stress on exports 
or tourism from tensions involving Ukraine and other countries in 
the region, and the impact of further lari depreciation on debt service 
burdens and household disposable income, as about 68% of mortgages 
are denominated in US dollars. 
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Policy challenge—developing domestic ﬁnancial 
markets
Narrow ﬁnancial markets have been a major constraint on growth in 
Georgia. The banking system and domestic bond markets are highly 
dollarized. Over two-thirds of housing loans are denominated in 
US dollars, and more than 80% of Georgia’s public debt is in foreign 
currency. Banking is highly concentrated, and the domestic bond market 
remains thinly developed, shallow, and insufficiently liquid, with few 
institutional investors. Banks are the main purchasers of public debt. 
Low domestic savings limit nonbank ﬁnancing for the budget or the 
private sector, leaving the economy overly reliant on inﬂows from 
abroad. Little long-term ﬁnancing in lari is available.
The government has taken some steps to address the problem. To 
promote commercial lending in lari, in 2014 the government issued 
GEL200 million in Treasury securities, depositing the proceeds in 
commercial banks for onlending. A similar operation is planned for 
2015. In addition, international ﬁnancial institutions issued bonds 
denominated in local currency in March 2014 and February 2015.  Bond 
issues such as these support the development of the local capital market 
and help attract the diversiﬁed investor base necessary to provide 
sufficient liquidity and demand in the domestic market. 
Besides these measures, the government aims to improve the 
mobilization of domestic savings. Ongoing pension reform and the 
planned development of private retirement funds can help in this regard, 
as private pools of savings promise to create demand from sources other 
than banks for government securities in local currency. In addition, 
these pools of savings can provide longer-term private sector ﬁnancing, 
including bond issuance. Introducing a deposit insurance system and a 
secured transaction regime would also be useful. Developing secondary 
markets for government bonds and other ﬁxed-income securities would 
help develop capital markets, including nonbank sources of government 
ﬁnance. Measures such as these would strengthen demand for local 
currency securities while promoting a ﬁnancial system better able to 
channel resources toward productive uses that support investment 
and growth. They could also help mobilize resources to ﬁnance 
infrastructure that would support growth. 
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This chapter was written by Manshuk Nurseitova of the Kazakhstan Resident Mission, 
ADB, Astana.
Kazakhstan 
Adverse external factors caused growth to slow to 4.3% in 2014 from 6.0% a year earlier, but 
currency devaluation in February 2014 strengthened budget revenues and the current account 
balance while adding to inflation. Growth is projected to slow further to 1.9% in 2015 before 
recovering to 3.8% in 2016.  Inflation should ease, but weak oil prices will turn the current 
account into small deficits in both years.
Economic developments 
Growth moderated to 4.3% from 6.0% in 2013, mainly because slow 
global growth cut demand for Kazakhstan’s main export commodities: 
oil, coal, metals, chemicals, and grain. Conditions worsened with a 
sharp decline in oil prices and spillover from sanctions on the Russian 
Federation, a major trading partner.  
On the supply side, industry grew by only 0.3%, versus 3.0% in 
2013, as mining and manufacturing performed poorly. Construction, 
driven by government programs, expanded by 4.1%, up from 3.5% a year 
earlier. Expansion in agriculture slowed sharply to 0.8% from 11.2% 
in 2013 as poor weather limited grain production. Services grew by 
6.0%, versus 6.8% in 2013, reﬂecting slowdowns in transport, trade, and 
communication (Figure 3.4.1).  
On the demand side, 9 months of data show that lower real income 
and constricted access to credit cut consumption growth to 2.5% from 
12.8% in the same period of 2013.  Private consumption grew only 
marginally by 0.4%, but higher government spending, including a pay 
increase after currency devaluation, boosted public consumption by 
11.2%. Investment growth slowed to 3.9% from 6.2% in 2013 as public 
investment expanded by 24.9% but private investment declined by 
0.3%. Meanwhile, a 15.6% drop in imports against a fall in exports half 
as steep—at 8.6%, reﬂecting weaker external demand for oil, coal, and 
metals—meant net exports improved by 7.5%, reversing the 12.7% drop 
in 2013 (Figure 3.4.2).
Although price administration limited the impact of the devaluation 
of the Kazakh tenge in February 2014, inﬂation accelerated to 6.7% from 
5.8% in 2013, reﬂecting price rises for food and other goods. Inﬂation in 
services slowed because of restrictions on utility tariffs. The 12-month 
inﬂation rate, December to December, was 7.4%, up from 4.8% in 2013 
(Figure 3.4.3). 
The ﬁscal deﬁcit in the republican budget expanded to 2.8% of GDP 
from 2.0% in 2013. Revenue reached 15.5% of GDP, up from 14.7% in 
2013, reﬂecting larger transfers from the National Fund of the Republic 
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of Kazakhstan (NFRK), equivalent to 4.8% of GDP, and a 13.3% rise in 
corporate income tax revenue. However, the post-devaluation pay rise 
and higher pensions and social transfers boosted expenditure to 18.4% 
of GDP from 16.7% a year earlier. In October, Kazakhstan sold $2.5 
billion in eurobonds, pushing public and publicly guaranteed debt to 
an estimated 15.0% of GDP from 13.0% in 2013. State enterprise debt 
declined to equal 13.4% of GDP at the end of September from 14.3% at 
the end of 2013.
Monetary policy aimed to combat inﬂation and rehabilitate the 
banking system while preventing a post-devaluation downturn; the 
policy interest rate was maintained. Broad money grew by 10.5%, versus 
10.2% in 2013, despite credit growth slowing to 7.2% from 13.4% in 
2013. Lending to large ﬁrms declined by 6.1%, while loans to small and 
medium-sized enterprises rose by 38.7% and to households by 12.5%. 
Deposits expanded by 15.9% (Figure 3.4.4), but a shift into foreign 
currency accounts limited the supply of long-term loans denominated 
in tenge. Interest rates on tenge deposits rose in most banks. To boost 
tenge liquidity, the National Bank of Kazakhstan, the central bank, 
opened in July a $10 billion window for tenge–US dollar swaps with 
commercial banks at an implied interest rate of 3%. 
Following devaluation in February, the tenge–US dollar exchange 
rate remained stable within a band of T182–T188 per US dollar. In 
September, the central bank widened the band to T170–T188. The rapid 
depreciation of the ruble against the major currencies in the second 
half of 2014 caused it to depreciate sharply against the tenge as well 
(Figure 3.4.5).
The resulting downward pressure on the tenge against the US dollar 
induced many ﬁrms and households to convert tenge deposits into 
foreign currency, raising foreign currency deposits by more than 70% to 
account for 55.6% of all deposits. To prevent speculation and excessive 
reserve losses, the central bank halted swap operations with banks. 
Lending slowed in the second half of the year, and some banks stopped 
lending in tenge (Figure 3.4.6).
Despite banks’ efforts to cut nonperforming loans (NPLs), 
devaluation helped push the NPL ratio to 33.7% in April from 26.3% in 
November 2013. In response, the central bank asked commercial banks 
with signiﬁcant NPLs to develop and implement action plans under its 
supervision. The discontinuation of tax disincentives for writing off bad 
loans helped rein in NPLs to 23.6% by the end of 2014. In addition, T250 
billion was allocated from the NFRK to capitalize the central bank’s 
fund for purchasing NPLs from banks (Figure 3.4.7). 
The current account surplus is estimated to have widened to 1.8% 
of GDP from 0.5% in 2013. Devaluation initially boosted exports, but 
declining commodity prices offset the gains and caused export revenue 
to fall by 8.6%, versus a 1.5% decline in 2013. Imports also fell, by 18.9%, 
following a 4.1% increase in 2013, as imports of food, chemicals, metal 
products, and machinery all declined (Figure 3.4.8). 
Gross reserves rose to $28.9 billion from $24.7 billion at the end 
of 2013, and NFRK assets reached $73.6 billion, though heavier use 
of NFRK funds for budgetary support and infrastructure spending 
cut growth in NFRK assets to 3.9% from 22.1% in 2013. External debt 
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including intercompany loans reached an estimated 74.3% of GDP from 
64.8% in 2013, while public and publicly guaranteed external debt rose 
to 3.9% of GDP from 2.7% a year earlier (Figure 3.4.9). 
Economic prospects
Despite the launch of the Eurasian Economic Union with Armenia, 
Belarus, and the Russian Federation, growth is forecast to slow to 1.9% 
in 2015. This reﬂects slumping oil prices, economic weakness in the 
Russian Federation, and tenge appreciation against the ruble, which has 
hurt the competitiveness of Kazakh exports and boosted imports from 
the Russian Federation. Growth is projected to recover to 3.8% in 2016 
as the economy adjusts to low oil prices and as stimulus measures take 
hold (Figure 3.4.10). 
On the supply side, mining is forecast to contract by 10.0% in 2015 
and remain unchanged in 2016, dragging down industry by 5.3% in 
the ﬁrst year and allowing marginal growth of 0.4% in the second. 
The slowdown will limit growth in services to 5.0% in both years. 
Investments in housing and infrastructure under a state program for 
regional development are projected to boost construction by 4.0% 
annually, and past investment under the Agriculture 2020 development 
program is projected to expand agriculture by 2.7% in 2015 and 4.0% in 
2016.   
On the demand side, government interventions should propel 
consumption growth by 4.2% in 2015 and 5.0% in 2016. Countercyclical 
policy will likely see investment supported by NFRK resources rise 
by 4.0% in 2015 and 4.8% in 2016, as Expo 2017 nears. Net exports are 
forecast to fall by 15.5% in 2015 on low oil prices and a weak grain crop, 
which will shrink agricultural exports and export revenue and by 8.0% 
in 2016, as imports rise by 5% and exports remain unchanged. 
Inﬂation is projected to slow to 6.0% in 2015 in line with lower food 
prices, slower income growth, cheaper imports from the Russian 
Federation, and the Kyrgyz Republic entering into the Eurasian 
Economic Union in May 2015, before accelerating marginally to 6.2% in 
2016 (Figure 3.4.12).  
On 11 February 2015, the President instructed the government to cut 
total budget expenditure by 10% but increase ﬁnancing for agriculture, 
fund job preservation in industry, and enlarge a government reserve 
fund. This followed the announcement of the Nurly Zhol countercyclical 
program in November 2014, which stipulated raising NFRK transfers by 
$3 billion per year to provide economic stimulus, ﬁnance infrastructure 
development, and support the labor market.  A revised 2015 budget 
based on an oil price of $50 per barrel projects the deﬁcit expanding 
to 3.0% of GDP. The provisional 2016 budget projects a smaller deﬁcit 
of 2.4% of GDP. Slower growth, lower oil revenues, cuts in export 
duties, and constrained imports are expected to limit revenue to 14.2% 
of GDP in 2015 and 15.3% in 2016. Expenditure is forecast at 17.3% of 
GDP in 2015 and 17.7% in 2016. Planned wage increases for 2015 have 
been postponed, and state-owned enterprises are reining in operating 
costs. Transfers from the NFRK are expected to expand to 6.0% of 
GDP in 2015 (Figure 3.4.13). The projected deﬁcit suggests that public 
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and publicly guaranteed debt may increase to 17.9% of GDP in 2015 and 
18.5% of GDP in 2016. 
Monetary policy for the next 2 years will aim to maintain 
macroeconomic and ﬁnancial stability while ensuring economic growth 
and building Kazakhstan’s competitiveness. The goal is to keep broad 
money growth around 10.0% each year. Efforts are under way to 
strengthen the ﬁnancial system, rehabilitate banks, and develop capital 
markets. Requirements for higher bank capitalization will take effect 
on 1 January 2016. In addition, preliminary measures to prepare for 
inﬂation targeting will be introduced.  
A top priority for monetary authorities will be to chart a path for the 
exchange rate, deciding when to spend currency reserves to defend the 
tenge and when to let it depreciate. The central bank plans to dampen 
exchange rate ﬂuctuation while limiting intervention to conserve 
reserves. Some further depreciation of the tenge can be expected, in 
part to offset past appreciation against the ruble. To stem dollarization 
in the economy, the authorities will double in 2015 the ceiling on deposit 
insurance guarantees to T10 million. Recommended interest rates for 
foreign currency deposits will be reset from 4.0% to 3.0%.
The current account balance is projected to move into a deﬁcit of 
1.0% of GDP in 2015 and 1.3% in 2016 (Figure 3.4.14). 
Declining oil prices are projected to slash exports by 32% in 2015 
but leave them unchanged in 2016. Imports are forecast to contract by 
10% in 2015 on lower volume and declining prices for goods from the 
Russian Federation, before recovering by 5% in 2016 on government 
spending and preparations for Expo 2017. Gross reserves may fall to 
$25.0 billion in 2015 and further to $22.0 billion in 2016 as reserves are 
used to dampen the anticipated depreciation of the tenge against the 
ruble. NFRK assets are forecast to decline to $67.0 billion by the end of 
2015 and remain about the same in 2016 because of weak oil revenues 
and stimulus expenditures (Figure 3.4.15). External debt is projected 
to reach 79.4% of GDP by the end of 2015 and 84.1% a year later, while 
foreign borrowing drives public and publicly guaranteed external debt 
to 4.7% of GDP at the end of 2015 and 5.3% of GDP a year later. 
Policy challenge—private sector development to 
diversify the economy
Falling oil prices underscore the need to diversify the Kazakh economy. 
Despite efforts to restructure the economy after the 2008−2009 oil price 
decline, dependence on oil has only strengthened. Investment growth 
has lagged lending, and spending on research and development has 
declined as a share of GDP to barely a quarter of the average for middle-
income countries. 
The ﬁrst priority is to address lost competitiveness from the tenge’s 
tremendous appreciation against the ruble during the past year. In the 
long run, industry, services, and agriculture will require a comprehensive 
and modern industrial policy to restore and maintain competitiveness. 
Economic diversiﬁcation will depend on stronger promotion of the 
private sector and an industrial policy conducive to industries that 
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3.4.2 National Fund for the Republic of Kazakhstan
The NFRK was established in 2000 to safeguard the 
country’s petroleum earnings, use them to maintain 
macroeconomic stability, and ensure their availability 
for future generations. The NFRK sets aside windfall oil 
revenues during periods of high prices to limit inﬂation 
and ease pressure on the exchange rate. Transfers from the 
NFRK supplement budget revenue to ensure funding for 
social and development programs. Since 2010, an annual 
transfer of $8 billion to the budget has been guaranteed, 
though the amount can be adjusted up or down by as 
much as 15%, depending on the economic situation. Since 
2013, additional targeted transfers have been allowed for 
speciﬁc investment projects.
NFRK assets, which rose from $1.2 billion in 2001 to 
$73.6 billion at the end of 2014, are divided into separate 
portfolios for saving and stabilization. Most assets are 
invested abroad. NFRK transfers helped the government 
respond to the global ﬁnancial crisis of 2008–2009, and 
today NFRK transfers support the government’s current 
anti-crisis program for 2015–2017. 
promise to drive future growth. Structural reform will need to address 
concerns about the business climate, property rights and the rule of law, 
bankruptcy procedures, governance issues, and price controls, while 
nurturing integrated enterprise clusters to promote diversiﬁcation. 
Kazakhstan ranked in the top half of 189 countries surveyed in the 
World Bank’s Doing Business 2015 report. However, addressing two 
extremely low rankings—154 for dealing with construction permits and 
185 for trading across borders—could signiﬁcantly improve the business 
climate. Better access to credit for private ﬁrms would also help, as 
would addressing issues raised by the World Economic Forum’s Global 
Competitiveness Report, 2014−2015. Kazakhstan’s ranking was 50 out 
of 144 economies surveyed, but it had much lower rankings in a number 
of areas, including 108 for soundness of banks, 111 for local competition, 
and 113 for quality of roads.   
The government has moved to address some problems, for example 
using NFRK resources to channel funds through selected banks for 
discount lending to small and medium-sized enterprises. Government 
loans to banks rose by nearly 23% in 2014, but government-supported 
lending cannot overcome banks’ unwillingness to lend in tenge or the 
strong incentives for dollarization in the current uncertain environment. 
Moreover, research has shown that governments help most by 
strengthening the business climate and capital market, investing 
in infrastructure and human capital, and supporting research and 
development in selected enterprise clusters. The success of efforts to 
diversify and develop public–private partnership depends critically on 
effective public ﬁnance management that features sound procurement 
policies, risk assessment, cost–beneﬁt analyses of investment programs, 
and evaluation of investment program outcomes.
Careful husbanding of past oil earnings has given Kazakhstan 
considerable resources to support reform. A well-designed and 
comprehensive policy package could go far toward restoring conﬁdence 
and macroeconomic stability while promoting diversiﬁcation and private 
sector development. 
This chapter was written by Gulkayr Tentieva of the Kyrgyz Resident Mission, ADB, 
Bishkek.
Kyrgyz Republic
Growth slowed to 3.6% in 2014 as the economies of the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan 
weakened, while local currency depreciation of about 19% pushed inflation to 7.5%. With economic 
contraction expected in the Russian Federation, growth will likely slow further to 1.7% in 2015 
before recovering slightly to 2.0% in 2016 as the external environment shows some improvement. 
Inflation will likely reach or exceed 10%, and the current account deficit 15% of GDP.
Economic performance
A 16% decline in gold production at the main Kumtor gold mine cut GDP 
growth by two-thirds to 3.6% in 2014 from 10.9% in 2014. Apart from 
gold mining, GDP rose by 4.6%, buoyed by expansion in services and 
industry (Figure 3.5.1). 
On the supply side, growth in industry was 5.1%, but this was a steep 
plunge from 30.5% in 2013, in which gold output doubled. Lower gold 
production contributed to declines of 3.0% in manufacturing and 0.5% in 
mining, though industry growth remained positive because of expansion 
in food products by 8%, construction by 24.9%, and minerals other than 
gold by 6.2%. Services grew by 4.1% as higher consumer demand and 
improved cross-border trade boosted retail and wholesale trade by 7.2%, 
hotels and restaurants by 9.6%, and transportation by 4.3%. Agriculture, 
by contrast, contracted by 0.6% because of adverse weather. 
On the demand side, private consumption is estimated to have 
increased on rising retail trade. Investment  expanded by 21.6%, 
reﬂecting a jump in private housing construction. 
Average annual inﬂation rose to 7.5% from 6.6% in 2013, as food 
prices rose by 13.9%, led by wheat. Prices for most other items increased 
by 6.8%, and utility charges by 5.9%. Inﬂation accelerated mainly 
during the second half of the year, when the Kyrgyz som depreciated 
by 19.1% against the US dollar; the 12-month inﬂation rate, December to 
December, jumped to 10.5% from 4.0% in 2013 (Figure 3.5.2).
The ﬁscal deﬁcit increased to 4.3% of GDP as growth slowed and 
revenue fell short. Higher grants and cuts in expenditure only partly 
offset the loss of nontax revenue from the closing of the Transit Center 
at Manas Airport in July 2014 as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
ended operations in Afghanistan (Figure 3.5.3). Public external debt 
surged to an estimated 51.0% of GDP at the end of 2014 from 43.7% a 
year earlier, reﬂecting in part sharp currency depreciation (Figure 3.5.4).
To limit inﬂation in the wake of currency depreciation, the National 
Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic, the central bank, sharply raised its 
policy interest rate from 4.16% at the beginning of the year to 10.50% 
at year-end. However, the full impact of the rate hike was limited by 
3.5.1 GDP growth by sector
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extensive dollarization, as more than half of all bank loans and deposits 
are in foreign currency and dollarization increased as the currency 
weakened. The average deposit interest rate rose marginally to 4.8% 
from 4.3% in 2013, but the average lending rate fell to 17.6% from 
18.4%. Moreover, deposits expanded by 22.6% and credit by 45.9%. 
Nonperforming loans declined to 4.5% of all credit outstanding at the 
end of 2014 from 5.5% a year earlier. 
The Kyrgyz som depreciated in 2014 by 19.1%, from Som49.19 per 
US dollar to Som58.59 (Figure 3.5.5), despite more than 61 central bank 
interventions that cost $516 million. By year-end, foreign exchange 
reserves had fallen to $1.96 billion, equal to about 4 months of imports, 
from $2.24 billion at the end of 2013. 
The current account deﬁcit is estimated to have risen to equal 15.0% 
of GDP from 14.1% in 2013. Data through December showed a 6.3% 
decline in exports, reﬂecting the drop in gold production and weaker 
sales of fruit, vegetables, and textiles. Imports fell by 4.3% as imports of 
petroleum products, coal, and apparel declined. Remittances, equivalent 
to about a quarter of GDP, declined by an estimated 5% to $1.8 billion, 
largely during the last quarter (Figure 3.5.6). External debt rose to an 
estimated 53% of GDP.
Economic prospects
Growth is likely to slow further to 1.7% in 2015, reﬂecting recession 
in the Russian Federation, sluggish performance in Kazakhstan, and a 
further drop in gold production as the quality of extracted ore declines 
(Figure 3.5.7). Growth is expected to remain positive, however, with 
recovery in agro-processing and textiles and more trade as the Kyrgyz 
Republic joins the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) on 1 May 2015. The 
government is developing an action plan to support export-oriented 
industries such as textiles and agro-processing through ﬁscal incentives 
and tax waivers. Growth is projected at 2.0% in 2016 on the assumption 
of some recovery in the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan and higher 
remittances. The highly volatile external environment poses downside 
risks to growth. 
On the supply side, processing, light industry, and construction 
should raise activity outside the gold sector. In addition, EEU accession 
may boost trade and transportation, though the need to raise tariffs to 
EEU levels may discourage trade outside the EEU. On the demand side, 
entry into the EEU may boost external demand, but lower remittances 
will reduce household incomes and, probably, domestic private 
consumption.
The economy remains vulnerable to shocks from its largest 
enterprise, the Kumtor gold mine, which supplied 7.4% of GDP in 2014 
and some 40% of exports. A long-standing dispute over mine ownership 
poses risks to the current forecast and damages the investment climate. 
Currency depreciation and tariff increases on imports to comply 
with the EEU are projected to keep average annual inﬂation at 10.5% 
in 2015 and 10.0% in 2016. Continued ruble depreciation could trigger 
further weakening of the som, which would likely worsen inﬂation and 
dollarization. 
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The ﬁscal deﬁcit is projected to reach at least 5.0% of GDP in 2015 
and 2016 as spending on teacher salaries and social protection rise, 
as announced, by half in 2015. With cautious revenue forecasts, the 
government has committed to limiting the deﬁcit in the medium term 
by restraining expenditure on low-priority items. Revenue is projected 
at around 29% of GDP in 2015 and 2016 on improved tax and customs 
administration. Expenditure is forecast at 34% of GDP or higher, 
reﬂecting modest growth projections for 2015 and 2016 and higher 
current and capital spending partly related to the election year. Public 
debt is expected to rise further to 56% of GDP in 2015. 
Monetary policy will remain cautious in 2015 as the central bank 
aims to limit inﬂation and stabilize the local currency. It will likely raise 
the policy interest rate again if inﬂation accelerates. Nominal interest 
rates should increase if the som depreciates further. 
The current account deﬁcit is forecast to stay at or near 16.0% in 
2015 because of import-intensive spending on infrastructure, then 
ease to 15.0% in 2016 (Figure 3.5.8). Exports are forecast to grow by 
10.0% in 2015 and 2016, mainly from gains in agricultural products and 
textiles. However, weaker consumer demand in 2015 in the Russian 
Federation and other EEU members may worsen the trade outlook. In 
addition, tariff increases may reduce trade with countries outside the 
EEU, while failure to meet EEU standards or technical regulations could 
initially hinder exports to EEU members. In view of these concerns, the 
government will support export-oriented industries and other measures 
to smooth the transition period, using $1 billion from the Russian 
Kyrgyz Development Fund newly established under a 2014 bilateral 
agreement. Imports are expected to grow by about 10.0% in both 2015 
and 2016 because of infrastructure projects. Foreign direct investment 
will depend largely on political stability and the implementation of 
proposed structural reform and improvements to the investment 
climate. Remittances will likely fall by 15% in 2015 with deterioration in 
the economies of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation, where most 
Kyrgyz migrants work, and the prospect of their currencies further 
depreciating. Lower remittance inﬂows will constrain household 
incomes and consumption, possibly putting further pressure on the 
local currency and worsening poverty, especially in remote parts of the 
country.
Policy challenge—better access to ﬁnance in 
poorer areas 
Wide disparity in economic opportunity arises in part from limited 
ﬁnancial development, which is a major obstacle to inclusive growth. 
Low domestic savings and high interest rates on loans, coupled with a 
shallow ﬁnance sector and inefficient ﬁnancial intermediation, restrict 
access to affordable ﬁnance and thereby constrain private investment, 
particularly in the poor and rural areas that need it most. 
A variety of factors limit bank lending. Lending rates are high 
because of such structural problems as risk aversion, a shortage 
of corporate clients, limited credit information on ﬁrms, the high 
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cost of lending to small ﬁrms and households, and a lack of credit 
infrastructure. In the Kyrgyz Republic, interest rates average 20.7% for 
domestic currency lending and 16.4% for foreign currency lending, both 
well above the inﬂation rate and among the highest in Central Asia. 
Moreover, bank loans have short maturities, are available for only a 
limited range of activities, and require substantial collateral. 
In addition, more than half of all loans are in foreign currency. 
As a consequence, banks provide only a small fraction of ﬁnancing 
for investment, leaving ﬁrms to rely mainly on retained earnings and 
private savings—particularly in rural areas, as 56% of lending and 86% 
of deposits are concentrated in the capital. Microﬁnance institutions 
now account for more than one-third of all credit in the economy, 
having grown since 2000 from a portfolio of Som500 million in loans to 
19,000 borrowers to a 2014 total of around Som24 billion lent to 340,000 
borrowers. Microﬁnance institutions play a limited role in facilitating 
private investment, however, because they are small and can offer only 
short-maturity loans at high interest rates. 
Under its National Sustainable Development Strategy, 2013–2017 and 
its Microﬁnance Development Strategy, 2011–2015, the government has 
been working to ensure better access to credit information for banks 
and other ﬁnance institutions and to improve the quality of ﬁnancial 
products available on the market. The reforms include new laws on the 
exchange of credit information, payment systems, and microﬁnance; the 
introduction of risk management systems in microﬁnance; a proposed 
new law on consumer protection; amendments to the Civil Procedures 
Code to accelerate the enforcement of arbitration awards; and 
amendments strengthening central bank independence and supervisory 
capability. Besides limiting state intervention in ﬁnance markets, these 
measures will expand the services and new products offered by ﬁnancial 
institutions. This  includes mobile banking, which has already been 
introduced in the country’s two largest cities, Bishkek and Osh, with 
plans to extend it nationwide during the next few years.  Such new 
technologies will make access to ﬁnancial services more equitable in 
rural areas as well as cities. 
These recent developments should improve ﬁnancial intermediation 
and help raise bank assets from the low 35.4% of GDP recorded at the 
end of 2014. The expanded provision of formal ﬁnancial services to 
remoter and poorer areas should help mobilize savings and support 
private sector growth.
3.5.8 Current account balance
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This chapter was written by ADB staff.
Tajikistan
Declines in remittances and the traditional exports of aluminum and cotton slowed growth 
to 6.7% in 2014 from 7.4% a year earlier. Inflation worsened to 6.1%, and the current account 
deficit to 7.9% of GDP. Expansion will likely slow further to 4.0% in 2015 before recovering to 
4.8% in 2016. Inflation will accelerate to 10.0% in 2015 with currency depreciation before easing 
to 6.5%. The current account deficit should narrow to 5.9% in 2015 and 4.8% in 2016.
Economic performance 
Growth slowed to 6.7% in 2014 from 7.4% in 2013 as remittance inﬂows, 
which are equivalent to almost half of GDP, fell sharply by 8.3% in 
US dollar terms. The fall was most pronounced in the fourth quarter 
and reﬂected prolonged economic slowdown, lost jobs, and currency 
depreciation in the Russian Federation, which hosts up to 90% of the 1 
million Tajik migrant workers. 
On the supply side, falling remittances helped slash expansion in 
services, which provide over half of GDP, to 1.0% from 9.7% in 2013. 
Growth in industry accelerated slightly to 5.1% from 3.9% in 2013, despite 
an estimated 30% drop in output at the Tajik Aluminum Company, 
long the economy’s main industrial producer and leading exporter. 
Construction expanded by 25.3%, led by gains of 13.9% for housing and 
13.0% for social facilities in response to strong government spending 
for social welfare. However, growth in agriculture slowed to 4.5% 
from 7.6% in 2013 as poor weather and seed outweighed gains from the 
introduction of modern irrigation techniques and measures to increase 
egg, ﬁsh, and poultry production (Figure 3.6.1). In particular, the 
production of cotton, a key export commodity that accounts for 60% of 
agricultural output, contracted by 8%.  
On the demand side, declining remittances constrained private 
consumption as approximately 13,000 Tajik migrants left the Russian 
Federation by the end of 2014 in the wake of wage cuts and layoffs, and 
with uncertain future job prospects. Rising inﬂation further dampened 
household demand and retail sales. Compounding the slowdown was 
import growth outpacing that of exports, partly reﬂecting sluggish 
demand for Tajikistan’s leading export commodities: aluminum and 
cotton.
Inﬂation accelerated to 6.1% in 2014 from 5.1% a year earlier. The 
increase came mainly from increases of 10.3% higher for food and 6.0% 
for services. Prices for other goods rose by only 3.0%, held down in part 
by falling global commodity prices, particularly for petroleum products, 
Tajikistan’s largest import.  
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Fiscal policy was broadly neutral during the year (Figure 3.6.2). The 
budget recorded a surplus equal to 0.3% of GDP, unchanged from 2013. 
Revenues reached 29.3% of GDP from 28.5% in 2013, notwithstanding 
a 1% reduction in the corporate tax rate and the abolition of sales tax. 
Rising revenues reﬂected the continued beneﬁts of tax reform in the 
form of a revised tax code, which has made tax administration markedly 
more efficient, effective, and transparent while enlarging the tax base 
and improving revenue collection. Total expenditure was 29.0% of 
GDP, versus 28.2% in 2013. The government met all of its announced 
commitments for 2014, including social expenditure for pensions, social 
protection, health care, and education, which together accounted for 60% 
of outlays. Public and publicly guaranteed debt declined to 22.5% of GDP 
from 25.3% in 2013 (Figure 3.6.3). 
Monetary policy aimed to support growth and cushion the economy 
from currency depreciation. After lowering the reﬁnancing rate from 
5.9% to 4.8% in early January 2014, the National Bank of Tajikistan, 
the central bank, raised it three times beginning in May to 8.0% in late 
December. Broad money grew by 7.0% from the end of 2013 to the end 
of 2014 (Figure 3.6.4). The share of broad money in foreign exchange 
deposits increased slightly, to about 36% at the end of 2014 from 34% a 
year earlier. 
Like many other currencies in the region, the Tajik somoni 
depreciated against the US dollar in 2014, by 11.2%, worsening inﬂation. 
The central bank avoided further depreciation with interventions 
totaling $137 million. From 1 January to early March 2015, the somoni 
depreciated a further 2.9% (Figure 3.6.5). 
The current account deﬁcit widened signiﬁcantly to 7.9% of GDP 
from 2.6% in 2013. Exports grew by 3.6%, reversing a 14.4% contraction 
in 2013, while the decline in remittances helped slow import growth 
to 7.3% from 9.1% in 2013. The reported rise in exports reﬂected a 37% 
increase in exports of electricity to 1.33 billion kilowatt-hours and 
higher fruit and vegetable exports to the Russian Federation. However, 
aluminum exports—the single largest export item, comprising a third 
of all exports—fell by 37.2% in 2014 to 125,000 tons, compounding a 
25% reduction in 2013.  The decline reﬂected lower global prices, the 
continued depreciation of production facilities, ongoing problems with 
the supply of power and core inputs, and ﬁnancial pressures at the Tajik 
Aluminum Company. Exports of cotton ﬁber, Tajikistan’s second largest 
export item, also fell steeply, by 24.5% to 86,400 tons, reﬂecting lower 
international prices and the diversiﬁcation of agriculture in Tajikistan 
as cotton farmers reallocated about 5% of cotton land to cereal and 
feed crops to supply the rising number of livestock and poultry farms. 
In 2014, remittance inﬂows fell for the ﬁrst time since 2009, by 8.3% to 
$3.3 billion (Figure 3.6.6). Foreign currency reserves fell to $400 million, 
equivalent to only about 1 month of imports, from $500 million at the end 
of 2013. 
Economic prospects
Growth is projected to slow to 4.0% in 2015, reﬂecting a recession of 
at least 3.0% in the Russian Federation and continued weakness in the 
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global economic outlook. Growth could recover somewhat to 4.8% in 
2016 with some improvement in the Russian Federation and the external 
environment generally (Figure 3.6.7). This will likely be supported by 
new job creation along the Trans-Tajik Gas Pipeline, which was ratiﬁed 
by parliament in December 2014 and is slated to begin construction this 
year. Plans to increase social spending and raise public sector wages by 
25% beginning in September 2015 should add to growth in 2016. 
Inﬂation will likely accelerate in 2015 to 10.0% or more as currency 
depreciation raises the prices of imported consumer goods. A more stable 
currency and some recovery in remittances would allow inﬂation to 
ease back to 6.5%–7.0% in 2016 (Figure 3.6.8). With growth slowing, the 
current account deﬁcit is forecast to narrow to 5.9% of GDP in 2015. It 
could narrow further to 4.8% in 2016 with some recovery in remittances 
(Figure 3.6.9). Exports are projected to grow by 14% in 2015 to $1.6 billion 
and a further 13% to $1.8 billion in 2016, while imports are projected to 
decline by 16% in 2015 to $4.8 billion in 2015, before recovering by 6% to 
$5.1 billion in 2016. Remittances will likely contract further in 2015 as new 
regulations require that migrants to the Russian Federation have Russian 
language proﬁciency, as well as medical tests and health insurance that 
are estimated to cost about $500 per Tajik migrant. This will induce more 
to return home. Remittances are expected to recover somewhat in 2016 
along with the economy of the Russian Federation. 
Policy challenge—protecting the economy from 
external shocks 
Landlocked and possessing limited arable land and a narrow industrial 
base, Tajikistan is highly vulnerable to external shocks. Geopolitical 
tensions have heightened this vulnerability, given Tajikistan’s heavy 
dependence on remittances and a few export commodities. 
Remittances are a critical lifeline for Tajikistan and its primary source 
of development ﬁnance. In 2011, remittance inﬂows were eight times official 
development assistance. However, because remittances are used mainly for 
household consumption, imports, and cover for Tajikistan’s rising trade deﬁcit, 
their potential beneﬁts for domestic growth, job creation, and long-term poverty 
reduction are limited. Further, remittance inﬂows are unpredictable and highly 
sensitive to economic and political developments in the Russian Federation. 
A 2014 World Bank study estimates that a 1 percentage point reduction in the 
GDP of the Russian Federation causes a 1 percentage point GDP contraction 
in Tajikistan. A debt sustainability analysis conducted by the International 
Monetary Fund in 2013 found that a modest shortfall in remittance inﬂows can 
worsen Tajikistan’s debt service ratios for a prolonged period. 
During the past decade, aluminum and cotton ﬁber have provided 
about two-thirds of Tajikistan’s exports. Prices and external demand 
for these commodities are highly volatile. Since 2013, falling aluminum 
and cotton prices have signiﬁcantly limited export growth. Tajikistan’s 
longstanding dependence on aluminum and cotton ﬁber has discouraged 
industrial diversiﬁcation. One consequence has been a halving of 
the share of manufacturing in GDP from 2000 to 2014, which has 
undermined the development of alternative export commodities. 
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Currently, Tajikistan’s exports constitute less than 17% of GDP, 
compared with 50% in countries with similar income.
The Ministry of Economic Development and Trade has developed 
an action plan for risk mitigation in 2015–2016 that identiﬁes 
medium-term ﬁnancial and economic risks for the economy. The plan 
outlines strategies to increase foreign exchange reserves, improve 
revenue collection, and reduce quasi-ﬁscal risks, emphasizing the 
ﬁnancial operations of two large state enterprises, Barki Tojik and 
Agroinvestbank. It further aims to strengthen governance in state-
owned enterprises by implementing international ﬁnancial reporting 
standards, improving ﬁnancial and operational disclosure, and 
introducing external auditing. The plan includes targeted social 
assistance and support programs, as well as steps to enhance the 
investment climate. 
The government anticipates that several factors will counterbalance 
falling remittances and a deteriorating industrial base. These include 
planned investments by the People’s Republic of China amounting to 
$6 billion from 2015 to 2017 and recent agreements to increase food 
exports to the Russian Federation, export surplus summer energy to 
Afghanistan and Pakistan under the Central Asia South Asia Electricity 
Transmission and Trade Project, strengthen regional road transport 
linking member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and 
participate in the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Tajikistan Railway. 
Over the longer term, unlocking the potential of Tajikistan’s valuable 
resources can help it overcome the limitations of being landlocked. The 
development of road and rail networks in the subregion and beyond 
offers an opportunity to access niche markets in Asia and Europe for 
exotic mountain fruits and herbs and for the ﬁsh that are abundant in 
Tajikistan’s unpolluted rivers. The country’s signiﬁcant gold and silver 
resources provide scope for expanding exports of lightweight ﬁnished 
products that can be transported by air, given the country’s favorable 
location for international ﬂights connecting Europe and Asia. 
Realizing this potential will require structural reform. Despite 
some improvement during the past year, Tajikistan still ranks 166 out 
of 189 economies in the World Bank’s Doing Business 2015 survey of 
investment conditions, with exceptionally low scores of 168 for getting 
construction permits, 178 for getting electricity, 169 for ease of paying 
taxes, and 188 for trading across borders. Tajikistan needs to address 
these problems to boost its exports and thereby mitigate its vulnerability 
to external shocks. 
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3.7.1 GDP growth 
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High growth at 10.3% in 2014 reflected robust public investment and gas exports. Strong foreign 
direct investment nevertheless drove the current account to a deficit of 4.4% of GDP. Growth 
is projected to slow to 9.7% in 2015 and 9.2% in 2016, and the current account deficit to widen 
further to 8.4% of GDP before moderating to 6.2% in 2016. Inflation is forecast to reach 7.0% 
before subsiding to 6.5%.
Economic performance
The government reported growth in 2014 at 10.3%, slightly above 10.2% 
a year earlier. The large hydrocarbon sector grew by 6.1%, while the rest 
of the economy expanded twice as fast, by 13.0% (Figure 3.7.1). 
On the supply side, industry and services were the main sources 
of growth. The government reported that industry expanded by 
11.4% in 2014, an improvement from 7.3% in 2013 that reﬂected faster 
growth in hydrocarbons, electricity, chemicals, construction materials, 
textiles, and agro-industrial products. Expansion in services slowed to 
10.6% from 12.7% in 2013. Growth in agriculture decelerated to 4.2% 
from 10.0% in 2013 as unfavorable weather held wheat and livestock 
production below targets.
On the demand side, strong investment was the main source of 
growth. Public investment for infrastructure under the National 
Program of Socio-Economic Development of Turkmenistan for 
2012–2016 expanded by 6.7% in 2014, compared with 7.1% in 2013. 
Despite some declines in prices for food and services in the ﬁrst 
half of the year, inﬂation rose in the second half with the reduction of 
subsidies and the concomitant rise in charges for public transportation 
and utilities. Nevertheless, the consumer price index is estimated to 
have risen by only 6.0% on an annual average basis, versus 6.8% in 2013, 
as the government continued to administer prices for basic goods and 
services and maintained a ﬁxed exchange rate through the end of 2014 
(Figure 3.7.2). Tighter monetary policy helped slow broad money growth 
to 22.6% from 31.1% in 2013, and expansion in private sector credit is 
estimated to have slowed marginally to 45% from 50%. 
The government’s ﬁscal surplus is estimated to have narrowed to 
0.8% of GDP from 1.5% in 2013, reﬂecting higher outlays for social 
programs and a 10% increase in pensions, students’ stipends, and 
public wages. Revenue was estimated at 16.4% of GDP, and identiﬁed 
budget expenditure at 15.6%. Public investment was also supported by 
off-budget resources. The large non-hydrocarbon ﬁscal deﬁcit suggests 
that hydrocarbon revenues continued to ﬁnance growth in the rest of 
3.7.2 GDP growth and inflation
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the economy (Figure 3.7.3). Public debt is estimated to have fallen to 
16.8% of GDP in 2014 from 21.1% in 2013. 
Imports ﬁnanced by foreign direct investment for large hydrocarbon 
projects pushed the current account to a deﬁcit of 4.4% of GDP. Exports 
were estimated to rise by 3.3% in 2014, while imports grew by 1.8%. 
Foreign direct investment rose above $4 billion to equal 8.7% of GDP 
(Figure 3.7.4). 
Economic prospects 
With hydrocarbons representing more than 90% of exports, the 
continued decline in energy prices and ﬂuctuating demand for 
Turkmen gas will likely reduce export revenues, weakening the current 
account. However, Turkmenistan has strong external buffers, as the 
International Monetary Fund estimated its foreign exchange reserves 
equal to 22 months of imports in 2014. Moreover, breakeven petroleum 
prices for the ﬁscal and external balance are considered to be the 
lowest in the region, providing some insulation against ﬂuctuating 
energy prices. 
GDP growth is projected to slow to 9.7% in 2015 and 9.2% in 2016 
(Figure 3.7.5), reﬂecting lower public investment. Growth will slow 
further if external difficulties persist and require ﬁscal adjustment. 
On 1 January 2015, the government devalued the manat by 19% 
to TKM3.50 per dollar from the previous TKM2.85, the ﬁrst such 
adjustment in 7 years. The move was intended to keep non-energy 
exports competitive, ease pressure on the currency from falling energy 
prices, and offset some of the 40% appreciation against the ruble during 
the second half of 2014. Along with further price increases for gasoline 
and public utilities, the devaluation will likely spur inﬂation to 7.0% in 
2015 before slowing to 6.5% in 2016. 
To limit inﬂation, the government will continue its import-
substitution policies and price administration. The Central Bank of 
Turkmenistan will likely tighten monetary policy by slowing credit 
expansion. Growth in the money supply is forecast to slow to 19.0% in 
2015 from 22.6% in 2014. 
The state budget for 2015 is planned to be broadly balanced and 
anticipates a 9.5% rise in spending and a 13.0% increase in revenues. 
Under current projections of low prices for hydrocarbons but some 
recovery in 2016, the current account deﬁcit is forecast to widen to 8.4% 
of GDP in 2015 before narrowing to 6.2% in 2016. External debt will 
remain low, decreasing to 18.6% of GDP in 2015 and 16.4% in 2016 as 
earlier loans are repaid.
Policy challenge—strengthening ﬁnance 
The National Program of Socio-Economic Development of Turkmenistan 
for 2011–2030 aims to diversify the economy and increase the role of the 
private sector. Strengthening the ﬁnancial system is essential for this 
goal because it is small, prone to excessive government intervention, and 
lacking in competition among banks. Banking assets amount to only 43% 
of GDP, and lending to only 27%. 
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The banking sector accounts for most ﬁ nancial activity and is highly 
concentrated, with over 80% of all assets in six state-owned banks. 
The remaining six private and foreign banks play only minor roles. 
Providing more than half of total credit to the economy, state-owned 
banks have traditionally directed lending to sectors selected to serve 
development policy objectives, off ering subsidized interest rates and 
implicit government guarantees. Credit to the private sector represents 
less than 23% of total lending, well below the average for other countries 
ranked upper-middle income. 
Recognizing the need for a better ﬁ nancial infrastructure, the 
government has instituted as part of its national reform strategy a 
program to develop the banking system from 2011 to 2030. The goal is 
to strengthen the ﬁ nancial sector and improve monetary and foreign 
exchange policy to enhance competitiveness and long-term growth. 
The program stipulates gradual restructuring and modernization 
in three stages, from 2011 to 2015, then to 2020, and ﬁ nally to 2030. 
Reform started with the uniﬁ cation of multiple exchange rates and 
the redenomination of the national currency, which helped to reduce 
distortions, improve access to foreign exchange, and strengthen 
conﬁ dence in the Turkmen manat. Major laws have been enacted to 
better govern the central bank, credit institutions, foreign exchange 
regulation and control, and accounting and ﬁ nancial reporting 
standards. New laws on small and medium-sized enterprises and 
microﬁ nance aim to develop the private sector. 
To enhance effi  ciency in intermediating public resources, the 
State Development Bank was created in 2011 to direct resources from 
the Stabilization Fund. The new bank is a major innovation and should 
help phase out directed lending by the central bank. State Development 
Bank lending accounted for about a quarter of all lending by 2014. 
The government’s program calls for further reforms to strengthen 
the legal and regulatory framework, integrate international standards 
and best practices into the ﬁ nancial sector, develop nonbank institutions, 
commercialize state banks, and improve the private sector’s access to 
ﬁ nancial products and services. Several additional measures would 
support government objectives to deepen and broaden ﬁ nancial 
intermediation and promote private sector development. These include 
increasing competition among banks by making the sector less 
segmented and allowing the entry of private and foreign banks, 
introducing market-based mechanisms for determining interest rates and 
lending activities, and developing capital markets to support the effi  cient 
allocation of long-term savings and investments. The government’s 
program and additional measures such as these will be important for 
expanding the non-hydrocarbon economy and enhancing Turkmenistan’s 
competitiveness. 
3.7.5 Growth by sector
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Growth rose marginally to 8.1% as increased lending and public outlays offset the impact of a 
weakening economy in the Russian Federation. Recession there and sluggish external demand are 
projected to slow growth to 7.0% in 2015 before it edges back up to 7.2% in 2016 as the external 
outlook improves. Inflation is projected to reach 9.5% in 2015 and 10.0% in 2016, with the current 
account showing surpluses of 0.9% and then 1.1% of GDP.
Economic performance
The government reported growth at 8.1% in 2014, slightly above 8.0% in 
the previous year. Lower growth was expected because of the economic 
slowdown in the Russian Federation, Uzbekistan’s largest trade partner 
and its major source of remittances. The slowdown there reduced 
bilateral trade and remittances, while lower export earnings accelerated 
the depreciation of the Uzbek sum against the US dollar. In response, 
the government expanded public spending and commercial lending to 
sustain domestic demand. On the supply side, industry and services were 
the main contributors to growth, as industry excluding construction 
expanded by 8.3%, versus 8.8% in 2013, and services expanded by 15.4%, 
up from 13.7% in 2013. In industry, the ongoing state modernization 
program, backed by substantial public investment, boosted the 
production of machinery, metals, and chemicals, which expanded 
by 10.2% and contributed almost 40% of total industrial output. In 
services, strong performers were information and communication 
technology (up by 24.1%) and ﬁnance (up by 33.9%), supported by robust 
demand and domestic lending. Another important service subsector—
trade and catering—grew by 17.5%. Despite unfavorable weather, 
agriculture grew by 6.9%, faster than in 2013, on healthy vegetable 
harvests and expanded livestock production (Figure 3.8.1).
On the demand side, increases in wages and pensions, public 
investment, and commercial lending were the main sources of 
growth. Public sector wages rose by 19.1% in 2014, sustaining private 
consumption. Gross ﬁxed capital formation was reported rising 
by 10.9%. Capital investment reached $14.6 billion, or 24% of GDP, 
including more than $3.0 billion in foreign investment. Notable projects 
completed in 2014 include the expansion of the General Motors 
Uzbekistan automobile manufacturing plant and the completion 
of a key branch of the gas pipeline linking Central Asia to the 
People’s Republic of China. Commercial bank lending raised credit to 
the economy by 31.2%.
3.8.2  Inflation and broad money
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The government reported average annual inﬂation at 6.1% in 2014. 
Official consumer price index data show that inﬂation slowed primarily 
because food prices fell in line with global trends. The International 
Monetary Fund estimated, using the same data as the government 
but a different methodology, that inﬂation slowed to 8.4% from 11.2% 
in 2013. Inﬂation is nevertheless believed to have risen in the fourth 
quarter because of rapid currency depreciation against the US dollar. 
Unofficial curb market rates show the Uzbek sum losing approximately 
20% of its value in 2014, and the pace of depreciation accelerated in 
the last quarter along with ruble depreciation and falling global fuel 
prices. In response to slowing exports and currency depreciation 
on the curb market, the Central Bank of Uzbekistan accelerated its 
official depreciation of the sum against the US dollar and tightened 
import controls. 
Broad money is estimated to have grown by 26% in 2014, about the 
same as in 2013, reﬂecting higher domestic credit. Monetary survey 
data are not available, but net foreign assets in the banking system may 
have decreased as domestic credit grew more quickly than broad money 
(Figure 3.8.2).
The government reported a budget surplus of 0.2% of GDP in 2014. 
Factoring in the surplus of the Uzbekistan Fund for Reconstruction 
and Development, the country’s sovereign wealth fund, the augmented 
budget balance is estimated to have shown a surplus equal to 2.4% 
of GDP, down from 2.7% in 2013. Budget revenues are estimated to 
have slipped from 36.2% of GDP in 2013 to 36.1% in 2014, in line with 
declining international prices for key export commodities. Higher 
government spending—notably for wages, pensions, health care, and 
education—raised budget expenditures from 33.5% of GDP in 2013 to 
33.7% in 2014 (Figure 3.8.3). Total government debt edged up from 8.5% 
of GDP in 2013 to 8.7% in 2014 as foreign lending for infrastructure 
increased.
The current account surplus is estimated to have narrowed to 
1.2% of GDP from 1.6% in 2013, reﬂecting a smaller trade surplus and 
lower remittances (Figure 3.8.4). External demand remained weak, 
and international prices for Uzbekistan’s key export commodities 
declined from historic highs. Much of the narrowing in the trade 
surplus reﬂected lower earnings from energy, which accounts for about 
30% of all exports. Earnings from energy exports have been declining 
since the third quarter of 2014 in line with retreating global oil prices 
(Figure 3.8.5). Total exports are estimated to have declined by 2.0%.
Developments in the economy of the Russian Federation during 
late 2014 profoundly affected Uzbekistan’s exports and remittances. 
Weak consumer demand there, coupled with rapid nominal appreciation 
of the Uzbek sum against the ruble, hurt bilateral trade. Diminished 
labor demand in construction and logistics—the main employers of 
Uzbek migrants—helped cut remittances from the Russian Federation 
by an estimated 10%, to about $5.0 billion. Quarter by quarter, bilateral 
trade and remittances were both lower than in 2013 (Figure 3.8.6).
Imports of goods and services rose by 1.1%, driven mainly by imports 
of consumer goods and chemicals. Despite declining by about 10% from 
2013, machinery and equipment remained the largest import items, 
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accounting for 40% of imports. This reﬂects continued but moderating 
demand for capital goods from state-led infrastructure development and 
industrial modernization programs scheduled to end in 2015.
With the decline in exports, the trade balance is estimated to have 
moved into deﬁcit by the end of 2014 (Figure 3.8.7). Public and private 
external debt is estimated to have increased to 13.4% of GDP in 2014 
from 13.0% in 2013. Gross official reserves were estimated at $23.9 billion, 
equivalent to 2 years of merchandise imports.
Economic prospects 
GDP growth is forecast at 7.0% in 2015 and 7.2% in 2016, reﬂecting 
projected contraction of at least 3.0% in the Russian Federation and 
historically low international commodity prices (Figure 3.8.8). To limit the 
growth slowdown, the government is expected to boost spending further, 
particularly for public investment. Gradual recovery in external demand 
should begin in 2016, but industry will remain the key supply-side driver 
of growth, with output supported by higher lending. Large industrial 
enterprises in strategic sectors—mining, oil and gas, and manufacturing—
are expected to receive the bulk of additional lending from both the 
government and commercial banks. Planned wage and pension increases 
that exceed the inﬂation rate should support private consumption and 
demand for services. Agriculture is projected to grow by 6.0% in line with 
stable production of the key agricultural crops: cotton and wheat.
The government is expected to complete its large modernization 
investment program in 2015. Public investment should increase 
substantially to achieve the goal of raising industry’s share of GDP 
to 28%, with most investment ﬁnanced by the Uzbekistan Fund for 
Reconstruction and Development. Gross ﬁxed capital formation is 
forecast to increase by 11.0% in 2015 and 12.0% in 2016.
In response to growing external risks and global uncertainties, the 
government announced in January 2015 reforms to be implemented over 
2015–2019 for economic diversiﬁcation, private sector development, a 
smaller state presence in the economy, and better corporate governance. 
In early March 2015, the government adopted a comprehensive 
structural transformation, modernization, and diversiﬁcation program for 
2015–2019. The program envisages a $19.6 billion investment package to 
be ﬁnanced through foreign investments and loans, the Uzbekistan Fund 
for Reconstruction and Development, and commercial bank lending.
As in 2013 and 2014, the government will continue to stimulate 
domestic consumption in 2015 and 2016, most likely by raising public 
sector wages, welfare payments, and pensions. With presidential elections 
in 2015, additional measures are expected to sustain household spending, 
including expanded consumer lending. Reﬂecting these developments, 
private consumption is forecast to rise by 2.0% in 2015 and 3.0% in 2016.
Inﬂation is projected at 9.5% in 2015 and 10.0% in 2016 (Figure 3.8.9). 
Inﬂationary pressures will emanate from higher government spending 
and continued depreciation of the local currency. Anticipated declines 
in global food prices and lower import costs could partly offset these 
pressures. Nevertheless, containing inﬂation will remain a key challenge 
over the medium term.
3.8.6  Bilateral trade with and remittances 
from the Russian Federation, 
2013–2014
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The government offi  cially projected a consolidated budget 
deﬁ cit of 1.0% of GDP in 2015, reﬂ ecting eff orts to support economic 
expansion. Factoring in expected surpluses in the Uzbekistan Fund 
for Reconstruction and Development, the budget is projected to post 
surpluses of 2.0% of GDP in 2015 and 1.5% in 2016. Budget expenditures 
are forecast to rise with increases in health care and education outlays, 
along with higher wage and pension payments. Low international 
prices for the country’s export commodities will limit the potential for 
revenue growth.
The current account surplus is forecast to narrow further, to 
0.9% of GDP in 2015, before expanding modestly to 1.1% in 2016. 
Falling international prices for the country’s main export commodities, 
weak global trade, the deteriorating economic situation in the Russian 
Federation, and slow growth in the People’s Republic of China will 
reduce the trade surplus and transfers, including remittance inﬂ ows. 
Also weakening the outlook is the announcement by Gazprom in 
February 2015 that slashes Russian Federation procurement of Uzbek 
natural gas from an estimated 4.5 billion cubic meters in 2014 to 
1.0 billion in 2015. However, plans by Uzbekistan’s national oil and 
gas conglomerate to raise natural gas exports to the People’s Republic 
of China to 10.0 billion cubic meters in 2015 may off set most of this loss. 
Potential recovery in the Russian Federation by 2016, albeit gradual, 
should support exports after 2015. Merchandise exports are projected to 
rise by 1.3% in 2015 and 3.0% in 2016.
Merchandise imports are projected to rise gradually, by 2.0% in 2015 
and 4.0% in 2016. Most demand will come from the public sector in line 
with continued infrastructure spending. Lower global commodity prices 
will constrain import payments, as will greater import controls.
The key downside risk is that lower global oil prices and continued 
US and European Union sanctions induce a recession in the Russian 
Federation that is deeper than expected. Compounding this risk are a 
possible tightening of global ﬁ nancing conditions and an expected hike 
in US interest rates.
Policy challenge—creating jobs through 
private sector development
As the Russian Federation enters recession, weak labor demand and 
stricter immigration rules are expected to leave many migrant workers 
without jobs or incomes. Many thousands of them will likely return 
to Uzbekistan, at least temporarily, which will intensify pressure on 
a domestic labor market that is already large and growing. Moreover, 
one-ﬁ fth of the domestic workforce is employed in agriculture, where 
productivity is low. Recognizing these challenges, the government 
adopted a program in November 2014 to create 409,500 jobs for 
returning migrant workers in 2015. The bulk of the new jobs will be in 
rural areas.
While recent government eff orts are important, they need to be 
matched by adequate demand from the private sector to meet the 
objectives of sustainable income generation and improved well-being. 
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Experience from other emerging economies shows that the private 
sector is more effective than the public sector at creating sustainable 
employment growth.
The private sector needs to play a greater role in the economy to 
ensure the sustainability of labor demand. Since 2002, four separate, 
independent enterprise surveys have identiﬁed a recurring set of 
impediments to private sector growth. These include access to ﬁnance 
and high tax rates (Table 3.8.2).
Historically high costs of doing business and state domination 
in industry, external trade, and ﬁnance have shaped the uneven 
distribution of economic opportunity and limited private sector growth. 
Official data show the number of private companies, including small 
enterprises, actually decreasing over the past several years (Table 3.8.3). 
3.8.3 Distribution of registered legal entities by form of ownership and sector
Total entities Of which private sector Share of private sector, %
2012 2013 2014 2012 2013 2014 2012 2013 2014
Total 301,613 266,397 273,627 101,945 95,637 90,571 34 36 33
Source: State Statistics Committee.
As economic decline in the Russian Federation may persist for some 
time, a strong and diversiﬁed private sector is crucial to generate new 
jobs and alleviate social pressures. Comprehensive reform is necessary 
to develop human capital, improve labor market efficiency, and 
strengthen the business environment. To these ends, policy measures 
should ensure ﬁrms’ access to ﬁnance and other resources; institute 
structural changes to liberalize trade and integrate ﬁnancial services; 
strengthen governance, regulatory quality, and the rule of law; and ease 
the tax burden while improving compliance. In addition to generating 
jobs, these policy measures would provide a foundation for planned 
modernization and diversiﬁcation programs.
3.8.1 Sources of growth 
Uzbekistan’s sources of economic 
growth have changed remarkably 
since 2000. Massive programs of 
infrastructure development and 
industrial modernization enabled 
the government to expand lending to 
state-owned enterprises for capital 
renovation. During this period, 
additional capital stock, rather than 
technological change or higher labor 
productivity, has driven growth.
Conventional growth accounting 
shows that, starting from 2000, 
capital was responsible for more 
than half of GDP growth (Box table). 
An analysis conducted earlier by the 
International Monetary Fund found 
similar trends.  
Spurring growth in total factor 
productivity and, consequently, 
competiveness will require the 
market-based allocation of capital 
and labor, removing price distortions 
including those related to exchange 
rates and interest rates, and 
eliminating market bottlenecks.
Given Uzbekistan’s relatively 
high investment rate of 24% of GDP 
and the declining productivity of 
investment, further efforts to scale 
up investment’s contribution to 
growth and poverty reduction will 
require measures to improve the 
quality of investment. Important 
steps to this end include tightly 
linking infrastructure investments 
to socioeconomic goals, selecting 
projects for their effects over time 
and across sectors and regions, and 
identifying each project’s poverty 
impact and beneﬁciaries.
Contributions to real GDP growth 
(annual average % change)
Period GDP Capital Labor TFP
2000–2007 6.0  5.4 2.4 2.8
2008–2010 8.5  8.5 2.7 1.1
2010–2013 8.3 14.5 2.6 2.6
TFP = total factor productivity.
Source: Institute for Forecasting and 
Macroeconomic Research. 2014. The Trends in 
Socio-economic Development of Uzbekistan 
(2000–2013). Tashkent.
3.8.2 Top ﬁve problems identiﬁed by businesses in Uzbekistan, 2002–2013
2002 EBRD-WB  
BEEPS
2005 EBRD-WB 
BEEPS
2008 IFC-WB 
Enterprise Survey
2013 IFC-WB 
Enterprise Survey
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regulatory policies
Tax administration Access to ﬁnance
Tax rates Access to ﬁnance Corruption Customs and trade 
regulation
BEEPS = Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey.
Source: www.enterprisesurveys.org
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3.9.2 Supply-side contributions to growth
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Growth decelerated in 2014 as investment slowed, particularly in real estate. The government 
targets the growth rate of 7.0% as “new normal.” Inflation will remain low. The surplus in the 
current account will expand in 2015 but moderate in 2016. The main policy challenge is to reform 
local government finance to reduce debt and improve transparency without hindering growth.
Economic performance
As the pace of investment slowed, GDP growth in the People’s Republic 
China (PRC) continued to decelerate, falling from 7.7% year on year in 
2013 to 7.4% in 2014 (Figure 3.9.1). Growth still met the government 
target of about 7.5%. As in 2013, the government provided ﬁscal and 
monetary support to ensure stability in labor and ﬁnancial markets but 
refrained from large-scale stimulus. It thus embraced more closely the 
new normal of decelerating growth as demographic shifts and the sheer 
size of the economy make sustaining the high growth rates of the past 
increasingly difficult.
On the supply side, output growth slowed in all sectors except 
agriculture. The service sector remained the main engine of growth 
even though a slowdown in hospitality and real estate services tamped 
down sector growth to 8.1%. Industry (including manufacturing, 
mining, and construction) expanded by 7.3%, with consumer-oriented 
manufacturing outperforming heavy industry. Domestic rebalancing 
from industry to services made further progress as envisioned by the 
government, such that the share of services in nominal GDP increased 
to 48.2% while that of industry decreased to 42.6%. Services contributed 
an estimated 3.5 percentage points to GDP growth while industry 
contributed 3.4 points (Figure 3.9.2). Urbanization and rising household 
incomes remained structural drivers, but services beneﬁted as well 
from deregulation and the continuing reform of taxes on services. 
Most of the new 13.2 million urban jobs created in 2014 were in services. 
Large investments raised agricultural growth slightly to 4.1% in 2014, but 
the share of agriculture in GPD declined to 9.2%. Almost 30% of the PRC 
workforce is still employed in this sector, pointing to a reservoir of excess 
agricultural labor that potentially can be tapped by industry and services.
Domestic rebalancing also progressed on the demand side as the 
contribution of consumption to GDP growth rose to 51.2% from 50.0% 
in 2013 while that of investment fell to 48.5% from 54.4% in 2013 
(Figure 3.9.3). Net exports added 0.3% to growth as the positive external 
shock of lower commodity prices slowed import growth by value as 
compared with exports.
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Growth in ﬁxed asset investment moderated to 15.1% year on year 
in real terms, down from 19.2% in 2013. Investment in infrastructure 
slowed less than investment in manufacturing or real estate, as 
infrastructure beneﬁtted from central government support, including 
through policy banks. The slowdown was most pronounced in real 
estate, where investment growth halved to 9.9% year on year in 2014, 
dragged down by tighter ﬁnancing conditions for developers and home 
buyers, the bursting of local housing price bubbles, and oversupply, 
particularly in small and medium-sized cities. Prices peaked nationwide 
in April 2014 and have since fallen by about 3.5%. The government 
cushioned the correction by removing tight purchase restrictions 
in most cities, improving access to mortgage loans and the housing 
accumulation fund (a mandatory savings scheme), and accelerating 
shantytown redevelopment and social housing construction. The 
housing market has started to stabilize in recent months, and sales 
growth has reentered positive territory in larger cities.
Consumption growth remained more robust, supported by strong 
income growth as households’ real disposable incomes rose by 8% 
year on year, driven by higher wages and social transfers. For the sixth 
successive year, rural households enjoyed faster real income growth 
than did urban households, though urban households still earn 2.75 
times more than their rural counterparts (Figure 3.9.4). This disparity 
and the reform of the household registration system under way since 
mid-2014 make it easier for migrant workers to apply for and receive 
social services in small and midsized cities, catalyzed a further rise in 
their numbers by 5 million in 2014. According to official ﬁgures, income 
distribution improved, with the Gini coefficient edging further down 
to 0.469 from 0.473 in 2013. Reﬂecting these developments, growth in 
retail sales moderated in 2014 only slightly to 10.9% year on year in real 
terms. The most dynamic section of the market remained online sales, 
which skyrocketed by 48.0%.
Consumer price inﬂation averaged 2.0% in 2014, down from 2.6% 
in 2013 (Figure 3.9.5). This reﬂected mainly slower food price inﬂation 
in line with global trends, as food accounts for one-third of the PRC 
consumer price index. Core inﬂation, which excludes energy and food, 
slowed only marginally to 1.6%, suggesting that lower inﬂation owed 
little to weaker domestic demand. Falling oil prices also pulled inﬂation 
down, though energy accounts for only 6% of the index and ongoing 
reform somewhat raised administered prices for energy, water, and gas.
Average producer price deﬂation remained unchanged at 1.9% for 
2014 as a whole, as global commodity prices continued to fall and excess 
capacity persisted (Box 3.9.1). Producer price deﬂation intensiﬁed in 
late 2014 and early 2015, as falling global commodity prices reduced 
industrial input costs, which are weighted heavily in the producer price 
index. However, since factory gate prices for ﬁnished consumer goods 
have not fallen as much, proﬁt margins in most industries have not been 
strongly affected so far, allaying concerns about industrial distress or 
deﬂation.
The deﬁcit in the official consolidated budget of the central and local 
governments narrowed to 1.8% of GDP in 2014 on a cash basis from 1.9% 
in 2013, undershooting the target of 2.1%. Budgetary revenue grew by 
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3.9.1 Managing excess manufacturing capacity
Manufacturing capacity utilization in the PRC declined to 
60% in 1998, gradually improved to beyond 80% in 2002, and 
started bobbing below 80% in 2008 (box ﬁgure 1). Recent 
performance is mediocre compared with the international 
norms for capacity utilization of 79%–82% derived from 
historical data in Brazil, the euro area, Japan, the Republic 
of Korea, Taipei,China, and the US. In 2013, excess capacity 
was widespread throughout the manufacturing sector, 
affecting 19 of 29 subsectors that together shared 87% of 
sector assets and 84% of proﬁts.
As capacity utilization in the PRC has been erratic over 
the years, historical data do not say much about excess 
capacity today. However, studies based on the experience 
of the US and 17 euro area countries indicate a robust 
relationship between the rate of capacity utilization on the 
one hand and, on the other, growth in industrial value added 
and the producer price index. Based on this relationship, the 
following equation was estimated using data from 2002 to 
2013. The regression results obtained are robust, with an R 
squared of 0.71.
Capacity utilization = 74.5677 + 0.5924  Growth of 
industrial value added + 0.5375  Producer price index
The results indicate that capacity utilization in the fourth 
quarter of 2014 was 77.6% in manufacturing as a whole, 
slightly below international norms but not as serious a 
problem as in some earlier years. However, the impact of 
excess capacity on the economy could still be signiﬁcant 
if it were high in economically important subsectors. 
Excess capacity is indeed high in these sectors, as indicated 
by mapping the average share of assets, revenue from 
principal business, and enterprise proﬁt in 19 manufacturing 
subsectors against their average rates of capacity utilization. 
The six largest subsectors (in red) have the lowest capacity 
utilization rates (box ﬁgure 2).
The government recognizes that dealing with excess 
capacity will make manufacturing signiﬁcantly more 
efficient and enhance the quality of economic growth. 
It started to address the issue in 2013 by boosting domestic 
demand for selected products, tapping global demand by 
accelerating its “go global” strategy, and facilitating mergers 
and acquisitions, while simultaneously strengthening 
environmental and energy-efficiency standards. In parallel, 
the government should prioritize reliance on market forces 
and the elimination of market distortions and inefficiencies 
created by various indirect subsidies such as land supplied 
at low prices, the lax implementation of pollution standards, 
and implicit guarantees for bank loans. Limiting government 
intervention by reforming administrative management, 
land use, and factor markets will undercut incentives for 
unwarranted and inefficient capacity expansion. Emphasis 
should be placed on better utilizing existing capacity by 
relocating industries to other regions or countries, as 
appropriate, and by winding down inefficient enterprises 
through bankruptcy, closure, mergers, and acquisitions. 
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8.6% in line with the budget, slightly outpacing nominal GDP growth 
(Figure 3.9.6). Nontax revenue growth accelerated to 13.5%, mainly on 
higher proﬁts (and perhaps also asset sales) transferred by state-owned 
enterprises. This compensated for the slowdown in tax revenue growth 
to 7.8% caused by new policy initiatives. Further, the government 
allowed automatic stabilizers to work on the revenue side and 
provided discretionary tax beneﬁts for smaller enterprises to support 
growth and employment. In addition, tax reform since July 2013 has 
effectively reduced the tax burden for the service sector and exporters. 
Government expenditures grew by 8.2%, lagging behind budget and 
nominal GDP growth, mainly because local governments underspent 
during the fourth quarter of 2014. The lower budget deﬁcit in 2014 does 
not necessarily imply a tightening of the ﬁscal stance, as official ﬁgures 
exclude some off-budget expenditures such as initiatives ﬁnanced 
through policy banks and local governments’ off-budget activities, 
whose proliferation in recent years has caused large debt and contingent 
liabilities to accumulate. In 2014, the government started a major reform 
initiative to rein in growth in local government debt, but its impact on 
the overall ﬁscal stance is not yet known.
Growth in the broad money supply (M2) continued to slow, by more 
than 2 percentage points to 12.7% on average in 2014, narrowing the 
gap between money supply and nominal GDP growth (Figure 3.9.7). 
This development resulted from the policy of the People’s Bank of 
China (PBOC), the central bank, to mitigate ﬁnancial risks stemming 
from rapid credit growth while still supporting sustainable economic 
growth by ensuring adequate money supply. The PBOC faced the 
challenge of managing the money supply as foreign currency ﬂows 
reversed early in 2014 from net inﬂow to outﬂow. Net foreign assets, 
which were the main driver of money supply growth in 2013, 
increased only slightly in 2014. To ensure adequate liquidity, the PBOC 
introduced measures to increase net domestic bank credit, including 
targeted liquidity injections into the interbank market (which, more 
than in 2013, succeeded in keeping interbank rates stable), raising some 
banks’ quotas for relending to small businesses and rural areas, and 
providing the China Development Bank with funds to support social 
and infrastructure projects. The PBOC also lowered regulatory reserve 
requirements for lending to small and medium-sized enterprises and 
to rural areas, allowed banks to include a broader range of deposits in 
the calculation of the regulatory loan–to–deposit ratio (which remained 
unchanged at 75%), and relaxed mortgage loan requirements. Further, 
it cut the benchmark loan and deposit rates in November 2014 and 
again in February, and lowered the required reserve ratio for all banks 
in February 2015—which, at 19.5%, nevertheless remains high for large 
banks by international norms.
To mitigate ﬁnancial risks, the PBOC and other regulators kept 
credit growth outside the banking sector on a declining trend since 
mid-2013 through stricter regulatory requirements and tighter controls 
on local government ﬁnancing vehicles. Other constraints on shadow 
banking are reduced demand for credit from property developers and 
investors’ heightened awareness of risk. As a result, net issuance of trust 
loans, entrusted loans, and bankers’ acceptances declined by 43.8% in 
3.9.6  Fiscal indicators and nominal GDP
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2014 (Figure 3.9.8), slowing the growth of their stock substantially to 
an estimated 15% in 2014, which is similar to the growth rate of bank 
credit. The drop in loans from shadow banks was partly compensated 
by net corporate bond issuance, which increased substantially to equal 
19.7% of new bank loans, and by net equity ﬁnancing, which reached 
4.3% of new bank loans. This development has strengthened the roles of 
banks and bond markets, made credit allocation more transparent, and 
pointed to a growing role for equity in company ﬁnance.
The renminbi–US dollar exchange rate became more volatile during 
2014 following the PBOC’s intervention in the market in February, 
which was designed to discourage speculative capital inﬂows, and the 
widening in March of the exchange rate band for the renminbi from 
±1% to ±2%. On average, the renminbi was 0.7% stronger against the 
US dollar in 2014 than in 2013, though it was 0.4% weaker at year end 
(Figure 3.9.9). The nominal effective exchange rate (against a trade-
weighted basket of currencies) and the real effective exchange rate 
(taking inﬂation into account) both showed renminbi appreciation 
by 2.5% on average in 2014. The rate of appreciation has intensiﬁed 
since the end of 2014, but the impact on the PRC’s external trade 
competitiveness has been manageable so far, particularly as the country 
has beneﬁtted from improved terms of trade for a third consecutive year. 
Export growth remained robust at 6.8% by volume, growing more 
quickly than global trade, while import growth halved to 4.8% because 
demand from construction declined and regulators cracked down on 
the misuse of metals as loan collateral. The combined effect of price 
and volume changes was a record trade surplus equal to 4.6% of GDP 
(Figure 3.9.10). Despite widening deﬁcits in services and transfers, the 
current account surplus expanded to 2.1% of GDP. The capital account 
balance turned from a large surplus in 2013 into a deﬁcit in 2014 as 
higher inﬂows were exceeded by even more rapidly rising outﬂows. 
This outcome reﬂected the PBOC’s successful efforts in early 2014 
to discourage one-sided appreciation expectations, as well as higher 
thresholds for outbound investments that need government approval 
and new authorization for companies to transfer funds from domestic 
foreign currency loans to overseas subsidiaries. Reﬂecting movements 
in the capital and current accounts, the PRC balance of payments was 
in equilibrium in 2014, leaving official reserves almost unchanged 
from 2013.
Economic prospects 
Further moderate deceleration is forecast for GDP growth, to 7.2% in 
2015 in line with the government target of about 7.0%, and 7.0% in 2016, 
before the rate stabilizes or rises again (Figure 3.9.11). The forecast 
reﬂects recent trends and recognizes that the government’s emphasis 
on high-quality growth and its ongoing gradual structural reform will 
likely moderate growth in the next 2 years. Growth in 2015 will beneﬁt 
from lower commodity prices, which will bolster domestic consumption 
and invigorate global demand for PRC exports. Commodity price 
recovery in 2016 is, however, forecast to have the opposite effect and 
push GDP growth lower.
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Investment will remain the main drag on growth, with real estate 
its weakest component. Swift government action has helped stabilize 
the market. Fundamental demand for housing is still strong, reinforced 
by low household debt and income growth that outpaces real estate 
price increases. A cyclical recovery in housing sales can therefore be 
expected in 2015. However, it will be tempered by historically high 
stocks of unsold existing ﬂ oor space. Investment in manufacturing and 
infrastructure will continue to perform better than real estate, but 
its growth will decelerate too. The government has announced plans 
to reﬁ ne and broaden pilot free trade zones in Shanghai and other 
cities and start rolling out reform nationwide. However, industrial 
excess capacity persists, and state-owned enterprises remain largely 
unreformed and burdened by debt, with reform plans still rather vague 
although a leading group on SOE reform has recently been established. 
The government foresees sizeable infrastructure investment, some with 
private participation, but not a large stimulus. Infrastructure investment 
growth will moderate, as local governments are ﬁ nancially constrained 
and the private sector is unlikely to ﬁ ll the gap quickly despite 
eff orts to improve the climate for private investment through further 
deregulation, service sector reform, and eff orts to make the business 
environment more enabling for public–private partnership.
Consumption will remain relatively robust but not immune to 
slowdown in the rest of the economy. Moderating investment growth will 
slow household income growth, particularly in the poorer parts of the 
PRC where investment is still the main driver of growth. Higher social 
spending and improved income equality are unlikely to fully compensate 
for slower wage growth. Household income is still forecast to continue to 
grow more quickly than nominal GDP, but less so than previously.
The current account surplus is forecast to widen in 2015, only to 
narrow again in 2016, mainly reﬂ ecting movement in commodity prices, 
which are forecast to languish in 2015 well below 2014 levels but rise 
again in 2016. Export growth will likely beneﬁ t from expanding global 
growth and trade even if the renminbi further appreciates against 
most of the PRC’s trade partners. The renminbi is pegged to a basket of 
currencies that is undisclosed, but econometric analysis suggests that 
the US dollar has a weight of above 90%. Since late 2014, the renminbi 
has appreciated against the currencies of most of its trade partners in 
line with a strongly appreciating US dollar. This trend could continue in 
2015 in the absence of policy change. However, with both the exchange 
rate and the balance of payments estimated to be at or near equilibrium, 
the opportunity exists to make the exchange rate more ﬂ exible or to 
change the composition of the exchange rate basket to reduce the weight 
of the US dollar.
Inﬂ ation is forecast to remain subdued at 1.8% on average in 
2015, much below the government ceiling of 3.0%, and 2.3% in 2016. 
Moderating GDP and credit growth is expected to limit price pressures 
(Figure 3.9.12). Falling global commodity prices will help suppress 
inﬂ ation in 2015, more than compensating for the inﬂ ationary eff ect of 
price reform, which saw price controls on 24 commodities and services 
removed in early 2015 and will accelerate. Higher inﬂ ation in 2016 is 
likely as commodity prices recover.
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Continued efforts to rein in local governments’ off-budget spending 
will likely translate into a less expansionary ﬁscal stance in 2015 
and 2016. However, bringing part of off-budget spending on-budget 
will push up the official consolidated budget deﬁcits (which exclude 
off-budget spending), as revenues are unlikely to increase strongly over 
the forecast period. In line with this, the government plans a higher 
consolidated deﬁcit of about 2.7% of GDP in 2015. Deﬁcits could be 
even larger if reform accelerates. However, as ﬁscal transparency and 
discipline improve, ﬁscal policy will become more effective, likely 
mitigating the impact of ﬁscal tightening on growth.
As in the previous 2 years, monetary policy will strike a balance 
between mitigating risks in the ﬁnancial and property sectors that 
stem from past rapid credit expansion, on the one hand, and supporting 
sustainable economic growth on the other. The money supply is 
expected to grow over the forecast period at a rate that edges closer to 
the nominal GDP growth rate. The PBOC is expected to take further 
incremental steps to implement monetary policy using the interest rate 
as an intermediate target and facilitating cross-border capital ﬂows.
The principal external downside risk to the forecast stems from 
commodity prices rebounding higher than expected—which may, 
however, be balanced by unexpectedly strong recovery in the major 
industrial economies. The principal domestic risk is uncertainty about 
how industrial restructuring will affect employment and wage growth, 
potentially undermining conﬁdence and consumption. This risk is 
mitigated by the government’s close attention to the labor market and 
income growth. Another domestic risk arises from the government’s 
implementation of its ambitious ﬁscal reform agenda, which may force 
local governments to cut expenditure excessively as their access to 
ﬁnance is curtailed.
Policy challenge—reforming local government 
ﬁnance
With the announcement from the State Council in June 2014 that 
the ﬁscal system would be reformed by 2016, the effort to put local 
government ﬁnance on a sounder footing has taken center stage. In the 
past, local governments were responsible for most expenditures but 
received only half of budget revenues and were officially restricted 
to borrowing only small amounts through the central government. 
As transfers from the central government did not ﬁll the gap, most local 
governments established off-budget ﬁnancing vehicles to cover their 
expenditures. This has undermined ﬁscal discipline and transparency. 
The National Audit Office reports that local government debt, including 
guarantees and contingent liabilities, increased from around 18% of GDP 
in 2008 to above 30% in 2013, suggesting sizeable off-budget spending.
Ongoing reform is guided by a principle the authorities call “opening 
the front door and closing the back door,” or allowing local governments 
to borrow directly to ﬁnance deﬁcits and preventing their borrowing 
off-budget, while bringing legitimate off-budget ﬁscal activities 
on-budget. The key challenge is to ensure neutral ﬁscal impact during 
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the transition, containing both the risk of a ﬁscal crunch caused by 
closing the back door without opening the front, and that of a debt surge 
if both doors are open simultaneously. Measures taken since May 2014 
include allowing selected local governments to issue bonds directly, 
amending the budget law with effect from 1 January 2015, and adopting 
regulatory guidelines on debt management. Local governments were 
required to report their off-budget liabilities to the central government 
by January 2015, to determine which outlays to bring on-budget. Yet 
to be determined are the proﬁle and servicing of debt that no longer 
beneﬁts from an implicit government guarantee, and the possible impact 
of defaults.
Local governments’ access to ﬁnance will be enhanced by 
increasing the number of governments allowed to participate in the 
local government bond pilot, raising the issuance ceiling, reforming the 
pricing mechanism to make it more market-driven, and allowing special 
project bonds in addition to general revenue bonds. However, local 
government bonds in circulation in 2014 amounted to less than 2% of 
GDP, and new issuance came to only 0.6%, including provincial bonds 
issued through the central government. Issuing bonds to service the 
substantial local government debt that matures over the forecast period 
may thus stretch the absorptive capacity of the bond market unless 
policy banks join the ranks of investors. The government also envisages 
opening new avenues for infrastructure ﬁnancing by improving the 
environment for public–private partnership, but these initiatives need 
time to gain traction. Proceeds from selling land-use rights (another 
source of local government ﬁnancing) have been declining recently. One 
way to compensate for the shortfall to some extent, if allowed, would be 
to sell local governments’ sizeable shares in state-owned enterprises.
In sum, local governments will continue to depend in the foreseeable 
future largely on transfers from the central government. Plans to reform 
the transfer system include raising to 60% the share of general transfers 
in all transfers. The total amount transferred has to be large enough to 
keep local governments from accumulating additional debt or slashing 
legitimate expenditures.
The design of the government’s ﬁscal reform initiative and the 
ﬁrst steps toward its implementation are promising. The government 
can be expected to follow through with the reform of local government 
ﬁnancing and to manage associated risks by keeping steps incremental, 
instituting transition arrangements, and ﬁne-tuning the process regularly. 
Over time, ongoing reform will be complemented by a comprehensive 
realignment of central and local government revenue and expenditure 
responsibilities, and by optimizing taxation through, for instance, better 
use of direct taxes such as on personal income and property tax.
This chapter was written by Benno Ferrarini and Cindy Castillejos-Petalcorin of the 
Economic Research and Regional Cooperation Department, ADB, Manila.
Hong Kong, China
Global economic and financial developments continue to weigh on the economy. GDP growth 
slowed in 2014, but current account and fiscal positions stayed healthy, and inflation remained 
moderate. Strengthening domestic demand is expected to boost growth in the next 2 years without 
igniting inflation or preventing continued improvement in the current account. A key challenge over 
the next 2 years is to implement the new strategy to provide affordable housing.
Economic performance 
The economy grew by 2.3% in 2014, down from 2.9% in 2013. Sluggish 
economic performance in Europe and moderating growth in the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) dampened growth in the ﬁrst half 
of the year, but a US economy performing better than expected and 
higher demand in Asia for exports lifted growth in the second half. 
Domestic demand was nevertheless the main engine of growth in 2014. 
Private consumption contributed 1.8 percentage points to growth, 
buttressed by rising real incomes, moderating underlying inﬂation, and 
unemployment at a 17-year low of 3.2% (Figure 3.10.1). These factors 
outweighed the drag on retail sales from a shift from more expensive 
items to cheaper consumer goods in the spending of PRC tourists, who 
are 78% of all arrivals. The contribution of government consumption 
remained unchanged at 0.3 percentage points despite cutbacks to one-off 
relief measures from the previous year. Investment grew by 2.8%, 
mainly for inventory accumulation, and contributed 0.7 percentage 
points to growth. A recent business tendency survey found cautious 
business sentiment holding down machinery and equipment acquisition. 
Building and construction rebounded to 6.5%, however, on large public 
infrastructure works and private housing projects. 
Net exports declined for the sixth consecutive year, subtracting 0.4 
percentage points from GDP growth. Export growth moderated because 
of weak external demand. Another factor could have been 4.0% nominal 
effective appreciation of the local dollar (Figure 3.10.2). Import growth 
also slowed in tandem with moderating GDP growth but outpaced that 
of exports.
Consumer price inﬂation was up marginally at 4.4% (Figure 3.10.3). 
Subdued global inﬂation and softer rental growth kept inﬂation at 
bay, though residential property prices rose by 13.5%, reﬂecting the 
ongoing low interest rate environment and a tight demand–supply 
balance. Excluding the one-off relief measures implemented in 2014, 
including payment of 1 month’s rent for public housing tenants and rates 
concession for 2 quarters, the adjusted overall inﬂation rate was 3.5%. 
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The current account surplus is estimated to have narrowed to 
0.2% of GDP owing to weak external demand, the appreciation of the 
local dollar, and slowing growth in net services receipts. Growth in 
transportation services and offshore trade was offset by lower tourism 
receipts and a slowdown in ﬁnancial and other business service receipts 
in a sluggish trading environment. The overall balance of payments is 
expected to record a surplus largely on sustained net portfolio inﬂows. 
Gross official reserves rose to nearly $329 billion, or cover for 7.2 months 
of imports. 
On the policy front, the budget is forecasted to record a surplus 
equivalent to 2.8% of GDP in FY2014 (ending 31 March 2015), with ﬁscal 
reserves reaching HK$819.6 billion (Figure 3.10.4). Revenue is forecasted 
to have been 9.4% higher than the original estimate for FY2014, 
mainly because of larger receipts from stamp duties and proﬁts taxes. 
Expenditure is forecasted to be lower at 17.7% of GDP and within the 
planned target of 20.0% of GDP.
As the local dollar is pegged to the US dollar, accommodative 
monetary policy in the US kept local interest rates low. Domestic 
credit rose by 12.1% as loans for manufacturing, utilities, and retail 
and wholesale trade rose. Growth in the broad money supply (M2) 
decelerated to 9.5% from 12.4% in 2013. The HKMA, the local monetary 
authority, introduced a requirement in 2014 that banks hold sufficient 
stable funds to support their lending business. Several rounds of 
macroprudential and tax measures introduced since October 2009 have 
successfully dampened mortgage loan growth and speculation in the 
property market, curtailing short-term resale (Figure 3.10.5). 
Shifting market sentiment caused the Hang Seng Index, the main 
index of the stock exchange, to swing from a low in March 2014 to 
a 6-year high in early September and close the year higher by 1.3% 
(Figure 3.10.6). Hong Kong, China remains a top-ranked fund-raising 
hub, second only to New York, with more than HK$232 billion raised in 
initial public offerings in 2014, a 38% rise on 2013. A $1 billion Islamic 
government bond was successfully issued in September.
The city’s role as the premier center for offshore renminbi trading 
was bolstered as the monetary authority lifted the daily conversion limit 
on renminbi for residents of Hong Kong, and as a link with the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange commenced operation, facilitating trade on the two 
exchanges by investors located in either city. The local monetary 
authority and the central bank of the PRC renewed the currency swap 
agreement for another 3 years. 
Economic prospects
GDP growth is forecast to improve slightly to 2.8% in 2015 and 2.9% 
in 2016, still below its 5-year average of 3.7% (Figure 3.10.7). Forecasts 
are premised on a strengthening US economy, sustained resilience in 
Asian economies, and slowing but healthy growth in the PRC. Domestic 
demand will be the engine of growth, spurred by strengthening private 
consumption underpinned by stable real income and full employment. 
Investment growth will ﬁnd support in improving business sentiment 
(Figure 3.10.8) and several ongoing big-ticket infrastructure projects, 
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including the expansion of the mass transit railway, public housing, and 
a bridge across the vast Pearl River estuary. Growth in tourism will 
compensate for any weakness in trade.
Inﬂation is forecast to decelerate to 3.3% in 2015 and then rebound 
slightly to 3.4% in 2016. Lower prices for imported food and oil and the 
knock-on effects of the expected drop in housing prices will outweigh 
inﬂationary pressure from the hike in the statutory minimum wage in 
January 2015. A further drop in housing prices, lower rents, and only a 
slight uptick in world oil and commodity prices will keep the inﬂation 
rate stable in 2016.
The budget for FY2015 is expected to post a small surplus of 
HK$36.8 billion. Notably, the budget sets out proposals to diversify 
industries, augment competitiveness, and maintain healthy public 
ﬁnances. Expenditure is not expected to exceed revenue or the target of 
20% of GDP. 
The outlook for external trade in 2015 will be modest at best. Weak 
external demand, particularly in the PRC, will continue to impinge on 
export growth. However, improved demand from the US and regional 
and bilateral trade agreements should support marginal expansion 
in exports. Imports are forecast to grow at a similarly modest rate, 
constrained by tepid demand for capital goods. The resulting trade 
deﬁcit will be outweighed by a healthy surplus in the services account 
as professional services and tourism grow, widening the current account 
surplus to 2.6% of GDP in 2015 and 2.5% in 2016.
The main risks to growth arise from slower recovery in the major 
industrial economies, a marked slowdown in the PRC economy, and 
continued appreciation of the US dollar that could undermine export 
competitiveness. In addition, interest rate hikes in the US could trigger 
capital outﬂows, higher local interest rates, and sharp corrections in 
the residential property market. However, the US Federal Reserve is 
expected to provide timely forward guidance, which will help build 
any future rate increase into market expectations, softening their 
impact. The recurrence of a sharp property downturn is unlikely 
because speculative buying has subsided. The remaining domestic risk 
is the possibility of civil disorder as seen in 2014, which could disrupt 
economic activity.
Policy challenge—providing adequate and 
affordable housing 
The problem of affordable housing—a perennial issue in Hong Kong, 
China—became acute as demand for housing rose steadily over the 
past few years, fueled by abundant liquidity, low interest rates, and 
rising population. As supply response takes time, the resulting shortage 
has pushed prices up for residential properties. The home purchase 
affordability ratio rose to 47% in the fourth quarter of 2014, an increase 
of 19 percentage points over 5 years (Figure 3.10.9). Higher interest rates 
could drive it even higher.
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In a major policy shift toward a supply-led strategy of making 
more housing available, the government promulgated in December 
2014 its Long Term Housing Strategy, which aims to provide over the 
next decade 480,000 new housing units, with a public–private split of 
60:40. To this end, the government is optimizing the use of existing 
urban areas and nearby land through land-use reviews and boosting 
development intensity as appropriate. The medium-to-long term 
will see new development areas, new town extensions, and perhaps 
reclamation outside Victoria Harbor and the use of underground 
spaces. Projections of housing demand will be reviewed annually and 
the supply adjusted as needed. To provide ﬁnancial resources, a new 
Housing Reserve has been established with HK$27.5 billion in seed 
money from investment returns generated in 2014. 
The economy’s demographic and socioeconomic proﬁle poses 
challenges for the strategy. Its successful implementation will require 
ample ﬁnancing, private sector support, public cooperation, and the 
timely delivery of housing units. The strategy is not without ﬁscal 
risks. Its ﬁnancing is highly contingent on the ﬁscal position of the 
government, and its cost is difficult to estimate. The rising trend in 
construction costs may continue in the coming years, increasingly 
burdening government ﬁnances. In addition, projections of softer real 
estate prices in the next 2 years may dampen private participation 
in construction, leaving more for the government to build. Another 
challenge for the government is to generate public support for change. 
Ultimately, the success of the strategy hinges on closely coordinating 
its short- and long-term aspects and transferring an increasing share of 
construction to the private sector.
3.10.9  Housing affordability and growth of 
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Republic of Korea
Growth picked up only marginally in 2014, as recovery in plant and equipment investment was 
the sole bright spot in subdued domestic and external demand. Inflation remained stable and 
low, and the current account surplus expanded. Improved external conditions, supported by 
accommodative fiscal and monetary policy, should lift growth moderately this year and in 2016. 
Coping with slowing growth and structural change in the PRC is a key policy challenge.
Economic performance
Economic expansion accelerated slightly from 3.0% in 2013 to an 
estimated 3.3% in 2014. Unexpected weakness in the world economy 
tamped down the anticipated export-led rebound. The contribution 
of net exports to GDP growth fell by two-thirds, from 1.5 percentage 
points in 2013 to 0.5. Domestic demand accounted for the bulk of GDP 
growth in 2014. Investment, mainly in plant and equipment, contributed 
1.5 percentage points, a marked turnaround from 2013, when its 
contribution was nil (Figure 3.11.1). Private consumption added another 
0.9 percentage points, and government consumption’s contribution 
held steady at 0.4 percentage points. Quarter on quarter, growth 
momentum failed to gain traction during 2014, as the pace of expansion 
slackened from 0.9% in the ﬁrst quarter to 0.4% in the fourth, mainly 
reﬂecting subdued domestic demand following the Sewol ferry disaster 
(Figure 3.11.2). Mirroring the continued general weakness of domestic 
demand and abetted by falling global oil prices, consumer price inﬂation 
remained low at 1.3% in 2014, below the central bank target band of 
2.5% ±1.0% percentage point. Core inﬂation, which strips out food and 
energy, was at 2.0%. 
Plant and equipment investment grew by 5.9% after shrinking 
slightly in 2013 (Figure 3.11.3). Construction investment decelerated 
sharply to 1.1% in 2014 from 6.7% in 2013, with both residential 
construction and civic works in the doldrums. Private consumption 
growth slowed further to 1.7% in 2014, owing to the Sewol ferry 
disaster, a reduction in a mobile phone subsidy that hurt sales, 
and sluggish wage growth despite the strong rise in employment 
(Figure 3.11.4). 
Merchandise exports in real local currency terms rose by a mere 
2.2% in 2014 (0.5% in nominal US dollars), halving from 4.5% in 2013 
as export growth slowed and turned negative in the second half of 
the year (Figure 3.11.5). The gathering recovery in the US, the sole 
bright spot in a generally bleak export environment, could not offset 
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the sluggishness of other main export markets, including the PRC and 
the European Union. In line with stuttering domestic demand and lower 
oil prices, merchandise imports grew by even less than merchandise 
exports, helping to push the current account surplus to a record equal 
to 6.3% of GDP—this despite the services account recording a deﬁcit, 
partly because intellectual property rights payments increased. The won 
appreciated during the ﬁrst half of the year but closed the year lower 
in nominal terms at W1,099 per US dollar. In real effective terms, 
it appreciated by 1.8% during the year.
With slow growth a bigger concern than inﬂation, the central 
bank cut its benchmark policy interest rate from 2.50% to 2.25% in 
August, 2.00% in October and a 4-year low of 1.75% in March 2015. 
Fiscal policy was also expansionary in 2014. The ﬁscal deﬁcit rose to 
1.8% of GDP from 1.5% in 2013, and the ratio of public debt to GDP 
nudged up to 35.1%. A $40 billion stimulus was unveiled in July, and the 
government signaled its intention to actively support growth through 
ﬁscal measures. Reﬂecting the low budget deﬁcit and public debt in the 
Republic of Korea, Moody’s upgraded its sovereign credit rating in 2014, 
as did Standard and Poor’s. 
Economic prospects
External and internal factors point to only modest recovery in 2015 that 
is unlikely to dispel concerns about the economy’s loss of momentum 
since the global ﬁnancial crisis. GDP growth is likely to rise a bit to 
3.5% in 2015 as global output and trade begin to stir, and on improved 
domestic demand, which is likely to rebound, buoyed by the improved 
terms of trade, much lower global oil prices, as the Republic of Korea 
imports virtually all of its energy, and a modest recovery in the housing 
market (Figure 3.11.6). GDP growth is expected to rise further to 3.7% 
in 2016, supported by a strengthening global economy. Subdued inﬂation 
and a strong ﬁscal position will allow both monetary and ﬁscal policy to 
support growth.
Merchandise export growth in real local currency terms will 
accelerate to over 3.0% in 2015, reﬂecting trends in global output and 
trade. Continuing weakness in the European and Japanese export 
markets poses a challenge for high-tech manufactures. The slowdown 
in the PRC and general sluggishness in Southeast Asia and other main 
emerging markets further constrain the scope for export growth. 
Exports of petroleum products, chemicals, steel, mobile phones, and 
automobiles will be squeezed by intensiﬁed competition, especially from 
the PRC and Japan, but exports of electronics parts and semiconductors 
could rise as the global glut eases. Despite tepid export growth, the 
current account surplus is projected to surge to 7.0% of GDP in 2015, 
owing to the sharp fall in global oil prices and despite a deﬁcit in 
services, which will widen as construction slumps along with oil in the 
Middle East. The current account surplus will shrink to 6.3% in 2016 
as import volumes expand in line with anticipated stronger growth and 
domestic demand.
Construction and investment in plant and equipment are projected 
to remain robust this year and next. Investment will be buoyed by 
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3.11.5  Growth in merchandise exports
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ongoing deregulation initiatives, a W30 trillion government program for 
coﬁ nancing investment in infrastructure and new growth industries, 
robust residential construction as the housing market recovers, and 
large public works projects, including a major rail line on the east coast 
and an extension for the Seoul subway. Investment growth will be 
tempered, however, by weak corporate operating proﬁ t and low capacity 
utilization (Figure 3.11.7).
Private consumption is expected to accelerate a little in 2015 as 
consumer conﬁ dence improves (Figure 3.11.8). The steep fall in global oil 
prices will boost household purchasing power, as fuel costs account for 
about 10% of their expenditure, and improvement in the terms of trade 
will stretch incomes. Private consumption will rise with the expanded 
social welfare budget, continuing tax reform, and strong employment 
growth, especially among older workers (Figure 3.11.9). Factors that 
temper consumption growth and improved consumer conﬁ dence are 
rising payments to service household debt, which now exceed 20% of 
household disposable income, and the reduction of the mobile phone 
subsidy in October 2014, which adversely aff ected sales of this major 
expenditure item.
Consumer price inﬂ ation is forecast to remain subdued at 1.3% in 
2015, unchanged from 2014 and well below the central bank target. 
The steep decline in oil prices will outweigh increased domestic demand 
to ﬁ rmly cap inﬂ ationary pressures. Core inﬂ ation will likely be slightly 
higher. Although inﬂ ation has been below 1.0% year on year since 
December 2014 (for the ﬁ rst time in 15 years), the risk of deﬂ ation seems 
remote, as domestic demand is forecast to grow and output is expected 
to rise toward full capacity. Inﬂ ation is likely to accelerate to 2.1% in 
2016, in tandem with rising commodity prices.
Fiscal policy is likely to be mildly expansionary in 2015, geared 
toward supporting growth in the short term, with both the deﬁ cit and 
the ﬁ scal impulse expanding (Table 3.11.1). However, the expansionary 
stance will likely be tempered by the need to reduce public debt and 
pension beneﬁ ts, raise pension contribution rates, and improve the 
management of public enterprises. These initiatives reﬂ ect concerns 
about medium-term ﬁ scal sustainability that arise from revenue 
collection being below target since 2012. With subdued inﬂ ation, 
monetary policy will, like ﬁ scal policy, remain largely neutral in 2015 
but tilted toward growth. However, the scope for monetary expansion 
will be squeezed by deepening household debt and concern that interest 
rate cuts could encourage excessive household borrowing. 
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3.11.1  Projected ﬁ scal policy stance
Indicators 2011 2012 2013 2014e 2015f
Fiscal balance, % GDP –1.10 –1.40 –1.50 –1.80 –2.20
Public debt, % of GDP 31.60 32.20 34.30 35.10 36.80
Fiscal impulse index –0.03 –0.10 –0.06 0.04 0.39
e = estimate, f = forecast, GDP = gross domestic product.
Note: The ﬁ scal impulse index measures the variation in ﬁ scal stance relative to the previous year.
Source: Korea Development Institute.
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The balance of risks to the forecast remains slightly biased to the 
upside in 2015. Domestic risks—such as high household debt on the 
downside and moderately recovering housing prices on the upside—are 
overshadowed by external factors. The depth and duration of the oil 
price decline, and its impact on the economy, are uncertain, as is its 
impact on exports to oil producers. However, given the huge oil import 
bill the Republic of Korea typically pays, the effect will be beneﬁcial on 
balance and may boost GDP growth. The widely expected tightening by 
the US Federal Reserve may induce ﬁnancial volatility in the Republic 
of Korea in light of its highly open capital account. However, the limited 
volatility experienced during the taper tantrum of May–June 2013, and 
the economy’s robust fundamentals, bode well for its ability to weather 
even large and unexpected global monetary shocks (Figure 3.11.10). 
A more difficult challenge in the short and medium term is the 
slowdown in the PRC, its largest export market.
Policy challenge—coping with slower growth 
and structural change in the PRC 
The expected slowdown in the PRC over the next 2 years could 
have adverse implications for exports and growth in the Republic 
of Korea. The PRC has been its single biggest export market since 
2003, when the giant neighbor replaced the US as its main engine of 
growth (Figure 3.11.11). The slowdown in the PRC is already being felt. 
Growth in exports to the PRC has slowed in tandem with deceleration 
in PRC growth, especially since the second quarter of 2013, and outright 
contraction marked the two middle quarters of 2014 (Figure 3.11.12). 
While exports to the PRC mildly recovered toward the end of 2014, it is 
unlikely that they will return to the high growth seen before the global 
ﬁnancial crisis. Deceleration in the PRC will weigh on export prospects 
for some time to come.
Ongoing structural changes in the PRC will also affect the 
Republic of Korea. As the PRC moves toward a growth strategy that 
emphasizes consumption, a larger share of its imports will be consumer 
goods rather than investment-oriented capital goods. Currently, the 
bulk of Republic of Korea exports to the PRC are capital goods such as 
machinery and transport equipment, including vehicles (Figure 3.11.13). 
Exports of manufactured consumer goods account for only a quarter of 
the total. 
The Republic of Korea clearly needs to further diversify its export 
markets, in particular toward fast-growing emerging economies. 
A summit of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) with 
the Republic of Korea in December 2014 produced calls to boost trade 
between the two sides to $200 billion by 2020, double the current 
amount. While ASEAN is already the second biggest export market of 
the Republic of Korea—accepting almost 15% of its exports, a twofold 
increase since 2009—ASEAN’s rapid growth, averaging 5.6% during 
2010–2014, suggests scope for further expansion. Ongoing progressive 
tariff reductions under a free trade area combining ASEAN and the 
Republic of Korea can provide impetus for such expansion. 
3.11.2  Selected economic indicators (%)
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Other policy initiatives could be for the Government of the 
Republic of Korea to support exports to relatively underexplored 
markets, such as in Africa and Latin America, through export credit 
issued by its export–import bank, or export insurance from K-sure, its 
trade Insurance corporation. Such government support could mitigate 
risks for ﬁrms that venture into markets that are unfamiliar but 
promising. 
The structural shift in the PRC from investment toward 
consumption presents opportunities. Besides diversifying its markets, 
the Republic of Korea can mobilize KOTRA, its trade promotion 
agency, and KITA, an international trade association that helps small 
and medium-sized enterprises enter foreign markets, to support 
the expansion of exports of consumer goods to the PRC market. 
The accelerated ratiﬁcation of a free trade agreement with the PRC, on 
which negotiations were concluded last year, can be another important 
vehicle for boosting consumer exports. 
The rise of the middle class in the PRC and its growing purchasing 
power present exciting opportunities for exports of services as well—
further strengthening the case for upgrading the service sector in the 
Republic of Korea, which lags behind its dynamic manufacturing sector, 
particularly in terms of regulatory reform. The Republic of Korea is 
already the top destination for PRC tourists, welcoming 6.1 million 
visitors in 2014, and the PRC is a huge market for K-pop entertainment. 
Building on these successes—and remedying traditional weakness in 
modern service industries with high value added such as ﬁnance—
should allow the Republic of Korea to open up more and better service 
export opportunities in the PRC and elsewhere. 
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3.11.13  Composition of exports to the 
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Mongolia
Economic growth decelerated in 2014 reflecting a drop in foreign direct investment. Inflation 
required monetary tightening, but the current account deficit moderated. Fiscal deficits remained 
high, and international reserves continued to shrink. Growth is forecast sharply lower in 2015 
and 2016, with lower inflation but current account deficits persisting or widening. A major policy 
challenge is to implement prudent macroeconomic management that retains sufficient scope for 
productive investment and social protection. 
Economic performance
Despite a substantial increase in mining output, GDP growth slowed 
to 7.8% in 2014 from 11.6% in 2013. Foreign direct investment (FDI) 
continued to fall, and the sizeable monetary stimulus that kept growth 
high in the previous year became increasingly difficult to maintain in 
light of pressures from inﬂation and the balance of payments (BOP).
As value added in mining increased by 24.2%, reﬂecting the 
ﬁrst full year of production at the vast Oyu Tolgoi copper and gold 
mine, industrial production expanded by 16.1% and contributed 4.8 
percentage points to GDP growth (Figure 3.12.1). This came despite 
a 16.3% drop in coal production. Agriculture remained a driver of 
growth, rising by 14.4% with favorable weather. Growth in services 
slowed to 4.8%, however, as plunging mine investment took its toll. 
Agriculture and services each contributed 1.5 percentage points to GDP 
growth, while the contribution from industry other than mining was 
negligible.
FDI dropped by 80.7% following the completion of the ﬁrst phase 
of Oyu Tolgoi and reﬂecting uncertainty over the economic viability 
of projects in light of lower commodity prices, as well as over the 
broader investment climate. Gross capital formation contracted by 
33.5%, dragging GDP growth down by 18.4 percentage points. Domestic 
consumption increased by 8.6% and contributed 6.0 percentage points 
to GDP growth, with private consumption accounting for nearly all 
of the increase. As exports grew by 51.4% in real terms and imports 
by only 4.9%, the trade deﬁcit shrank by 82.7% and the contribution 
of net exports to GDP growth expanded to 20.3 percentage points. 
Oyu Tolgoi’s contribution to GDP growth thus continued to shift from 
investment to net exports (Figure 3.12.2).
The current account deﬁcit narrowed signiﬁcantly to 8.2% of 
GDP from 25.4% in 2013 as the trade deﬁcit crossed into surplus. 
Merchandise exports grew by 35.3% as higher exports of copper 
concentrates more than compensated for a decline in other exports. 
Merchandise imports fell by 14.4%, largely reﬂecting a sharp drop in 
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investment-related material and equipment, as well as lower fuel prices. 
The services deﬁcit stabilized at $1.3 billion, equal to 11.2% of GDP. 
Declining capital inﬂows generated a BOP deﬁcit equal to 3.9% of GDP 
despite nearly $700 million in government-guaranteed borrowing by 
the Development Bank of Mongolia (Figure 3.12.3).
Gross international reserves fell to $1.6 billion—cover for 2.9 months 
of imports—from $4.1 billion in 2012, and are increasingly ﬁnanced 
by short-term foreign liabilities, including a 3-year currency swap 
arrangement with the central bank of the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) (Figure 3.12.4). Raising the currency swap ceiling in August 2014 
to CNY15 billion (equal to 20% of GDP) provided a liquidity buffer, but 
withdrawals will eventually need to be repaid or renewed. Public and 
publicly guaranteed external debt including the foreign liabilities of the 
Bank of Mongolia, the central bank, stood at 57.3% of GDP at year-end, 
having more than doubled in 4 years and now approaching the $1.5 
billion raised through the US dollar-denominated sovereign Chinggis 
bond. As capital inﬂows ebbed, the Mongolian togrog depreciated by 
13.8% against the US dollar, having already depreciated by 19.2% in 
2013. Meanwhile, ruble depreciation caused the togrog to appreciate in 
nominal effective terms by 2.3%, and by 11.0% in real terms because of 
comparatively high inﬂation in Mongolia.
The government continued its highly procyclical ﬁscal policy in 
2014, largely by channeling substantial expenditures off-budget through 
the Development Bank of Mongolia and ﬁnancing them with the 
proceeds of the Chinggis bond and government-guaranteed external 
borrowing. The consolidated ﬁscal deﬁcit, which includes off-budget 
spending, rose to 11.5% of GDP from 9.8% in 2013. Excluding off-budget 
spending, the cash deﬁcit expanded to 4.1% of GDP from 0.9% in 2013, 
and the structural deﬁcit reached 3.7%, breaching the 2% ceiling under 
the Fiscal Stability Law (FSL) (Figure 3.12.5). Budgetary expenditure 
remained constant at 32.2% of GDP. However, revenue fell to 28.1% of 
GDP from 31.3% in 2013 as receipts increased by only 2.6%, falling short 
of the highly optimistic budget partly because of falling commodity 
prices. On the positive side, the Glass Account Law will improve the 
transparency of procurement, budgets, and ﬁnances of government 
agencies and legal entities with state involvement.
The ratio of public debt to GDP rose in net present value terms to 
54.7% in 2014 (breaching the 40% ceiling of the FSL) and to 77.4% in 
nominal terms including the central bank’s foreign liabilities. Interest 
payments reached 7.1% of government expenditures in 2014 (Figure 3.12.6). 
Debt sustainability is further affected by the rising share of commercial 
borrowing since 2012 and the uncertain economic returns of some public 
investment projects. 
Expansionary monetary and ﬁscal policies and currency 
depreciation drove consumer price inﬂation to a peak in July 2014 of 
14.9% year on year. Facing inﬂationary and BOP pressures, the central 
bank raised the policy rate from 10.5% to 12.0% in July 2014 and 13.0% 
in January 2015. Despite starting corporate lending worth 1.6% of GDP, 
the central bank’s total quasi-ﬁscal loans—mainly for housing and 
construction at subsidized rates—were reduced to 18.7% of GDP from 
23.7% in 2013. Growth in domestic lending slowed markedly to 16.1%, 
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holding broad money growth to 12.5%. Inﬂation moderated to 11.0% in 
December, having averaged 12.8% for the year (Figure 3.12.7).
The quality of bank assets is under pressure in light of their rapid 
expansion in recent years and slowing economic growth. While 
commercial banks’ stock of nonperforming loans grew by 48.5%, the 
ratio of such loans rose only slightly to 3.1% of all loans outstanding. 
However, loan growth is slowing rapidly, and the stock of loans past 
due—a leading indicator—more than doubled by the end of 2014 to 
2.2% of all loans. Moreover, sizeable policy loan programs point 
to supervisory forbearance and increased exposure to the cyclical 
construction and housing sector. Banks need bolstering by closer 
monitoring of asset quality and liquidity buffers, stronger supervision 
of risk, the adoption of international capital standards, improved 
corporate governance, and forward-looking provisioning. Some positive 
steps from January 2015—introducing a 1% provisioning ratio for new 
loans and imposing higher risk weights on new foreign currency loans 
to unhedged borrowers—should perhaps be gradually extended to 
existing loans.
Economic prospects
Despite robust growth expected in agriculture and expanded extraction 
at Oyu Tolgoi, albeit less than in 2014, GDP growth is forecast to slow 
to 3.0% in 2015 as falling prices for exports are felt and as monetary and 
ﬁscal policy are tightened to contain inﬂationary and BOP pressures. 
Industrial production will grow more slowly than in 2014 as a credit 
squeeze affects construction and real estate, and as lower export 
prices pressure mine operators. Services are projected to grow only 
marginally as other economic activity slows. Assuming a stable external 
environment and the resumption of major investment in mining in 
2015, economic growth should recover to 5.0% in 2016 even with the 
continuation of restrictive ﬁscal and monetary policies (Figure 3.12.8).
Consumer price inﬂation will moderate to an average of 8.9% 
in 2015 and 7.7% in 2016, reﬂecting slower growth and ﬁscal and 
monetary tightening (Figure 3.12.9). The forecast assumes that the 
central bank will prioritize its target of 7.0% year on year for consumer 
price inﬂation and achieve it by the end of December 2016. Gross 
international reserves are likely to remain under pressure in 2015 as 
FDI inﬂows stay weak and the current account deﬁcit large. The deﬁcit 
is forecast to be stable at 8.0% of GDP in 2015 as higher export volume 
is balanced by falling prices. When large new mining investments start 
to push up imports in 2016, the current account deﬁcit may almost 
double to 15.0% of GDP. 
The main risks to the outlook stem from the economy’s 
vulnerability to external shocks. If slowdown exceeds expectations in 
the PRC—the destination of over 87% of Mongolia’s exports—or if prices 
for exports decline further, the BOP, ﬁscal balance, and growth could 
all suffer. The forecast is sensitive to the timing of large FDI projects, 
such as underground expansion at Oyu Tolgoi or further development 
of the Tavan Tolgoi coal deposits. The possibility of these projects 
not  going ahead in 2015 constitutes a signiﬁcant risk to the outlook 
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for 2016. Another major factor is the ability of the government and 
the central bank to achieve deﬁcit reduction and keep inﬂation under 
control. The government faces a difficult challenge to prepare and 
implement realistic budget that respect FSL ceilings on debt and the 
deﬁcit, and the central bank may face pressure to expand its quasi-ﬁscal 
lending—in particular to provide direct credit to corporations—or lower 
its policy rates.
Policy challenge—strengthening debt management 
In the long run, Mongolia needs to diversify its economy and better 
insulate itself from the vagaries of volatile price swings and large-
scale FDI. However, the government’s immediate policy challenge is 
to tighten monetary and ﬁscal policy to address pressure on the BOP, 
while safeguarding ﬁnancial sector stability, debt sustainability—and the 
welfare of the population, especially the poor. 
Some recent ﬁscal reforms are steps in the right direction. 
Development Bank of Mongolia expenditures that were previously 
off-budget are now partly within structural deﬁcit calculations. Further, 
the authorities revised the FSL structural deﬁcit and debt ceilings to 
bring them in line with reality, and will gradually lower them to more 
prudent levels by 2018. 
On the other hand, public debt has been redeﬁned to exclude a 
number of items as a means to create ﬁscal leeway without adjusting 
the ceilings.  Such measures weaken debt management and shift the 
debate on debt sustainability to a myopic focus on raising debt and 
deﬁcit ceilings or the numeric value of the ratio of debt to GDP.  This 
is unconstructive as more important issues are debt sustainability 
with full appreciation of the nature of different debt instruments as 
well as productive use of borrowed funds to ensure their contribution 
to repayment. In addition, preparations are urgently required toward 
reﬁnancing or repaying in 2017 and 2018 the $580 million eurobond of 
the Development Bank of Mongolia, credit withdrawn from the currency 
swap facility with the central bank of the PRC, and the $500 million 
ﬁrst tranche of the Chinggis bond. 
In light of large consolidated deﬁcits, rising debt and interest 
payments, and anticipated depressed commodity prices, these issues 
require open and informed discussion toward designing an effective 
strategy to manage debt.
This chapter was written by Akiko Terada-Hagiwara and Shiela Camingue-Romance of 
the Economic Research and Regional Cooperation Department, ADB, Manila.
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Taipei,China
Improved demand for electronic products raised the growth rate in 2014, while soft oil prices 
kept inflation low. Growth is expected to be stable in 2015 and 2016 on the back of strong 
external demand for electronic products and rising tourism services. The economy’s major policy 
challenge remains the need to upgrade its core manufacturing sector.
Economic performance
GDP expanded in 2014 by 3.7% year on year, the strongest growth in 
3 years, fueled by rising consumption, investment, and exports. All 
domestic demand components added to growth (Figure 3.13.1). Private 
consumption expanded by 3.0%, adding 1.6 percentage points to 
growth as improving consumer conﬁdence boosted private spending. 
Government consumption grew by 3.4%, adding 0.5 percentage points, 
and total investments rose by 4.4% to contribute 1.0 percentage point 
as private investment remained strong despite moderating since 2013 
(Figure 3.13.2).
Exports of goods and services, which provide 70% of the economy’s 
GDP, rebounded by 5.7% in 2014 in response to stronger demand from 
the US, Japan, and the euro area for machinery, electronic products, and 
electrical equipment. Exports to other Asian economies were mixed, 
with those to the PRC almost stable and those to Hong Kong, China 
improving by 7.9%. Imports of goods and services also expanded by 
5.4%, as demand picked up for capital equipment and consumer goods. 
In sum, net exports improved by 7.7%, lifting GDP growth in 2014 by 0.6 
percentage points.
On the supply side, the industrial production index, which was 
almost ﬂat in 2013, rose by 6.1% in 2014, and industrial output grew by 
5.7%, contributing 1.9 percentage points to GDP growth. This reﬂected 
a rebound in manufacturing by 6.3% as growth in the production of 
information and communication technology (ICT) products rose by 
double digits. Mining and quarrying continued to weaken, however, 
as oil prices declined and growth in construction faltered in a 
cooling property market. The service sector grew by 2.2% with solid 
expansion in information and communication, ﬁnance and insurance, 
transportation and storage, and trade, contributing 1.3 percentage points 
to GDP growth. Agriculture expanded by 3.5%. 
Inﬂation edged up to 1.2% in 2014 as higher food prices outweighed 
the decline in prices for fuels, lubricants, and transportation equipment. 
Core consumer prices, which strip out energy and fresh food, rose by 
1.3% (Figure 3.13.3).
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On the policy front, central bank monetary policy remained 
accommodative, with no change in the rediscount rate. The money 
supply (M2) climbed by 6.1% in 2014 as banks’ net foreign assets rose by 
11.0% and bank credit to the private sector grew by 5.7% . The cooling of 
the property market eased the concentration of real estate in banks’ loan 
portfolios. The budget deﬁcit rose from the equivalent of 0.9% of GDP 
in 2013 to 1.3% in 2014. Central government revenue declined by 1.4% 
despite the higher business tax rate for banks and insurance companies 
implemented in the second half of 2014. Meanwhile, expenditure 
increased by 3.1% as education, culture, and defense outlays grew.
The current account surplus reached a record 12.3% of GDP in 2014 
(Figure 3.13.4) on the back of strong exports and net service receipts 
boosted by tourist arrivals from the PRC. The continued depreciation of 
the local currency helped boost the current account. Despite increased 
outﬂows of $53.0 billion to ﬁnance higher investment in foreign debt 
securities, the balance of payments registered a surplus equal to 2.5% of 
GDP, higher than the 2.2% recorded in 2013. However, foreign exchange 
reserves declined by 0.9% to $419 billion as of the end of December 
2014, mainly on valuation changes as the US dollar appreciated against 
other major currencies.
Economic prospects
GDP growth is forecast to remain stable at 3.7% in 2015 on strong 
external demand and improving prospects for local consumer demand, 
as well as likely stimulus to production as the drop in global oil 
prices translates into lower costs and higher corporate proﬁts. Export 
orders rose by 8.1% in January 2015, on top of a double-digit surge 
in September and October 2014, with those from the US and Europe 
surpassing those from the PRC and Southeast Asia (Figure 3.13.5). The 
outlook is positive for exports, tourism, and repatriated earnings from 
overseas investments, which are expected to lift the current account 
surplus to 12.5% of GDP in 2015 and 13.0% in 2016. 
Consumption should be robust in 2015. Consumer conﬁdence has 
been trending up since October 2014, unemployment is low, and real 
wages will rise with the planned 3.8% increase in the minimum wage 
by mid-2015. Consumption will receive further boosts from lower fuel 
and utilities prices and as tourism expands mainly on a likely increase 
in tourist arrivals from the PRC. The public investment outlook for 
2015 and 2016 is somewhat less positive, moderated mainly by the 
government’s continuing efforts to consolidate its budget and uncertainty 
over energy-related investments. Private investment looks set to expand 
by the start of 2016 following an announcement from a leading contract 
chipmaker that it will ramp up production of next-generation chips. 
Meanwhile, the manufacturing industry sentiment index rebounded 
in December from a 3-year low, and expectations of rising external 
demand and tourist arrivals could provide some impetus to investment 
growth. With the gains from lower oil prices wearing off and as exports 
competition intensiﬁes further, growth should slip to 3.6% in 2016.
Inﬂation will trend downward in 2015 to average 0.5% before 
rising again to 1.0% in 2016 as oil prices gradually recover, employment 
3.13.3 Inflation 
% change, year on year
2012 2013 2014 2015
−4
0
4
8
12
Jan July Jan July Jan July Jan
Overall
Food
Core
Sources: Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting 
and Statistics (DGBAS). http://eng.stat.gov.tw; Haver 
Analytics (both accessed 6 March 2015).
3.13.4 Current account components
$ billion % of GDP
−5
0
5
10
15
−30
0
30
60
90
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Trade in goods
Trade in services
Income balance
Current transfers Current account balance 
Sources: Haver Analytics; http://www.cbc.gov.tw (both 
accessed 6 March 2015).
3.13.5 Export orders by economy
% change, year on year
2013 2014 2015
−30
0
30
60
Jan July Jan July Jan
Overall
United States
People’s Republic of China and Hong Kong, China
Japan
Europe
ASEAN−6
ASEAN-6 = Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
members Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand, and Viet Nam
Sources: Haver Analytics; http://www.cbc.gov.tw (both 
accessed 6 March 2015).
164  Asian Development Outlook 2015
prospects improve, and incomes rise. Monetary policy is expected to 
remain accommodative, given the low and stable inﬂation environment in 
2015 and 2016. The central bank has ample room to adjust its monetary 
policy if required by any sudden economic or ﬁnancial developments at 
home or abroad.
Fiscal policy will aim to narrow the deﬁcit, mainly by raising 
government revenue. Following the increase in business tax rates for 
banks and insurers under the Sound Finance Program initiated in early 
2014, the government is expected to introduce a new top bracket for 
income tax and a tax on proﬁts from property sales, as well as increase 
the goods and services tax. Budgetary expenditure may increase as the 
2016 election approaches, but the budget deﬁcit is expected to fall to 1.0% 
of GDP in 2015. 
The downside risks to the forecasts arise primarily from the 
slowdown and production localization in PRC, and the changing political 
landscape in Taipei,China. Exports could suffer as competition in ICT 
products heats up following a free trade agreement signed by the PRC 
and the Republic of Korea in November 2014, as well as Apple’s recent 
announcement that it would shift to the Republic of Korea a big chunk 
of its production of chips and other components hitherto produced in 
Taipei,China. On the other hand, higher-than-expected growth in the 
US and the euro area could provide an upside surprise, enabling stronger 
demand for electronic products and positive spillover to propel growth. 
Policy challenge—safeguarding growth in 
semiconductors 
The established reputation of Taipei,China as a leading producer of 
high technology products is a source of economic strength, but its 
narrow specialization and relatively high domestic production costs are 
sources of weakness. Growth momentum in the forecast period will 
likely ﬁnd support from robust global demand for mobile devices and 
their components, such as the sophisticated integrated circuits that 
Taipei,China dominated in 2013 with more than 60% of global sales 
in integrated circuits foundry production (Figure 3.13.6). However, 
the sustainability of this growth model is called into question by rapid 
transformation in information and communication technology (Figure 
3.13.7), a ﬁercely competitive market with expanding production 
elsewhere in Asia and North America, and relatively high domestic 
production costs. The authorities face the challenge of designing a 
two-pronged strategy that preserves the vibrant semiconductor industry 
while sowing the seeds for developing alternative high-tech industries 
that could eventually complement ICT exports if they begin to slacken 
over the medium term as competition stiffens. 
As a ﬁrst step toward assessing the best approach for developing 
the domestic semiconductor industry, trade specialization 
coefficients were computed to compare the evolution of ﬁve 
products: semiconductor devices, integrated circuits, ﬁnal products 
such as notebooks and mobile phones, wafers, and semiconductor 
manufacturing equipment. Taipei,China was compared with its three 
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main competitors and partners in vertical production chains: the PRC, 
Japan, and the Republic of Korea.  
The coefficients are computed as the share of net exports of each 
product divided by the sum of exports and imports of that product. 
They can range from –1 for an economy that imports the product but 
does not export it, to +1 for an economy that exports it but does not 
import it. A zero coefficient indicates that exports and imports are 
even. Each economy can therefore have ﬁve different ratios determined 
by the extent of its export and import of each product (Figure 3.13.8).
The results show that Taipei,China is the most specialized of 
the four economies in semiconductor devices and integrated circuits 
and the least specialized in manufacturing equipment. While 
specialization evolved in each economy during 2007–2013 (indicated 
by the difference between the broken and solid lines in Figures 
3.13.8) it has been relatively stagnant in Taipei,China. Comparing 
Taipei,China with the Republic of Korea is most revealing because of 
their similarity in export composition, with electric products being 
the major items (Figure 3.13.6) and both vying to be major suppliers 
of integrated circuits, with a common specialization coefficient of 
0.3 in 2013 (Figure 3.13.6). The Republic of Korea has expanded its 
semiconductor devices segment and emerged as a net exporter since 
2010. Other economies have expanded too, with the PRC moving into 
wafer production, and other countries like Malaysia and Singapore 
expanding into manufacturing equipment. Moreover, as Taipei,China 
shifted some of its ﬁnal product assembly to the PRC (largely before 
2007), its specialization coefficient for ﬁnal products fell much lower 
than that of the Republic of Korea. Indeed, the PRC is the most 
competitive in this area, with a coefficient close to +1 because it hardly 
imports any ﬁnal products.
One option for safeguarding export growth in the semiconductor 
industry is to move toward producing wafers and manufacturing 
equipment. This option is consistent with the general need for 
Taipei,China to develop proﬁtable capital-intensive industries, given 
its high labor costs. By replacing imports of wafers and manufacturing 
equipment from Japan or the US, localizing these segments would 
reduce transportation costs. More importantly, it would help 
Taipei,China accumulate and develop frontier knowledge. 
Also, as the industry evolves quickly, the currently proﬁtable 
integrated circuit segment needs to prepare for the era after 
smartphones by moving toward wearable devices and the so-called 
internet of things. Over the medium term, diversiﬁcation into other 
highly capital-intensive industries may be needed to complement the 
semiconductor industry if market shares start to slip. 
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Afghanistan
Rivals in the disputed presidential election in June 2014 finally agreed in September to form 
a unity government. The political crisis and the withdrawal of international security forces 
undermined confidence and the economy. The outlook is for modest recovery helped by large 
inflows of development assistance and security grants. The new government has energetically 
sought to improve governance, shore up public finances, and enlist regional cooperation to 
improve security.  
Economic performance
Protracted deadlock and political uncertainty before agreement to share 
power in a unity government combined with worsening security sharply 
curtailed economic growth in 2014. Growth is estimated to have fallen 
to 1.7% from 3.4% in 2013 (Figure 3.14.1). On the supply side, expansion 
in industry and services fell by half and agriculture remained ﬂat at 
about 1.0%, as food production achieved its maximum potential for a 
third consecutive year. Opium production rose by 17%, though its farm 
gate value of $850 million was 10% less than in 2013. While opium 
is omitted from official GDP estimates, its earnings boost domestic 
demand and are a signiﬁcant source of foreign exchange. 
On the demand side, private consumption continued to be the main 
driver of growth, but at a much slower pace because of uncertainty 
and income lost in the retrenchment of spending by security forces. 
Investment decreased with the number of newly registered ﬁrms falling 
to 2,086 from 3,895 in 2013. These ﬁgures include registrations of 
foreign ﬁrms, which halved to 98 from 193.
Inﬂation fell markedly in the second half of 2014 (Figure 3.14.2). 
Food inﬂation dropped to 2.9% in December 2014 from 9.7% a year 
earlier as prices for vegetables, oil, and fats fell because of ample supply 
and lower international prices. Nonfood inﬂation has been declining 
since 2012, mainly because of falling property rents. Average inﬂation 
was 5.0%, down from 7.4% in 2013. 
Fiscal policy came under immense pressure in 2014 when domestic 
revenue fell short of target by a large margin equal to $527 million. 
Revenues amounted to only AF99.3 billion, far below the budgeted 
target of AF128.8 billion. Asked to ﬁll the gap, development partners 
provided only $118 million, leaving the government to ﬁnance the 
difference by drawing down treasury cash reserves. Domestic revenue 
ﬁnanced only 43.9% of the operating expenditures, 11.6% less than in 
2013 (Figure 3.14.3). Weak revenue collection was partly due to the 
economic slowdown, but deteriorating revenue performance since 
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2012 basically comes down to weak governance with tax and customs 
administration. 
Central bank monetary policy continued to be conducted through 
biweekly foreign exchange auctions. Fluctuation in foreign exchange 
reserves in mid-2014 reﬂected inconsistent foreign grant inﬂows and 
capital outﬂows in response to political and security concerns, but 
reserves stabilized toward the end of the year. Gross international 
reserves stood at $7.4 billion at the end of December 2014, up slightly 
from $7.1 billion a year earlier. The value of the afghani has trended 
downward since 2011 but was broadly stable in 2014, depreciating by less 
than 1% against the US dollar to AF58.0 (Figure 3.14.4).
Broad money (M2) growth slowed to 8.3% from 9.4% a year earlier, 
as expansion in demand deposits was only 3.7%. Preference for holding 
cash reﬂects continued distrust and weak ﬁnancial intermediation in the 
banking sector since the massive failure of the Kabul Bank in 2010. 
The current account including grants is estimated to have been 
in surplus equal to 3.8% of GDP in 2014, up from 3.6% in 2013. This 
reﬂected increased earnings from transporting the military equipment 
of departing international security forces, as well as higher on-budget 
grants (Figure 3.14.5). Excluding grants, the current account is 
estimated to have been in deﬁcit equal to 36.6% of GDP, improving on 
40.4% in 2013 mainly because imports for grant-supported projects fell. 
Economic prospects
The economy is projected to grow by 2.5% in 2015, up from 1.7% in 
2014, if the political, security, and business environment is stable. With 
the cabinet not yet fully named at the end of March and parliamentary 
elections due by June 2015, consumer and investor enthusiasm will 
remain subdued. As agriculture performed at full potential in 2014 and 
winter snowfall was meager, agricultural output is expected to decline 
in 2015. Growth in industry and services is projected to pick up in the 
second half of 2015 on greater political stability, but demand for services 
will suffer from the withdrawal of international security forces. Growth 
in 2016 is projected to edge up to 3.5% on progress with political and 
security issues. 
National budget expenditure for 2015 is set at AF436.2 billion, an 
increase of 1.8% over 2014 (Figure 3.14.6). The operating budget is 
allocated AF283.5 billion, or 65% of the national budget, 67% of it for 
security. Almost 71% of the national budget is ﬁnanced by foreign grants 
and loans: 90% of the development budget and 57% of the recurrent 
budget. Taking grants and loans into account, the deﬁcit is estimated to 
reach AF7.9 billion in 2015. Loan ﬁnancing is less than 1% of the total 
budget. 
Inﬂation is projected steady at 5% in 2015 and 2016 assuming 
prudent ﬁscal and monetary policies, good agricultural production, and 
favorable international commodity prices. The government will continue 
to manage the exchange rate with the current managed ﬂoat regime, 
but the afghani will likely face downward pressure as inﬂows from 
development partners shrink. 
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The current account balance including grants is projected to be a 
smaller surplus equal to 1.4% of GDP in 2015 and then move into deﬁcit 
equal to 1.0% of GDP in 2016 as foreign assistance declines, especially 
for the operating budget. Excluding grants, current account deﬁcits 
are projected to narrow to 36.2% of GDP in 2015 and 34.6% in 2016 as 
externally funded activity winds down.
Policy challenge—boosting tax revenue 
Afghanistan faces a deteriorating ﬁscal position, unable to raise revenue 
even as public expenditures rise. These trends risk an ever-widening 
ﬁscal gap. In response to the revenue shortfall, the government 
adopted strict austerity in the second of half of 2014 that reduced 
overtime payments to civil servants, set aside some new discretionary 
development projects, and limited salary increases, bonuses, and other 
beneﬁts. Despite these measures, a large ﬁnancing gap fails to cover 
civilian wages, pensions, and other essential recurrent and development 
spending, requiring the government to draw down cash reserves.
Missed targets for budget revenue during the past 3 years pose a 
critical policy challenge in light of the withdrawal of international 
security forces, contracting inﬂows of development assistance, 
and slowing business activity. The government estimates that aid 
commitments from overseas will shrink to $3.2 billion in 2015 from 
$5.0 billion in 2014. Revenue mobilization from domestic resources has 
become critical. The economic slowdown may have contributed to tax 
collection shortfalls, which should improve as the economy picks up. 
A large part of the problem, though, is the loss of about one-third of 
revenues to weak governance and poor tax and customs administration. 
Bridging the ﬁscal gap requires better governance, transparency, 
and accountability in the use of public funds. In addition, the 
government must expedite credible reform as stipulated in the Tokyo 
Mutual Accountability Framework. In particular, reform needs 
to strengthen tax and customs compliance and broaden the tax 
base. Officials must ensure the speedy implementation of the newly 
approved value-added tax, reverse the earlier reduction of the rate 
from 10% to 5%, and conduct effective risk-based tax audits to improve 
compliance. The unity government is keen that governance reform 
streamline government administrative structure by removing parallel 
operations, repair land administration, monitor development project 
contracts through the President’s Office, revisit the Kabul Bank fraud 
investigation and court decisions, reform the judiciary with a special 
focus on eliminating corruption, and provide for removing government 
officials, including provincial governors, whose performance is 
unsatisfactory. 
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Bangladesh 
Brisk exports helped to maintain growth and a current account surplus in FY2014 despite 
political disturbances ahead of elections in January 2014. Political blockades and violence in 
early 2015 will constrain growth and turn the current account into a small deficit. Higher growth 
and a current account surplus are projected to return in FY2016 with political calm. Prolonged 
strife remains a risk. Eliminating infrastructure bottlenecks and improving the investment climate 
are top priorities. 
Economic performance
Economic growth in FY2014 (ended June 2014) is provisionally 
estimated at 6.1%, slightly improved from 6.0% in FY2013 (Figure 
3.15.1). Agriculture expanded by 3.3%, aided by good weather and 
continued government support. Industry growth slumped to 8.4% 
from 9.6% a year earlier, however, because political unrest before the 
parliamentary election in January 2014 disrupted the supply of materials 
and undermined consumer conﬁdence. Services advanced by 5.8%, 
up slightly from 5.5% the year before, mainly on stronger trade in the 
second half of the year.
On the demand side, net exports added to growth as garment 
exports grew briskly. A decline in remittances and weak consumer 
conﬁdence ahead of the election held down growth in consumer 
spending. Investment rose slightly to 28.7% of GDP in FY2014 from 
28.4% in the previous year, as private investment slipped to 21.4% of 
GDP from 21.8% in FY2013 while public investment rose from 6.6% 
to 7.3%. Private investment was constrained by the unsettled political 
environment, difficulties with infrastructure and skills deﬁcits, and 
procedural problems that inhibit investment. Rising public investment 
came as the government stepped up its implementation of election 
pledges. Foreign direct investment remained low.
Annual average inﬂation accelerated to 7.4% from 6.8% in FY2013 
as political unrest before the election disrupted food supplies and 
pushed up prices. Wage increases in both the public and the private 
sector, and an upward adjustment to power tariffs effective in March 
2014, contributed to inﬂation. By June, inﬂation had moderated to 7.0% 
year on year. In the ﬁrst 7 months of FY2015, to January 2015, food 
inﬂation eased and inﬂation for other expenditures edged up slightly 
to converge at 6.0% (Figure 3.15.2). Moderate demand, unchanged 
administered prices, a stable exchange rate, and a cautious monetary 
policy underpinned the outcome. 
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Money supply and credit growth slowed in FY2014, reﬂecting the 
central bank’s cautious monetary stance. Broad money growth was, at 
16.1% in June 2014, slightly lower than the FY2014 monetary program 
target of 17.0% (Figure 3.15.3). Private credit growth slowed to 12.3%, 
well below the program target of 16.5%. Growth in net credit to the 
government slowed sharply because little bank ﬁnancing was needed 
for the budget. The large surplus in the overall balance of payments 
expanded net foreign assets by 41.2% over the year, which accounted for 
nearly half of monetary expansion.
With ample liquidity in the banking system, the central bank raised 
the cash reserve requirement from 6.0% to 6.5%, effective in June 2014. 
Easy liquidity nevertheless caused the call money rate to decline. The 
weighted average yield on 91-day Treasury bills fell to 6.9% in June 
2014 from 8.3% a year earlier, and banks’ weighted average lending rate 
eased to 13.1% from 13.6% at the end of June 2013. The deposit rate also 
declined, to 7.7% from 8.4%, widening banks’ interest rate spread by 0.2 
percentage points to 5.4%.
Weak discipline at state-owned commercial banks (SCBs) and 
specialized banks have caused nonperforming loans to proliferate in 
banks and the larger banking system. SCBs hold about 25% of banking 
system assets, and specialized banks about 5%. At the end of 2014, 
the ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans stood at 9.7% (Figure 
3.15.4), up from 6.1% at the end of 2011. Specialized banks had the 
highest ratio at 32.8%, and the more ﬁnancially important SCBs had 
an extraordinarily high ratio of 22.2%. Before 2012, the central bank’s 
options were largely limited to tightening classiﬁcation and provisioning 
requirements, but the Bank Company (Amendment) Act, 2013 gave the 
central bank much more authority to supervise SCBs. To improve their 
performance, the central bank has undertaken a restructuring program 
that sets detailed requirements in memoranda of understanding that are 
acknowledged and signed by the board of each SCB. The memoranda 
deﬁne policies dealing with credit risk management, internal control 
and compliance, loan review, and liquidity management. They also set 
speciﬁc limits on credit growth. The program aims to put the banks on 
a sound ﬁnancial basis over time. However, it is important that NPLs 
are accurately assessed at all banks, including privately owned banks, to 
appropriately assess the risk of banking system distress.
Revenue collection by the National Board of Revenue grew by 10.4% 
in FY2014 but underperformed the budget target because of disrupted 
economic activity. Total domestic indirect taxes grew by 11.8%, while 
income tax collection rose by 15.6%. Revenue from taxes connected with 
imports was weak, however, as imports of higher-duty consumer goods 
slackened and the bulk of imports were low-duty items such as capital 
goods, industrial raw materials, and food grains. As a share of GDP, 
revenue collection rose to 11.6% in FY2014 from 10.7% the previous year 
(Figure 3.15.5). Meanwhile, total spending reached 16.0%, limiting the 
budget deﬁcit to 4.4% of GDP. Domestic sources ﬁnanced close to 70.0% 
of the deﬁcit.
As part of its periodic adjustment program, the government raised 
electricity tariffs for retail consumers by 6.7% in March 2014. However, 
it did not adjust the price of furnace oil, which is used mostly to 
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generate electricity, and it last adjusted diesel, kerosene, and gasoline 
prices in January 2013.
Exports grew by 12.0% in FY2014, up from 10.7% growth a year 
earlier. Higher demand  from the large traditional buyers—the European 
Union and the US—and from newly developed markets pushed growth 
in readymade garment exports to 13.8%, outpacing the previous year’s 
12.7% expansion. Import payments rose by 8.9% in a marked revival 
from low growth of 0.8% in FY2013. The upturn reﬂected big increases 
in imports of petroleum products, machinery and other capital goods, 
industrial raw materials, and food grains. A stark departure from trend 
saw workers’ remittances fall by 1.6% to $14.2 billion because of a large 
drop in employment abroad, especially in the Middle East.
Despite a smaller trade deﬁcit, the decline in workers’ remittances 
and the higher services deﬁcit narrowed the current account surplus 
from $2.4 billion in FY2013 to $1.3 billion, equal to 0.8% of GDP (Figure 
3.15.6). With stronger inﬂows into capital and ﬁnancial accounts, the 
overall balance of payments recorded another very large surplus of $5.5 
billion in FY2014, slightly above the $5.1 billion recorded in FY2013. 
The central bank’s foreign exchange reserves rose sharply by the end of 
June 2014 to $21.5 billion, equal to about 5.9 months of imports (Figure 
3.15.7).
Active management by the central bank kept the exchange rate 
stable for the Bangladesh taka, which appreciated by a slight 0.2% 
against the US dollar in FY2014 (Figure 3.15.8). Because of the taka’s 
nominal appreciation against other currencies and domestic inﬂation 
that was higher in Bangladesh than in its trading partners, the taka 
appreciated in real effective terms by 5.5% year on year as of the end of 
June 2014, indicating lost export competitiveness.
Key stock market indicators improved in FY2014. The Dhaka 
Stock Exchange broad index rose by 9.2% by June 2014, and market 
capitalization by 16.3%. The price-to-earnings ratio rose to 16.4 in June 
2014 from 14.6 a year earlier, and 12 new companies were listed. Net 
foreign portfolio investment of $825.0 million in FY2014—more than 
double the $368.0 million in FY2013—also contributed to market vitality. 
Reforms such as demutualization and enhanced surveillance undertaken 
by the Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission have improved 
market discipline. 
 
Economic prospects
Projections for FY2015 are based on a several assumptions: The 
central bank will maintain its cautious monetary stance to contain 
inﬂation, as envisaged in the January 2015 monetary policy statement. 
The government will raise electricity and natural gas prices to cut 
subsidies and keep current spending within the budget. It will attain 
targeted budget revenue and foreign ﬁnancing and strengthen project 
implementation. Finally, the weather will be favorable.
GDP growth in FY2015 is projected at 6.1% (Figure 3.15.9). Before 
political unrest began in January 2015—the anniversary of national 
elections that the opposition boycotted—the economy had been 
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expanding briskly for 6 months, indicating good growth prospects for 
FY2015. Strong remittance inﬂows boosted consumption, and private 
investment was rising, as indicated by higher capital equipment imports. 
Although exports remained subdued, they were gradually improving as 
export orders picked up. However, political unrest and action to shut 
down transportation began undermining growth prospects by affecting 
private investment and export activity. Continued healthy remittance 
inﬂows are expected to support consumer spending, however, and 
sustain economic momentum. Notwithstanding the country’s resilience 
under domestic and external shocks, if political unrest continues, it 
would further hinder economic growth.
Growth in FY2016 is projected to accelerate to 6.4%, aided by 
higher remittances and export growth, which is underpinned by the 
continued economic recovery in the US and the euro area. Consumer 
and investor conﬁdence are expected to pick up as the political situation 
stabilizes, strengthening growth momentum. In addition, infrastructure 
constraints will likely ease somewhat with the completion of ongoing 
projects, particularly the opening of new power plants.
Agriculture incomes will be constrained in FY2015 by losses of 
perishable foodstuff caused by disrupted supply, distribution, and 
marketing networks. Nevertheless, growth is expected to reach 3.3%, 
aided by a good harvest, continued policy support, and favorable 
weather. With rising demand for agricultural products other than 
traditional crops—and a positive supply response boosted by improved 
infrastructure, connectivity, and marketing facilities—agriculture 
growth is projected to improve to 3.5% in FY2016.
At 8.5%, industry growth in FY2015 will be slower than expected 
earlier, as unrest affects exports, small-scale manufacturing, and 
construction. However, strong performance by large and medium-sized 
industrial ﬁrms before the onset of unrest is expected to mean good 
industry growth recorded for the full year. Industry growth is projected 
to rise to 9% in FY2016 with improved prospects for the readymade 
garments industry following reform that improved safety standards 
and compliance, along with stronger external demand as the pace of 
recovery strengthens in the euro area. Industry will be further boosted 
by better electricity supply and infrastructure, as well as improving 
business conﬁdence.
Services growth is expected to moderate to 5.7% from 5.8% in 
FY2014 as transport, trade, and wholesale and retail business have been 
affected by demonstrations and attacks on vehicles. A pickup in external 
trade and a rise in domestic demand are projected to slightly improve 
services growth to 6.0% in FY2016.
Inﬂation is expected to slow to 6.5% in FY2015 and further to 6.2% 
in FY2016 (Figure 3.15.10). A slowing inﬂationary trend that started in 
June 2014 continued during the ﬁrst 7 months of FY2015, with inﬂation 
decelerating to 6.0% year on year in January 2015 from 7.5% in January 
2014 as food and other commodity prices fell on the international 
market. Although likely increases in administered prices for natural gas 
and electricity may exert inﬂationary pressure in the ensuing months, 
inﬂation is expected to soften over time with easing constraints on 
supply, large public stocks of food, normal weather, and a supportive 
3.15.10 Annual inflation
Forecast
%
5−year moving average
0
3
6
9
12
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Note: Years are ﬁscal years ending on 30 June of that year.
Source: Bangladesh Bank. 2015. Monthly Economic Trends. 
February. http://www.bangladesh-bank.org; ADB 
estimates.
3.15.9 GDP growth by sector
%
Forecast
0
3
6
9
12
2010 2012 2014 2016
Agriculture
Industry
Services
Gross domestic product
Note: Years are ﬁscal years ending on 30 June of that year.
Sources: Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics. 2014.  National 
Accounts Statistics. June; ADB estimates.
3.15.8 Exchange rates 
2012 2013 2014 2015
Taka/$ Index
80
100
120
14070
75
80
85
Jul Jan Jul Jan Jul Jan
Nominal Real effective
 
Sources: Bangladesh Bank. 2015. Monthly Economic Trends. 
February. http://www.bangladesh-bank.org; Monetary 
Policy Department.
174  Asian Development Outlook 2015
monetary policy that includes strong supervision by the central bank to 
discourage banks’ extension of unproductive credit. 
Exports grew by only 2.1% in the the ﬁrst 7 months of FY2015, 
signiﬁcantly down from 15.1% in the corresponding period of FY2014 
(Figure 3.15.11). Exports of readymade garments grew by 1.9%, a low 
number that reﬂects in part declines in payments to exporters for 
weaker orders executed in FY2014 during political unrest before the 
parliamentary election. Even accounting for the impact of the current 
round of political disruption on strong order books, export growth is 
greater in the second half of the ﬁscal year, bringing export growth to 
6.0% for all of FY2015. Export growth is projected to recover to 10.0% in 
FY2016 on the expected pickup in external demand and further progress 
in improving garment industry safety standards and compliance, which 
attracts global players that buy large volumes.
Import payments surged by 18.3% in the ﬁrst half of FY2015 with 
higher imports of rice, petroleum, fertilizer, raw materials for garments, 
and capital goods (Figure 3.15.12). Import growth is expected to slacken 
in the second half of the ﬁscal year, for an increase by 11.0% in FY2015. 
Imports are projected to increase by 13.0% in FY2016, reﬂecting modest 
expectations for improvement in trade and the economy.
Workers’ remittance inﬂows rose by 8.7% to $8.7 billion in the 
ﬁrst 7 months of FY2015 as employment overseas increased, especially 
since early 2014. Remittances picked up notably from the Middle East, 
Malaysia, and the US. With jobs abroad trending higher, remittances are 
expected to expand by 11.0% in FY2015 and 14.0% in FY2016, in good 
part because of resumed recruitment by Saudi Arabia and Qatar.
Despite rising remittances, the current account balance is expected 
to move to a small deﬁcit of 0.5% of GDP in FY2015 because of a larger 
trade deﬁcit and growing deﬁcits in the services and income accounts 
(Figure 3.15.13). However, the current account is projected to move back 
to a small surplus of 0.5% of GDP in FY2016 as larger remittances offset 
projected deﬁcits in trade and nontrade items.
Revenue collection grew by 16.7% during the ﬁrst 7 months of 
FY2015, with domestic indirect taxes outpacing indirect taxes connected 
with imports. The collection of direct taxes also remains strong. The 
FY2015 budget targets 19.3% growth in tax revenue, which is higher 
than growth in nominal GDP, to lift the ratio of tax to GDP by 0.5 
percentage points to 10.1%. Reaching the target may be a challenge, 
especially as political unrest hinders economic activity, unless 
discretionary tax measures are adopted. Total expenditure was slated to 
rise to 16.4% of GDP in FY2015, with current spending falling to 8.4%, 
net capital lending level at 2.3%, and the annual development program 
reaching 5.2%—a signiﬁcant rise, as the government intends to step 
up implementation to meet election pledges. The target for the budget 
deﬁcit is 4.4% of GDP, about two-thirds of it set to be ﬁnanced from 
domestic sources (Figure 3.15.14). 
Sustained low global oil prices have two main implications: Lower 
spending for imports improve the trade and current account balances, 
and the government beneﬁts from reduced expenditures on fuel 
subsidies. Though the drop in oil prices has created opportunity to 
review policies regarding energy prices and subsidies, market-based 
price adjustments are unlikely in the coming months as the authorities 
3.15.12 Growth in imports and components
FY2014 FY2015
%
−40
−20
0
20
40
60
80
100
2013 2014 Jul−Dec Jul−Dec
Food grains Consumer goods
Petroleum Garment raw materials
Capital goods Others
Total
Note: Years are ﬁscal years ending on 30 June of the same 
calendar year.
Source: Bangladesh Bank. http://www.bangladesh-bank.org
3.15.11  Contributions to export growth
FY2015
Percentage points
−10
0
10
20
30
40
50
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Jul−Jan
Garments
Others
Export growth
Notes: Years are ﬁscal years ending on 30 June of the same 
calendar year.  
Sources: Export Promotion Bureau; ADB estimates.
3.15.13 Current account balance
% of GDP
5−year moving average
−2
−1
0
1
2
3
4
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Forecast
Note: Years are ﬁscal years ending on 30 June of that year.
Sources: Bangladesh Bank. Annual Report 2013-2014. http://
www.bangladesh-bank.org; ADB estimates.
Economic trends and prospects in developing Asia: South Asia Bangladesh  175
are expected to ﬁrst recoup earlier losses of the Bangladesh Petroleum 
Corporation.
The outlook is subject to several downside risks: delayed economic 
recovery in the European Union, Bangladesh’s main export destination; 
inability to mobilize the domestic revenue or foreign ﬁnancing needed 
to meaningfully improve infrastructure, especially for power generation; 
and prolonged political unrest that would drain conﬁdence. Finally, 
unfavorable weather is always a risk in Bangladesh.
Policy challenge—opening investment 
bottlenecks
Economic and social progress notwithstanding, Bangladesh still faces 
formidable challenges over the medium to long term in its efforts to 
raise investment to a level sufficient to put it on a high growth trajectory. 
Private investment needs to be greatly scaled up. This ﬁrst requires 
reversing the falling trend over the past 2 years caused by political 
uncertainty, land and infrastructure shortages, a skills deﬁcit, and a 
weak business climate. In terms of infrastructure quality, Bangladesh is 
less competitive than other Asian economies. These include the People’s 
Republic of China, from which it stands to inherit opportunities in light 
manufacturing, and such competitors as Cambodia, India, and Sri Lanka 
(Figure 3.15.15). Bangladesh needs to improve the quality of its roads, 
ports, railways, electricity supply, water supply, and sanitation. Further, 
capacity constraints in government agencies need to be addressed. 
According to the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness 
Report 2014–2015, inadequate and unreliable energy and power 
supply appear to be the most binding constraints on the country’s 
competitiveness. Likewise, in the World Bank’s Doing Business 2015, 
Bangladesh ranks 188 among 189 countries on the ease of electricity 
delivery (Figure 3.15.16). The cost of power outages has been estimated 
to equal 0.5% of gross domestic product. Electriﬁcation rates rose from 
35% in FY2003 to 62% in FY2013, and transmission and distribution 
losses were reduced, but supply remains irregular and overly reliant 
on natural gas. Power outages are still frequent, and transmission and 
distribution systems suffer high losses. Even though installed capacity 
is over 10,000 megawatts, available capacity is limited to 6,000–7,000 
megawatts. The problem may get worse, as supply coming online is 
inadequate to meet growing demand in the coming years. In addition, 
higher transaction costs and excessive procedures are major regulatory 
hurdles to getting electricity. 
Bangladesh needs to seriously cut the costs of doing business to 
boost private and foreign investment. The Global Competitiveness 
Report ranks Bangladesh at 109 out of 144 countries surveyed. Strong 
efforts are needed to reduce the burden of paying taxes, getting credit, 
registering property, and enforcing contracts. Bangladesh ranks 131 
on the ease of getting credit, compared with India at 36. On average, 
contract enforcement has 41 procedures that take 1,442 days in 
Bangladesh, costing 66.8% of the value of the claim. 
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Land shortages have emerged as a binding constraint on investment. 
Unplanned urban sprawl and high population pressure complicate 
ﬁnding suitable locations for enterprises. The land market is inefficient 
because of long delays and the high cost in property registration, weak 
land ownership data, the lack of automation in land records, and poor 
zoning laws. On registering property, Bangladesh ranks 184 out of 189 
countries, signiﬁcantly below such subregional peers as Pakistan at 114, 
India at 121, and Sri Lanka at 131. Registering property in Bangladesh 
requires eight procedures and 244 days, costing 7.2% of the property 
value. Institutional reform to simplify land transactions and registration, 
improve land administration and record keeping, and develop more 
economic zones is key to attracting private investors domestically and 
from overseas. 
A sound ﬁnancial system is vital for private and foreign investment. 
Banks have limited capacity to ﬁnance large projects and provide 
sufficient trade ﬁnance. Discipline needs to be strengthened in 
banks, especially SCBs, by instituting effective competition, efficient 
management, higher credit standards, and enhanced supervision 
and corporate governance. Progress has been made in strengthening 
prudential regulation, enhancing central bank capacity, and allowing 
more competition through the entry of new private banks. 
To boost investment and growth, Bangladesh adopted in 2012 a 
broad policy framework with support from international ﬁnancial 
institutions. The structural reform agenda aims to strengthen ﬁscal 
revenue and tax capacity (including implementing a new value-added 
tax) to generate greater resources for a revamped and well-prioritized 
public investment plan. It includes reform to operations at SCBs to 
improve governance, strengthen labor and safety standards and social 
safety nets, and streamline regulations on business, trade, and foreign 
exchange. Substantial progress has been made, even in the current 
contentious political environment.  
The government is setting up ﬁve economic zones, each providing 
one-stop service. Measures to improve the business climate include 
automating the administration of the judicial system to expedite the 
enforcement of contracts, computerizing the processing of exports 
and imports to speed cross-border trade, and introducing alternative 
mechanisms to resolve disputes over income tax, value-added tax, and 
customs duties that will ease the administrative burden and cost of 
paying taxes. 
To accelerate infrastructure development, the government has 
fast-tracked a number of priority projects and established a high-level 
technical committee to implement them. The projects are a deepwater 
seaport in southern Sonadia, a metro rail in Dhaka, the Padma Bridge, a 
terminal for imports of liqueﬁed natural gas, the Matarbari ultra-super 
critical coal-ﬁred power plant, the Payra seaport, and a coal-ﬁred power 
plant at Rampal, in the southwest of the country. 
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Bhutan
Growth increased slightly on pickups in construction of hydropower and manufacturing. With 
most temporary import and credit restrictions lifted, new monetary and fiscal policy mechanisms 
have been in place to manage excessive demand. The outlook is for rapid growth as new large 
projects are built to generate more hydropower for export. The current account deficit will 
be substantial, reflecting construction imports, but large capital inflows and cautious demand 
management are expected to sustain a surplus in the overall balance of payments.
Economic performance
The economy expanded in FY2014 (ended 30 June 2014) at an estimated 
4.0%. This is up from 3.5% a year earlier but remains below the 
long-term growth rate of nearly 8.0% (Figure 3.16.1). The boost came 
from growth in industry and construction, mainly in hydropower, 
which comprises about a third of economic activity. Sales of cement, 
one of the country’s few industries, recovered from a contraction 
last year, reﬂecting stronger performance in construction as well as 
manufacturing. The value of electricity output grew on higher power 
tariffs and despite hydropower production falling slightly.
Services grew marginally more quickly than last year, 
notwithstanding wholesale and retail trade continuing to fall from their 
double-digit expansion of earlier years. Although credit restrictions on 
housing construction and vehicles continued, output from the ﬁnance 
sector picked up somewhat as lending for manufacturing, tourism, and 
personal use increased. Tourism, though a niche activity, recorded a 
nice gain. Agriculture saw a marginal pickup in growth, but its share in 
GDP is small.
Consumer prices are highly volatile because of heavy dependence on 
imports, which supply about half of goods, both food and nonfood, with 
most supplies coming from India. In FY2014, average annual inﬂation 
accelerated to 9.6% from 8.8% in the previous year, due mainly to high 
prices for food, with price pressures coming from India as well as 
domestic markets (Figure 3.16.2). Food inﬂation peaked at 14.5% in the 
fourth quarter of 2013, then receded to 5.9% a year later. Inﬂation for 
other expenditures was fairly stable, averaging 7.8% in FY2014.
The ﬁscal deﬁcit in FY2014 equaled 4.1% of GDP, marginally lower 
than in the previous year but higher than the government’s target of 
3.0% on average over the Eleventh Five-Year Plan, FY2014–FY2018. 
Preliminary estimates show domestic revenue growing by only 3.7%, 
much more slowly than in previous years as import restrictions cut 
into tax earnings. Although domestic revenue at 19.6% of GDP was able 
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to fully cover current expenditure at 17.2%, the remaining balance fell 
short of ﬁnancing the government’s target of covering 15% of capital 
expenditure. Grants picked up to equal 10% of GDP but were insufficient 
in FY2014 to cover the remainder of capital expenditure (Figure 3.16.3).
Money supply grew by 6.6%, much less than in FY2013, reﬂecting 
slower increases in net foreign assets and bank credit (Figure 3.16.4). 
Growth in credit to the private sector remained tame at 6.4%, slightly 
less than in the previous year, as temporary credit restrictions continued 
in some sectors, having been imposed in 2012 to address excessive 
consumption and a severe shortage of Indian rupee reserves. 
To strengthen ﬁnancial and liquidity management, the Royal 
Monetary Authority adopted new monetary and macroprudential 
policies in the banking sector, including new risk-weighting 
requirements for various loans, the imposition of loan-to-value caps 
for housing and vehicle loans, and a loan-to-income cap of 70% for 
consumer loans. The ﬁscal authority also implemented demand-
management policies such as revised taxes and import duties on 
vehicles and a new green tax on fuel. With these new measures in place, 
the monetary and ﬁscal authorities have begun to gradually remove 
temporary measures, lifting in February 2014 the import and foreign 
exchange restrictions on furniture and alcohol and in September the 
remaining restrictions on credit and imports. 
The current account deﬁcit improved slightly from 27.3% of GDP 
in FY2013 to 25.5% in FY2014, owing to lower deﬁcits in the trade and 
primary income accounts (Figure 3.16.5). Restrictions caused imports 
to fall by 5%, narrowing the trade deﬁcit. Lower interest payments in 
FY2014—largely reﬂecting the full liquidation of overdraft loans from 
India obtained during the rupee crises—helped reduce the primary 
income deﬁcit. Financial net inﬂows fell but were still substantial at 
13.0% of GDP. With a hefty increase in investment grants from India, 
the capital account rose to 14.8% of GDP, and the overall balance 
remained in surplus, albeit substantially lower than in the previous year. 
At the end of FY2014, the overall balance of payments surplus 
stood at $98.7 million, or 5.4% of GDP, and gross international reserves 
increased to $997.9 million, equivalent to 13 months of imports (Figure 
3.16.6). Of total reserves, $829.3 million was in convertible currency. 
Indian rupee reserves, equivalent to $168.6 million, were 16.9% of total 
reserves, which was a marked improvement from the miniscule balance 
in FY2012.
Economic prospects
Economic recovery is set to continue, and high growth rates are 
projected over the next 2 years. The industry sector, comprising about 
four-tenths of GDP, will continue to drive the economy, bolstered 
by the construction of new hydropower including the Nikachhu and 
Kholongchhu  plants and increased electricity output from the new 
Dagachhu plant, which opened early this year. 
Growth in services is expected to accelerate as trade and ﬁnance 
activities gather pace with temporary restrictions being lifted. Expansion 
will not be at the rates seen during the severe rupee shortages in previous 
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years, however, as new monetary and ﬁscal measures and better bank 
regulation are expected to help rein in excessive consumption spending. 
Tourism is expected to be robust with the government declaring 2015 to 
be Visit Bhutan Year. Over the ﬁrst half of FY2015, tourist arrivals grew at 
an astonishing 43.1% and revenue by 18.4%. 
Inﬂation in the ﬁrst half of FY2015 slowed to 7.5%, as food and other 
prices eased from their highs in the previous year in line with lower 
inﬂation in India. Inﬂation is expected to ease further to an average of 
7.0% this year and 6.8% next year. The improved inﬂation outlook comes 
from price moderation in India and forecasts of declining world oil prices, 
which will help offset increases in domestic power tariffs. 
The government plans to narrow the ﬁscal deﬁcit to 2.7% of GDP 
in FY2015 with revenue-enhancing reforms such as new tax measures 
on fuel and telecommunication services, a revised tax and import duty 
on vehicles, and revised export tariffs. Current expenditure is expected 
to grow by 13.7%, mainly on planned increases in infrastructure 
maintenance and civil service salaries. While capital expenditure is 
currently set much lower than last year at Nu15.2 billion, it may be revised 
when grant funding is secured during the year.
The current account deﬁcit is projected to widen over the next 2 years 
to about 30% of GDP as the trade deﬁcit expands to accommodate large 
imports of goods related to hydropower investments. Although exports 
will also strengthen as electricity exports to India increase, adequate 
inﬂows of external funding—mostly hydropower loans and budgetary 
investment grants from India—are projected to keep the overall balance of 
payments in surplus.
Policy challenge—enhancing agriculture for 
more inclusive growth
Since the hydropower subsector began its development in the 1980s, the 
share of agriculture in GDP has been steadily displaced, falling from 
over half to about 13% and contributing in the past decade only 8% of 
annual GDP growth. Agriculture remains crucially important, however, 
as it employs 56% of the workforce and it is the main source of income 
in rural Bhutan. The challenge is to improve the sector to help achieve 
more balanced and inclusive growth in the economy and contribute to 
poverty reduction. 
Growth in agricultural production in constant terms averaged 2.1% 
per annum in the 1980s, declined to –1.0% in the 1990s, and picked up to 
3.5% over the recent decade to 2011. Similarly, growth in food product 
exports in constant terms improved substantially to average over the 
recent decade 2.8% growth per annum. Over half of Bhutan’s food 
exports are processed fruits and vegetables, and about a quarter are 
spices. With respect to export destinations, most processed fruits and 
vegetables go to India, about a third to Bangladesh, and the balance to 
newer markets in Japan, Singapore, Thailand, and Hong Kong, China. 
Constraints on agriculture and economic diversiﬁcation in Bhutan 
are legion: rough topography, limited arable land, lack of infrastructure, 
ﬂuctuating yields, inadequate market links, and high transaction costs. 
3.16.6 Gross international reserves
$ million Months of imports
0
3
6
9
12
15
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Rupee
Convertible currency
Total reserves
Rupee reserves
Note: Years are ﬁscal years, ending on 30 June of that year.
Source: Royal Monetary Authority of Bhutan. 2014. Annual 
Report FY2013/14. http://www.rma.org.bt
3.16.7 Most problematic factors for 
exporting
Score
Factor
0 5 10 15 20
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
1 = Identifying potential markets and buyers, 2 = Difficulties in 
meeting quality or quantity requirements of buyers, 3 = Access 
to imported inputs at competitive prices, 4 = Inappropriate 
production technology and skills, 5 = Access to trade ﬁnance, 
6 = High cost or delays caused by domestic transportation, 7 = 
Technical requirements and standards abroad, 8 = Corruption 
at foreign borders, 9 = Burdensome procedures at foreign 
borders, 10 = High cost or delays caused by international 
transportation, 11 = Tariff barriers abroad, 12 = Rules of origin 
requirements abroad.
Source: World Economic Forum.  2014. The Global Enabling 
Trade Report 2014. http://www3.weforum.org
3.16.1 Selected economic indicators (%)
2015 2016
GDP growth 6.8 7.0
Inﬂation 7.0 6.8
Current account balance 
(share of GDP)
-30.6 -30.6
Source: ADB estimates. 
180  Asian Development Outlook 2015
In addition, export businesses cite at the top of their list of problems 
difficult entry into potential markets and meeting their quality 
requirements (Figure 3.16.7). 
One advantage that Bhutan does have in relation to its neighbors is 
seasonal diversity, allowing it to produce a wider range of crops. And, 
compared with other landlocked countries, and with developing Asia 
as a whole, Bhutan scores well on enabling trade, and fares even better 
on foreign market access (Figure 3.16.8). Recent progress in improving 
agricultural production can be reinforced by modernizing farming 
technology, improving yield and productivity, and addressing market 
constraints and infrastructure challenges. This would help to expand 
food exports and boost rural incomes.
The government’s current ﬁve-year plan identiﬁes agriculture as a 
key entry point to address poverty and to augment economic growth by 
accelerating agricultural growth from the current average of 2.4% to 
at least 4.0% annually. The plan promotes commercial over subsistence 
farming and aims to engage the private sector to improve farm 
productivity. Bhutan plans to strategically position itself by expanding 
agriculture’s export base and markets where it has comparative 
advantage, in fruit, vegetables, and spices. Product differentiation to 
create proﬁtable niche products is recognized as crucial to agricultural 
development. Strategic diversiﬁcation into new markets, particularly the 
emerging Asian economies, could help expand the export base. Success 
will depend on overcoming supply-side constraints, logistics challenges, 
and trade barriers.
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India
Growth picked up in 2014, inflation markedly declined, and the external position was comfortable, 
helped by positive policies and lower global oil prices. The outlook is for economic strengthening 
through higher infrastructure spending, increased fiscal devolution to states, and continued reform to 
financial and monetary policy. The government underscored its intention to move steadily to tackle 
politically difficult structural issues that have stalled investment and limited economic performance 
in recent years.
Economic performance
A more robust economic performance than was earlier indicated 
emerges from revised data based on an updated base year, wider 
coverage of goods and services, and the inclusion of tax data to estimate 
economic activity. Real growth was previously estimated as a change in 
volume, but the new series estimates value added at each stage. 
The government’s initial estimates for FY2014 (ending 31 March 
2015) show that economic growth accelerated to 7.4% (Figure 3.17.1). 
Agriculture growth slipped to 1.1% in FY2014 largely because the 
monsoon was erratic, particularly affecting the summer crop. The 
production of food grains contracted by 3.2% from FY2013.
After growing by 4.5% in FY2013, industry accelerated to 5.9% in 
FY2014, helped by a 6.8% expansion in manufacturing. These estimates 
may be a tad optimistic, however, as they assume manufacturing growth 
to have exceeded 10% in the ﬁnal quarter of FY2014. Monthly industrial 
production estimates indicate a more modest upturn. The production 
of capital goods expanded after 3 years in the red. However, consumer 
durables continued to decline. Improved coal production helped double 
the growth of electricity generation over the previous year’s rate.
Service sector growth rose to 10.6% in FY2014. Financial services 
received a boost from the government’s new ﬁnancial inclusion scheme, 
under which new depositors have opened 125 million accounts. An uptick 
in industrial activity enhanced the growth of trade and transport services. 
Private consumption growth increased to 7.1% (Figure 3.17.2). 
Declining oil prices, weakening food inﬂation, improved job 
prospects, and a stable currency helped lift consumer conﬁdence, 
though moderation in rural wage growth could have dampened rural 
consumption. Despite the policy momentum toward resolving issues 
that have constrained investment, growth in capital formation inched up 
only to 4.1% in FY2014. While the pace slowed as the year progressed, 
the initial estimates point to recovery in the last quarter of FY2014.   
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Consumer price inﬂation fell sharply over the course of the year to 
average below 7% in FY2014. Food inﬂation moderated considerably, 
helped by a limited increase in minimum support prices for food grains, 
muted rural wage growth, and the government’s offloading of food 
stocks. A sharp drop in global oil prices helped moderate fuel inﬂation, 
though hikes in excise duty limited the pass-through of global oil prices 
to domestic retail prices. The central bank’s strong anti-inﬂationary 
stance and the declining trend in the ﬁscal deﬁcit bode well for core 
inﬂation, which dropped to below 5% (Figure 3.17.3).
After maintaining an anti-inﬂationary stance during most of FY2014, 
despite retail inﬂation declining by almost 400 basis points from April to 
December 2014, the central bank reduced key interest rates by 50 basis 
points in the fourth quarter of FY2014 (Figure 3.17.4). The move came 
after inﬂation had fallen signiﬁcantly below the 8% target for January 
2015 and because inﬂation was likely to continue to average less than 6% 
to January 2016. The central bank eased requirements on the portion of 
deposits that banks must invest in government bonds by 50 basis points 
to 21.5%, to encourage banks to onlend for productive uses.
February 2015 saw a monetary policy framework formalized 
under which the primary objective is to maintain price stability while 
remaining mindful of growth. The central bank is expected to bring 
consumer price inﬂation down to 6% by January 2016, with the target 
for inﬂation being 4% ±2% from FY2016.
The quality of banks’ assets continues to be a matter of concern. 
The ratio of nonperforming assets (NPAs) to total advances deteriorated 
from 3.4% in March 2013 to 4.5% in September 2014 (Figure 3.17.5). 
A major part of the NPAs are with government-owned banks, whose 
NPA ratio rose to 5.3% in September 2014. Much of the rise reﬂects 
a corporate sector stressed by high leverage and adverse business 
conditions. In addition, restructured loans have continued to proliferate, 
their ratio growing to 6.2% of all loans in the ﬁrst half of FY2014. More 
than half of these loans are concentrated in infrastructure, iron and 
steel, textiles, and power. 
The government’s ﬁnancial inclusion scheme to universalize banking 
access introduces several innovations, including insurance provided up 
front to subscribers, mobile banking, and the issuance of debit cards 
with overdraft facility. 
The central government’s budget deﬁcit is estimated at 4.1% in 
FY2014, below the 4.4% recorded in FY2013. The reduction in the deﬁcit 
came largely from curtailed expenditure, as revenue growth remained 
sluggish. While most major tax revenue segments underperformed their 
original targets, growth in corporate and service taxes was especially 
subdued. A sharp drop in global oil prices provided an opportunity to 
garner additional revenue by raising excise duty on various petroleum 
products. Receipts from asset sales increased in the last quarter of 
FY2014 but still fell well below target. 
Expenditure grew by 7.8% in FY2014, less than the targeted 12.9%. 
However, as in previous years, much of the burden of expenditure 
compression fell on capital expenditure, which grew by 2.5%, only a 
fraction of the 20.8% growth target. In contrast, current expenditure 
grew by 8.5%.The drop in global oil prices, deregulation of diesel prices, 
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and limited increase in minimum support prices helped contain the 
subsidy bill, which was 2.1% of GDP.
A commission set up by the government every 5 years to advise on 
revenue distribution between the center and the states, as well as among 
the states, has recommended increasing the share of tax devolved from 
the center to the states from the current 32% to 42%. It advises local 
bodies and states to explore municipal bonds for funding infrastructure. 
With a view to facilitating the introduction of the uniform goods and 
services tax, the commission recommended a tapering compensation 
package for the states for 5 years to reimburse their lost revenues. 
After moderating to 1.7% of GDP in FY2013 from record heights 
in the previous 2 years, the current account deﬁcit is estimated to 
have narrowed further to 1.5% of GDP in FY2014 (Figure 3.17.6). The 
improvement largely reﬂected a compressed trade deﬁcit in FY2014 
as imports grew by only 2.0%. Oil imports, which account for nearly 
one-third of all imports, declined by about 15% as global prices fell 
sharply. The relaxation of restrictions on gold imports imposed in 
FY2013 spurred gold import growth over the previous year, which was 
more than offset by the decline in oil imports.  
Export growth moderated to 2.3% in FY2014. The double-digit 
growth witnessed in the ﬁrst quarter slowed considerably in subsequent 
months, tracking slowdowns in the People’s Republic of China and 
the European Union that impacted external demand, and declining 
oil prices because they affected export of reﬁned petroleum products. 
Higher services exports and a slight increase in remittances helped to 
narrow the current account deﬁcit.
A decisive election result, improved ﬁscal and current account 
deﬁcits, and some movement toward resolving structural bottlenecks 
buoyed investor sentiment and foreign capital inﬂows. Net portfolio 
investment inﬂow recovered strongly to over $35 billion in FY2014, after 
recording unusually low levels in FY2013. Foreign direct investment 
revived on improved growth prospects, while low interest rates in 
advanced economies aided external commercial borrowings. 
An improved current account deﬁcit and boisterous capital ﬂows 
helped reserves increase by $33 billion in FY2014 to over $337 billion 
(Figure 3.17.7). Despite the rise in reserves, import cover continues to be 
well short of historical norms. 
The healthy external position was reﬂected in exchange rate 
developments. The Indian rupee remained within a narrow range 
against the US dollar during FY2014, compared to depreciation of 7.0% 
and 9.0% in the previous 2 years (Figure 3.17.8).
Economic prospects
A further pickup in economic growth would be contingent on 
accelerated investment. Prospects look promising at this stage, though 
signiﬁcant challenges remain. Policy momentum toward addressing 
structural bottlenecks that hampered the investment climate is 
likely to provide a ﬁllip to the investment cycle. Investor sentiment 
should improve with government measures to remove bottlenecks to 
investment: expediting environment and forest clearances, easing land 
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acquisition for building infrastructure and industrial corridors, allowing 
the auction of coal mines to the private sector, and easing the burden 
of compliance with labor laws for small and medium-sized enterprises. 
While these measures show the government’s commitment to pushing 
through reforms, some have been introduced through executive 
orders and will become void without legislative ratiﬁcation within the 
stipulated time frame. This leaves uncertainty for investors. 
The Project Monitoring Group set up by the cabinet in mid-2013 to 
facilitate clearances for large infrastructure projects has cleared projects 
worth $105 billion, equal to 4.8% of GDP. This has helped to revive some 
stalled projects. According to the data from the Centre for Monitoring 
Indian Economy, announcements of new projects in the year ending in 
December 2014 reached their highest level since 2011 (Figure 3.17.9). 
Industry is likely to record an uptick in growth. Mining clearances 
and auctions of coal mines will provide a ﬁllip to mining and electricity 
generation. Manufacturing will receive a boost from the government’s 
ﬂagship Make in India program, which aims to induce businesses 
around the world to invest in manufacturing by providing infrastructure 
and streamlining regulations. A benign inﬂation outlook would serve to 
help monetary policy support growth.
The HSBC India manufacturing purchasing managers’ index rose 
in December 2014 to its highest in over 2 years before slipping a bit in 
January and February 2015 (Figure 3.17.10). Current indicators such as 
output, and forward indicators including domestic and export orders, 
have both improved over previous months. Despite some weakening 
in the most recent quarter ending December 2014, the central bank’s 
business expectation index continues to be at its highest in the past 
2 years, indicating improved sentiment on production and exports 
(Figure 3.17.11). 
A pickup in growth in the advanced economies would provide a 
boost to tradable services like ﬁnance, software design, and business 
services. The HSBC India services index revealed expansion for the 
ninth consecutive month in January 2015, helped by sustained growth 
in new business. 
On balance, GDP growth is expected to accelerate to 7.8% in 
FY2015 on improved performance in both industry and services as 
policy addresses structural bottlenecks and external demand improves. 
Growth is expected to edge up further to 8.2% in FY2016, helped by a 
supportive monetary policy in 2015, as inﬂation continues to trend lower 
and by a pickup in capital expenditure.
Consumer inﬂation is expected to decline further to 5.0% in FY2015 
as inﬂation is restrained by muted hikes in rural wages and minimum 
support prices and by the government’s offloading of excess stocks. 
With control on gas and diesel prices lifted, domestic fuel inﬂation will 
be largely determined by global oil price movements. The expectation 
that the price will be about $65 per barrel in 2015 bodes well for fuel 
inﬂation. After rising by double-digits for nearly 5 years, inﬂation 
expectations of households dropped to around 9% in December 2014. 
This would help moderate core inﬂation. Inﬂation is likely to pick up 
marginally to 5.5% in FY2016 as global oil prices ﬁrm and improved 
economic prospects lift demand.
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With consumer inﬂation likely to remain within the central bank’s 
target band, and with a move toward ﬁscal consolidation outlined in the 
budget, policy rates are likely to be cut a bit more in FY2015. However, 
aggressive interest rate cuts are unlikely with a new monetary policy 
framework focused more on inﬂation and an uptick in the growth rate 
closing the output gap. The framework should improve coordination 
between monetary and ﬁscal policy. 
The government set a ﬁscal deﬁcit of 3.9% of GDP for FY2015, 
pushing back the medium-term ﬁscal deﬁcit target of 3.0% by a year 
to FY2017 (Figure 3.17.12). The adjustment allows additional spending 
that will fund larger infrastructure investment. At the same time, the 
limited decline in the revenue deﬁcit from 2.9% in FY2014 to 2.8% in 
FY2015 continues to be a matter of concern. Tax revenue is projected 
to grow at 15.8%, helped by hikes in rates for customs duty and excise 
and service taxes. However, a larger outgo to the states will mean only 
marginal growth in tax revenue for the center. The disinvestment target 
of 0.5% of GDP could be on the ambitious side, given the failure of the 
government to meet the FY2014 target despite a buoyant stock market.
The expenditure mix is expected to improve signiﬁcantly, with capital 
expenditure growing by a robust 25.5%, well above 3.2% growth for 
current expenditure. This bodes well for capital expenditure, which in 
FY2014 fell to 1.5% of GDP, the lowest in more than a decade. Government 
investment in infrastructure for energy, transport, and industry is 
projected to rise by 25% and renew the investment cycle. While the 
share of subsidies as a percentage of GDP is expected to fall from 2.1% in 
FY2014 to 1.7% in FY2015, the decline is largely from lower fuel subsidies 
allowed by lower global oil prices and from leakage plugged through cash 
transfers. Fertilizer and food subsidies remain elevated, with no clear 
roadmap to prune them or improve their targeting.
With global oil prices expected to be about 35% lower in 2015 than 
in the previous year, oil imports are expected to signiﬁcantly contract in 
FY2015. In contrast, gold imports are likely to increase with the removal 
of most of the restrictions imposed in 2013, but their extent will be 
limited by positive real interest rates, lower inﬂationary expectations, 
and reduced incentives to hoard gold. Moreover, higher gold imports 
will continue to be more than offset by the decline in oil imports. 
Accelerating economic activity is likely to push up imports other than 
commodities. On balance, imports are likely to contract by 1.1% in 
FY2015. Export growth is expected to be at 3.2% as global growth 
momentum improves and moderating inﬂation boosts competitiveness. 
However, lower oil prices will drag down export of petroleum products. 
Higher growth prospects in the advanced economies will boost 
remittance inﬂows. The current account deﬁcit in FY2015 is expected to 
equal 1.1% of GDP, signiﬁcantly less than in FY2014 (Figure 3.17.13).
In FY2016, the current account deﬁcit will expand to 1.5% as 
recovering oil prices raise oil imports. Rising industry and investment 
will raise demand for imports other than commodities, bringing 
overall import growth to 5%. Further growth recovery in the advanced 
economies would boost exports, and petroleum exports would beneﬁt 
from higher oil prices. Overall, export growth is likely to inch up to 7%. 
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Improved growth prospects and a stable currency will continue 
to attract portfolio capital inﬂows. However, with more than 80% of 
the cap on foreign investment in the bond market already achieved, 
additional inﬂows to the bond market would be limited. Investors’ 
optimism about India’s growth prospects is readily seen in the increase 
in portfolio investment, which helped to lift stock prices on the Bombay 
Stock Exchange Sensex by about 29% in FY2014 (Figure 3.17.14). Net 
foreign direct investment inﬂows are likely to increase on better growth 
prospects, liberalized ceilings in several sectors, and the government’s 
focus on improving the ease of doing business and other enabling 
policies under the Make in India program. The proportion of the current 
account deﬁcit that is funded by stable foreign direct investment inﬂows 
is thus expected to increase, mitigating the vulnerability associated with 
volatile capital inﬂows. 
Policy challenge— turning cities into engines of 
growth and job creation
Economic growth, industrialization, and urbanization are intertwined, 
as greater economic growth enables structural transformation with 
increased workforce migration from agriculture into more productive 
industry and services. As these sectors are usually based in cities, 
industrialization naturally promotes urbanization. Economic growth 
raises per capita income, prompting people to migrate from rural 
areas to cities in search for a better standard of living. Thus, cities 
can act as engines of faster and inclusive growth through the forward 
and backward linkages they create through markets, demand for raw 
materials, and employment. 
India is urbanizing. The 2011 census found 35% of the population, 
or about 400 million people, living in urban areas. India is expected 
to have by 2030 nearly 600 million living in urban areas, which will 
expand urban areas much faster than ever before. At this juncture, 
the challenge for policy makers is to prepare cities for their role as 
promoters of faster and more inclusive growth. 
In the last 10 years, the urban share of the workforce has been 
stagnant at around 25% to 30%. Further, the share of manufacturing in 
urban employment has been low and largely informal (Figure 3.17.15), 
and almost 75% of the urban population lives on less than $2 per day. 
These statistics indicate that the potential of urbanization to generate 
inclusive growth has not been realized fully.
While several factors are responsible for this, one of the most 
important is the limited synchronization of urban and industrial planning. 
Policy makers in India have mostly treated urbanization and 
industrialization as distinct processes requiring different management 
systems. Urban development agencies have focused on land-use planning 
and service provision with local economic development not being their 
area of focus. Similarly, industrial development agencies have focused 
on the economics of setting up and operationalizing industrial facilities 
but paid less attention to urbanization. This has left urban areas with 
limited industrialization and industrial areas with limited urbanization. 
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As a result, since the 1980s, industry, especially formal 
manufacturing, has prematurely moved away from cities (Figure 
3.17.16). This is because governments have provided incentives for new 
industries to locate in less-developed areas, polluting industries have 
been forced to relocate outside of cities, and land has become costly and 
difficult to consolidate in urban areas partially due to stringent land 
use policies. Consequently, migration from rural to urban areas, which 
usually follows industrialization, has not been fully realized. Much of 
urban population growth from the 1980s to the 2000s has been from 
natural increase, not migration.
Further, most of the new industrial locations, unlike existing cities, 
have only limited support infrastructure and inefficient delivery of 
urban services. Thus, while industries moved out of cities, a large part of 
the workforce stayed. The decline of industrial employment in cities has 
been associated with a rise in skill-intensive service jobs but also with 
low-productivity informal manufacturing jobs, limiting the scope for 
translating urbanization into inclusive growth. 
If India is to reap the beneﬁts of urbanization, it must synchronize 
urban and industrial planning to attract industries back to cities. 
Further, support for infrastructure is needed to realize the full potential 
of industry and services to create forward and backward linkages and so 
achieve inclusive growth. 
An important step in this direction is the Make in India campaign, 
under which various government departments are working in close 
coordination to develop economic corridors. The purpose is to promote 
the development of industry, especially manufacturing, in and around 
cities that are engineered to be smart and sustainable, and along 
transport and freight corridors. The government has announced several 
measures to develop such corridors, including setting up a national 
institution to coordinate, integrate, and supervise their development, 
while improving the ease of doing business through regulatory reform 
and building trunk infrastructure. The successful implementation of 
these measures will ensure the creation of cities that are equipped with 
world-class infrastructure, provide affordable public services, and have a 
business-friendly climate to attract investments.
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Maldives
Growth accelerated last year on expansion in tourism and an impressive revival in construction. 
The outlook is for moderately slower growth on less robust gains in tourism from major tourist 
markets. Higher capital expenditure and the promotion of special economic zones are planned 
toward raising growth potential. However, high public debt requires improved efforts to reduce 
recurrent expenditures and keep budget deficits sustainable.
Economic performance
Government data show economic growth to have accelerated to an 
estimated 6.8% in 2014 from 4.7% in the previous year. Tourism and 
related transport and communication remained key contributors to 
growth, while, in contrast with the previous 2 years, construction 
contributed substantially to expansion (Figure 3.18.1).
Preliminary estimates show that tourism expanded strongly by 6.8%, 
albeit less than the 9.0% growth recorded in 2013. Growth in tourist 
arrivals at 7.1% in 2014 was much less robust than the 17.4% seen in the 
previous year as European economies were sluggish and the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) experienced a slowdown. Asian tourists now 
make up 47% of the market of 1.2 million visitors per year, most of them 
from the PRC. The share from Europe, which used to be the major 
market, has declined to 44% (Figure 3.18.2).
Transport grew robustly by 11.2% and communication by 9.6%, as 
reﬂected by the rapid increase in communication services such as mobile 
cellular and internet subscriptions. Government services likewise grew 
on increased social welfare spending and subsidies.
Construction rebounded substantially, by an estimated 20.6%, after 
a 2.5% contraction in 2013. The bulk of construction is in new resort 
projects and real estate development, notably on Hulhumalé to help 
relieve overcrowding in the nearby capital, Malé. Buoyant construction 
drove up imports of cement, wood, and other construction materials 
by nearly 30.0%. Bank lending to private construction ﬁrms rose 
accordingly. After growing at 5.1% in 2013, agriculture slowed to 2.1% as 
the ﬁsh catch declined. Fish exports, which account for essentially all 
domestic exports, fell by 2.8%, compared with 22.1% expansion in 2013.
Average inﬂation moderated to 2.4% in 2014 from 4.0% in 2013, 
mainly on declining world commodity and fuel prices as well as 
weakening domestic ﬁsh prices. Monthly inﬂation throughout the year 
was low, ranging from 1.1% to 3.5% and trending downward in a seesaw 
pattern (Figure 3.18.3). 
Fiscal policy was expansionary, with total expenditure increasing by 
20.6% from 3.5% growth last year. Current expenditure, which makes up 
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over 80% of total expenditure, rose by 17.1%, largely on increased social 
welfare beneﬁts, pension payments, and subsidies for food, medicine, 
electricity. Capital expenditure increased by 40.4% but still comprised 
only about 18% of the ﬁscal budget. Revenue and grants grew rapidly by 
25.3%, owing mainly to increases in the business proﬁts tax, the tourism 
goods and service tax, and nontax revenues. Based on reported ﬁscal 
data, the budget deﬁcit is estimated to have narrowed to 3.2% of GDP 
from 3.9% in 2013 (Figure 3.18.4). The International Monetary Fund 
estimates, however, that the Maldives budget deﬁcit widened to 11.6% of 
GDP in 2014 from 7.8% in 2013.
Government ﬁnancing of the deﬁcit was funded largely through 
treasury bills bought primarily by domestic sources, mostly banks 
and other ﬁnancial corporations. Total domestic claims on the central 
government increased from 40.7% of GDP in 2013 to 44.3% in 2014 
(Figure 3.18.5). Notably, all outstanding loans granted by the Maldives 
Monetary Authority (MMA) to the government were retired and 
replaced with treasury bonds, which nearly doubled to Rf6.4 billion. 
External public debt increased by 5.6% to $789.5 million in 2014, 
amounting to 26.1% of GDP. Total public debt was estimated at 70.4% 
of GDP at the end of 2014, about 2 percentage points higher than a year 
earlier.
Monetary stance has been accommodative because inﬂation is low 
and credit growth slowing. The MMA has moved to stimulate lending by 
reducing in February 2014 the minimum reserve requirements for banks 
from 25% to 20%, halving in September the overnight deposit facility 
interest rate to 1.5%, and cutting the overnight Lombard policy rate to 
10% from 12% (Figure 3.18.6). Despite these efforts, bank lending rates 
for the private sector stayed elevated, though the rate eased somewhat 
for public corporations (Figure 3.18.7).The MMA reintroduced in April 
the ﬁxed-rate tap system for issuing treasury bills, and the rates were 
since set at 7.5% for the 28-day bill and 8.0% for the 91-day bill. 
Credit to the private sector was depressed by net repayments for 
most of 2014 but began to pick up in the last quarter and, at year-end, 
was up slightly by 3.3% as lending for construction and commerce 
increased while lending for tourism continued to fall (Figure 3.18.8). 
Growth in credit to the public sector slowed from 12.9% in 2013 to 7.4% 
in 2014. The large overall balance of payments surplus substantially 
increased the MMA’s net foreign assets, and with suspended open 
market operations from May, banks’ reserves with the MMA expanded 
by almost half, and with them banks’ ability to lend. Growth in broad 
money eased to 14.7% from 18.4% in 2013.
The current account deﬁcit is estimated to have widened to 9.6% 
of GDP from 6.5% in 2013 as higher imports outweighed increased 
tourism receipts (Figure 3.18.9). Merchandise imports rose by 16.8% 
in 2014, much more than in the previous year, on robust imports of 
construction materials. This widened the trade deﬁcit to 54.8% of GDP 
as exports remained small. With capital and ﬁnancial inﬂows double 
those of a year earlier, the overall balance of payments moved to a 
large surplus estimated at nearly $250 million, and gross international 
reserves climbed to $614.7 million, sufficient to cover 3.7 months of 
merchandise imports.
3.18.3  Inflation
2013 2014
%
−5
0
5
10
15
20
Jan Apr Jul Oct Ja n Apr Jul OctDec
Consumer price index
Food, including ﬁsh
Housing, water, electricity, & gas
Source: National Bureau of Statistics. 2015. Consumer Price 
Index. January. http://www.planning.gov.mv
3.18.4  Fiscal indicators
Forecast
% of GDP
−10
0
10
20
30
40
50
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Domestic revenue
Grants
Recurrent expenditure
Capital expenditure
Fiscal deﬁcit
 
Source: Maldives Monetary Authority. 2015. Monthly 
Statistics. February. http://www.mma.gov.mv
3.18.5  Government domestic debt
% of GDP
0
15
30
45
60
2008 2010 2012 2014
Treasury bills
Treasury bonds held by MMA
Loans from Maldives Monetary Authority
Others
Loans from other ﬁnancial corporation
2009 2011 2013
MMA = Maldives Monetary Authority.
Source: Maldives Monetary Authority. 2015. Monthly 
Statistics. February. http://www.mma.gov.mv
190  Asian Development Outlook 2015
Economic prospects 
GDP growth is forecast to average 6.3% in 2015 and ease to 5.1% in 
2016. Tourism is projected to see growth rebound to 8.3% in 2015 as 
the government forecasts 13.0% growth in tourist arrivals. The launch 
of three new ﬂights to the PRC this year and a strengthened promotion 
campaign support this projection. Tourism expansion will moderate 
in 2016 in light of the low growth outlook in tourist source economies. 
Growth in related transport and communication is expected to follow 
a similar trend. Construction will continue to expand but at a moderate 
pace of 8.0% in 2015 off the high base in 2014. Construction is expected 
to grow at similar rate in 2016 as work gathers pace on government 
infrastructure and private investments connected with the new special 
economic zones.
With increased import duties from April 2015 on about 17 goods—
including tobacco, alcohol, land vehicles, and construction materials—
inﬂation is projected to accelerate slightly to 3.0% in 2015 before easing 
back to 2.5% as the base effect weakens and global prices remain low. 
The trade deﬁcit is expected to narrow substantially over the next 2 
years on much slower growth in petroleum products, a major purchase 
for the Maldives, and other imports whose prices follow petroleum, as 
well as more moderate growth in construction. Tourism projections 
inform a forecast that the current account deﬁcit will narrow to just 
over 6% of GDP. 
The government intends to further consolidate ﬁnances, reducing 
the ﬁscal deﬁcit over the next 2 years to average just over 3% of GDP. 
New revenue measures include increased import duties, the new green 
tax of $6 per visitor night, and new leases on 10 islands for resorts. 
Policy measures to consolidate spending include improved regulation of 
public sector employment and preparations to better target government 
subsidies on electricity and food.
A risk to the outlook arises from the arrest in February of the ﬁrst 
democratically elected president, who narrowly lost the 2013 contest 
and became the opposition leader. This may revive violence like that 
experienced in 2012 as the country heads into parliamentary elections 
in April.
Policy challenge—developing infrastructure 
across a disbursed archipelago 
Infrastructure development is essential to diversify the economic base 
beyond tourism and support sustainable growth in the Maldives. The 
archipelago’s stark vulnerability to climate change further accentuates 
the importance of investment in infrastructure to enhance productivity 
growth and the resilience necessary to mitigate the economic volatility 
likely to accompany climate change. However, the population in the 
Maldives is small at only 350,000. About a third is concentrated in 
the capital, Malé, and the rest is thinly dispersed over more than 180 
inhabited islands (Figure 3.18.10). Infrastructure investment is costly 
for lack of economies of scale, raising the cost per capita of inclusive 
infrastructure investment. 
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The current infrastructure gap is inequitable. Although virtually 
all Maldivians have electricity, diesel-fuelled generation is expensive. 
Diesel imports, mostly for power generation, cost around $300 million 
in 2013. Despite signiﬁcant government subsidization of diesel at over 
8%, difficult transport keeps supply unreliable, particularly in the 
outer islands. Renewable energy production is thus a priority of the 
government, which aims to become carbon neutral by 2020. To this 
end, local solar and wind generator projects are being developed. 
Difficult fuel supply also drives up the cost of transport and 
freshwater. Sea transport remains the sole mode of transport between 
most islands. As transport uses diesel, services to outer islands are 
expensive and irregular. Limited access to safe water on the outer 
islands was exacerbated by the devastating tsunami of 2004, which 
damaged water-supply infrastructure and contaminated groundwater 
supplies. Many islands turned to diesel-operated desalination, which is 
effective but more costly than tapping groundwater.
Recognized the archipelago’s infrastructure deﬁcit, the government 
nearly doubled the budget of the Public Sector Investment Program in 
2015 to Rf6.3 billion from Rf3.5 billion last year. This is to fund water 
supply and harbor projects, electricity generation, airport upgrading, 
and sewage and waste collection systems. Inevitably, however, not 
all desirable investments will be ﬁnancially feasible, so careful cost–
beneﬁt analysis is required to select the best investments. Proposals 
to consolidate the Maldivian population on fewer islands aim to 
address the ﬁnancial constraints and enable more equitable access to 
infrastructure and greater growth opportunities for all. However, the 
beneﬁts to such consolidation need to be carefully weighed against 
social costs through appropriate, broad-based consultation.
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This chapter was written by Chandan Sapkota of the Nepal Resident Mission, ADB, 
Kathmandu.
Nepal
Robust agriculture and remittances boosted growth and the current account surplus. Growth is 
expected to slow this year with an unfavorable monsoon but revive in 2016 as the weather returns 
to normal. Concluding the protracted negotiations over the new constitution would strengthen the 
outlook. Nepal can leave behind dependence on agriculture and remittances for an economy with 
a higher growth trajectory if it invests more in eliminating major deficiencies in infrastructure. 
Economic performance
GDP growth accelerated to 5.2% in FY2014 (ended 15 July 2014) from 
3.5% a year earlier. A favorable monsoon boosted agricultural output 
and a marked increase in remittance income, now amounting to 28.2% 
of GDP, bolstered spending on services, which accounts for over half of 
GDP (Figure 3.19.1). Growth in agriculture, at 4.7%, and in services, at 
6.1%, was the highest in the last 6 years. Industry again advanced only 
marginally at 2.7%, as long hours of power outages and other supply-
side constraints continued to stunt manufacturing and divert to imports 
consumer spending on ﬁnished goods. 
Inﬂation stayed high at an average of 9.1% in FY2014, moderating 
little from 9.9% a year earlier as stubbornly rising food prices offset 
gains from falling prices for other expenditures (Figure 3.19.2). 
Despite a better harvest, food price inﬂation averaged 11.6%, up from 
8.6% a year earlier, as transport costs rose, supply-side bottlenecks 
persisted, and food inﬂation worsened in India, an important supplier. 
In the ﬁrst half of FY2015, year-on-year inﬂation fell to 6.8% by 
January 2015, reﬂecting several downward adjustments to domestic 
fuel prices that have helped to ease nonfood inﬂation, though food 
inﬂation remains elevated.
Despite the timely adoption of the FY2014 budget, actual expenditure 
amounted to just 82.4% of budget allocations, which held spending 
to 20.9% of GDP, only slightly improved from the previous year’s 
depressed level. Budget execution shortfalls reﬂect long-standing 
procedural and procurement inefficiencies that constrain investment 
spending and development. Higher tax collections from a surge in 
imports and efficiency gains in revenue administration allowed revenue, 
including grants, to expand by 21.3%, pushing it to a record 20.8% 
of GDP. The budget balance turned to a deﬁcit of 0.1% of GDP, much less 
than the target deﬁcit of 2.4%, but an improvement on the unintended 
surplus in the previous year (Figure 3.19.3).
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Monetary conditions remained highly accommodative in FY2014. 
The increase in remittance inﬂ ows boosted deposits and bank 
liquidity, and ﬁ nancial institutions struggled to ﬁ nd bankable projects 
immediately ready for investment. The interbank rate hovered at close 
to zero, and weighted average rates for deposits and loans continued 
to ease, leaving real lending rates positive and deposit rates negative 
(Figure 3.19.4). Growth in credit to the private sector was, at 18.3%, more 
contained than the 20.2% expansion recorded in FY2013 (Figure 3.19.5). 
While the central bank has sought to channel credit to productive 
investment and so foster growth, monetary policy cannot compensate 
for inadequate infrastructure, political uncertainty, and other supply-
side constraints that inhibit productive business activity. 
The current account surplus expanded to 4.7% of GDP on large 
remittance inﬂ ows despite an ever-widening trade deﬁ cit (Figure 3.19.6). 
Exports reversed a decline in FY2013 to increase by 5.1% with the help 
of a marked deprecation of the Nepalese rupee, which is pegged to the 
Indian currency. Imports grew by 13.9%, mainly because imports other 
than oil expanded sharply as disposable income rose, though imports of 
petroleum products, about 20% of the total, also recorded a double-digit 
increase. The trade deﬁ cit widened to 30.9% of GDP. Remittance inﬂ ows 
grew by 11.9%, reaching a record 28.2% of GDP. The balance of payments 
surplus climbed to $1.3 billion, and gross foreign exchange reserves hit 
$6.9 billion, equivalent to 10.2 months of imports of goods and services 
(Figure 3.19.7).
Economic prospects 
The economic outlook is less favorable than in FY2014 because 
agricultural output is crimped by a weak monsoon and the political 
situation is ﬂ uid. The Constituent Assembly, the second of which was 
elected in November 2013, failed again to write a new constitution, this 
time by the 22 January 2015 deadline agreed by all political parties. 
There is yet no unanimity among the political parties on how to 
proceed. Many of the outstanding issues that the earlier Constituent 
Assembly failed to resolve remain contentious, leaving uncertainty over 
the future course of politics regarding such basic matters as the number, 
names, and functions of proposed federal states, as well as on the overall 
structure of governance.
The weak monsoon and such natural disasters as ﬂ oods and 
landslides will aff ect the output of paddy, maize, and millet. Industry 
may see better conditions in the medium term following the 
government’s strong commitment under the FY2015 budget to ease 
business regulations by introducing updated policies and legislation, 
though a downside risk is that the unsettled political environment will 
derail legislative action. Nevertheless, news from the power sector 
bolstered business and investor conﬁ dence. The government concluded 
project development agreements in the ﬁ rst half of FY2015 for two 
900-megawatt hydroelectricity projects promoted by Indian investors. 
Considering the unfavorable monsoon and the lingering political 
uncertainty, GDP growth is projected to slow to 4.6% in FY2015, 
less than the government’s revised target of 5.0%. The Ministry of 
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Agricultural Development projects paddy output to drop by 5.1%, 
and maize by 6.0%. Almost half of growth will come from services, 
particularly robust growth in wholesale and retail trade, tourism, and 
transport and communications. The reform-oriented budget calls for 
higher capital expenditure and for total planned spending to increase to 
23.7% of GDP, up by 5 percentage points. This should help to underpin 
growth, especially in construction, even if capital spending falls 
modestly short. Assuming a stable political situation, a normal monsoon, 
a timely budget and its effective execution, and strong remittance 
inﬂows, GDP growth is expected to rebound to 5.1% in FY2016.
Despite the expected agricultural shortfall—and an increase in civil 
service salaries and allowances for a second consecutive year—average 
inﬂation is expected to continue to slow to 7.7%, lower than the target 
set by the central bank in its 2015 monetary policy, as neighboring India 
experiences markedly lower inﬂation and the drop in international oil 
prices passes through as lower administered fuel prices. Food inﬂation 
is expected to ease somewhat but will remain elevated owing to the 
smaller domestic harvest. Inﬂation is projected to edge lower in FY2016 
to 7.3% on a better harvest, broadly stable oil and commodity prices, and 
central bank’s progress in efforts to rein in excess bank liquidity. 
The external position is expected to weaken in FY2015 with lower 
surpluses in the current account and overall balance of payments. 
Though export growth is expected to stay at 5.0% and import growth to 
slow to 10.0% on lower prices for petroleum imports, the improvement 
in the trade deﬁcit will likely be offset by some slowing in remittance 
inﬂows, narrowing the current account surplus to 2.7% of GDP. A pickup 
in export growth, strong remittance inﬂows and tourism receipts, 
and continued low global oil prices are expected to boost the current 
account surplus to 3.5% of GDP in FY2016.
Policy challenge—accelerating capital expenditure 
Capital spending has been persistently weak, with both planned and 
actual spending languishing far below what is required to close the 
infrastructure deﬁcit, which has been estimated to require capital 
spending equal to between 8.2% and 11.8% of GDP per year until 2020 
(Figure 3.19.8). Raising the amount and quality of capital expenditure 
is one of the country’s most pressing challenges. Accelerated capital 
spending is needed to scale up infrastructure investments and thereby 
attract the private investment needed for Nepal to attain higher 
economic growth that is both sustainable and inclusive.
In its provision and quality of infrastructure, Nepal is rated one of the 
least competitive countries in the world, ranked 132 of 147 (Figure 3.19.9). 
Disaggregating aspects of infrastructure, Nepal’s ranking on the quality 
of electricity supply is 136, on air transport infrastructure 129, and on 
roads 115. These dismal ﬁgures indicate that Nepal needs more and better 
investment to foster innovation, make the economy competitive, and 
enhance the efficiency of markets for goods, labor, and ﬁnance. Gross 
ﬁxed capital investment has to be raised to at least 30% of GDP from the 
current 22% to support higher economic growth. Higher public capital 
spending is crucial, as it is the catalyst for private capital investment. 
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Capital spending comprises government spending on, among other 
things, land, buildings, furniture and ﬁttings, civil works, vehicles, 
and plant and machinery. The average planned capital expenditure 
in the past 4 years was 5.6% of GDP, but actual spending averaged 
just 3.3% (Figure 3.19.10). Given Nepal’s huge infrastructure ﬁnancing 
needs, budgeted capital spending is insufficient in itself to bridge the 
infrastructure deﬁcit in such critical sectors as energy, transport, 
water supply and sanitation, irrigation, and telecommunications. 
The government’s recent commitment to meet certain infrastructure 
needs by developing public–private partnerships is an encouraging 
sign that the gap can be closed. A worrying observation, though, is that 
project spending has averaged only 71% of budgeted allocations in the 
past decade, indicating that the government is unable to fully disburse 
allocated funds on time. 
Efficient budget execution has been hampered by bureaucratic 
hassles over project approval and by such structural issues as the 
limited capacity of line ministries to prepare a pipeline of projects 
ready to implement. That projects are included in the budget despite 
lack of readiness has left large sums of money unspent at the end of 
each ﬁscal year. A project will face many problems in execution if it is 
launched without detailed design, clarity about land acquisition, project 
offices properly established and staffed with the required personnel, 
and detailed procurement plans. Further, delays affecting government 
ministries’ project approval and budget release, and inherent 
weaknesses in procurement processes, and contractors’ capacity and 
construction management, have hobbled implementation. Finally, the 
desired acceleration of capital spending has been hampered by political 
interference and by frequent staff turnover that weaken project planning 
and implementation capacity. 
The government recently reached a number of decisions to tackle 
these challenges. It resolved to abolish or shorten some of the processes 
required for project approval at the National Planning Commission, 
require the advance submission of procurement plans for projects 
seeking approval, and provide better mechanisms for planning and 
monitoring projects to troubleshoot in a more effective and timely way 
critical issues that slow project implementation. The government is 
amending the existing Public Procurement Act to remove legislative 
hurdles for accelerated project implementation. Essential to boosting 
the quality and quantity of capital spending are prudent public ﬁnance 
management, better interministerial coordination, the elimination of 
political interference, better qualiﬁed and lower turnover of staff for 
project offices, careful planning and preparation, sound construction 
management, and more diligent project monitoring.
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Pakistan
Government policies narrow the budget deficit, rebuild depleted exchange reserves, and raise 
the growth modestly despite large energy deficits. The outlook is for moderate growth, lower 
inflation, and a stable external position underpinned by low oil prices and stronger growth in the 
advanced economies. These projections assume further progress in the government’s extensive 
program of macroeconomic and structural reforms, as well as manageable political and security 
challenges.
Economic performance
A strong revival in construction and steady expansion in manufacturing 
and services edged GDP growth up to provisional 4.1% in FY2014 (ended 
30 June 2014) from 3.7% in the previous year (Figure 3.20.1). Agriculture 
growth decelerated to 2.1% as a fall in the production of minor crops 
and slow growth in livestock offset rising output in most major crops.
Construction expanded in double digits on larger government 
development expenditure, providing most of the lift to industry. Large-
scale manufacturing, which contributes 80% of manufacturing output, 
grew by 3.9% in FY2014, little changed from FY2013. Energy shortages 
continued to suppress manufacturing output despite efforts to improve 
energy supply and management. Textiles (21% of manufacturing), food, 
petroleum products, automobiles, and cement expanded at a slightly 
slower pace, but leather products saw strong gains, as did fertilizer with 
improved supply of natural gas for the sector. Expansion in services, 
which comprise nearly 60% of GDP, slowed to 4.3% in FY2014 from 
4.9% in the previous year. Weaker growth in transport and government 
services offset rapid growth in wholesale and retail trade.
Increased remittances and likely growth in rural and small business 
income markedly boosted private consumption expenditure and, with 
government consumption, essentially accounted for all the rise in 
domestic demand (Figure 3.20.2). Investment remained stagnant and 
contributed only 0.2 percentage points to GDP growth despite improved 
credit to the private sector. Fixed investment as a share of GDP declined 
from 12.6% to 12.4% in FY2014. Net exports turned negative, reﬂecting 
higher import growth. 
Headline inﬂation rose to 8.6% in FY2014 from 7.4% the year 
before. The surge was led by food price acceleration reﬂecting short 
supply, rising utility prices, and an increase in the general sales tax by 
1 percentage point. The depreciation of the Pakistan rupee against the 
US dollar raised prices for imports. To control inﬂation, the State Bank 
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of Pakistan, the central bank, raised its policy rate by 50 basis points in 
September and again in November 2013, to 10%.
The consolidated budget deﬁcit narrowed to 5.5% from 8.2% in 
FY2013 (Figure 3.20.3). Revenues rose by 22% with strong growth for 
the second year in a row in nontax revenues, reﬂecting sharp increases 
in central bank proﬁts, inﬂows under the Coalition Support Fund and 
the Pakistan Development Fund, proceeds from the auction of 3G/4G 
spectrum licenses, and the utilization of the Universal Support Fund. 
Despite 16.7% growth in tax collection by the Federal Board of Revenue, 
the target set in the budget was missed, as in previous years. Improving 
the low ratio of tax to GDP (10.1% in FY2014) continues to be a key 
policy challenge.
Total expenditure grew by 9.2% in FY2014 over the previous year 
as provincial expenditure fell short and subsidies declined. Subsidies 
contracted by 16.8% in FY2014 as those to the power sector were 
contained by an increase in electricity tariffs. Subsidies still remained 
above the budget target, totaling PRs309 billion or 1.2% of GDP. The 
exclusion of power sector arrears for FY2014, estimated at 0.9% of GDP, 
helped lower accounted expenditures. Interest payments and defense 
expenditures each increased by over 15%. Consolidated development 
spending expanded by 46.2%, reﬂecting an enlarged public sector 
development program, but spending was below target by 14.4%. 
The smaller budget deﬁcit was ﬁnanced with large foreign inﬂows in 
the second half of FY2014. Government borrowing from domestic banks 
fell signiﬁcantly to PRs323 billion from PRs1.4 trillion in the previous 
year (3.20.4). This created space for better provision of credit to private 
ﬁrms in food, textiles, telecoms, and energy for working capital, ﬁxed 
investment, and trade ﬁnance—allowing credit to the private sector 
to balloon to PRs298 billion from PRs17 billion in FY2013. Consumer 
ﬁnancing doubled in FY2014 from a small base.
Public debt decreased as a share of GDP by 0.6 percentage points 
to 64.8% in FY2014 (Figure 2.20.5). The government’s domestic debt 
stock increased only marginally, by 0.4 percentage points to 43.2% 
of GDP. The maturity proﬁle of domestic debt improved with an 
increased share of long-term debt largely comprising 3-year investment 
bonds. Public external debt and liabilities increased to 22.1% of GDP 
from 21.9% in FY2013. To guide policy, the government produced the 
country’s ﬁrst medium-term debt-management strategy, which assesses 
different ﬁnancing strategies and their associated costs and risks under 
alternative scenarios for interest and exchange rates. 
The current account deﬁcit widened slightly to 1.3% of GDP in 
FY2014 from 1.1% a year earlier as imports growth picked up while 
exports rose only modestly. Remittances were robust, growing at 13.7%. 
The services deﬁcit widened because Coalition Support Fund inﬂows fell 
to $1.0 billion from $1.8 billion in FY2013. Financing the current account 
deﬁcit were strong foreign inﬂows through eurobond placements, 
the one-off receipt of a $1.5 billion external grant, the sale of 3G/4G 
spectrum licenses, and disbursements by multilateral agencies. 
Reﬂecting the large external inﬂows, net foreign exchange reserves 
rose to $9.1 billion at the end of June 2014, and the Pakistan rupee, 
which had come under depreciating pressure during the ﬁrst half of 
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FY2014, rebounded to PRs98.9 to the US dollar in the last quarter, for 
overall appreciation of 0.9% in FY2014. Appreciation in real effective 
terms was by 5.6%, with likely adverse implications for export 
competitiveness.
Economic prospects
GDP growth is projected at 4.2% in FY2015 and 4.5% in FY2016, 
underpinned by low international oil prices and the expected uptick in 
economic growth in advanced economies. The projections assume steady 
progress in macroeconomic and structural reforms, manageable political 
and security challenges, and normal weather. Growth in FY2016 
could be higher if economic reform proceeds at a faster pace. The 
government has made some progress in implementing macroeconomic 
and structural reforms to strengthen its ﬁscal position, alleviate energy 
shortages, and restructure and privatize loss-making public enterprises. 
However, progress remains slow in a challenging political and security 
environment.
Weak (preliminary) results for some major crops are expected 
to limit any rebound in agriculture in FY2015. Lower prices will 
likely suppress sugarcane output, but increased rains in the ﬁrst half 
of FY2015 should have beneﬁted rice production. The government 
increased procurement prices for wheat to cushion farmers from adverse 
prices and, if weather is favorable, perhaps bolster production. 
Continued power and gas shortages, lower cotton and edible oil 
prices, and weak external demand for some products such as cotton 
yarn and cloth and cement are likely to contain growth in large-scale 
manufacturing, which decelerated to 2.7% during July–December 
2014 from 6.6% in the same period a year earlier (Figure 3.20.6). 
Growth slowed in most of the components, including low-end textiles,  
electronics, and petroleum products. Fertilizer and food output declined. 
Only iron and steel, automobiles and leather products picked up from 
last year. Higher credit to private cement producers and construction 
ﬁrms for infrastructure projects suggests strengthening activity in 
these sectors. Lower input costs, including easier credit conditions and 
borrowing costs in the second half of FY2015, should help improve 
the industrial outlook. Services are expected to grow in line with the 
performance of commodity producing sectors. 
Consumer price inﬂation averaged 5.8% in the ﬁrst 7 months of 
FY2015, decelerating from 8.8% in the same period of FY2014 (Figure 
3.20.7). In January 2015, headline inﬂation slowed to 3.9% year on year 
largely because food inﬂation dropped signiﬁcantly to 3.0%, reﬂecting 
lower commodity prices both globally and locally, the latter made 
possible by the limited impact of ﬂoods in August 2014 on supplies of 
perishable products. Nonfood inﬂation also declined, to 4.5% in January, 
as the government passed on to domestic consumers most of the beneﬁt 
of lower international oil prices. Moreover, a signiﬁcant reduction 
in government borrowing from the central bank in the latter part of 
FY2014 likely helped contain inﬂation expectations. 
Following the marked decline in inﬂation, the central bank revised 
the policy interest rate downward in November 2014 and January 2015 
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by a cumulative 150 basis points to 8.5% (Figure 3.20.8). It had earlier 
kept the policy rate unchanged from November 2013 to contain inﬂation. 
Headline inﬂation is expected to average 5.8% in FY2015, assuming 
some rise in oil prices from lows in the ﬁrst half of FY2015, some hiked 
gas and electricity tariffs toward implementing structural policy to bring 
tariffs closer to cost recovery, and the impact of midyear increases in 
sales taxes and duties for several items to bolster budget revenue. 
A lower consolidated ﬁscal deﬁcit projection at 4.9% of GDP in 
FY2015 assumes that Federal Board of Revenue tax collection increases 
by 0.7% of GDP to PRs2.8 trillion. The target was revised down to 
PRs2.6 trillion in February 2015 because revenues disappointed 
expectations in the ﬁrst half of the ﬁscal year (Figure 3.20.9). Taxable 
transactions fell steeply amid lower world commodity prices, reductions 
in administered electricity tariffs and prices for petroleum products in 
the ﬁrst half of the ﬁscal year, and weak large-scale manufacturing. The 
general sales tax on petroleum products was raised from 17% to 27% 
in two steps in December 2014 and February 2015, and February also 
saw increases announced for taxes and regulatory duties on furnace 
oil and certain luxury items, which may increase tax collections in the 
later part of FY2015. However, the second round sale of 3G/4G licenses, 
projected to provide PRs56 billion in nontax revenue for the year, 
has not yet taken place. Despite implementing a number of structural 
measures to improve tax compliance and broaden the tax base, reform 
has yet to yield a buoyant tax system able to lift the country’s low tax 
ratio.
Lower expenditures are budgeted for FY2015, with current 
expenditures reduced by 1% of GDP from the previous year, partly 
reﬂecting a cut in subsidies to bring them down to 0.7% of GDP. As 
receding oil prices reduce the cost of generating electricity in thermal 
plants, which provide 33% of power, it may be possible to limit 
electricity tariffs increases further while reining in power subsidies that 
the government pays to cover the difference between actual costs and 
official tariffs for consumers. 
Risks to the budget targets include elevated expenditures to 
enhance security, a build-up of power sector arrears, and failure to 
realize planned revenues. Missed targets could force down development 
spending, which, at 1.1% of GDP in the ﬁrst half of FY2015, was already 
badly trailing its budget allocation equal to 4.2%. 
The plan to ﬁnance the ﬁscal deﬁcit in FY2015 relied largely on 
domestic borrowing from commercial banks and nonbank sources. 
Nonbank ﬁnancing was 43% of the budgeted amount during the ﬁrst 
half of FY2015. As government targets zero borrowing from the central 
bank for the budget, borrowing from banks to cover the revenue 
shortfall in the ﬁrst half climbed to over 80% of planned borrowing for 
the full year. To address banks’ liquidity shortages in the money market, 
the central bank made signiﬁcant injections on the open market.
The current account deﬁcit is expected to narrow to 1.0% of GDP in 
FY2015 from 1.1% a year earlier, owing to lower world prices for oil and 
other commodities, a sustained increase in remittances, and expected 
Coalition Support Fund inﬂows (Figure 3.20.10). Import growth slowed 
to 0.9% in the ﬁrst 7 months of FY2015 from 5.3% in the same period 
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a year earlier, reﬂecting lower oil import payments. However, nonoil 
imports rose by nearly 6% as higher domestic prices for wheat drove a 
16% increase in food imports. 
Exports contracted by 2.5% during the ﬁrst 7 months of FY2015 
(Figure 3.30.11), as lower prices for cotton cloth and yarn exports more 
than offset strong gains by readymade garments, knitwear, and bed wear 
that beneﬁt under the Generalized System of Preferences Plus scheme of 
the European Union. Lower input costs should provide some support for 
exports and manufacturing growth during the second half of the ﬁscal 
year and into FY2016. Pakistan’s exports may suffer as the US dollar 
strengthens against currencies of Pakistan’s export competitors and 
as the euro weakens. The rupee appreciated in real effective terms by 
3.5% in the ﬁrst 6 months of FY2015. Energy shortages are expected to 
continue, and volatility in supply remains a risk to exports and growth. 
The current account deﬁcit is expected to widen slightly in FY2016 
to 1.3% of GDP, assuming some pickup in oil prices and moderate 
expansion in nonoil imports to support higher growth.
The ﬁnancial account surplus increased sharply to $2.4 billion in 
the ﬁrst 7 months of the year from $527 million in the same period of 
FY2014. This came in large part from an upsurge in portfolio inﬂows 
to $1.2 billion in the period, from a mere $141 million a year earlier, as 
the issuance of Sukuk bonds in December 2014 brought in $1.0 billion. 
Increased bilateral and multilateral inﬂows of official development 
assistance provided the bulk of loan ﬂows of $670 million, while 
net foreign direct investment remained low at $545 million in light 
of continuing security challenges and shortcomings in the business 
environment. Official foreign exchange reserves rose to $10.4 billion in 
January 2015 from $9.1 billion in June 2014 (Figure 3.20.12). In the 7 
months to January 2015, the Pakistan rupee depreciated against the US 
dollar by only 1.8% to PRs100.75.
Policy challenge—boosting manufacturing
The economic transformation of Pakistan has largely bypassed 
manufacturing as it evolved from agriculture to services, most of the 
services with low productivity. The share of manufacturing in GDP 
increased from 13.4% in FY1995 to 18.3% in FY2005 but then subsided 
to 13.5% in FY2006, changing little since. Within manufacturing, 
large-scale manufacturing comprises 10.9% of GDP while small-scale 
industries amount to only 1.7%. The share of manufacturing in total 
employment is, at 14.1%, dwarfed by 43.0% in agriculture and 32.7% in 
services.
The weak performance of manufacturing reﬂects industry-speciﬁc 
issues, security challenges, and energy shortages. Historically, the 
sector’s performance has been marred by a number of factors: poor 
infrastructure, cumbersome regulations, low productivity, distortions 
arising from industrial policy, a trade policy favoring import substitution 
and biased against exports, and limited access to ﬁnance, especially for 
small manufacturers.
Manufacturing has undergone little diversiﬁcation or deepening. The 
sector largely produces items with little value added, such as low-end 
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textiles, food, and leather products, which together comprise about 
half of production by large-scale manufacturers. Although the share of 
higher-tech manufacturing increased from 17% of the total in 1970 to 
25% in 2006, it lags the 53% achieved in Malaysia, 52% in Thailand, 45% 
in the People’s Republic of China, and 38% in India—and only slightly 
exceeds 24% in Bangladesh. Notably, electronics occupied in FY2014 
only 2.8% of large-scale manufacturing in Pakistan, and engineering 
goods a strikingly small 0.6%.
Pakistan’s share of world exports remained stagnant at 0.13% from 
1970 to 2013, while the shares of other regional economies increased 
appreciably: India’s rising from 0.56% to 1.66%, Malaysia’s from 0.55% 
to 1.21%, and Thailand’s from 0.14% to 1.21%. About two-thirds of 
Pakistan’s merchandise exports are textiles, many of which enjoy little 
potential for higher demand or proﬁtability in world markets (Figure 
3.20.13).
Most of the growth in manufacturing in Pakistan arises from higher 
inputs. Total factor productivity growth was only 1.6% in the 1990s and 
even slower at 0.9% from 1998 to 2007. Most ﬁrms lack both incentive 
and capacity to innovate. In some key sectors, ﬁrms are risk-averse, 
partly for lack of competition, and they often beneﬁt from tax and tariff 
exemptions. 
The share of manufacturing in total investment, the lowest among 
sectors, has declined by half since FY2006 (Figure 3.20.14). Foreign 
direct investment has been concentrated in oil and gas and, since sector 
liberalization and privatization, in ﬁnance and telecoms. The high cost 
of doing business, including the disproportionate burden of taxes, deters 
investment in manufacturing. The federal budget for FY2015 cut the 
corporate income tax rate from 34% to 33%, but this is still high among 
Pakistan’s competitors. Deﬁcient infrastructure remains a key constraint 
on investment, and shortages of electricity and natural gas are binding 
constraints that force industries to operate below capacity. 
The World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index 
2014–2015 ranks Pakistan at 129 of 144 countries surveyed (Figure 
3.20.15). Very low ranks on most of the components of the index indicate  
weakness in global competitiveness and in many areas necessary for 
rapid economic growth. Enhancing industrial competitiveness will 
require that Pakistan address policy distortions, lower trade barriers, 
create a business-friendly environment with a stable macroeconomic 
framework, and improve infrastructure, access to ﬁnance, and human 
development.
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Sri Lanka
The economy continued to grow robustly in 2014, inflation fell markedly, and the current account 
deficit narrowed. The election in January 2015 brought a new president into office on a mandate 
for political and economic change. With parliamentary elections expected in June 2015, the year 
will be marked by political transition. The outlook is for a continued strong economic performance 
aided by generally favorable global conditions. 
Economic performance
GDP grew by 7.4% during 2014, up slightly from 7.2% a year earlier 
(Figure 3.21.1). Continued high growth was driven by faster expansion in 
industry, which offset substantially weaker growth in agriculture. 
Provisional estimates show that industry provided the lift to growth 
as it advanced by 11.4%, up from 9.9% a year earlier, reﬂecting fast 
expansion in construction and a pickup in manufacturing apparel for 
export. Performance would have been better if not for a temporary 
slowdown in garment manufacturing and exports in October and 
November. Services grew by 6.5%, little changed from a year earlier, 
driven by continued solid expansion in hotels and restaurants, wholesale 
and retail trade, and post and communication. The improving global 
economy contributed to higher tourist arrivals and better trade 
performance. Agriculture performance was much weaker than a year 
earlier, however, expanding by a mere 0.3% because of droughts and 
ﬂoods during some months of the year 2014. 
On the demand side, investment, exports, and government 
consumption are estimated to have recorded higher nominal growth 
in 2014 than in 2013 (Figure 3.21.2). Expansion in private consumption 
slowed, however, to 8.5% from 9.9% in 2013. Government consumption 
rose by an estimated 15.4% from 11.3% in 2013, reﬂecting increased 
salaries and wages for public employees, as well as larger special 
allowances and cost-of-living allowance granted during the year. Fixed 
capital investment expanded by 15.7%, fueling robust construction 
performance. 
Inﬂation continued to fall in 2014 (Figure 3.21.3). Annual average 
inﬂation was 3.3% in 2014,  the lowest recorded since 1985. Nonfood 
inﬂation averaged 2.8%, dropping signiﬁcantly from 6.1% in 2013 with 
the fading of the base effect from increased administered energy prices 
in 2013, as well as with decreases in fuel prices in September and 
December 2014. The 2015 budget was revised by the new government 
to further reduce fuel prices at the end of January 2015. As a result, the 
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nonfood index shows deﬂation since October 2014. Food inﬂation was on 
the rise, however, climbing to 12.0% by January 2015 because of earlier 
adverse weather that reduced harvests, especially of rice, before easing 
to 9.5% in February. 
The central bank relaxed its monetary policy in December 2012 as 
inﬂation eased. Policy rates were further reduced by 50 basis points in 
October 2013 and again in January 2014. In response, banks’ lending 
rates declined from 9.7% in January 2014 to 6.4% in January 2015 
(Figure 3.21.4). Credit to the private sector nevertheless decelerated 
until July 2014, when it turned up to reach 8.8% year on year by 
December 2014. This helped to support a pickup in private sector 
investment. 
Fiscal consolidation continued in 2014. The budget deﬁcit was 
estimated to drop to 5.2% of GDP in 2014, compared with 5.9% in 2013. 
Capital expenditure was estimated at 5.7% of GDP, broadly consistent 
with the government target of 6%-7%. Domestic revenue was estimated 
to have increased to 14.2% of GDP in 2014 from 13.9% in the previous 
year. In January and April 2014, the government successfully issued 
foreign currency denominated debt on international markets for $1 
billion and $500 million, respectively. Total government debt declined 
to 74.4% of GDP in 2014 from 78.3% in 2013 (Figure 3.21.5). Total 
public debt—including government debt, treasury guarantees, and the 
borrowing of state-owned enterprises from banks and foreign sources—
is estimated to have been 88.9% of GDP at the end of 2014. 
Exports expanded by 7.0% in 2014 and amounted to $11.1 billion, 
following growth recovery in the second half of 2013. However, 
export performance showed some weakness toward the end of 2014, 
when exports were down 13.7% year on year in October and 10.7% 
in November. Imports grew by 7.9% to reach $19.4 billion in 2014, 
recovering from a 6.2% drop in the previous year. Oil imports, which 
account for about a quarter of total imports, started to decline in the 
second half of 2014 in line with the downdraft in global prices. 
Service exports were boosted in 2014 as booming tourism ran up a 
28.6% increase in earnings and robust remittances expanded by 9.5%. 
Accordingly, the current account balance is estimated to have recorded 
a deﬁcit of 3.5% of GDP in 2014 that improved on the deﬁcit of 3.9% in 
2013 (Figure 3.21.6).
Notwithstanding outﬂows on account of foreign debt service 
payments amounting to $2.1 billion and payments to the International 
Monetary Fund amounting to $704 million, strong ﬁnancial inﬂows 
maintained a surplus in the overall balance of payments for 2014. 
Gross official foreign currency reserves increased to $8.2 billion as of the 
end of December 2014, covering 5.1 months of imports (Figure 3.21.7). 
The Sri Lankan rupee held steady against the US dollar in 2014, 
depreciating marginally by less than 1%. It appreciated, however, in 
nominal and real effective terms by nearly 6% over the year, with 
most of the change occurring after midyear as the dollar strengthened 
markedly against other currencies, notably the euro (Figure 3.21.8).
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Economic prospects
Following the election in January 2015 that ousted a powerful 
incumbent, and with parliamentary elections expected in June 2015, Sri 
Lanka is experiencing substantial political transition this year. Risks to 
economic growth arise from uncertainties during the transition and a 
wait-and-see approach adopted by investors.
The election manifesto of the new President set out the broad 
policies of the new government, which emphasizes good governance, 
inclusive growth, and private sector development. The good governance 
agenda includes reviewing some of the previous administration’s 
development projects for possible corruption and waste. The government 
initially focused on its 100 days program toward reducing the powers 
of the Executive President and addressing corruption. In addition, relief 
to low-income groups promised in the campaign was a main focus 
in the new government’s budget, which replaced that of the previous 
administration. The direction of development strategy and ﬁscal policy 
is likely to be clear only after the general elections expected in June.
The revised budget for 2015, which Parliament approved on 1 
February, has current expenditure higher than in the original budget 
and substantially lower capital expenditure, cut to 4.6% of GDP from 
6.2%. While the revenue ratio was reduced, the ﬁscal deﬁcit was lowered 
slightly to equal 4.4% of GDP, compared with 4.6% earlier (Figure 
3.21.9). The revised budget plans to collect more revenue through new 
one-off taxes from high income groups and large commercial operations 
to ﬁnance the additional expenditures. Since the increase in recurrent 
expenditure will continue in the following years, it is crucial for the 
government to ensure ﬁscal revenue increase, so that sufficient public 
investment is secured to support long-term economic growth. 
Recurrent expenditure increased due to higher salaries and pensions 
for public workers and for transfers and subsidies, which included a 
200% increase from April 2015 in the Samurdhi (prosperity) monthly 
social security payment. Capital spending was reduced by removing 
expenditure considered wasteful, such as allocations for poorly 
performing state-owned enterprises. The taxes introduced to fund the 
additional recurrent expenditure included heavy taxes on assets such as 
large houses and on large proﬁts, as well as the one-off super gain tax, 
which is levied on companies and individuals that earned proﬁts over 
SLRs2 billion in 2013–2014. 
Growth in 2015 will be affected by the political transition and 
the revised priorities of the government. Construction will slow 
after leading growth in the recent years, driven by large government 
infrastructure projects. Political uncertainty would retard private 
investment. While investment is likely to lose momentum in 2015, 
consumption is expected to pick up. Price reductions for food and fuel 
will encourage private consumption, and government consumption 
will rise with the shift in the budget toward recurrent expenditure. 
Somewhat faster growth in advanced economies will beneﬁt export 
industries such as apparel and tourism. How well agriculture performs 
after mixed fortunes over the past 5 years will depend on the weather, 
but increases in government-guaranteed prices for several agricultural 
products should boost production. Against this backdrop, assuming that 
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politics settle in the second half of 2015 and that investment rebounds, 
growth is projected to ease to 7.0% in 2015 and then strengthen to 7.3% 
in 2016. 
Inﬂation is expected to remain low in 2015, held in check by a 
series of reductions in fuel prices in September and December 2014 
and January 2015 that are expected to restrain other prices. With 
international oil prices expected to remain low this year and next, 
inﬂationary pressures are eased. Moreover, the government’s revised 
budget announced tax reductions for several essential items including 
ﬂour, bread, milk powder, and sugar. Accordingly, inﬂation is expected 
to ebb to 2.0% in 2015 before rebounding to 5.0% in 2016 on account of 
the base effect. 
With inﬂation remaining low, the central bank has signaled that 
monetary policy will maintain its current accommodative stance. Policy 
rates are likely to be kept low in 2015, supporting higher private sector 
credit. 
Exports will continue to improve in 2015 and 2016 as Sri Lanka’s 
partner economies pick up pace. Imports are expected to rise, though 
imports of investment goods will likely slow on more moderate 
investment. Higher domestic consumption will exert upward pressure 
on imports and shift the composition of imports away from investment 
to consumption goods, while low international oil and food prices will 
help contain total value. Earnings from tourism and remittances are 
expected to continue current growth trends. They will contain the 
current account deﬁcit at 1.4% of GDP in 2015. The deﬁcit is projected 
to widen marginally to 1.5% in 2016 as the economy and domestic 
investment pick up. 
Indications are that Sri Lanka is being viewed more favorably 
internationally with the change in government and its policies, which 
will attract higher foreign investment and cement trade ties, especially 
with Europe and the US. These factors will strengthen the balance of 
payments position in the medium term. 
With GDP per capita estimated at about $3,700 in 2014, Sri Lanka is 
at the cusp of gaining upper-middle-income status. While the country 
has been focusing on infrastructure and human capital development, 
the time has come to adjust strategy to enable it to rise to the next stage 
of development. Private sector investment should take over the role of 
driving economic growth. A new focus on human capital development 
has already started, and emphasis should gradually shift to higher 
skills and tertiary education to meet the market requirements of the 
knowledge economy. 
With upper-middle-income status comes the need for greater 
gains in efficiency, or total factor productivity, to continue climbing 
to high-income status. Sri Lanka should start by strengthening its 
technological readiness to accept technology transfer through foreign 
direct investment. At the same time, it should begin innovating. The 
development of infrastructure and human resources should be adapted 
to this new policy agenda. 
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Policy challenge—promoting innovation
Innovation is becoming an important policy agenda for Sri Lanka. 
Nevertheless, according to the Knowledge Economy Index of the World 
Bank, Sri Lanka lags in innovation and technological adoption (Figure 
3.21.10). 
The Global Competitiveness Index of the World Economic Forum 
ranks Sri Lanka behind other countries in university–industry 
collaboration in research and development (R&D), Patent Cooperation 
Treaty patents and applications, corporate R&D spending, and the quality 
of science research institutions (Figure 3.21.11). 
Sri Lanka’s spending on R&D equaled 0.16% of GDP in 2010. This is 
low even compared with its South Asian neighbors, with India at 0.81% 
in 2011, Pakistan at 0.33% in 2011, and Nepal at 0.30% in 2010. Sri Lanka’s 
component of high-tech products in total manufactured exports was 0.9% 
in 2012, far below the 6.2% average for South Asia, 8.4% for lower-middle-
income economies, and 20.6% for upper-middle-income countries.
Private investment in R&D needs to be encouraged by removing 
institutional and regulatory bottlenecks and improving infrastructure, 
including those pertaining to information and communication technology. 
The environment for innovation could be improved by establishing 
proof-of-concept labs and patent-application grants, innovation voucher 
schemes and incentives for collaboration between ﬁrms and universities, 
and investment in knowledge-based capital supported by copyrights, 
trademarks, and brand equity. These initiatives may create multiple 
innovation bases and hubs. 
Innovation cannot depend solely on large companies within 
structured systems. As the important role of frugal innovation is 
increasingly recognized, frugal innovation for consumers in the middle of 
the pyramid should be encouraged. The government should aim to raise 
R&D expenditure to at least 1.5% of GDP and concentrate public funds on 
innovation in a few high-impact areas. 
Sri Lanka’s universities and research labs are not well linked with 
industry as is the case in many developed and emerging economies. 
Such links should be strengthened, as was done successfully with the 
establishment of the nanotechnology park near Colombo, which secured 
ﬁve patents in its ﬁrst full year of operation. Sri Lanka has started to build 
up a pool of experts by gearing the education system to produce high-
quality science and technology graduates. The proportion of students 
currently studying science subjects is low, as over 30% prefer the arts. 
Reform to secondary education to improve curricula and teaching quality 
should continue to be the government’s focus, but the university system 
also needs quality improvement. 
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This chapter was written by Mohammed Parvez Imdad of the Southeast Asia 
Department, ADB, Manila.
Brunei Darussalam 
Declining hydrocarbon production has weighed on this economy. GDP has contracted for 2 
years and is projected to contract in 2015. Consumer prices are forecast to ease for a second 
straight year. Growth in sectors unconnected to energy indicates that the country is making 
gradual progress toward broadening its economic base.
Economic performance
GDP contracted by an estimated 1.2% in 2014, a second consecutive 
year of decline, as oil and gas production continued to contract (Figure 
3.22.1). The oil and gas sector, which directly accounts for almost 
two-thirds of the economy, has contracted since 2012 (Fig 3.22.2). The 
production of crude oil and condensate fell to 135,000 barrels per day 
in the ﬁrst half of last year from 151,000 barrels per day a year earlier 
(Fig. 3.22.3). Since 2006, daily oil output has fallen by about 40% with 
the depletion of existing oilﬁelds, protracted closures for maintenance 
of aging equipment, and government policy to manage oil production 
so that it lasts until other industries can generate a larger share of GDP. 
The production of natural gas declined to 1,225 million cubic feet a day 
in the ﬁrst half of 2014 from 1,248 million in the ﬁrst half of 2013. 
The rest of the economy—mainly services, construction, and 
manufacturing—grew by an estimated 2.6% in 2014, based on data 
through September. Services, particularly those provided by the 
government, contributed most of this growth. Construction and 
agriculture grew, but manufacturing contracted. From the demand side, 
private consumption recorded a modest rise. Government consumption 
increased, but ﬁxed investment decelerated and net exports fell from 
2013, reﬂecting the weakness in oil and gas production.
The government rebased its 2010–2013 national accounts to 2010, 
which widened the GDP contraction in 2013 to 2.1%. Using the new base 
year, GDP grew by 0.8% on average over 2010–2013. 
Merchandise exports comprise mainly crude oil, liqueﬁed natural 
gas, and methanol. In 2014, exports fell by 6.9% to $10.7 billion (Fig. 
3.22.4). Imports, which provide most of the country’s food, consumer 
goods, and capital equipment, fell by 5.1% to $3.4 billion. That narrowed 
the trade surplus to a still large $7.2 billion and the current account 
surplus to $4.7 billion, equal to 26.4% of GDP. International reserves 
rose to $3.5 billion, cover for 12.1 months of imports of goods. 
Prices eased last year for many consumer goods and services: food 
and drink, clothing and footwear, housing and utilities, household 
furnishings, and recreation. These declines more than offset small 
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increases in health care, transportation, communications, education, 
and restaurant and hotels costs, so that the consumer price index fell by 
0.2% on average from 2013. Price controls and subsidies curtail inﬂation 
in the economy.
Income from hydrocarbons through taxes, dividends, and royalties 
provides the government almost all of its revenue to fund a relatively 
large public sector and to invest in infrastructure and subsidize 
consumer goods and services. However, declining hydrocarbon 
production and plunging oil prices have reduced the government’s 
revenue. In FY2013 (ended 31 March 2014) revenue fell by 17.3% (Fig. 
3.22.5). Government spending was virtually ﬂat, leaving a ﬁscal surplus 
equal to 9.3% of GDP. Revenue dropped by a further 21.5% in the ﬁrst 3 
quarters of FY2014, when the government reduced its spending by 8.4%.
The Brunei dollar, which is pegged at par to the Singapore dollar 
through a currency board arrangement, depreciated by 4.7% against the 
US dollar between the end of 2013 and end of 2014. Growth in credit 
slowed from 8.1% in 2013 to 2.3% in the third quarter of 2014.
In February 2014, the monetary authority relaxed a cap on personal 
loans from banks, and in October it removed a cap on interest rates on 
residential property loans. The launch of a real-time gross settlement 
system in November was part of an effort to modernize the national 
payment and settlement systems. 
Economic prospects
Subdued production and the impact of lower global prices for 
hydrocarbons will likely see GDP contract in 2015 before a slight 
rebound in 2016, assuming some recovery in oil and gas output. 
Accurate forecasting is hampered by uncertainty over the timing of oil 
and gas production from new ﬁelds and of stoppages for maintenance of 
wells and pipelines.
Prospects for growth also depend on the timing of several large 
construction projects. The biggest is an oil reﬁnery and aromatics 
cracker planned for Pulau Muara Besar with capacity to produce 
160,000 barrels a day of petroleum products for domestic use and for 
export. Led by a company from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), 
this project is expected to involve investment over several years of more 
than $2.5 billion. In January 2014, the company signed a land-lease 
agreement with the Brunei Economic Development Board. Completion 
was scheduled for 2017, but construction has been delayed. 
Also last year, PRC investors signed a land-lease agreement with 
Brunei to build a $50 million carbon steel pipe factory. This plant 
is scheduled to start operating in 2017, with the capacity to produce 
100,000 tons per year of welded rounding carbon steel pipes for the oil 
and gas and construction industries. A company from the Republic of 
Korea signed a nonbinding agreement to build a $107 million plant to 
produce 120,000 tons per year of aluminum billet casting and 48,000 
tons per year of aluminum extrusions, mainly for export.
These projects are part of the government’s strategy to diversify 
the economy through export-oriented manufacturing and services. The 
government intends to build bridges, roads, and utilities for the projects. 
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It is investing in a high-speed broadband network and hopes to revive 
plans to import hydropower from neighboring Sarawak.
However, the government has also signaled that its expenditure in 
FY2015 will be constrained by the slide in revenue from oil and gas. 
The budget is expected to fall into deﬁcit before accounting for income 
from investments.  
Consumer prices are forecast to decline marginally again this 
year, despite a recent uptick in prices and the potential for further 
depreciation of the Brunei dollar against the US dollar (Fig. 3.22.6). In 
2016, prices are seen edging higher as domestic demand improves and 
global commodity prices turn up. 
Weak global oil and gas prices are projected to lower export receipts 
again in 2015. Next year, rising oil prices and the anticipated pickup 
in oil production will see exports start to recover. Imports, too, are 
expected to decline in 2015 but bounce back in 2016 if substantial 
construction gets under way on proposed projects. Nevertheless, exports 
will still comfortably exceed imports to maintain substantial trade and 
current account surpluses. Large sovereign wealth funds and sizeable 
international reserves provide buffers against external and ﬁscal risks.
Policy challenge—diversifying the economy
Oil and gas production generates a GDP per capita of $42,240, which is 
one of the highest in developing Asia. However, heavy reliance on one 
sector leaves the economy vulnerable to swings in global energy demand 
and to the gradual depletion of hydrocarbon reserves.
Aiming to diversify the economy, the government has identiﬁed 
certain industries and provides incentives to draw foreign investment 
to develop export-oriented businesses. This includes petrochemicals, 
halal products, information and communications, Islamic ﬁnancial 
services, and aviation and oilﬁeld support services. Incentives include 
the provision of land and infrastructure, liberal trade and labor policies, 
competitively priced utilities, and tax breaks. 
From 2015, the government has cut the corporate tax rate to 18.5%, 
abolished corporate tax for small businesses, and increased tax breaks 
for investment in plant, machinery, and industrial buildings.
Investments made and planned by foreign companies indicate, 
along with the gradual expansion of the domestic private sector, that 
the strategy is achieving some success. Nevertheless, more could be 
done. Brunei Darussalam is ranked near the middle  of 189 countries 
in the World Bank’s Doing Business 2015, putting it above Indonesia 
but well below Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand—and also under the 
Philippines and Viet Nam. Improving the business environment is key to 
attracting new investment and diversifying the economy.
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Cambodia 
The forecast is for higher growth based on a better outlook for exports and tourism, an easing 
of domestic political and labor tensions, and lower fuel costs. Prospects are brighter as well for 
agriculture, which lagged in 2014. Inflation has ebbed and is projected to remain low. A major 
development challenge is to diversify sources of growth.
Economic performance
Solid growth last year estimated at 7.0% slightly underperformed 
the 7.3% average of the previous 3 years (Figure 3.23.1). Industry and 
services were the drivers as agriculture lagged. Prolonged expansion 
has lifted Cambodia’s gross national income per capita toward the 
$1,045 threshold for entry into lower-middle income status. 
Political tensions and, in the garment industry, labor unrest spilled 
from 2013 into 2014 to temporarily dampen investment and disrupt 
garment manufacturing and tourism. These headwinds eased as the year 
progressed. Exports of garments and footwear, based on customs data, 
reached $6.0 billion in 2014, rising by 10.7% but decelerating from the 
previous year. Shipments to the European Union increased by 22% to 
$2.4 billion, but those to the US fell by 5.4% to $2.0 billion. Construction 
continued to expand, funded by inﬂows of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) and a 34.3% rise in bank credit for the segment. Industry as a 
whole grew by an estimated 9.8%.
Growth in wholesale and retail trading, tourism, and real estate 
contributed to an estimated 7.9% expansion in services. Tourist arrivals 
increased by 7.0% to 4.5 million, though this was slower than in 2013 
because of political tensions early in the year and a decline in tourism to 
neighboring Thailand.
Flooding and drought hurt agriculture, curbing its growth to an 
estimated 1.8%. Preliminary estimates show paddy production falling by 
2% to 9.2 million tons. Output of maize and soybeans also declined, but 
cassava production jumped by 41%, mainly to meet rising demand from 
the People’s Republic of China. 
The political and labor uncertainties appeared to dent foreign investor 
sentiment, causing net FDI inﬂows to fall by 9.9% to $1.6 billion in 2014. 
Inﬂation accelerated through the ﬁrst half, mainly on higher meat 
prices, before easing in the second half. Lower global oil prices brought 
inﬂation down to 1.1% year on year in December (Figure 3.23.2). 
For 2014 as a whole, inﬂation averaged 3.9%.
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Fiscal estimates suggest improvement last year. Robust domestic 
demand and stronger tax collection lifted revenue to an estimated 15.7% 
of GDP, while expenditure as a ratio to GDP declined slightly to 19.8%, 
narrowing the ﬁscal deﬁcit excluding grants to an estimated 4.1% of 
GDP. Foreign loans and grants funded the ﬁscal deﬁcit. The government 
replenished its deposits in the banking system to the equivalent of 7.0% 
of GDP, approaching the 7.8% maintained in 2008, before the global 
ﬁnancial crisis (Figure 3.23.3). 
Credit to the private sector grew by a rapid 31.3%, and M2 money 
supply, excluding foreign currency outside the banking system, by 
29.9% (Figure 3.23.4). The Cambodian riel depreciated by a slight 
0.3% against the US dollar over the year. Dollarization remained 
high, with foreign currency deposits accounting for more than 80% 
of liquidity. 
External accounts strengthened in 2014. Merchandise exports—
mainly garments, footwear, and milled rice—rose by an estimated 13.4% 
to $7.4 billion. Merchandise imports rose by 10.1% to $10.7 billion. 
The current account deﬁcit excluding official transfers shrank to an 
estimated 12.5% of GDP. This gap was fully ﬁnanced by FDI and official 
loans and grants. Gross international reserves rose to $4.4 billion, cover 
for 4.2 months of imports of goods and services. 
Economic prospects
The outlook is for economic growth to pick up in light of anticipated 
stronger performance in trade partners—the US and Thailand and, to 
a lesser extent, the European Union—coupled with a calmer domestic 
political environment and lower fuel costs. GDP is projected to increase 
by 7.3% in 2015 and 7.5% in 2016 (Figure 3.23.5). 
Over the medium term, growth will be stimulated by gradual 
diversiﬁcation into light manufacturing and further integration into 
regional and global supply chains.
Garments and footwear will beneﬁt this year from improved demand 
in major markets. Industry as a whole is seen growing by 9.7% as 
services growth accelerates slightly to 8.1%. Wholesale and retail trade 
will gain from rising incomes. The calmer political environment in both 
Cambodia and Thailand paves the way for tourism to pick up. Real estate 
is supported by FDI inﬂows and moderately accommodative ﬁscal and 
monetary conditions. Agriculture is expected to improve moderately to 
grow by 2.5% in 2015, assuming better weather than last year. 
Inﬂation is seen edging up to 3.0% by the end of 2015, but the year-
average rate will likely be a low 1.6% (Figure 3.23.6). Rising food and 
fuel prices in 2016 could prod inﬂation to 2.7%. 
This year’s budget targets a 10.1% increase in government spending 
and a budget deﬁcit of 4.8% of GDP excluding grants. The target for 
domestic revenue is 12.1% higher than for last year’s budget. 
The ratio of the trade deﬁcit to GDP is projected to narrow slightly 
in 2015 on rising exports and declining prices for imported food and 
fuel. Higher tourism receipts will keep the services account in surplus. 
The current account deﬁcit, excluding official transfers, is forecast to 
be a little changed (Figure 3.23.7). Downside risks to growth for the 
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forecast period are unexpected deterioration in the prospects for major 
trading partners and natural disasters such as ﬂoods. 
Rapid ﬁnancial deepening has seen growth in credit to the private 
sector rise by an average of 27.3% in 2010–2013, accelerating to 31.3% 
in 2014, and the ratio of credit to GDP climb to 54.6% last year from 
45.0% in 2013. These trends, combined with high dollarization, heighten 
macroﬁnancial risks. Strengthening bank supervision and the regulatory 
framework, and closely monitoring lending for real estate investment, 
would help ensure a stable ﬁnancial sector and forestall bubbles in real 
estate and construction. 
Analysis of debt sustainability by the International Monetary Fund 
last year found Cambodia at low risk of debt distress but vulnerable to 
shocks to growth, exports, and the budget. Further structural reforms 
to diversify growth and raise ﬁscal revenue would mitigate these risks. 
External debt is long term in nature and on concessional terms.
Policy challenge—diversifying sources of growth
Growth over the past 2 decades has depended on garments, tourism, 
rice, and construction. This narrow production base and a concentration 
of exports to the European Union and the US, heavily facilitated by 
preferential trade access, leaves the economy exposed to external 
price and demand shocks and changes in trade policy. Also, without 
diversifying into products and services with higher value, the country 
could stay mired in low-wage, low-technology production.
Modest progress has been made toward diversiﬁcation, reﬂected 
in Cambodia’s widening range of agricultural products and growth in 
light manufacturing, mainly furniture and components for automobiles 
and electronics. More could be done to attract foreign investment, 
which is critical for the capital, technology, and management needed 
to diversify and upgrade the economy. The government provides some 
ﬁscal incentives, such as exemptions from corporate income tax, but a 
sharper focus on incentives for introducing new products and services 
may bring better results. Infrastructure improvements—especially for 
transportation, energy, and water supply—would enhance the investment 
climate, as would better customs and trade regulations. 
Special economic zones have helped to attract foreign investors in 
manufacturing, as 11 of 35 approved zones are up and running. There is 
no strong evidence, however, that ﬁrms in these zones signiﬁcantly 
outperform others in Cambodia or that they deliver substantial spillover 
to beneﬁt the wider economy. 
As higher-value industries need a skilled workforce, efforts should 
be redoubled to improve human capital and teach skills relevant to the 
workplace. Assistance in accessing technology, understanding market 
opportunities, and meeting standards and certiﬁcations is important 
to raise competitiveness. The government is ﬁnalizing an industrial 
development policy that will address many of these issues. 
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Indonesia
After 4 years of decelerating growth, policy reform to improve the investment climate is 
expected to spur economic recovery this year and next. Reform of fuel subsidies has already 
freed significant public funding for social and physical infrastructure. Inflation is seen subsiding 
to moderate rates through the forecast period, and the current account deficit to narrow. 
Challenges center on maintaining reform momentum, bolstering government revenue, and 
developing export-oriented manufacturing. 
Economic performance
Political transition to the new government in October 2014 went 
smoothly and policy reform gathered momentum. Nevertheless, 
measures over the previous 2 years to restrain domestic demand 
and curb the current account deﬁcit, coupled with sluggish exports, 
weighed on the economy. GDP growth slowed to 5.0% in 2014, a fourth 
consecutive year of deceleration (Figure 3.24.1). In 2014, personal 
consumption remained buoyant, but government spending and ﬁxed 
investment slowed and net exports fell.
Almost 60% of GDP growth last year was generated by private 
consumption, which expanded by a robust 5.3%. Consumption spending 
beneﬁtted from growth in employment, as new jobs created in the 12 
months through August 2014 exceeded entrants into the labor market. 
The unemployment rate fell from 6.2% to 5.9% over that period. Poverty 
incidence declined from 11.5% to 11.0% over the 12 months to September. 
By contrast, public consumption grew by a meager 2.0% last year as 
the government cut nonessential spending in the second half. 
Growth in ﬁxed investment was dampened by rising interest rates, 
the weakness in external demand, and uncertainty ahead of elections—
in April for Parliament and in July for the President. After accelerating 
to 9% in 2011–2012, growth in ﬁxed investment slowed over the past 2 
years to 4.1% in 2014 (Figure 3.24.2). Net external demand dragged on 
GDP growth as the volume of imports of goods and services increased 
by 2.2%, outpacing a 1.0% rise in the volume of exports. 
On the supply side, growth in services moderated to 6.1%. 
Communications maintained double-digit growth, and wholesale and retail 
trading picked up from 2013, but transportation and ﬁnancial services 
slowed. Services still contributed just over half of total GDP growth.
Manufacturing recorded slightly faster growth of 4.6% last year, 
after a sharp deceleration in 2013. Recovery in manufacturing was 
uneven, though, with better growth in food processing, machinery and 
equipment, and paper products but slower growth of textiles, chemicals, 
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and metals and an output decline for reﬁned petroleum products. 
Construction and utilities also picked up from the previous year. 
Mining was subdued, a result of declining crude oil extraction, 
weak global commodity prices, and a temporary ban on the export of 
unprocessed mineral ores. These factors combined to pull down growth 
in mining to 0.5%. Agriculture grew by 4.2%, the same pace as in the 
previous year, despite extremely dry weather from an El Niño weather 
pattern in the ﬁnal quarter of 2014. 
Inﬂation ebbed over the ﬁrst 8 months of 2014 from 8.1% year on 
year to 4.0%, as the impact of fuel price hikes in June 2013 faded and 
food price inﬂation slowed (Figure 3.24.3). In November, the incoming 
government raised subsidized prices of gasoline by 31% and diesel by 
36%, which pushed inﬂation back to 8.4% in December. Electricity 
tariffs also rose during 2014. For the year, inﬂation averaged 6.4%. 
In this context, Bank Indonesia, the central bank, raised its policy 
interest rate by 25 basis points to 7.75% in November, which followed rate 
rises of 175 basis points in 2013 to curb inﬂation and a widening current 
account deﬁcit. Growth in credit halved to 11.4% in 2014 from 2013. 
The slowing economy and lower commodity prices hurt government 
tax revenue, which fell 8.0% short of the target and prompted the 
government to reduce nonessential spending during the second half. 
The outcome was a ﬁscal deﬁcit equal to 2.0% of GDP, narrower 
than planned. Disbursement of government capital expenditure also 
undershot the target owing to impediments to budget execution 
compounded by delays during the election and the transition to a new 
government.
External accounts improved, but the current account deﬁcit remains 
a concern. Merchandise exports fell by 3.7% in US dollars terms on 
subdued demand from Indonesia’s major trading partners, particularly 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and on soft prices for export 
commodities such as coal and natural rubber. Exports of manufactured 
products rose moderately, supported by depreciation of the Indonesian 
rupiah. 
Merchandise imports fell in US dollars terms by 4.5%, more steeply 
than exports, to raise the trade surplus by 18.3% to $6.9 billion. Lower 
imports of capital equipment reﬂected weakness in ﬁxed investment. 
Deﬁcits in services and income put the current account deﬁcit at $26.2 
billion, equal to 3.0% of GDP, compared with 3.2% in 2013. 
Net portfolio investment more than doubled to $25.8 billion, despite 
jittery ﬁnancial markets toward the end of 2014. Foreign investors 
increased their holdings of Indonesian shares by $3.8 billion and 
holdings of government bonds by $11.0 billion. Foreign direct investment 
increased by $3.3 billion to $22.3 billion. These large capital inﬂows 
more than offset the current account deﬁcit to keep the balance of 
payments in surplus (Figure 3.24.4). Gross international reserves 
increased by $12.5 billion to $111.9 billion, covering 6.4 months of 
imports and government debt payments (Figure 3.34.5).
With the central bank allowing greater exchange rate ﬂexibility to 
help correct the current account deﬁcit, the rupiah depreciated by 1.8% 
against the US dollar between the end of 2013 and the end of 2014.
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Economic prospects
Projections for 2015 and 2016 assume that the new government’s rapid 
reform momentum is maintained through both years and that the 
administration follows through on policies to accelerate infrastructure 
development, improve the investment climate, reduce logistic costs, and 
enhance budget implementation. On this basis, GDP growth is forecast 
to recover to 5.5% this year and 6.0% in 2016 (Figure 3.24.6).
Last November’s cut in fuel subsidies greatly improved the ﬁscal 
outlook and freed up signiﬁcant resources for more productive purposes. 
Savings of $16.9 billion in 2015 that were achieved by reducing the 
subsidies have allowed the government to more than double its capital 
spending allocation in 2015, increase outlays on education and health, 
and still lower the ﬁscal deﬁcit target to 1.9% of GDP (Figure 3.24.7). 
Moreover, a government decision in January to link domestic fuel 
prices to international prices has removed risks posed by remaining fuel 
subsidies to the ﬁscal accounts. 
Fiscal resources will be further bolstered by a drive this year to raise 
much more tax revenue, including by stronger enforcement of personal 
income taxes and higher consumption taxes on the wealthy. The impact 
of stronger tax collection efforts will be partly offset by lower oil and gas 
revenue, which comprised 14% of total revenue last year. Nevertheless, 
the ﬁscal position could, if required during this year, accommodate a 
more expansionary stance. 
Prospects for improvements to budget execution support the outlook 
for public investment. The government has simpliﬁed the procurement 
process for infrastructure projects, including through electronic 
procurement, and new regulations became effective early this year to 
expedite the acquisition of land for infrastructure projects. 
Policy reforms are expected to stimulate private investment. 
In addition to the large increase in infrastructure investment that 
will improve the investment climate, the government is upgrading 
investment regulations. A new one-stop investment licensing service 
that started this year will speed up and enhance the transparency of 
obtaining licenses, starting with priority industries. In March, the 
government introduced tax breaks for investment in export-oriented 
industries, the railway and shipping industries, and research and 
development. This follows some liberalization last year of investment 
restrictions to encourage private investment in selected infrastructure 
such as ports and power plants, including through public–private 
partnership. Finally, growth in credit is projected to increase to 15% this 
year, which will support investment.
Private consumption is seen remaining robust in light of growth 
in employment, cash payments from the government to 15.5 million 
low-income households through June 2015 to compensate for the fuel-
price hike, and slowing inﬂation. The central bank’s latest surveys show 
that consumers and businesses are optimistic about their prospects for 
2015 (Figure 3.24.8). 
Inﬂation is projected to subside to average 5.5% in 2015 and 4.0% in 
2016 (Figure 3.24.9). The central bank lowered its policy rate by 25 basis 
points following a sharp deceleration in inﬂation in the ﬁrst 2 months of 
this year. While the central bank will need to keep its focus on stability 
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issues in the near term as it contemplates the expected eventual rise in 
US interest rates, the anticipated downtrend in inﬂation could pave the 
way for further monetary easing during the forecast period. 
Flexibility in the rupiah’s exchange rate should help to facilitate 
external adjustments. The rupiah depreciated a further 6.0% against the 
US dollar from the start of 2015 through mid-March.
Exports are expected to rise slightly this year—by 1.2% in US dollar 
terms—before trending higher in 2016. Better prospects for markets 
including the US and India are countered to some degree by slowdown 
in the PRC economy. Soft global prices for energy and commodities 
will weigh on export receipts. Manufactured exports should improve 
gradually, though the industrial production index was ﬂat in January 
(Figure 3.24.10). 
Imports are also projected to edge up. Higher capital spending 
will lift imports of machinery, equipment, and construction materials. 
However, lower prices for imported petroleum and expected slower 
growth in the volumes of petroleum imports after the cuts in fuel 
subsidies should contain the increase in the import bill. Imports of 
crude oil and petroleum products together comprised 22.2% of total 
imports in 2014.
In January and February 2015, the decline in merchandise exports 
and imports generated a trade surplus of $1.5 billion for the ﬁrst 2 
months (Figure 3.24.11). The trade surplus is projected to rise this year 
and the current account deﬁcit to narrow gradually over the next 2 
years (Figure 3.24.12). Inﬂows of direct and portfolio investment should 
keep the balance of payments in surplus. 
Downside domestic risks to the outlook are shortfalls in government 
revenue and slowing momentum on reform. Lower-than-expected 
revenue in the ﬁrst half could see the government decide to widen its 
ﬁscal deﬁcit target but also cut planned investment in infrastructure, 
which would dent prospects for achieving growth forecasts. Any slowing 
in the pace of reform would hurt the recovery in private investment. 
This risk has been lessened somewhat by increasing political support for 
the government’s infrastructure and reform programs. 
External risks would be posed by unexpected weakness in the 
growth of major trading partners and disruption to capital ﬂows to 
emerging markets triggered by the expected rise in US interest rates. 
The potential for disruption to fund ﬂows to cover Indonesia’s current 
account deﬁcit is mitigated by the buildup in international reserves 
and policy reforms that attract investment. A more ﬂexible exchange 
rate and market-driven adjustments to bond yields have improved the 
country’s resilience under volatility in global ﬁnancial markets. 
To further manage risks the government has prepared management 
protocols effective in the event of a ﬁnancial crisis, improved 
coordination between relevant agencies, and been careful to maintain 
substantial contingent funding facilities with development partners, as 
well as currency swap agreements. 
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Policy challenge—to spur manufacturing
A medium-term goal of the government is to drive GDP growth back 
above 6%, which was last achieved in 2010 and 2011, when the global 
commodity boom powered exports. 
Now that the commodity boom has faded, Indonesia needs a new 
source of export growth to help restore 6%-plus GDP expansion. Export-
oriented manufacturing would be more stable than volatile commodities 
and would generate more and better jobs. 
Manufacturing has been constrained by factors that include 
inadequate infrastructure, rupiah appreciation during the commodity 
boom, and regulatory uncertainties. In Indonesia, manufacturing 
depends heavily on imports of raw materials and semi-ﬁnished 
products, so it needs well-functioning ports and efficient logistics to be 
competitive in world markets. However, logistics costs are relatively 
high and ports are strained owing to underinvestment in infrastructure. 
In this regard, the government’s efforts to boost investment in 
infrastructure with a focus on ports and connectivity should show 
signiﬁcant results in the medium term. Addressing congestion and 
delays in ports will also require further measures to simplify export 
and import procedures, streamline customs clearance, and improve 
preclearance processes. 
Foreign direct investment is particularly important to spur 
innovation through technology and management skills and to link 
Indonesia to regional and global production networks. During the 
commodity boom, manufacturers had to compete with the buoyant 
commodity industries for investment and was disadvantaged in world 
markets by the rupiah’s appreciation. In recent years, a higher share 
of foreign investment has been channeled into manufacturing (Figure 
3.24.13). This trend should be reinforced by the new one-stop investment 
licensing service, which gives export-oriented manufacturing priority 
treatment, and by the depreciation of the rupiah. 
Longer term, manufacturing would beneﬁt from sustained 
low inﬂation that keeps ﬁnancing costs competitive, more efficient 
connectivity infrastructure, a more predictable process for setting wages 
that is based on productivity, and the acceleration of reform in education 
and training to upgrade labor skills.
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This chapter was written by Soulinthone Leuangkhamsing of the Lao Resident Mission, 
ADB, Vientiane. The policy challenge section draws on the Lao PDR Private Sector 
Assessment 2014. ADB. forthcoming.
Lao People’s Democratic Republic
Despite headwinds that have slowed growth, GDP is seen increasing by 7.0% this year and 
slightly faster in 2016, fuelled by expansion in hydropower and services. Inflation is expected to 
remain modest, and some improvement is forecast in external accounts. Renewed efforts are 
needed to spur the development of the domestic private sector.
Economic performance
Growth was maintained above 7% for a ninth consecutive year in 
2014, though ﬁscal tightening and weaker global demand for minerals 
moderated the pace by 0.5 percentage points to 7.4% (Figure 3.25.1). 
Two decades of signiﬁcant economic growth helped to halve the 
national poverty rate from 46% in 1992 to 23% in 2013.
By sector, services expanded by 9.0% in 2014. Wholesale and retail 
trading, public services, and transport and communications recorded 
solid growth. A decline in tourism in neighboring Thailand, owing to 
political unrest and street protests there, saw fewer tourists taking side 
trips to the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (PDR), such that growth 
in total tourist arrivals slowed to 10.8% in 2014 (Figure 3.25.2). 
Industry grew by 8.5%, supported by foreign direct investment 
to construct hydropower projects, residential and commercial 
developments, and factories in special economic zones. Output of 
electricity, most of it sold to Thailand, rose by 7.7% to 15.4 billion 
kilowatt-hours (Figure 3.25.3). Softer global demand and prices for 
minerals dampened growth in mining. Copper production from the 
two main mines in the Lao PDR rose by 3.1% to 159,680 tons, and 
silver output increased, but gold production fell by 23.2% to 168,755 
ounces, reﬂecting the end of gold production from the Sepon mine in 
December 2013. 
Better weather for agriculture, which employs nearly 70% of 
the workforce but accounts for only 25% of GDP, lifted this sector’s 
production by 2.9%.
The government tightened ﬁscal policy in reaction to a sharp 
widening of its ﬁscal deﬁcit in FY2013 (ended 30 September 2013), 
when it had boosted wages and allowances for the civil service and 
then fell into arrears. In FY2014, the government cancelled a cost-of-
living allowance for the civil service, curbed off-budget spending, and 
postponed some infrastructure projects. A second sharp hike in civil 
service wages went ahead, but the government cancelled a third wage 
hike that was to take effect in FY2015. These measures narrowed the 
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ﬁscal deﬁcit, including grants but excluding off-budget spending, to an 
estimated 4.2% of GDP in FY2014 from 5.6% in FY2013. 
The monetary authorities, concerned about rapid growth in 
credit and declining international reserves, restricted sales of foreign 
currency to the public and directed commercial banks to limit lending 
in foreign currency. The central bank also curbed its direct lending for 
infrastructure. Credit growth decelerated to 14.1% at the end of 2014 
from 35.7% in 2013 (Figure 3.25.4).
Some businesses dealing with the public sector faced delays 
receiving payments that hurt their earnings and their capacity to service 
loans, which added to banks’ nonperforming loans. 
Inﬂationary pressures eased steadily in 2014 owing to better food 
supplies, lower fuel prices, and the ﬁscal tightening (Figure 3.25.5). 
Inﬂation abated to 2.4% year on year by December, bringing the average 
rate in 2014 to 4.2%, the lowest in 5 years. 
Moderating domestic demand restrained growth in merchandise 
imports to 4.4% last year, while merchandise exports grew by 6.1%. 
The current account deﬁcit narrowed to an estimated $3.2 billion, 
or 25.0% of GDP. Inﬂows of foreign direct investment contributed 
to a slight rebuilding of gross international reserves to an estimated 
$815 million, cover for only 1.3 months of imports of goods and services.
The Lao kip depreciated by 2.7% against the US dollar during 2014, 
though it appreciated by 2.9% against the Thai baht. In real effective 
terms, the kip has appreciated over recent years, hurting export 
competitiveness.
Economic prospects
Growth is expected to moderate further in 2015 as lackluster demand 
for minerals weighs on mining and as ﬁscal constraints curb public 
investment. Nevertheless, GDP growth is forecast at 7.0% in 2015, 
picking up to 7.2% in 2016 (Figure 3.25.6). 
Investment in power projects will generate much of the growth 
over the forecast period. More than 20 power projects are under 
construction, including the $3.5 billion Xayaburi hydropower plant, 
scheduled for commissioning in 2019 with capacity to generate 
1.3 gigawatts. Power generation will get a boost when the large Hongsa 
lignite power plant, able to generate 1.9 gigawatts, comes on stream later 
this year and is fully operational in 2016. Total electricity production is 
projected to rise by 6% in 2015, accelerating signiﬁcantly in 2016 when 
six new plants come online. 
Recovery in Thailand, and in its tourism industry in particular, will 
beneﬁt the Lao PDR. So will lower oil prices, as the country imports 
all its oil, which comprises 15% of merchandise imports. Services will 
continue to expand at a strong pace, but agriculture is expected to 
record only slight growth this year.
Weaker revenue from mining suggests that the ﬁscal deﬁcit could 
widen to about 5% of GDP. Public debt is projected to increase from 60% 
of GDP to 65% over the medium term. The International Monetary Fund 
reported that the risk of external debt distress worsened in 2014 but is 
still moderate.
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Inﬂation eased further to 1.4% in February 2015. Lower oil prices and 
slowing economic growth are forecast to trim year-average inﬂation to 
3.5% for the year. In 2016, inﬂation is seen quickening to 4.0% as domestic 
demand picks up and prices of imported oil and food trend higher.
Oil price declines will also beneﬁt the current account. Electricity 
exports will rise though prices of metals and some other export 
commodities will likely stay soft. The deﬁcit in the current account 
is expected to remain substantial but to narrow through the forecast 
period (Figure 3.25.7). 
Domestic risks stem from delays in strengthening the ﬁscal position, 
low foreign reserves, and weaknesses in the banking system. 
For the medium term, the government has lowered its annual GDP 
growth target to 7.0%–7.5% in its Eighth National Socioeconomic 
Development Plan, 2016–2020 from the target of 8.0% growth during 
the seventh plan. The private sector is expected to play a stronger role 
during the upcoming plan period, as foreign aid is expected to decline.
Policy challenge—developing the private sector
Outside of foreign-dominated mining and hydropower, the Lao PDR 
private sector consists mostly of small enterprises in agriculture, 
construction, manufacturing, and services. Few have links to the two 
main growth industries, and many operate in the informal economy and 
have little hope of developing into larger businesses that could help to 
diversify the economy and spread the beneﬁts of growth.
According to a recent private sector assessment, informal enterprises 
decide to stay informal to avoid the time and costs involved in 
registration, regulatory compliance, and taxation. The problem is that 
informal status severely constrains their access to bank credit and 
government support programs, as well as their ability to link to global 
business networks. Moreover, high rates of business informality unfairly 
disadvantage registered competitors, who pay the costs of compliance, 
and narrow the government’s tax base.
A survey in 2012 of formally registered businesses found that 42% 
faced competition from informal enterprises, which is likely one reason 
that very few ﬁrms achieve the scale needed to improve productivity and 
compete in foreign markets. In 2010, the Lao PDR had only about 1,100 
registered medium-sized enterprises (those employing 20–99 people) and 
just 200 large enterprises (employing 100 or more). 
Inducing informal enterprises to register and comply with regulations 
requires streamlined procedures and lower costs for compliance, coupled 
with more consistent and transparent tax administration. Broader 
constraints on businesses could be addressed by measures that include 
improving their access to ﬁnance, better infrastructure, and through 
education and training reforms to improve the supply of skilled and 
semiskilled labor. 
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Malaysia
Though buffeted by the slump in oil prices, the economy is projected to post growth through 
the forecast period that is more moderate than last year’s rate but still solid. Trade and current 
account surpluses will narrow in 2015, but inflation is seen little changed in year-average terms. 
Fiscal reform will help to offset lower revenue from hydrocarbons.
Economic performance
Buoyant private consumption and strong exports powered GDP growth 
to a 4-year high of 6.0% in 2014, despite slowdowns in both ﬁxed 
investment and government spending (Figure 3.26.1). 
Private consumption grew by a robust 7.1%, near the pace in the 
previous year, to contribute more than half of GDP growth from the 
demand side. The rise was driven by job creation, low unemployment, 
and higher wages. Cash transfers from the government continued to 
supplement incomes and support consumption. Government efforts to 
rein in the budget deﬁcit saw expansion in government consumption 
ease to 4.4%. 
Growth in ﬁxed investment slowed for a second straight year, 
to 4.7% (Figure 3.26.2). Private ﬁxed investment decelerated, but it 
still grew by 11.0%, with a focus on manufacturing and services. The 
government’s ﬁscal tightening and the completion of some projects 
contributed to a 4.9% fall in public ﬁxed investment. A decline in 
inventories dragged down GDP growth. However, a rebound in net 
exports of goods and services substantially contributed to GDP growth.
From the supply side, services grew by 6.3% to generate most of 
the GDP growth. Communications, wholesale and retail trade, and real 
estate and business services recorded robust growth, reﬂecting buoyant 
household spending and business expansion. Increased tourism spurred 
the pace of growth in accommodation and restaurants.
Manufacturing expanded by 6.2% in 2014, the strongest 
performance in 4 years. Faster growth was seen in export-oriented 
manufacturing, particularly electronics and electrical products, 
and in consumer products, including food and drinks. Construction 
maintained double-digit expansion for a third year on vigorous 
housing activity in the Klang Valley, Penang, and Johore and on 
civil engineering projects that included the Klang Valley mass rapid 
transport system, Janamanjung power station, and the expansion of the 
North–South Expressway.
Though much smaller than services or manufacturing, mining made 
its most signiﬁcant contribution to GDP growth in 7 years as crude oil 
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production recovered by 4.3% last year from contraction in 2013, and 
as natural gas production posted a small gain. Better food production 
lifted growth in agriculture to 2.6%, despite a sharp fall in natural 
rubber production and ﬂoods on the east side of the peninsula that hit 
palm oil production late in 2014. The price of palm oil weakened as 
plunging global oil prices undercut demand for biofuel. 
Inﬂation picked up in 2014 to average 3.1%, the highest in 3 years 
(Figure 3.26.3). Upward pressure on prices stemmed from the buoyant 
consumer demand and government decisions to reduce subsidies, 
particularly on fuel, and to raise electricity tariffs. Fuel subsidies, 
which largely beneﬁtted higher-income groups, were cut in 2013 and 
removed in 2014.
Bank Negara Malaysia, the central bank, raised its policy interest 
rate by 25 basis point to 3.25% in July 2014 to dampen further inﬂation 
pressure expected from the planned introduction of a 6.0% goods and 
services tax in April 2015. It was also concerned about speculation in 
property and high household debt. Growth in lending to households 
moderated to 9.9% in December 2014 from 11.5% a year earlier, while 
lending to businesses picked up to 9.4% from 7.9%. 
The Malaysian ringgit weakened against the US dollar as global oil 
prices fell in the second half of 2014. It depreciated by 6.1% against the 
US dollar in 2014 and another 2.3% in the ﬁrst 11 weeks of 2015. 
Government efforts to curtail the budget deﬁcit narrowed the ﬁscal 
gap to 3.5% of GDP in 2014, mainly on higher revenue (Figure 3.26.4). 
Strong economic growth and rising oil and gas production generated 3.4% 
higher revenue. The government raised operating expenditure by 3.9% but 
continued to trim net development expenditure, by 5.5% in 2014. 
The trade surplus rose after 2 years of declines. Merchandise 
exports increased by 2.9% to $221.8 billion on a robust performance 
from manufactured goods, particularly electronics and electrical 
products, and higher exports of commodities, partly from rising oil 
production and shipments. Exports to India, the European Union, and 
the US grew at double-digit rates, but those to the People’s Republic of 
China declined. 
Merchandise imports lagged exports, growing by 1.3% to $183.6 
billion. Imports of consumer products and intermediate goods needed 
by manufacturers grew, but imports of capital goods fell, reﬂecting 
slower ﬁxed investment. These developments expanded the trade 
surplus by 11.2% to $38.3 billion. 
After accounting for wider deﬁcits in services and income, the 
current account surplus rose to $15.1 billion, equal to 4.6% of GDP 
(Figure 3.26.5). However, large net outﬂows in the ﬁnancial account 
put the balance of payments in deﬁcit by $11.1 billion. Net outﬂows 
of portfolio investment jumped to $11.6 billion, and foreign direct 
investment recorded net outﬂows of $5.2 billion as investment abroad 
by Malaysians outstripped inﬂows of foreign direct investment. Gross 
international reserves of $106.9 billion in February 2015 provided  cover 
for more than 6 months of goods imports. 
Malaysia’s external debt was $213.0 billion at the end of 2014, equal 
to 69.6% of GDP, a marginal increase over 12 months. Slightly over half 
of the external debt has medium- to long-term maturity, and about half 
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comprises nonresident holdings of ringgit-denominated debt securities 
and deposits.
Economic prospects
Economic growth is projected to slow in 2015 largely on the impact of 
weaker demand and the slump in prices for oil and other commodities 
(Figure 3.26.6). The slowdown will be tempered by expected beneﬁts to 
manufacturing, which now comprises one quarter of the economy, and 
to services such as tourism. The beneﬁts will ﬂow from lower fuel costs, 
ringgit depreciation, and, not least, the improving economic outlook in 
the major industrial economies, particularly the US. 
From the demand side, growth in private consumption is expected 
to moderate through the forecast period. Lower earnings from oil and 
other commodities will weigh on spending. So will the new goods and 
services tax, though its impact will be mitigated by the removal of the 
sales and services taxes it replaces and by tax cuts and government 
assistance to low-income groups. Lending to households is projected to 
decelerate further in an economy where household debt already equals 
a high 87.9% of GDP. A cooling housing market and recent weakness 
in  share prices could dent conﬁdence, as indicated by consumer and 
business sentiment weakening late in 2014 (Figure 3.26.7). 
Nevertheless, several factors, including the ﬁrm labor market 
and government cash transfers, will ensure that private consumption 
remains a driver of GDP growth. Lower fuel prices, even with fuel 
subsidies gone, are expected to contribute to higher disposable incomes. 
Fixed investment faces headwinds  from the slump in commodities, 
ringgit depreciation, ﬁscal tightening, and possibly higher borrowing 
costs. The government’s Economic Transformation Programme to 
upgrade industry and infrastructure continues to generate investment 
projects, though the ﬂow from this pipeline to oil and other commodity 
projects may diminish this year. Fixed investment is expected to 
strengthen in 2016 as prospects improve for global trade.
In January 2015, the government revised its budget and reset the 
ﬁscal deﬁcit target for 2015 at 3.2% of GDP, a modest tightening from 
last year’s actual deﬁcit of 3.5%. Meeting this target could be a challenge 
as almost one-third of government revenue derives from oil and gas. 
Revenue will also suffer from slowing economic growth, weak prices 
for commodities other than hydrocarbons, and income tax cuts for 
individuals and businesses. Further, reconstruction after ﬂoods late 
in 2014 adds budget strain. On the positive side, subsidy reform will 
produce substantial ﬁscal savings, and the goods and service tax will 
broaden sources of revenue. 
After raising its policy interest rate once last year, the central bank 
has paused in light of surprisingly low inﬂation and heightened risks to 
growth. In March 2015, the monetary authorities said the policy rate of 
3.25% supported growth. 
On the balance of these inﬂuences, GDP growth is forecast to 
decelerate to 4.7% in 2015 but to then pick up to 5.0% in 2016 as the 
outlook improves for investment and exports (Figure 3.26.8).
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Inﬂation forecasts for 2015 have edged down over recent months. 
In January, inﬂation ebbed to 1.0% year on year as fuel prices fell. 
The introduction of the goods and services tax, as well as the impact 
of ringgit depreciation on the cost of imports, will put some upward 
pressure on prices during this year. In year-average terms, inﬂation 
is projected to be little changed in 2015 before it eases in 2016 as the 
temporary impact of the new tax fades (Figure 3.26.9). 
Exports started 2015 on a weak note. The slide in prices for oil 
and some other commodities has pulled down merchandise exports in 
US dollar terms since last October (Figure 3.26.10). In January 2015, 
customs-recorded exports fell by 8.3% year on year. Exports of reﬁned 
petroleum products plunged by 46.3% in January, and exports of palm 
oil products by 27.3%, as both volumes and prices were lower. Exports 
of natural rubber fell by 36.6% and of liqueﬁed natural gas by 7.9%. 
Shipments of electronics and electrical products fell by 2.3% in US 
dollars terms but rose in ringgit terms. Imports were even weaker than 
exports, falling by 12.6% in January. 
Merchandise exports are forecast to decline by 1.5% in 2015 before  
rebounding by 6.6% in 2016. Imports are seen rising modestly in 2015 
and accelerating in 2016 in line with investment growth. Trade and 
current account surpluses are projected to narrow in 2015, then turn up 
next year.
Policy challenge—defending against economic 
headwinds
Malaysia is well braced for this year’s buffeting. Its economic structure 
is increasingly diversiﬁed, as services and manufacturing now account 
for 80% of GDP, with mining, agriculture, and construction each 
making signiﬁcant contributions. Manufactured products provide 65% 
of merchandise exports, and oil, gas, and other commodities 35%. The 
removal of fuel subsidies and the broadening of the tax base through the 
goods and services tax should pave the way to a balanced budget over 
the medium term and a lower ratio of debt to GDP. 
Foreign currency reserves have declined but are still healthy, and 
the current account is seen remaining in surplus. The ﬂexible exchange 
rate system and substantial ﬁnancial buffers provide defense against 
any volatile capital ﬂows that may arise from the eventual raising of US 
interest rates.
Finally, Malaysia and its fellow members of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations will soon launch the ASEAN Economic 
Community and stand to beneﬁt from further accelerating the pace of 
subregional economic and ﬁnancial integration. 
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Myanmar 
Policy reform allowed rapid economic growth in the closing fiscal year and is expected to drive 
stronger expansion through the forecast period. Inflation will likely accelerate as well, and stresses 
are seen building in fiscal and external accounts. A key challenge is to develop the country’s human 
resources, in particular by better equipping its young people for roles in a modern economy. 
Economic performance
GDP growth is estimated at 7.7% in FY2014 (ending 31 March 2015), 
reﬂecting strong expansion in construction, manufacturing, and 
services. The government’s ambitious structural reform program has 
underpinned the strong growth performance in recent years.
Construction was driven by government investment in infrastructure, 
and property development in Yangon and Mandalay. Manufacturing 
beneﬁtted from increasing ﬂows of foreign direct investment, with more 
than one new garment factory opening per week on average in 2014. 
Growth in services was bolstered by a surge in tourist arrivals from 
2.0 million in 2013 to an estimated 3.1 million in 2014 (Figure 3.27.1).
The natural gas industry continued to expand, as reﬂected in a $400 
million increase in gas exports to $2.1 billion in the ﬁrst half of FY2014. 
However, growth in agriculture slowed. Agriculture provides just over 
30% of GDP and more than 60% of employment.
A 10% increase in business registrations in the ﬁrst 9 months of 
FY2014 indicated that business conﬁdence remains robust (Figure 3.27.2). 
The Directorate of Investment and Company Administration streamlined 
procedures to slash from 72 days to 3 days the time it takes to register a 
company. Growth in credit to the private sector continued to grow rapidly 
at 36% year on year in November 2014.
Approvals of foreign direct investment totaled $6.6 billion between 
April and December 2014, up from $4.0 billion for all of FY2013. 
Telecommunications attracted almost a third, followed by oil and gas 
at 24%, real estate at 18%, hotels at 13%, and manufacturing (primarily 
garments) at 8%. Less than 1% was for agriculture. 
Inﬂation picked up toward the end of FY2014, partly because of 
rising food prices and higher prices for imports owing to depreciation 
of the Myanmar kyat. The kyat weakened from MK965 to the US dollar 
at the start of FY2014 to MK1,042 toward the end, largely the result of 
a widening current account deﬁcit and a stronger US dollar. Inﬂation 
averaged an estimated 5.9%.
Strong demand for capital equipment and liberalized import and 
foreign exchange restrictions drove a surge in merchandise imports 
that outpaced exports, widening the current account deﬁcit to an 
estimated 7.1% of GDP in FY2014. Gross official reserves look set to total 
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$4.8 billion at the end of the ﬁscal year, which is cover for 2.7 months of 
imports, down from 3.0 months in FY2013. 
The government increased spending in FY2014, while revenue from 
sales of telecommunications licenses declined from FY2013, widening 
the ﬁscal deﬁcit to an estimated 4.3% of GDP. Treasury bill auctions 
introduced in January 2015 broadened options for funding the deﬁcit 
and strengthened the capacity of the Central Bank of Myanmar to follow 
an independent monetary policy.
Total external debt as a ratio to GDP fell slightly to 17.6%. Debt 
sustainability analysis by the International Monetary Fund in October 
2014 found Myanmar at low risk of external debt distress after clearing 
arrears with Paris Club creditors in 2013.
Economic prospects
After moderating in FY2014, growth is forecast to accelerate to 8.3% 
in FY2015 and remain close to this pace in FY2016 as it is propelled 
by investment stimulated by structural reform, an improved business 
environment, and Myanmar’s gradual integration into the subregion 
(Figure 3.27.3).
Better prospects in neighboring India and Thailand—and further aﬁeld 
in the major industrial economies—support the outlook for Myanmar but 
are partly offset by a slowdown in the People’s Republic of China. 
Fiscal policy is expected to provide additional stimulus in FY2015. 
Increases in government spending and higher civil service salaries 
could sharply widen the ﬁscal deﬁcit  to 6.3% of GDP. This raises 
concern because prudent ﬁscal policy is particularly important to 
macroeconomic stability when monetary policy tools are limited. It 
could be a challenge to maintain ﬁscal discipline ahead of national 
elections in the fourth quarter of 2015. 
Higher ﬁscal spending and expected higher wages will add to 
domestic demand such that inﬂation is projected to accelerate to 8.4% in 
FY2015 before easing in FY2016 (Figure 3.27.4). 
Strong economic growth will drive up imports, though lower global 
oil prices will counteract some of the impact on the trade balance. The 
current account deﬁcit is seen narrowing slightly to 6.8% of GDP in 
FY2015 (Figure 3.27.5). Eventually, though, low oil prices could drag 
down natural gas prices, dampening export earnings and government 
revenue. This vulnerability in ﬁscal and external accounts intensiﬁes the 
need to build gross official reserves to more comfortable levels.
External debt is projected to rise to $12.5 billion in FY2015, or 18% 
of GDP. Myanmar’s risk of debt distress is expected to remain low 
as signiﬁcant concessional funding becomes available. In addition, a 
new public debt law and debt management office will strengthen the 
management of debt, both external and domestic.
After 4 years of signiﬁcant economic reform, many development 
challenges remain: improving infrastructure, strengthening governance 
and public sector capacity, developing human capital, building a 
dynamic private sector, and revitalizing agriculture. Poverty reduction 
is imperative. The United Nations Development Programme last year 
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ranked Myanmar 150 among 187 countries included in its human 
development index, with 26% of the population below the poverty line. 
Risks to the economic outlook come from thin external and ﬁscal 
buffers, ethnic and sectarian tensions, vulnerability to bad weather, and 
possible slowing of reform momentum ahead of the elections. Progress 
was achieved in 2014 toward improving economic data, which is badly 
needed to support policy formulation and planning. 
Policy challenge—equipping young people for a 
modern economy
Many young people entering Myanmar’s workforce are poorly educated 
and skilled. This undercuts efforts to achieve inclusive economic growth 
and threatens to trap the economy in a model that adds little value and 
depends heavily on exploiting natural resources. 
Employers cite inadequate human resources as a serious barrier 
to doing business. They complain that the low quality and relevance 
of education, compounded by low average attainment, leaves young 
workers ill-equipped for either work or further training because they 
lack basic knowledge and skills for problem-solving or teamwork. 
Broadening the ranks of secondary school graduates is a prerequisite 
to expanding and modernizing industry and services. Enhanced 
technical and vocational education and training (TVET) needs to play 
a complementary role by providing speciﬁc technical skills. However, 
in FY2009, 57% of males and 39% of females who were aged 18–27 and 
held formal jobs had left school during or immediately after secondary 
school, and fewer than 2% had completed post-secondary TVET. 
Analysis of enrollment data suggests that secondary education is 
the bottleneck: of the estimated 1.1 million new enrollees in ﬁrst grade 
in 2002, four-ﬁfths successfully completed primary schooling 5 years 
later, but only one-tenth completed secondary education by passing 
the matriculation exam at the end of grade 11 in 2013 (Figure 3.27.6). 
Low pass-through from secondary school is a principal factor limiting 
entry into higher education and TVET. Moreover, half of all youths, and 
two-thirds of the poor, are unable to complete even lower-secondary 
education, which leaves them with virtually no access to TVET and 
facing bleak prospects for decent employment.
To address these challenges, the government is preparing its National 
Education Sector Plan, 2016–2020.  The plan is expected to improve the 
secondary school curriculum and align it with workforce needs, boost 
secondary education completion rates, establish pathways linking secondary 
education with TVET, and expand access to new forms of demand-responsive 
TVET, particularly for disadvantaged youths and unskilled workers. 
More broadly, the government is starting to address chronic 
underinvestment in education. Public investment in education was 0.8% 
of GDP in 2011, far below the Asian norm. From FY2011 to FY2013, the 
government more than tripled spending on education in nominal terms, 
but this brought spending to only an estimated 2.0% of GDP. Critically, 
the education plan will provide an evidence-based roadmap for further 
increases in ﬁnancing. 
3.27.6  Grade progression and exit from 
schooling
Thousand students
Primary Lower
secondary
Upper 
secondary
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Pass
 
Grade
Note:  “Pass” refers to grade 11 students who successfully 
pass the matriculation exam.
Source: ADB staff estimates using Myanmar Education 
Management Information System data for school years 
2002/03 – 2012/13, and adjusting grade 1 enrollment for 
underreported repetition.
3.27.5 Current account balance
% of GDP
−8
−6
−4
−2
0
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Forecast        
 
Note: Years are ﬁscal years ending 31 March of the 
following calendar year.
Sources: International Monetary Fund; ADB estimates.
This chapter was written by Sona Shrestha and Teresa Mendoza of the Philippines 
Country Office, ADB, Manila.
Philippines
A recovery in government expenditure is seen driving strong economic growth, together with 
robust private consumption, investment, and exports. Inflation has eased and is forecast to 
remain moderate. Challenges center on accelerating infrastructure development and advancing 
investment climate reforms to generate more and better jobs for poverty reduction.
Economic performance
The economy expanded by 6.1% in 2014, fueled by sustained increases in 
private consumption, higher ﬁxed investment, and recovery in exports. 
The pace of growth decelerated by almost 1 percentage point from the 
average of the previous 2 years, largely on a slowdown in government 
expenditure (Figure 3.28.1). 
Private consumption generated more than 60% of the GDP growth 
last year. Consumer spending grew by 5.4%, beneﬁtting from a 2.8% rise 
in employment, modest inﬂation, and higher remittances from overseas 
Filipinos, which reached $27.0 billion after climbing in 2014 by 6.3%, or 
by 10.9% in Philippine peso terms.
Government consumption contracted through the ﬁrst 3 quarters, 
reﬂecting in part a Supreme Court ruling against certain government 
funds that slowed disbursements. In the fourth quarter, the government 
accelerated spending so that outlays for the year edged up by 1.8%, 
compared with a much bigger increase of 7.7% in 2013. 
Fixed investment rose by 8.6%, also decelerating from the 
previous year largely due to the slowdown in government spending 
(Figure 3.28.2). Private construction rose at a double-digit pace, 
driven by demand for offices, retail space, and housing. Investment in 
machinery and transport equipment expanded as well. However, public 
construction fell by 1.5%, though it started to recover in the fourth 
quarter. Exports of goods and services rebounded in volume terms from 
contraction in 2013. Imports rose in volume terms at a slower pace, 
which generated a signiﬁcant contribution to GDP growth from net 
external demand.
From the production side, services contributed nearly 60% of GDP 
growth, and manufacturing one-third. Comprising about half the 
economy, services grew by 6.0%, led by wholesale and retail trading, 
business process outsourcing, tourism, ﬁnance, and real estate.
Manufacturing grew by 8.1%, close to its recent annual average 
rate of increase. Buoyant domestic demand and rising export orders 
for manufactured products underpinned this growth. Damage inﬂicted 
by Super Typhoon Haiyan late in 2013 and other storms in 2014 hurt 
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agricultural production for much of last year, but ﬁsheries output and 
crops recovered to lift full-year agricultural production by 1.9% over 2013. 
Nevertheless, poor harvests and supply bottlenecks pushed inﬂation 
to 4.9% year on year in August, the highest for 3 years (Figure 3.28.3). 
Supply bottlenecks included a Manila city ordinance restricting cargo 
trucks, which disrupted deliveries. After August, better harvests, 
additional rice supplies from imports, and plunging global oil prices 
brought inﬂation down and put the average for 2014 at 4.1%. 
Inﬂation in the ﬁrst 3 quarters prompted Bangko Sentral ng 
Pilipinas, the central bank, to raise policy interest rates by 50 basis 
points between July and September 2014, to 4.0% for the overnight 
borrowing rate and 6.0% for the overnight lending rate. The central 
bank raised the reserve requirement for banks by 2 percentage points 
to mitigate risk from the rapid expansion of domestic liquidity, and it 
increased the interest rate on its special deposit account. Consequently, 
growth in broad money (M3) decelerated to 11.3% in December. 
Subdued government spending, as well as higher revenue, cut the 
ﬁscal deﬁcit to 0.6% of GDP in 2014, well under the ceiling of 2.0% and 
narrower than the deﬁcit of 1.4% recorded in 2013. Revenue rose by 
11.2%, helped by more stringent tax administration, while expenditure 
excluding interest increased by 6.7%. 
Merchandise exports rebounded to shrink the trade deﬁcit. Exports 
rose in US dollar terms by an estimated 9.0% on higher shipments of 
machinery and transport equipment, furniture, garments, fruit and 
vegetables, and minerals. Exports of electronics, mainly semiconductors, 
recovered from a slump in 2013. A modest 2.4% increase in merchandise 
imports in US dollars reﬂected increases in capital and consumer goods 
tempered by falling oil prices in the second half (Figure 3.28.4). 
After accounting for higher inﬂows of remittances and earnings 
from business process outsourcing, the current account surplus was 
estimated at 3.6% of GDP. The balance of payments was in deﬁcit, 
however, on net outﬂows in the ﬁnancial account, mainly of portfolio 
investment. Gross international reserves at $81.3 billion in February 
2014 provided a high 10.4 months of cover for imports of goods and 
services and income payments. The peso depreciated by 0.5% against 
the US dollar between the end of 2013 and the end of 2014.
Economic prospects
Strong GDP growth is projected for 2015 and 2016 based on buoyant 
private consumption, a solid outlook for investment and exports, and 
recovery in government expenditure. GDP is projected to increase by 
6.4% in 2015 and 6.3% in 2016 (Figure 3.28.5).  
Factors that powered private consumption in 2014—growth in 
employment, modest inﬂation, and higher inﬂows of remittances—are 
projected to continue through the forecast period. One million new jobs 
were generated in the 12 months to January 2015, mostly in services, 
and the unemployment rate fell to 6.6% from 7.5% in January 2014.  
Lower fuel prices are beneﬁting consumers and businesses alike. 
Surveys conducted by the central bank show positive consumer and 
business  sentiment (Figure 3.28.6).  Upgrades to the country’s credit 
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rating support investor sentiment. After lifting its rating for the 
Philippines to investment grade in 2013, Moody’s upgraded it again in 
December 2014 by one notch to Baa2. 
Prospects for construction are favorable. Building permits for houses 
and apartments increased by 21.5%, and nonresidential permits by 14.5%, 
in the fourth quarter of 2014 from the year-earlier period. Other positive 
indicators include brisk motor vehicle sales and growth in manufacturing 
output and credit. Lending to the private sector rose by 15.3% year on 
year in January 2015, with credit to businesses up by 16.0%. Election-
related spending will provide a boost to domestic demand through May 
2016, when national and subnational elections are held.
Fiscal policy is expected to become more expansionary. The 
government has maintained its ﬁscal deﬁcit ceiling at 2.0% of GDP for 
2015 and 2016, which accommodates a widening from the 0.6% deﬁcit 
in 2014 if  disbursements increase as planned. The government budget 
this year is 15.1% larger than last year and has, at the equivalent of 18.4% 
of GDP, the biggest ratio to GDP in at least a decade. The budget boosts 
allocations for social services and infrastructure and directs additional 
support for the development of agriculture, tourism, and manufacturing. 
A master plan approved last October for rehabilitating areas 
damaged by Super Typhoon Haiyan will help to accelerate 
reconstruction spending. The plan covers 171 affected cities and 
municipalities and involves outlays of about $4 billion. 
Inﬂation eased further to 2.4% in the ﬁrst 2 months of 2015, mainly 
owing to lower fuel prices and modest increases in food prices. For the 
year as a whole, inﬂation is projected to average 2.8%. There are risks 
to this forecast from El Niño weather conditions that are expected to 
last through the ﬁrst half, as well as from possible power shortages 
and pending petitions for higher electricity tariffs. Next year, inﬂation 
is seen quickening to 3.3% on higher global prices for oil and other 
commodities (Figure 3.28.7). 
As inﬂation stays within the central bank’s 2%-4% target range, the 
monetary authorities may maintain current policy settings for some 
time before resuming a gradual tightening. The policy rates were at 
record lows before last year’s increase of 50 basis points.
Improved economic prospects for major industrial economies 
bode well for exports and foreign direct investment. The US is the 
Philippines’ second biggest market after Japan, buying 14% of exports 
in 2014. The European Union, the market for 11% of exports, granted 
duty-free entry late last year to additional Philippine products. As well 
as stimulating exports, this concession should help to attract investment 
into products that enjoy duty-free access to the European Union.
Exports are forecast to rise faster than imports, pushing up the 
current account surplus in 2015 to 4.0% of GDP. Strong domestic demand 
will lift imports, but this will be countered by lower oil prices. The 
Philippines imports more than 90% of its oil, and crude oil comprises 
about 12% of total imports. In 2016, the current account surplus is 
projected to fall to 3.6% of GDP as oil prices rise. Sustained growth in 
remittances and services exports will bolster current account surpluses. 
Risks to the outlook come from unexpectedly weak recovery in 
the industrial countries, as Japan, the US, and the euro area together 
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take half of all Philippine exports. Luzon may suffer power shortages 
during the summer. To mitigate this risk, the government is providing 
incentives to big power users such as factories to run their own 
generators to ease demand on the grid. After May 2016, the new 
administration’s priorities and policies will have an important bearing 
on economic prospects. 
Policy challenge—stimulating investment
Higher rates of investment are needed to build on recent gains and raise 
employment to reduce poverty. While the Philippines has posted solid 
growth in recent years, unemployment and underemployment remain 
high. Even when the unemployment rate fell to 6.6% in January 2015, 
the lowest in 10 years, 2.6 million people remained jobless, nearly half of 
them aged 15–24 years, and a further 6.5 million were underemployed. 
An average of 1 million new workers join the workforce each year. 
Poverty incidence declined during 2013, though a quarter of the 
population remained poor, reﬂecting the need for more and better 
jobs. In the ﬁrst half of 2014, poverty incidence was reported at 25.8%  
compared to 24.6% in the same period in 2013, rising largely due to 
higher food prices and damages to livelihoods caused by typhoons.
Investment has improved in the Philippines but still lags its 
subregional peers (Figure 3.28.8). Net foreign direct investment inﬂows 
are modest, despite a 66% increase to $6.2 billion in 2014 (Figure 3.28.9). 
A key constraint on growth stems from inadequate past investment 
in infrastructure. The Philippines ranks 95 out of 144 countries for 
the quality of its infrastructure in the World Economic Forum’s Global 
Competitiveness Report 2014–2015 (Figure 3.28.10). Acknowledging this, 
the government has prioritized infrastructure investment and aims to 
double outlays on infrastructure from 2% of GDP over the past decade to 
4% in 2015 and further to 5% in 2016.
The government’s public-private partnership (PPP) program has now 
begun to make progress. From 11 projects in 2010, the Philippines now 
has 61 potential PPPs, covering highways, railways, light rail mass transit, 
classrooms, and hospitals. Nine projects costing a total of $2.9 billion 
have been awarded since 2010. Continued progress in the PPP program, 
including through the enactment of proposed legislation to improve the 
PPP framework, instituting better project appraisal and monitoring, and 
strengthening capacity in the agencies involved, will be needed to meet 
the country’s vast infrastructure needs. 
Recent liberalization of aviation policy and lifting of restrictions on 
foreign ownership of banks were important milestones. Further reforms 
to enhance competition, improve regulatory efficiency, and reduce the 
administrative costs of doing business are crucial for achieving higher 
levels of investment.
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Singapore
The economy slowed in 2014, inflation remained tame, and the current account improved. An 
uptick in growth is forecast for 2015 and 2016, with inflation subsiding in 2015 and edging 
up again later, and external surpluses narrowing. The main policy challenge during the forecast 
period is to enhance the business environment for creating competitive export-oriented 
enterprises.
Economic performance
GDP growth slowed to 2.9% in 2014 from 4.4% in 2013 as productivity 
gains remained weak for the third straight year (Figure 3.29.1). The 
service sector was the main driver of growth in 2014, expanding by 3.2% 
and contributing 2.1 percentage points to GDP growth (Figure 3.29.2). 
Finance, insurance, and business services were the best performers, and 
their share in GDP increased to 25.6% in 2014. Industry contributed 0.7 
percentage points to growth, as biomedical and chemical output rose on 
strong external demand. Construction growth halved to 3.0% on weak 
private sector activity. Quarrying rebounded, as did agriculture and 
ﬁsheries as the government provided funds to farmers to increase their 
yield and productivity. 
On the demand side, net exports expanded further in 2014, 
contributing 1.7 percentage points to GDP growth as exports rose by 
2.1% in real terms, outpacing the 1.4% rise in imports (Figure 3.29.3). 
Growth in domestic demand decelerated to 0.3% because investment 
contracted and growth in government expenditure was weak, 
contributing only 0.01 percentage points to GDP growth. Investment 
to construct nonresidential buildings fell, and government expenditure 
rose by only 0.1%, a tiny fraction of 11.5% expansion in 2013. However, 
private consumption rose by 2.5% and contributed 1.0 percentage point 
to growth as wages continued to rise, reﬂecting a low unemployment 
rate and job vacancies outnumbering job seekers. 
Reﬂecting soft global commodity prices, inﬂation averaged 1.0% in 
2014, down from 2.4% in 2013 (Figure 3.29.4). Increases in prices for 
prepared food, recreation, and health care were the main contributors 
to inﬂation, but transport and communication costs moderated as prices 
for automobiles and internet subscription fees declined. Core inﬂation, 
which excludes rent and private road transport, increased by 2.0% in 
2014, up from 1.7% in 2013.
The trade surplus expanded to equal 24.8% of GDP in 2014, though 
exports and imports both declined in foreign currency terms. Exports 
were weighed down by falling exports of reﬁned petroleum products 
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and the continued slump in electronics, while merchandise imports 
shrank as oil imports fell by 1.7% with the sharp drop in oil prices in the 
fourth quarter. Services exports have been recording robust growth in 
recent years and now make up over a quarter of the country’s exports. 
However, net services registered a deﬁcit amounting to 0.4% of GDP 
in 2014 as insurance and ﬁnancial payments exceeded maintenance, 
transport, and insurance receipts. The current account surplus widened 
to 19.1% of GDP, but the overall surplus in the balance of payments 
narrowed to 2.0% of GDP, owing to large deﬁcits in the capital and 
ﬁnancial accounts (Figure 3.29.5). 
The budget recorded a deﬁcit of S$126 million in FY2014 (ending 31 
March 2015), or 0.03% of GDP, as government expenditure including 
special transfers rose by 16.1% while revenue including contributions 
from investment returns grew by 7.0% (Figure 3.29.6). Revenue growth 
reﬂected rising personal income tax and vehicle quota premiums paid to 
obtain certiﬁcates of entitlement, which are required for motor vehicle 
registration. The steep rise in government expenditure followed higher 
outlays on health care, culture, community and youth, and special 
transfers.
The Monetary Authority of Singapore maintained its policy of 
modest and gradual appreciation of the Singapore dollar in terms of its 
nominal effective exchange rate (NEER)—a policy that has served the 
country well by containing inﬂation both domestic and imported, and by 
ensuring that inﬂation expectations remain anchored. The appreciating 
trend in the NEER and the real effective exchange rate continued 
in 2014, but at a slower pace than in 2013, with the NEER rising by 
1.3% and the real effective exchange rate by 0.1% (Figure 3.29.7). The 
Singapore interbank offered rate increased by 0.03 basis points in 2014, 
dampening the growth of credit (Figure 3.29.8), which together with a 
substantial narrowing of the balance of payments surplus reduced the 
growth of money supply (M2) to 3.3% from 4.3% in 2013 
Economic prospects
Inﬂuenced by diverging global economic developments and ongoing 
economic restructuring, the Singapore economy is forecast to grow by 
3.0% in 2015 and 3.4% in 2016, as global recovery gathers momentum 
and the service sector continues to strengthen. Finance, insurance, and 
business services will be the main drivers of growth again in 2015 and 
2016, but growth in labor-intensive sectors like construction, retail, 
and food services could be constrained by the persistently tight labor 
market. 
Domestic demand will expand as public investment and government 
spending on public transportation and health-care infrastructure is 
expected to rise. Beneﬁtting from higher government subsidies for 
education services and the enhancement of a low-income voucher 
scheme, private consumption should also rise in 2015. With moderate 
improvement in external demand in 2015 on the expected strengthening 
of its partner economies, Singapore’s should see exports grow 
modestly—though they may be also tamped down by weakening exports 
of petroleum products, which fell by 33.3% year on year in January 2015. 
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Imports are expected to grow even more slowly, however, generating a 
modest rise in net exports. The current account surplus will narrow to 
18.9% of GDP in 2015 and rise to 19.3% in 2016. 
The inﬂation rate will slow to 0.2% in 2015 as oil prices decline, 
domestic cost pressures recede, and the Singapore dollar continues to 
appreciate through a measured change in the NEER. Rental increases 
will likely be minimized by current macroprudential policies, and 
transportation costs will rise little in 2015 as lower premiums for 
certiﬁcates of entitlement are sustained. Wages may rise modestly owing 
to the tightening labor market, but the authorities do not expect the 
pass-through to be large. In 2016, the inﬂation rate may rise to 1.5% as 
commodity prices start to edge up.
Fiscal policy will be expansionary in 2015 with a rise in the budget 
deﬁcit to 1.6% of GDP in FY2015 (ending 31 March 2016). Government 
expenditure is expected to increase by more than 14.0% as outlays 
on health-care infrastructure, public transport, and Changi Airport 
increase, surpassing the 4.7% growth in revenue anticipated from duties 
on motor vehicles in particular. 
External risks to the outlook include sluggish growth in the 
advanced economies (particularly in the euro area and Japan), 
continuing structural reform in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), 
and the impact on the  Singapore interbank offered rate from eventual 
higher interest rates in the US. Domestically, a sharp correction in the 
real estate market may adversely affect construction and real estate 
investment, and rising labor costs and declining labor productivity could 
hinder the growth of labor-intensive sectors, slowing economic growth 
during the forecast period.
 
Policy challenge—building efficient companies 
to safeguard resilient growth 
Singapore’s small domestic market makes the maintenance of its current 
export orientation and global competitiveness essential for safeguarding 
resilient economic growth. To stay globally competitive, Singapore 
needs to position itself to take advantage of existing and prospective 
developments in the region. It needs to facilitate the establishment 
of additional world-class service companies to cater to the needs of a 
growing middle class in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) and beyond.
ASEAN—a growing market of 620 million people with a combined 
GDP of $2.3 trillion in 2013—is Singapore’s top investment destination 
and its largest trading partner, accounting for more than 26% of its 
trade. The urban population of ASEAN is growing fast and will account 
for 65% of the population by 2030, spurring demand for modern services 
that Singapore can provide. ASEAN’s links with global value chains 
enhance Singapore’s selling point as a hub for the region and allows 
Singapore-based companies to better tap opportunities both within the 
region and further aﬁeld.
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3.29.9  Exports of services by major trading 
partner, 2004–2013
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Other developments in Singapore’s international trade relations 
provide additional opportunities. With the implementation of the 
ASEAN Economic Community in 2015, Singapore will beneﬁt from 
lower foreign equity limits and reduced tariff and nontariff barriers to 
trade in services, which is an important sector in Singapore’s economy 
(Figure 3.29.9). In addition, the Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership—which will link ASEAN with the PRC, the Republic of 
Korea, India, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand when established—
should boost intraregional trade ﬂows to the beneﬁt of Singapore’s 
wholesale trade sector.
The government is already leveraging these advantages to encourage 
the emergence of competitive export-oriented companies that can 
cater to the burgeoning needs of ASEAN members and other countries. 
Singapore is halfway through its program of economic restructuring 
toward innovation and accelerated internationalization. The 2015 
budget will raise grant support and introduce tax deductions and 
incentives for small and medium-sized enterprises to help them capture 
greater value from research and development. It will also catalyze 
enterprise ﬁnancing, which is important for small businesses attempting 
breakthrough. In particular, improvements in tax allowances for 
acquisition costs and tax beneﬁts for mergers and acquisitions should 
help small and medium-sized enterprises scale up, attract talent, and 
compete effectively overseas toward becoming strategic partners to 
multinational companies.
The government could also encourage investment overseas by 
companies that it partly or wholly owns and that have potential to lead 
the development of indigenous technological capabilities. Meanwhile, 
Singapore should strive to maintain its current position as ASEAN’s hub 
for trade, ﬁnance, and intellectual property.
The authorities plan to enhance productivity over the next decade 
by encouraging businesses to upgrade their technological and capital 
bases, create better jobs, and raise real wages. These efforts could be 
undermined, however, by an aging population and a shrinking labor 
pool, which could inhibit the growth of established enterprises and the 
launch of new ones. An effective response would be for Singapore to 
extend to capital and labor ﬂows the kind of liberal external economic 
policy it maintains for trade in goods and services. 
This chapter was written by Luxmon Attapich of the Thailand Resident Mission, ADB, 
Bangkok.
Thailand
Cautious economic recovery that started in 2014 is expected to gather momentum slowly, 
nudged forward by higher investment and abetted by a calmer political environment, better 
prospects for some exports markets, and lower fuel costs. Consumer prices will barely change 
this year before edging up in 2016. Stronger public investment depends heavily on state-owned 
enterprises, which need reform. 
Economic performance
A contraction in GDP in the ﬁrst quarter of 2014 was followed by a 
cautious recovery sufficient for the economy to post marginal growth 
of 0.7% for the year (Figure 3.30.1). Political unrest and street protests 
disrupted economic activity into the ﬁrst half of 2014, culminating in a 
military takeover of the government in May. Various disruptions since 
2007 have conﬁned average growth over this period to 2.9%. 
Consumption and net exports contributed to the slight GDP 
increase in 2014, while investment fell sharply. Private consumption 
recorded meager growth of 0.3%, weighed down by depressed consumer 
conﬁdence during the political strife and a decline in farm incomes 
caused by weaker prices for agricultural products. Government 
consumption also made a minor contribution to GDP growth.
However, ﬁxed investment fell by 2.8% in 2014, following on 
from a 2.0% decline in the previous year (Figure 3.30.2). Public ﬁxed 
investment was hampered by political disruptions and legal challenges 
to the previous administration. Political uncertainty and soft domestic 
and external demand hurt private investment, which started to recover 
in the second half. 
Imports of goods and services shrank in volume terms more 
than exports did, allowing net external demand to make the biggest 
contribution to GDP growth.
From the supply side, services grew by 2.2% and agriculture by a 
modest 1.1%, but industry contracted by 0.9%. Services beneﬁted from 
growth in telecommunications and ﬁnance, partly offset by weakness 
in wholesale and retail trade—and in hotels and restaurants as tourist 
arrivals fell by 6.7% to 24.8 million, suppressed by street protests and 
military intervention (Figure 3.30.3). Agriculture, hampered by lower 
prices for rice and natural rubber and a disease in shrimp aquaculture, 
grew at the weakest pace in 4 years. 
Contraction in industry stemmed mainly from declines in 
manufacturing and construction. Manufacturing, hit by slack domestic 
demand and declining export orders, shrank by 1.1%. Construction 
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contracted by 3.8%, mainly the result of a political vacuum in the ﬁrst 
part of the year that delayed construction by state-owned enterprises. 
Inﬂation decelerated for a third straight year in 2014, to average 1.9%. 
Lower food and oil prices along with weak domestic demand pulled 
inﬂation back down to 0.6% year on year by December (Figure 3.30.4). 
Responding to the ﬁrst-quarter economic contraction, the Bank of 
Thailand, the central bank, lowered its policy interest rate in March 
2014 by 25 basis points to 2.0%. Although commercial banks trimmed 
lending rates, growth in credit to the private sector slowed sharply to 
4.5%, reﬂecting subdued demand for loans and banks’ deepening caution 
toward extending credit to households and small businesses. 
Government spending through the ﬁrst half of FY2014 (ended 30 
September 2014) was severely limited by legal and political constraints, 
causing public ﬁxed investment for the year to fall. Total government 
spending and revenue fell over the ﬁscal year and the ﬁscal deﬁcit 
widened to 2.5% from 2.0% in the previous year. 
In the external accounts, sluggish demand in major markets and 
falling prices for export commodities, including natural rubber and sugar, 
dragged down merchandise exports by 0.3% to $224.8 billion in 2014. 
Exports to the People’s Republic of China fell by a relatively sharp 7.9%. 
Merchandise imports dropped by 8.5% to $200.2 billion, a result 
of lower exports, falling oil prices, and weak domestic demand, 
particularly for capital goods (Figure 3.30.5). Consequently, the trade 
surplus jumped to $24.6 billion and the current account turned to a 
surplus of $14.2 billion, equal to 3.8% of GDP. 
Capital and ﬁnancial accounts registered net outﬂows of $15.3 
billion, mainly on outﬂows of portfolio investment, and the balance of 
payments showed a small deﬁcit. Gross international reserves of $157.1 
billion at the end of 2014 covered 7.4 months of imports. The Thai baht 
weakened early in 2014 but ended the year little changed against the US 
dollar. It appreciated over the year against the euro, Japanese yen, and 
most regional currencies. 
The previous government’s costly support program for rice farmers 
ended last year. After that, farmers faced not only declining rice prices 
but also drought in many areas. The interim administration provided 
support through subsidies for rice farmers’ production costs, capped 
at B15,000 per farm. It paid B1 million to each drought-affected 
district for community investments and hired farmers temporarily to 
maintain irrigation canals. Rubber producers also received a subsidy for 
production cost. 
Economic prospects
The economy is expected to beneﬁt this year from a relatively calm 
political environment, the restoration of government investment, better 
prospects for exports to the major industrial economies, and lower fuel 
costs for businesses and consumers. These factors are forecast to lift 
GDP growth to 3.6% in 2015 and 4.1% next year (Figure 3.30.6). 
In particular, public ﬁxed investment will rise in 2015 after last year’s 
decline and is expected to accelerate in 2016. The interim government 
has approved an infrastructure program that includes $95 billion in 
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investments over 8 years in railways, roads, ports, airports, and special 
economic zones. This year, public investment will be conﬁned to relatively 
small projects, with larger-scale construction to start from next year. The 
government plans to offer contracts for mass rapid transit rail lines in 
Bangkok and for double-tracking rail lines across the country.
Fiscal policy is expected to support economic recovery. The budget for 
FY2015 provides for a deﬁcit of B250 billion, equivalent to 1.9% of projected 
GDP. In addition, the government is implementing stimulus measures 
such as a soft-loan program through state-owned ﬁnancial institutions 
and is drawing on funds carried over from past budgets to help ﬁnance 
public investment. The execution of budget programs has improved 
as 42.6% of the budget was disbursed in the ﬁrst 5 months of FY2015. 
Looking to FY2016, the ﬁscal deﬁcit is expected to widen to B390 billion to 
accommodate additional spending. Public debt is manageable at 45.8% of 
GDP, below the 60.0% ceiling set under the ﬁscal sustainability framework.
Private ﬁxed investment is recovering gradually and is expected 
to pick up as infrastructure projects get under way and consumption 
spending strengthens. Approvals for ﬁrms’ investment privileges, which 
ground to a halt last year during the political disruptions, have resumed. 
Lower energy costs and a further reduction in interest rates in March 
2015 should support investment, though low capacity utilization hinders 
expansion in some industries. 
The interim government plans to develop ﬁve special economic zones 
along Thailand’s borders to attract industries such as logistics, processing 
agricultural products, and labor-intensive manufacturing. Investors in the 
zones get several tax breaks and privileges, including permission to employ 
foreign experts and for foreign investors to own land. Under the plan, 
migrant workers from neighboring countries can work in the Thai zones 
and still live at home.
Consumer conﬁdence rallied in the second half of 2014 on the calmer 
political environment, but conﬁdence waned in early 2015 (Figure 3.30.7). 
Household spending is expected to show a modest increase this year, 
supported by higher civil service salaries from January, lower fuel costs, 
and government measures to help farmers. However, data for January 
showed that private consumption and private investment remained sluggish 
(Figure 3.30.8).
Recovery in consumer spending is muted by ﬂagging rural incomes 
caused by subdued prices for agricultural products and high household 
debt that by last September had risen to the equivalent to 84.2% of GDP. 
Under a new program designed to improve access to formal ﬁnance and 
ease the cost of debt servicing for low-income earners, nonbank ﬁnancial 
institutions can lend up to B200,000 to individuals at interest rates above 
those charged by commercial banks but far below those charged by 
unlicensed loan sharks. 
Consumer prices eased by 0.5% in the ﬁrst 2 months of 2015, brought 
about by lower prices for fuel and transport as the prices of most other 
consumer goods and services edged up. For the full year, inﬂation is 
projected to average a low 0.2% (Figure 3.30.9). In March, the central 
bank lowered its policy interest rate by 25 basis points to 1.75%, citing a 
disappointingly weak economic recovery and declining consumer prices 
(Figure 3.30.10). 
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Next year, inﬂation is seen quickening to 2.0% as domestic demand 
strengthens and global prices for food and other commodities turn up. A 
restructuring of domestic fuel prices has reduced subsidies on diesel and 
cooking gas and lowered the excise tax on benzene, bringing prices more in 
line with the international market. 
Exports are projected to improve gradually through the forecast period. 
In January of this year, merchandise exports declined by 3.5% in value 
terms. Shipments of manufactured goods rose, but export commodities 
remained weak. Imports will recover from last year’s slump, though the 
increase will be contained by lower oil prices; crude oil and petroleum 
products comprised 21% of Thailand’s total merchandise imports in 2014. 
Imports will accelerate from 2016 if major infrastructure projects get under 
way as planned.
Tourism is likely to be a bright spot this year, illustrated by a 15.9% 
rise in tourist arrivals in January. Further gains in tourism receipts are 
expected in 2016, particularly if martial law is lifted nationwide by the 
interim administration ahead of proposed elections. 
These developments are expected to generate a signiﬁcant current 
account surplus in 2015 and a smaller surplus in 2016 (Figure 3.30.11).
Domestic risks to the economic recovery center on how well the public 
infrastructure program is implemented and on political uncertainty. 
The interim government has set an ambitious target to disburse better 
than 90% of its investment budget in FY2015. A signiﬁcant shortfall would 
dent conﬁdence and growth. The outlook assumes that national elections 
proceed smoothly in 2016 and that the incoming government follows 
credible economic policies. External risks come from volatile global capital 
ﬂows and growth in major trading partners turning out weaker than 
anticipated.
Policy challenge—reforming state-owned 
enterprises 
The need for stronger public sector investment to help revive Thailand’s 
economy and to improve its infrastructure has turned a spotlight on 
the country’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs), whose combined annual 
outlays are twice those of the government. 
The assets of the 56 SOEs, which range from banks to airlines 
and energy companies, total $355 billion, and their annual investment 
exceeds that of the government (Figure 3.30.12). 
Renewed focus on the role of SOEs has prompted proposals to 
improve their performance and efficiency, help shield them from 
political interference, and stem the drain on the national budget caused 
by the half of SOEs that operate at a loss. 
Governments over the years have used SOEs to implement programs 
that, while popular with sections of the public, at times have imposed 
large, opaque ﬁnancial burdens on the SOEs and eventually the state. 
The rice-pledging program launched by the previous government in 
2011 to bolster rural incomes is an example. Payments to farmers to 
buy their rice at a 40%–50% premium above the market price were 
made through the state-owned Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural 
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Cooperatives. But the bank’s ﬁnancial position was put at risk at 
one stage when the previous government was unable to make timely 
reimbursements for the rice purchases. The program expired last year 
leaving the state with huge losses. 
Government lending programs and political interference that 
compromised lending decisions over the years contributed to ﬁnancial 
stress at the state-owned Small and Medium Enterprise Development 
Bank of Thailand (SME Bank). In 2013, SME Bank was weighed down 
by nonperforming loans that equaled 33.7% of total lending, and by a 
capital-adequacy ratio less than half that of commercial banks. Early 
in 2015, the Ministry of Finance injected B2 billion into SME Bank to 
bolster its capital. 
Well-designed public-service programs executed through SOEs can 
beneﬁt the public and act as effective economic stimulus. However, 
the programs and the government’s funding obligations should be 
transparent and deﬁned precisely, allowing the SOEs to maintain 
accounts that separate public-service activities from regular operations. 
At the State Railway of Thailand, the sole operator of railway 
services in the country, passenger traffic fell by 41% from 1993 to 2009, 
but the railway kept in operation roughly the same number of trains. 
Low-fare passenger traffic takes up 70% of the railway’s track capacity. 
The railway incurs annual losses and at times lacks adequate funds 
for maintenance. Its freight operations have been slowly losing ground 
to road carriers, partly because the railway is short of suitable rolling 
stock and other equipment.
To address some of these issues, the interim administration 
appointed the State Enterprises Policy Commission, which earlier this 
year approved a rehabilitation program for seven SOEs, including SME 
Bank, the State Railway of Thailand, and Thai Airways International. 
The commission has approved in principle the formation of a holding 
company to supervise SOEs and shield them from direct political 
intervention. Another proposal being discussed is to bring governance 
standards at SOEs into line with those at companies listed on the 
stock exchange. 
Longer term, consumers and businesses would beneﬁt from stiffer 
competition with SOEs from private ﬁrms, which should spur them 
to improve their performance. Indirect subsidies enjoyed by SOEs, 
such as government guarantees on debt and exemption from certain 
regulations, could be reconsidered to drive higher efficiency.
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This chapter was written by Dominic Mellor, Aaron Batten, Chu Hong Minh, and Nguyen 
Luu Thuc Phuong of the Viet Nam Resident Mission, ADB, Ha Noi.
Viet Nam
Rising foreign direct investment helped to accelerate economic growth to 6.0% in 2014. Inflation 
abated, and robust external accounts enabled the rebuilding of foreign reserves. Growth is forecast 
to edge higher again this year and next, while inflation remains relatively low. Policy challenges are 
to reform banks and state enterprises and to integrate domestic firms into global value chains. 
Economic performance
The economy grew by 6.0% in 2014, the strongest pace since 2011 
(Figure 3.31.1). Industry expanded by 7.1%, against 5.4% in 2013, 
beneﬁtting from foreign direct investment (FDI) that boosted growth 
in manufacturing to 8.5%. Recovery in demand for property lifted 
growth in construction to 7.1%. Agriculture picked up to grow by 3.5%, 
supported by higher exports of ﬁsh and shrimp.
By contrast, growth in services eased from the previous year to 
6.0%, partly a result of fewer visitors from the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC), which hurt tourism. Total visitor arrivals increased by 
4.0% in 2014—a deceleration from 10.6% in 2013. 
On the demand side, private consumption accelerated by almost 
a percentage point to 6.1%, reﬂecting improved consumer sentiment. 
Growth in public consumption eased to 7.0% as the government reduced 
capital expenditure and contained increases in public sector wages. 
Investment strengthened last year as gross capital formation rose by 
8.9%, spurred by an estimated 16% increase in FDI disbursements and 
lower domestic interest rates. However, net external demand weighed 
on GDP growth because imports of goods and services rose in volume 
terms at a faster pace than exports. 
Inﬂation decelerated to average 4.1% in 2014, the lowest in 10 years, 
owing to better food production and lower global prices for oil and 
commodities. By the end of 2014, inﬂation was just 1.8% year on year 
(Figure 3.31.2).
Moderating inﬂation paved the way for the State Bank of Viet Nam, 
the central bank, to reduce policy interest rates by a further 50 basis 
points, to 6.5% for the reﬁnancing rate and to 4.5% for the discount rate. 
Commercial banks lowered lending rates, which helped to stimulate 
credit growth to an estimated 12.6%, meeting the central bank’s 
12%–14% target for 2014 (Figure 3.31.3). M2 money supply grew by an 
estimated 16%, also in line with the official target. 
International reserves recovered by the end of 2014 to an estimated 
3 months of import cover (Figure 3.31.4). Merchandise exports rose by 
an estimated 13.7% on a balance-of-payments basis and in US dollars, 
supported by further gains in shipments of manufactured products 
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such as mobile phones from foreign-invested factories. Measured the 
same way, imports rose by 12.1%, so that the trade surplus increased to 
an estimated $11.9 billion. Exports beneﬁtted from a 1% devaluation of 
the Viet Nam dong against the US dollar in June 2014, which followed a 
similar devaluation in mid-2013. 
The current account recorded its fourth consecutive surplus, 
estimated at $8.1 billion or 4.4% of GDP. On the capital account, the 16% 
increase in FDI disbursements to $8.1 billion more than offset a drop in 
portfolio inﬂows (Figure 3.31.5).
Fiscal policy was moderately expansionary in 2014. The ﬁscal deﬁcit, 
excluding off-budget and on-lending items, widened to 4.4% of GDP 
from 3.9% in 2013. Preliminary ﬁgures show that budget expenditure 
remained at the equivalent of 25.9% of GDP, but revenue and grants fell 
to 21.5% of GDP, mostly a result of weak growth in tax collection. 
Moody’s Investors Service raised Viet Nam’s sovereign credit rating 
by one notch to B1, and Fitch upgraded its rating to BB–, citing improved 
macroeconomic stability and stronger external accounts. These actions 
supported the government’s sale of $1 billion in 10-year bonds at an 
annual coupon rate of 4.8%, the lowest rate of its three issuances of 
offshore debt denominated in US dollars since 2005. 
The Viet Nam Asset Management Company acquired from banks 
an estimated $5.7 billion in nonperforming loans by the end of 2014, 
a key part of the government’s efforts to mend a banking system 
handicapped by impaired balance sheets and insufficient capital. 
However, the government has yet to outline a clear strategy to resolve 
the nonperforming loans. Further, the extent of bad loans remaining 
with the banks is unclear. Full enforcement of new guidelines on loan 
loss classiﬁcation and provisioning was delayed until April 2015. 
Cross holdings between banks, as well as between banks and 
nonbanks, pose risks to the ﬁnancial sector. The central bank introduced 
new prudential regulations to address this issue which, if effectively 
implemented, will improve ﬁnancial stability.
Addressing the reform of underperforming state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs), the government approved new laws to guide divestment of SOE 
assets and accelerate their commercialization. The number of SOEs 
equitized or partly privatized rose in 2014, though it fell short of the 
official target (Figure 3.31.6).
Economic prospects
GDP growth is forecast to edge up to 6.1% in 2015 and 6.2% in 2016, 
with FDI an important driver (Figure 3.31.7). Data from the Foreign 
Investment Agency show that new FDI commitments rose to $15.6 billion 
in 2014, while an additional $4.6 billion was committed to existing 
foreign-funded projects. 
Better economic performance in the major industrial economies—
particularly the US, Viet Nam’s biggest export market—will spur 
exports, but this positive effect will be partly offset by slowing growth 
in the PRC. Exports of manufactured products will continue to 
expand, given that 76% of last year’s disbursed FDI was directed into 
manufacturing. 
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Factors bolstering private consumption will be expanded 
employment, low inﬂ ation, and growth in remittances, which reached 
almost $10 billion last year. In January 2015, ahead of the lunar new 
year, retail sales jumped by 13% in nominal terms. 
Lower interest rates, ratings upgrades, and brighter prospects 
for manufactured exports have improved the outlook for investment. 
The central bank targets credit growth of 13%–15% in 2015, slightly 
above last year’s estimated outcome. Restrictions on foreign investment 
in real estate will be eased from July 2015, which should support other 
measures taken by the government to revive the property market. 
The drop in global oil prices from last year is a positive development 
for this economy. Though Viet Nam produces about 350,000 barrels 
of oil per day and is a net exporter of crude oil, it is a net importer 
of reﬁ ned petroleum products. Lower fuel prices boost household 
disposable income, stimulate consumption, and reduce costs for many 
businesses, supporting proﬁ ts and investment. The National Financial 
Supervisory Commission estimates that savings on domestic production 
costs could reach 3% this year. The fall in oil prices dents government 
revenue, but ﬁ scal policy is still likely to promote economic growth.
On a sector basis, industry is expected to be the major driver of 
growth. FDI and government investment will spur construction while 
recent increases in imports of manufacturing inputs—including chemicals, 
cotton, and plastics—signal strength in industry. The HSBC Purchasing 
Managers’ Index showed that new orders, output, and employment in 
manufacturing continued to rise through February 2015 (Figure 3.31.8). 
The service sector stands to gain from lower fuel and transport 
costs, as well as from recovery in tourism from the PRC. Stepping up 
progress on SOE reform would spur growth in other service industries. 
Agriculture, too, has been helped by the decline in fuel and transport 
costs, but its expansion is impeded by sluggish global food prices and 
bottlenecks in transport and trade infrastructure. 
Fiscal policy looks set to remain expansionary in light of a planned 
budget deﬁ cit of 5.0% of GDP in 2015 and a similar deﬁ cit likely in 
2016. Budget priorities include greater emphasis on capital expenditure, 
which is slated to rise by nearly 20% after 2 years of absolute declines. 
Current expenditure is expected to rise at a more modest rate of 10%, 
including increases of 11% for health care and 5% for education. 
The government may struggle to meet its revenue target. 
Reductions in corporate income tax rates, the removal of tariff s, and 
exemptions for favored ﬁ rms have eroded the tax base. From 2010 to 
2014, central government revenue and grants fell from 27.6% of GDP 
to an estimated 21.5%. During the forecast period, the lower oil prices 
will hurt corporate and resource tax collections. The outlook assumes 
that, if revenue is weaker than anticipated, the authorities will opt 
for a moderately wider budget deﬁ cit rather than signiﬁ cant cuts in 
expenditure. Under this scenario, public debt may rise toward 60% of 
GDP by the end of 2016. This prospect highlights the importance of 
correcting ﬁ scal imbalances over the medium term to avoid running up 
unsustainable debt or jeopardizing investor conﬁ dence. 
Inﬂ ation ebbed further in the ﬁ rst 2 months of 2015 to average just 
0.6% as food and transport costs declined. For the full year, inﬂ ation 
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is projected to average 2.5%. It is seen quickening to 4.0% in 2016 as 
domestic demand and global oil prices rise (Figure 3.31.9). 
The forecasts assume the government will maintain expansionary 
monetary policies in a low-inﬂ ation environment. The central bank wants 
banks to trim deposit and lending interest rates by 1.0–1.5 percentage 
points in 2015, after cuts of around 2 percentage points made in 2014. 
In January this year, the central bank devalued the dong by a further 1% 
against the US dollar and it might devalue by up to 2% in 2015. 
Export receipts from agricultural products and crude oil will 
likely decline as imports expand to meet stronger domestic demand 
and to supply inputs for manufacturing—albeit partly off set by lower 
prices for imported petroleum and commodities. Trade and current 
account surpluses are projected to fall through the forecast period 
(Figure 3.31.10). 
Additional impetus for trade and investment should come in the 
medium term from new trade agreements, Viet Nam’s integration 
into the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Economic 
Community from late 2015, and the planned easing of restrictions 
on foreign ownership of property and companies listed on the stock 
exchange. Gradual progress is being achieved toward strengthening 
the banking system though the encouragement of mergers and the 
state’s acquisition of bad debt held by banks. More SOEs will be partly 
privatized. 
The banking system and SOEs nevertheless continue to pose 
risks to the economy. Undercapitalized banks with deﬁ cient ﬁ nancial 
transparency remain exposed to shocks. Finding suffi  cient investors 
to participate in share sales of SOEs is hampered by their complex 
ownership structures and opaque ﬁ nancial accounts.  
Over the longer term, achieving higher rates of economic growth 
depends on Viet Nam’s ability to undertake deeper structural and 
corporate governance reform, and to facilitate local ﬁ rms’ integration 
into global value chains. 
Policy challenge—linking local ﬁ rms to 
global value chains 
The gradual opening of Viet Nam’s economy over the past 30 years, 
including through trade pacts that culminated in membership of the 
World Trade Organization in 2007, has spurred FDI, exports, and 
economic development. FDI inﬂ ows averaged $7.3 billion annually from 
2007 to 2014. Rising international trade has lifted the ratio of trade to 
GDP to 170%. Exports of manufactures have surged in the past 5 years 
as multinational companies built factories to assemble products such as 
mobile telephones and electronics, or to fabricate parts, as part of their 
global production chains (Figure 3.31.11). 
However, Viet Nam’s main contribution to these production chains 
is low-skilled labor. The cost of imported materials and components 
is estimated to equal 90% of the value of Viet Nam’s exports of 
manufactured goods. Future economic prosperity will depend in large 
part on involving more domestic ﬁ rms in global value chains so they can 
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beneﬁt from foreign funding and technology and gain access to global 
markets, as well as generate spillover to beneﬁt the whole economy.
At this stage, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Viet Nam 
generally lack the capacity to participate in supply chains for foreign-
invested factories. Only 36% of all Vietnamese ﬁrms are integrated into 
export-oriented production networks, compared with nearly 60% in 
Malaysia and Thailand. Just 21% of Vietnamese SMEs participate in 
global supply chains, and SMEs’ contribution to exports from Viet Nam is 
signiﬁcantly less than in other countries (Figure 3.31.12). 
While the government supports industrial deepening and the 
development of SMEs, insufficient interagency coordination often 
fragments policies and weakens implementation. A proposed new law on 
SMEs provides an opportunity to correct some of these shortcomings. 
Moreover, greater consultation with the private sector would better 
inform the government about constraints that inhibit links with 
production networks. The private sector needs to be closely involved as 
well in initiatives intended for its own development. For example, the 
success of the proposed Institute of Directors, which aims to improve 
corporate governance, will depend on attracting funding and support 
from the private sector.
Industry-speciﬁc strategies are also needed. For manufacturers, 
encouraging the development of more industry clusters could allow 
for economies of scale, shared learning, and lowered transaction and 
transportation costs. Agribusinesses would beneﬁt from improved product 
certiﬁcation standards and better regulation of aquatic resources.
Early in 2015, the Prime Minister endorsed the selection of ﬁve 
industries as priorities for developing industry clusters and value-chain 
products: electronics, textiles, food processing, agricultural machinery, 
and tourism. Action plans should now be drawn up for these industries 
with the aim of targeting support to those supply chains with maximum 
potential for FDI spillover into the domestic private sector, as measured 
by domestic value added, job creation, and tax revenue.
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Fiji
Growth was broad based in 2014, as investor confidence strengthened in the run-up to the 
September election and persisted thereafter. Macroeconomic policy continues to be mildly 
expansionary, with investment in infrastructure, particularly transport, helping to boost growth. 
While growth has been sustained over the past 5 years, tightening fiscal conditions will require the 
implementation of structural reforms announced in the 2015 budget to further encourage private 
investment and rebalance the economy.
Economic performance
The Fiji economy is estimated to have grown by 4.6% in 2013 and 4.2% 
in 2014 (Figure 3.32.1). The economic expansion that began in 2010 has 
been one of the longest sustained periods of growth since independence 
in 1970. Greater government capital expenditure, higher remittance 
income, and improved business conﬁdence in the run-up to the elections 
held in September 2014 saw new lending for consumption increase by 
72.8% and for investment by 11.3%. These trends have contributed to 
record growth in private sector investment, which is expected to reach 
13.5% of GDP in 2014. 
Growth was broad based, with investments in ﬁnance, construction, 
and transport leading the trend. The increase in construction saw 
demand for domestic cement increase by 17.6%. Despite high growth, 
inﬂation slowed to 0.5% in 2014, reﬂecting the steep fall in global oil 
prices, which led the Fiji Commerce Commission to reduce its retail 
price of gasoline and diesel by nearly 8%.
The Fiji Revenue and Customs Authority reports that its collections 
in 2014 totaled $1.12 billion, exceeding their original forecast of $1.08 
billion. The rising revenues were an improvement of 13.7% over 2013 
collections. This solid performance came on the back of strong growth 
in revenues from income tax by 12.5% and value-added tax by 5.7%. 
Planned asset sales fell below expectations, however, leaving a ﬁscal 
deﬁcit in 2014 equal to 2.0% of GDP.  This was larger than anticipated, 
even as a planned large increase in government expenditure was scaled 
back.
Fiji’s macroeconomic policies continue to support growth. An 
expansionary ﬁscal policy has boosted growth through substantial 
spending on infrastructure, mainly for transport, as well as higher 
spending on education toward implementing a policy of providing 
free primary and secondary education to all school-aged children. 
While a moderately expansionary ﬁscal policy has been appropriate, 
new programs were expected to be ﬁnanced in large part by the 
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disappointing asset sales. Over the medium term, faster growth and 
higher revenue collection are needed to support public programs 
and allow the government to meet its objective of ensuring that debt, 
currently 49.7% of GDP, remains manageable.
Monetary policy is able to support higher economic growth by 
stimulating domestic demand because the outlook for inﬂation is 
soft. Bank lending rates remain low, and commercial banks’ enjoy 
comfortable liquidity. Foreign reserves at the end of 2014 were estimated 
at 4.7 months of import cover.
With the exception of ﬁshing and mining, all productive sectors 
of the economy are estimated to have grown in 2014. Earnings from 
tourism continue to trend upwards, with a record-breaking 692,630 
tourist arrivals in 2014, 5.3% higher than in the previous year (Figure 
3.32.2). Tourist arrivals from Fiji’s two largest markets maintained solid 
growth in 2014, as the number of visitors from Australia rose by 2.7% 
and New Zealand by 14.5%. Arrivals from the People’s Republic of China 
were up 13.4% during the year, further boosting Fiji’s strong tourism 
performance. 
Fiji’s production of sugar, its primary agricultural commodity, 
exceeded expectations in 2014 as output grew by 13.7% year on year. 
Investment to improve milling efficiency and introduce higher-yielding 
varieties of sugarcane contributed to higher output. Data from the Fiji 
Bureau of Statistics indicate that the value of sugar exports increased by 
about 22% in 2014. This reverses the fall in export returns seen in 2013. 
Gold production fell modestly in 2014, and by year’s end output was 
1.8% lower year on year. The fall was partly attributed to the declining 
quality of the ore extracted, and partly to the sharp downtrend in the 
price of gold, which began in 2013. The value of gold exports continued 
to decline dramatically, plunging by 72.7% in the year to November 2014. 
Exports of ﬁsh and garments also fell in 2014, but this was offset by 
strong exports of sugar and mineral water to generate 0.3% growth in 
exports net of re-exports (Figure 3.32.3).
Fiji recorded a current account deﬁcit equal to 8.9% of GDP in 
2014, improving on the previous year’s deﬁcit of 14.9%, which included 
Fiji Airways’ purchases of new aircraft. Excluding aircraft purchases, 
however, the trade deﬁcit widened on rising imports of machinery and 
mechanical and electrical appliances in 2014. Tourism receipts and 
remittances from abroad grew by 13% year on year, which helped to 
narrow the current account deﬁcit. 
Economic prospects
Indicators suggest that growth will moderate slightly in 2015 to 4.0% 
as the economy navigates a transition in its growth drivers. Tourism is 
expected to continue to grow at a steady pace, while current sugar and 
gold prices will make it hard to maintain growth in these industries in 
the coming year. 
In an effort to maintain last year’s growth momentum, the 2015 
budget increases public expenditure on infrastructure for transport, 
energy, and water supply and sanitation. This should directly boost 
construction and indirectly spur growth in other sectors. The 
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government plans to fund most of the higher infrastructure spending 
through grants and borrowing from bilateral and multilateral 
development partners. A rise in grant ﬁnancing will help contain public 
debt, which is projected to decline to 48.3% of GDP in 2015. Increased 
support from multilateral lenders in the medium term can ease debt 
service requirements, even if total debt stocks remain broadly constant. 
The Ministry of Finance is projecting a net ﬁscal deﬁcit equivalent to 
2.5% of GDP for 2015 (Figure 3.32.4).
Investments in new and existing businesses are expected to make a 
greater contribution to growth in 2015. The efforts of ﬁrms, particularly 
in the transport sector, to replace and upgrade their productive assets 
are evident in recent years’ growth outcomes. 
Prospects for growth in 2016 remain strong, fuelled by rising 
expenditures on social and economic infrastructure funded by 
development partners. Working with bilateral and multilateral partners, 
the government is planning much-needed poverty alleviation projects, 
which are expected to begin implementation toward the end of 2015. 
Public capital expenditure is expected to continue at present levels, 
with spending on infrastructure for transport, water supply, and urban 
sanitation as priorities. Infrastructure spending is expected to have an 
immediate impact on GDP in 2016 by increasing demand for labor and 
construction materials. Once the projects are completed, the enhanced 
infrastructure will underpin GDP growth over the longer term. 
The government is expected to face tighter ﬁscal conditions in 2016 
but plans to privatize selected state-owned enterprises in 2015 to defuse 
mounting ﬁscal pressure and contain the budget deﬁcit. 
Inﬂation is seen to rise slightly as a result of unseasonably dry 
weather early in the year that is likely to affect domestic food supply. 
However, low international prices for food and fuel are expected to keep 
inﬂation low at 2.5% in 2015 and 2016 (Figure 3.32.5). 
The current account deﬁcit is expected to widen in 2015 to the 
equivalent of 9.8% of GDP as the trade deﬁcit widens with the import 
of construction equipment and materials for development projects. 
However, foreign currency reserves are expected to remain sufficient, 
providing about 4.5 months of import cover. The current account deﬁcit 
is projected to equal 8.7% of GDP in 2016 (Figure 3.32.6). 
Policy challenge—structural reform to encourage 
private investment 
The current year looks to be a crucial one for government efforts 
to guide the economy through a transition from growth driven by 
domestic investment and public stimulus to growth with a broader 
foundation. Maintaining macroeconomic stability while attracting 
greater investment from overseas, including investment projects funded 
by development partners, will be central to this effort. The economy has 
enjoyed sustained growth during the past 5 years, but the government’s 
policy options for spurring future growth have been eroded by rising 
expenditures and relatively expansionary monetary policy in recent 
years. To maintain macroeconomic stability and facilitate investment, 
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policy makers need to control Fiji’s ﬁscal and trade deﬁcits and keep 
the public debt burden manageable while maintaining growth during 
the transition. As growth accelerates, the economy may face capacity 
constraints, including skills gaps and shortages, until investments in 
infrastructure and human resources yield returns. In the interim, a risk 
is that higher imports could deepen the trade deﬁcit. 
To manage this transition, policy makers need to accelerate the pace 
of structural and ﬁnancial management reform announced in the 2015 
budget. An increasingly open and transparent policy-making process—as 
has been seen since the election last September—would help alleviate 
policy uncertainty and encourage domestic and foreign investment. 
Rapid progress on reform should make budget execution more efficient, 
strengthen government accountability and transparency, and improve 
state-owned enterprises’ provision of basic public services such as 
electricity and other utilities. Improvements in education quality, 
particularly those that enhance students’ capacity to innovate and 
adapt to changing workplace needs, can help to address emerging skills 
shortages and gaps. Fast-tracking efforts to strengthen implementation 
capacity in the public sector, as proposed in the government’s civil 
service reform, and to improve the regulatory framework for public–
private partnership will hasten the implementation of public investment 
programs and encourage private sector growth. 
 
This chapter was written by Aaron Batten formerly of the Papua New Guinea Resident 
Mission, ADB, Port Moresby.
Papua New Guinea
New gas exports are forecast to drive a growth surge to 15.0% in 2015 that will subside to 5.0% 
in 2016. In contrast with mining and petroleum, the rest of the economy is projected to grow 
by a more modest 4.0% in both years. As the economy comes to rely more heavily on resource 
extraction, policy needs to ensure that the benefits of growth are shared widely to reduce poverty 
and regional inequality.  
Economic performance 
Economic growth in Papua New Guinea (PNG) rose to 8.0% in 2014 
following the commencement of liqueﬁ ed natural gas (LNG) exports. 
Growth in other sectors of the economy remained modest. Construction 
output fell by 6.4% in 2014, and this spilled over into the broader 
economy, stalling wholesale and retail trade growth at 5.5% and slowing 
utilities from 9.0% growth in 2013 to 6.0% in 2014. Long-term declines 
continued at a number of older mining operations, but rising output 
from a new nickel project meant mining and quarrying as a whole 
expanded by 5.9% (Figure 3.33.1).
Agriculture, forestry, and ﬁ shery growth picked up to 3.9% in 2014 
as weather improved, enabling greater production and exports of cocoa, 
coff ee, and oil palm. However, much of this growth was recovery from 
weak growth in previous years. The sector continued to be hampered 
by low global commodity prices, declining yields from aging plantations, 
inadequate pest control, and poor transport infrastructure. 
Fiscal policy remained expansionary, with the government achieving 
its planned budget deﬁ cit of 5.9% of GDP in 2014 (Figure 3.33.2). 
However, with revenue growth lower than expected and a number of 
unplanned expenditures, hitting the target required an expenditure 
slowdown toward the end of the year and K1 billion (nearly 5% of 
domestic revenue) reapportioned from unspent project trust funds back 
into the central government account. Despite the slowdown, government 
spending grew by 20% in 2014, continuing 4 years of rapid ﬁ scal 
expansion that has seen expenditure grow by an average 25% annually. 
Rapid spending growth over the past 3 years has required a 
signiﬁ cant increase in government borrowing, some 70% from local 
capital markets. This has the potential to crowd out ﬁ nance for local 
investment and has begun to push up local interest rates. Government 
borrowing costs for long-term domestic debt reached 14% per annum in 
2014. While government debt remains modest by regional standards, the 
cost of servicing it is rising sharply, from 5.5% of domestic revenue in 
2013 to an expected 9.2% in 2015 (Figure 3.33.3). 
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Aggregate demand eased following the completion of LNG project 
construction and global commodity prices declines, exerting downward 
pressure on inﬂation during 2014. However, these pressures were 
more than offset by government spending and price rises for imports 
caused by a depreciating currency. The rise in the consumer price index 
accelerated, from 4.0% in 2013 to 8.3% in 2014 (Figure 3.33.4). 
In June, the Bank of Papua New Guinea, the central bank, attempted 
to stem kina depreciation by placing a trading band on an official rate. 
The fact that the official rate valued the kina 20%–30% higher than 
prevailing market rates triggered a shortage of foreign exchange as 
residents and business moved currency offshore. Although the kina 
was allowed to depreciate slowly in the latter half of the year, foreign 
currency shortages continue, with all commercial banks reporting 
order backlogs. The central bank’s ongoing intervention in the currency 
market drained foreign exchange reserves during 2014. By the end 
of the year, they were sufficient to cover only 4.6 months of imports, 
down from 5.9 months at the end of 2013 and a peak of 10.5 months at 
the end of 2011. 
PNG’s current account balance strengthened signiﬁcantly in 2014, 
recording a deﬁcit equal to 11.4% of GDP, or half of the 22.6% deﬁcit in 
2013. This improvement reﬂected growing surpluses in the goods balance 
driven by the onset of LNG exports and strengthened agricultural 
exports, partly offsetting large deﬁcits in services and income.
Economic prospects 
GDP growth is forecast at 15.0% in 2015, slowing to 5.0% in 2016. 
Leading this growth is the oil and gas sector, as 2015 is the ﬁrst full 
year of LNG production. While near a record high, current growth 
projections for 2015 are signiﬁcantly below the 21.0% forecast in 
Asian Development Outlook 2014. This largely reﬂects the early 
commencement of LNG production in 2014, which raised the base 
last year, and the delay of peak production until 2016, which lowers 
projected production this year. A rebound in the mining and quarrying 
sector is expected as operations at a new nickel mine continue to 
expand, more than offsetting declines at a number of older operations. 
Real growth in the sector will reach 12.0% in 2015, falling back to 3.0% 
in 2016. 
In contrast with mining and petroleum, activity in the rest of the 
economy is expected to remain modest, with non-mineral growth 
forecast at 4.0% in 2015 and 2016. After contracting by 6.4% in 2014, 
construction will grow by 3.8% in 2015, boosted by government 
investment in transport and energy infrastructure and new sports 
facilities. The transport and logistics sector is expected to grow by 5.0% 
in 2015 as the global oil price slump brings lower fuel prices. 
During 2015 and 2016, growth in wholesale and retail trade is 
seem to return to a long-run average of 5.5%, and ﬁnancial services 
to 4.5%. The agriculture, forestry, and ﬁshery sector is expected to 
continue its recovery, with growth at 3.6% in 2015 and 3.7% in 2016. 
Although international prices remain subdued, a cheaper kina and 
savings on transport costs generated by lower fuel prices will boost the 
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sector strongly, as it is dominated by export commodities (logs, tuna, 
crustaceans, coff ee, cocoa, and palm oil). 
The 2015 budget aims for much-needed ﬁ scal consolidation 
(Figure 3.33.5). The budget deﬁ cit target is 4.4% of GDP in 2015, 
and the government plans to return to a balanced budget by 2017. 
Achieving this will be a challenge. Corporate and personal income 
taxes and sales taxes, which make up roughly 80% of domestic revenue, 
are all expected to remain stable over the coming years, as the beneﬁ ts 
of measures to enhance compliance fade and growth in non-mineral 
sectors of the economy remains weak. Further, the slump in world 
energy prices means revenues from the ﬁ rst shipments of LNG are likely 
to be signiﬁ cantly lower than expected. This will have implications 
for government revenue. If lower prices persist, a proposed cut of 10% 
to nominal government expenditure to 2017 may have to be higher to 
balance the budget.
Inﬂ ation is anticipated to moderate to 7.0% in 2015 and then 5.0% 
in 2016, as the pass-through of a lower kina exchange rate is off set 
by a slowing domestic non-mineral economy and lower commodity 
prices. This forecast depends heavily on the government’s ability 
to rein in expenditure growth and on the central bank maintaining 
prudent monetary policies. Domestic deposit rates are seen to remain 
near zero for the foreseeable future unless the central bank can 
undertake monetary interventions suffi  cient to soak up liquidity in the 
banking system. 
After several years of large deﬁ cits, the current account is expected 
to record a surplus of 13.5% in 2015 and 15.0% in 2016. This reﬂ ects 
an expected 48.6% increase in exports during 2015 from the ﬁ rst full 
calendar year of LNG exports and from expanded nickel production 
at the new mine. With LNG construction completed and ﬁ scal 
consolidation planned, imports are expected to fall by 8.2% in 2015 
and 12.9% in 2016. Meanwhile, payments from abroad are expected to 
increase substantially from 2015, mainly income and dividends paid to 
the government from LNG exports. 
Policy challenge—adapting to elevated resource 
dependence 
PNG has reached an important economic crossroad. The commencement 
of LNG production and exports marks the end of the large inﬂ ows 
of foreign direct investment that fueled a period of construction-led 
growth. What is emerging is an economy that depends heavily on 
mineral resources. Over the next 12 months, the share of output 
generated by the resource sector will almost double from 12% to 
22% of GDP, while the share of budget revenue obtained directly 
from mining, oil, and gas operations similarly soars from 11% to 20%. 
By contrast, growth in the job-intensive non-mineral sector will likely 
be modest. A number of new resource projects in the pipeline mean this 
dependency may intensify over the coming decade. As the current sharp 
and unexpected drop in global prices for energy and other commodities 
demonstrates, managing the volatility associated with resource 
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dependence will be an increasingly important part of macroeconomic 
management. To ensure that growth is sustainable, a number of 
adjustments to economic policy are needed. 
First, ﬁscal consolidation is required to enhance the economy’s 
resilience under adverse economic shocks. As PNG’s dependence on 
mining, oil, and gas exports grows, so will its vulnerability to global 
economic downturns, particularly those related to commodity prices. 
After a decade of commendable ﬁscal discipline, which slashed public 
debt from 72.4% of GDP in 2002 to 22.1% in 2011, expansionary ﬁscal 
policy over the past 4 years has seen public debt rebound to 35.5% of 
GDP at the end of 2014. This debt slightly exceeds the government’s own 
ceiling of 35.0% of GDP (revised up from 30.0% in 2013). This borrowing, 
largely from local capital markets, has begun to create a number of 
macroeconomic pressures: crowding out local investment, exerting 
downward pressure on the kina, and spurring inﬂation. It has also 
cramped the government’s ﬁscal space to undertake countercyclical ﬁscal 
measures. With LNG revenues expected to be modest over the medium 
term, lower spending growth and returning the budget to near balance 
will be vital for maintaining macroeconomic stability.
Second, strong institutions need to be established to ensure 
transparent and accountable resource revenue management. 
Transparency necessarily underlies accountability and is essential for 
informed decision making and assuring the community that resource 
revenues are being used appropriately. Since 2009, the government 
has been working toward establishing a sovereign wealth fund to 
insulate the budget from commodity price volatility and provide 
a clear and transparent process for managing resource revenues. 
After several unsuccessful attempts, a policy framework has been 
worked out for establishing the fund; this should be done soon so that 
robust institutional oversight can be applied at the earliest stages of 
LNG exports and revenues. In addition, with current policy proposals 
suggesting that a portion of resource revenues will be channeled to 
off-budget government institutions, further efforts are needed to ensure 
that the design of the sovereign wealth fund is credible. In 2013 the 
government signaled its intention to comply with the global Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative. This was a positive step, but 
progress in compliance has been slow, suggesting that greater effort 
is needed to ensure that PNG is able to satisfy these standards in a 
timely manner. Also important to PNG is to improve transparency in 
subnational resource revenue ﬂows, something that the initiative is 
not designed to address. This includes creating a mechanism to inform 
communities about the ﬂow of revenues from resource extraction to 
provincial governments and landowner groups who hold equity in 
resource projects or receive royalties from them. 
Third, a greater focus is needed on enhancing the quality and impact 
of public expenditure. Capacity shortfalls are often seen as the major 
challenge facing the public sector’s ability to implement ambitious 
budgetary plans, but other factors contribute. Sector agencies highlight 
frequent disconnects between sector budget submissions and the 
approved budget, often forcing project staff to hurriedly design and 
implement unfamiliar projects. Work on feasibility and design studies is 
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often lacking before projects are ﬁnanced. This has caused unrealistic 
cost estimates, tendering delays, and difficulties attracting private sector 
participation in construction. While funding given to provincial and 
district governments is on the rise, they often lack the expertise and 
administrative skills to plan, procure, and maintain infrastructure. 
In addition, new capital projects continue to trump recurrent operations 
in funding allocations. From 2009 to 2014, recurrent budget allocations 
fell from 60% of total allocations to 51%. This limits sector agencies’ 
ability to expand human resources to meet growing investment demands 
and jeopardizes sustainability by underfunding routine maintenance. 
Taken together, these three priorities constitute an ambitious reform 
agenda to ensure that PNG transitions successfully and inclusively into 
greater resource dependence. The moderate funding growth outlined in 
the budget for 2015 presents an opportunity to make progress toward 
all of these targets. Sector agencies will have to play catch up to work 
through investment backlogs, and they should focus on building the 
technical and institutional capacity necessary to deliver cost-effective 
and sustainable infrastructure and services. Meanwhile, a period 
of ﬁscal consolidation can allow central agencies to improve budget 
coordination and planning and to enhanced efforts to establish the 
institutions and policies needed to ensure that future resource revenues 
are managed transparently and accountably. 
This chapter was written by Milovan Lucich of the Paciﬁ c Liaison and Coordination Offi  ce, 
ADB, Sydney.
Solomon Islands
The economy contracted in 2014 after disruptive flooding in April. Growth is expected to 
pick  up in 2015 on flood-reco very spending and in 2016 on increased foreign investment, though 
the medium-term outlook for mining and forestry is uncertain. A new government elected in 
December faces a challenging budget outlook. A priority is to promote financial inclusion to 
generate inclusive growth and economic opportunity, particularly in rural areas.
Economic performance
Floods in April caused GDP to contract by 0.2% in 2014, with per capita 
GDP falling by 2.4%. Gold production ceased, and damage to businesses, 
houses, and public infrastructure was widespread (Figure 3.34.1). 
Private enterprise and public services were heavily aff ected. Damage 
was centered in and around Honiara, the capital, where dozens of 
people were killed, more than 10,000 were displaced, and 52,000 were 
aff ected in other ways. The government estimated damage and losses 
from the ﬂ ooding at $108 million, or 9% of GDP.
Gold output fell by over 70% in 2014 because ﬂ ooding halted 
production at the only mine, where operations are likely to remain 
suspended for some time. The government is currently in talks with 
the former operators to transfer the lease and management. Before 
the mine closed, the United Nations had expressed concern over the 
environmental dangers posed by its tailings reservoir.
The ﬂ ooding damaged transport links and disrupted log exports, 
but they recovered strongly and, by year’s end, were close to the record 
achieved in 2012 (Figure 3.34.2). Logging output has essentially been ﬂ at 
for the past 4 years, with production sustained by secondary harvests in 
previously logged areas. Logging output is expected to begin to decline 
over the next few years as forest area dwindles.
Agricultural output grew strongly in 2014 despite disruption 
from ﬂ ooding. Cocoa, copra, and ﬁ sheries all registered double-digit 
increases, but palm oil output stagnated as production was concentrated 
in areas aff ected by the ﬂ ooding. 
The current account deﬁ cit widened to an estimated 14.7% of GDP 
in 2014. This was partly because of arrested gold production, and partly 
because lower prices reduced the value of cash crop exports. Despite the 
worsening deﬁ cit, foreign exchange reserves remained high, bolstered 
by large inﬂ ows of grants and foreign direct investment. As of December 
2014, foreign reserves exceeded cover for 10 months of imports, down 
only slightly from 11 months a year earlier.
Headline inﬂ ation accelerated to 6.0% in 2014 from 5.4% in 2013. 
Food prices rose sharply after the April ﬂ ood but moderated in the 
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second half of the year as agricultural production recovered and local 
transport links were restored.
The Central Bank of Solomon Islands continued its eff orts to tame 
inﬂ ation by trying to mop up liquidity through short-term instruments 
known as Bokolo bills (named after a former bank governor). The Solomon 
Islands dollar remained pegged to a basket of currencies in 2014, with 
the result that it appreciated strongly against the Australian dollar and 
Japanese yen but fell against the US dollar. 
After a major Australian bank withdrew trade ﬁ nancing for logging 
exports over environmental concerns, the government off ered additional 
banking licenses. Pan Oceanic Bank, headquartered in Sri Lanka, took a 
license and by year’s end had gathered over 7,000 depositors in the country.
The 2014 budget increased government spending by almost 10%, to 
SI$3.5 billion, with investments to develop agriculture and ﬁ sheries as 
the main recipients of higher expenditure. The government aimed to 
maintain a balanced budget with an additional SI$2.8 billion in revenue 
and SI$665 million in grants. However, the shutdown of the gold mine and 
slower growth pushed tax revenues lower than expected, even as relief 
eff orts following the ﬂ ood forced unplanned spending, as did spending 
associated with the election and overspending on university scholarships. 
The result was a budget deﬁ cit estimated to equal 1.8% of GDP in 2014.
The government has controlled growth in public debt, maintaining 
the ratio of debt to GDP at 14% in 2013 and 2014. Its debt-management 
strategy provides for an annual limit on new borrowing based on a debt-
sustainability analysis undertaken each year as part of the budget process. 
The limit on new debt in 2014 was SI$160 million, equal to 1.8% of GDP. 
The Debt Management Advisory Committee vets new loan proposals.
Economic prospects
Growth is expected to rebound to 3.0% in 2015, driven by spending on 
ﬂ ood reconstruction and continued recovery in agriculture, and despite 
projected declines in gold and forestry output.
In 2016, growth is projected to pick up further to 3.5%, driven by 
ﬁ scal stimulus from investment projects and their spillover into the 
broader economy. Increased investment in telecommunications and 
spending to develop large nickel deposits in Isabel Province are also 
expected to strengthen growth next year.
Inﬂ ation is seen to moderate in 2015 to 5.0% as price rises from 
ﬂ ood-related spending dissipate (Figure 3.34.3). Then, in line with higher 
growth, inﬂ ation is expected to pick up slightly to 5.5% in 2016.
The 2015 budget has been delayed because a new government was 
elected only in November 2014 and it will likely present the budget to 
Parliament by the end of March 2015. The government has announced 
that it will take no new loans for recurrent expenditure in 2015 but will 
need to closely monitor and control major areas of government expenditure 
such as payroll, constituency funds, and tertiary scholarships in a challenging 
ﬁ scal environment of lower logging revenues and no mining revenues. 
In its most recent policy statement, the central bank noted that it would 
pursue a more expansionary policy, but its ability to do so is limited as 
monetary policy is boxed in by the currency basket and lack of capital controls.
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The current account deﬁ cit is expected to deepen in 2015, growing to 
the equivalent of 15.5% of GDP (Figure 3.34.4). A similar deﬁ cit equal to 
15.0% of GDP is projected for 2016. These deﬁ cits primarily reﬂ ect low 
export growth and imports of equipment for ﬂ ood reconstruction and 
investment. The government plans to fund the deﬁ cit through continued 
development assistance and foreign direct investment. Currency 
reserves are expected to shrink but remain above 8 months of import 
cover through 2015 and 2016.
Policy challenge—promoting ﬁ nancial inclusion
Solomon Islands has achieved strong growth outcomes since ethnic 
tensions eased in 2003, but growth has not generally translated into 
improved social indicators. Many Solomon Islanders remain outside 
the formal economy and its ﬁ nancial system. Before the global ﬁ nancial 
crisis, Solomon Islanders’ access to ﬁ nancial services was among the 
most constrained in the world. In 2007, the portion of the population 
using ﬁ nancial services was estimated at 15%. 
Since 2010, the government and the central bank have pursued 
a national strategy that actively promoted ﬁ nancial inclusion. 
The National Financial Inclusion Task Force established in 2010 
committed the government, commercial banks, the private sector, and 
civil society to work to expanding ﬁ nancial inclusion by 70,000 people, 
or 12% of the population 2015.
The task force has made great strides by using new technology. 
Commercial banks have off ered mobile phone banking and branchless 
banking through neighborhood businesses using 3G technology. 
From 2011 to the third quarter of 2014, more than 129,000 new accounts 
opened, most of them using technology-enabled ﬁ nancial services. 
Over half of adults in the country now have bank accounts, having 
signed up for the low-fee no-frills accounts through streamlined 
processes that include eased requirements for personal identiﬁ cation 
documents. The number of access points per 10,000 adults is now 2.4, 
well above the government’s target of 1.0.
While access to basic banking services has improved, access to 
credit remains constrained, particularly for small and medium-sized 
enterprises. The ratio of credit to GDP rose to 18% by the end of 2013, 
but this is still only half the average across Paciﬁ c island economies. 
Impediments to credit expansion include weak investor protection, 
unclear property rights that limit the availability of collateral, and a 
shortage of investable projects. The government has taken steps to 
improve the property rights regime, introducing a law on secured 
transactions and a registry for movable property. The new government 
has pledged to record and register land under customary ownership to 
facilitate its productive use.
Though Solomon Islands has yet to fully extend access to credit 
or generate much market activity, its ﬁ nancial system is sound. Banks 
are adequately capitalized, highly liquid, and proﬁ table. The rate of 
nonperforming loans jumped to 7.2% at the end of 2013, after declining 
for several years, but subsequently fell to about 5% by mid-2014.
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This chapter was written by David Freedman, consultant, Timor-Leste Resident Mission, 
ADB, Dili.
Timor-Leste
Large increases in public spending accelerated economic growth in 2014. Growth is expected to 
be slower in 2015 but recover in 2016 if major investment projects proceed as planned. Inflation 
eased under favorable external conditions but is projected to rise in 2015 and 2016. Declining 
petroleum production and low energy prices highlight the need to diversify the economy by 
encouraging private investment.
Economic performance 
Economic growth accelerated in 2014, with GDP excluding the offshore 
petroleum sector (non-oil GDP) expanding by an estimated 7.1% (Figure 
3.35.1). Improvements in budget execution saw own-funded government 
expenditures rise by 26.5% as the proportion of planned expenditures 
that were actually disbursed improved from 62% in 2013 to over 90% 
in 2014. Total public expenditures, including activities funded by 
development partners, were equivalent to 110% of non-oil GDP in 2014.
The private sector remains reliant on demand from government 
spending. This was highlighted by the recently published Business 
Activity Survey of Timor-Leste 2013, which provides the most recent 
comprehensive data on formally registered businesses. Public spending 
fell by 7.5% in 2013 and this contributed to an estimated 4.1% fall in 
formal employment in the private sector and a 3.5% drop in sector 
proﬁts. The new data imply that non-oil GDP growth in 2013 was 
signiﬁcantly lower than the most recent official estimate of 5.6%. 
Fiscal stimulus in 2014 supported increased commercial activity and 
strong growth in private consumption. Electricity use by businesses rose 
by 10.9%. Motorcycle and passenger vehicle registration increased by 
60.4%. The entry of a new airline restored competition on the Bali–Dili 
route. While total passenger numbers were ﬂat, the number of Timorese 
passengers more than doubled. 
Inﬂation continued its downward trend in 2014 as annual average 
inﬂation slowed to 0.7% despite higher demand from rising public 
spending (Figure 3.35.2). As the US dollar is the official currency of 
Timor-Leste, its continued strength against the currencies of trading 
partners such as Indonesia was a key factor. Lower oil prices reduced 
transport costs and lower international food prices kept local prices 
stable in the face of rising demand. 
The 2014 budget introduced new regulations to improve the quality 
of public spending, including limits on single-source procurement, 
conditions linking withdrawals from the Petroleum Fund to timely 
budget execution, and controls on advance payments. Several of these 
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regulations were subsequently relaxed as budget execution lagged. This 
helped push own-funded capital expenditures up by 27.8% to $448 
million in the year, with more than half of this higher spending in 
November and December. 
The government continued to invest in the national electricity 
network. Expenditures of $133 million in 2014 brought investment on 
the network since 2008 to $1 billion. Despite excess generation capacity, 
additional investment and reform are needed to reduce operating 
subsidies of $87 million in 2014—equal to 6% of non-oil GDP. 
Government revenues totaled $3.0 billion in 2014 and yielded a ﬁscal 
surplus equivalent to 1.3 times non-oil GDP. This surplus was saved in 
the government’s Petroleum Fund, increasing the Fund’s balance to 
$16.5 billion or $13,700 per capita. Fund investments obtained a nominal 
return of 3.3% in 2014. This was consistent with the benchmark yields 
established by the fund’s investment mandate, but investment income 
nevertheless fell 35% short the 2014 budget forecast. 
Real sector outcomes were mixed in 2014. Construction is estimated 
to have grown rapidly on the back of increased public capital investment 
and sustained demand from the private sector, though official trade 
statistics reported lower imports of such inputs as cement and steel. 
Heavy rains contributed to a 29% fall in coffee production, but coffee 
export revenues fell by only 12% thanks to higher international prices. 
The Food and Agriculture Organization estimated that rice and maize 
production increased by 18% with expanded planted area, the adoption 
of new technologies, and favorable growing conditions. 
Lending to businesses and individuals was ﬂat in 2014 but showed 
signiﬁcant variation by sector. Lending for trade and ﬁnance accounted 
for 20% of all private sector credit in 2013 but fell by more than 64% 
in 2014, while lending for transport and communication fell by 18%. 
Lending to all other sectors grew. Credit to individuals rose by 11% and to 
construction ﬁrms by 15%. Lending for agriculture, manufacturing, and 
tourism accounted for 6% of all lending in 2013 but grew rapidly in 2014 
to account for 13% of total private sector credit by the end of the year. 
Businesses continued to accumulate bank deposits in 2014. Growth 
in business deposits averaged 46% year on year, such that the stock of 
deposits now exceeds total credit to the private sector. This growth, 
which started in 2013, suggests that more businesses can now use 
retained earnings to ﬁnance their operations. 
Despite declining petroleum income, Timor-Leste once again posted 
a current account surplus, equal to 88% of non-oil GDP in 2014, as 
higher petroleum income offset a large deﬁcit in goods and services 
trade (Figure 3.35.3).
 
Economic prospects
Growth is expected to slow to 6.2% in 2015 as stimulus from rising 
public spending eases, then rise to 6.6% in 2016 as major public and 
private investment projects move forward. Inﬂation is forecast at 2.8% 
in 2015 and 4.0% in 2016 as the deﬂationary effects of the strong dollar 
and low international food prices dissipate and domestic demand builds. 
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While growth is forecast to be lower than in recent years, encouraging 
signs have emerged of a more active private sector. Work on a new $45 
million brewery and bottling plant is set to begin in 2015, and domestic 
and foreign investors are considering several other major investment 
projects.
Budgeted spending for 2015 is 5% above the 2014 budget envelope 
and 21% above the government’s own target for long-term ﬁscal 
sustainability. The share of recurrent spending in the budget has 
continued to rise, with social transfers and grants accounting for more 
than a quarter of public spending. The government has also maintained 
plans for large public capital projects. The 2015 public investment 
program includes $66 million to upgrade national roads and bridges and 
an additional $57 million for the electricity system. Work to develop a 
new international port is expected to start, and the budget anticipates 
investments in other transport infrastructure to be greatly scaled up in 
2016. 
Taxes and royalties from petroleum production provided 57% of 
government revenues in 2014. Production from current ﬁelds peaked 
in 2012 and is forecast to end in 2020, while the prospects for new 
development remain uncertain. The 2015 budget cut the discounted 
forecast of future petroleum revenues by 16% to $4.7 billion in 
anticipation of production downgrades, rising costs, and lower prices 
(Figure 3.35.4). This forecast assumes an average oil price of $89 
per barrel from 2015 to 2020. As it was prepared in May 2014, it did 
not factor in the sharp fall in oil prices in the second half of 2014. In 
January, the World Bank forecast the average price of crude at $63 per 
barrel during 2015–2020. 
Lower oil prices will likely narrow the current account. Surpluses 
are expected to fall to 55% of non-oil GDP in 2015 and 51.6% in 2016. 
The ﬁscal surplus will fall to 36% of non-oil GDP in 2015 and 8% in 2016 
if planned spending increases go ahead (Figure 3.35.5). The 2015 budget 
estimated that the Petroleum Fund could sustain annual withdrawals 
of $638.5 million without losing value in real terms. However, lower oil 
prices will likely cut the estimated sustainable income to less than $600 
million—signiﬁcantly below planned withdrawals of $1.3 billion in 2015 
and $1.7 billion in 2016. 
The government of Timor-Leste decided in October to establish a 
special commission to negotiate maritime boundaries with Australia. 
Progress in resolving territorial disputes could pave the way for 
developing the Greater Sunrise gas ﬁeld, though prospects remain 
uncertain. As revenues from existing ﬁelds decline, prudent ﬁscal policy 
is needed avoid rapidly depleting savings in the Petroleum Fund. Fiscal 
consolidation is likely to mean a period of lower growth, but improving 
the quality of public spending can bring sustained improvement in living 
standards. 
Policy challenge—encouraging private investment 
Growth and job creation increasingly depend on the private sector, 
which has expanded rapidly in recent years but remains at an early stage 
of development. Limited domestic capacity means that foreign investors 
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can play important roles by providing access to capital, technology, and 
new markets. 
Successive governments have implemented policies and laws to 
encourage foreign investment. The 2005 Foreign Investment Law 
established a framework for investment by foreign citizens and 
nonresident Timorese. The law guaranteed foreign investors equal 
treatment and established an investment certiﬁcation process with 
modest tax incentives and few restrictions on the sectors open for 
investment. To encourage investment, tax reform in 2008 slashed 
corporate tax from 30% to 10%, which compares favorably with the 
average corporate tax rate of 23% among members of the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations. Further incentives were provided in the 
2011 Investment Law to encourage investment by foreign nationals and 
resident Timorese citizens. Investors who meet legal requirements can 
receive tax exemptions for up to 10 years. 
Despite these incentives, private investment has increased only 
moderately. National accounts data show that private capital formation 
has grown modestly since 2007 when compared with the rapid increases 
in public investment (Figure 3.35.6). Growth in the number of registered 
foreign investments has also been slow. The government has registered an 
average of six foreign investments per year since 2006, with an average of 
$2.9 million per investment equal to 0.2% of non-oil GDP (Figure 3.35.7).
Investors from Australia, the People’s Republic of China, Indonesia, 
Portugal, and Viet Nam have been most active in the country since 2006, 
and there is clear potential to attract greater foreign investment. However, 
current low investment reﬂects the country’s challenging business 
environment and the failure of incentives to overcome these challenges. 
To attract greater investment from overseas, the government has 
established a new agency to promote Timor-Leste as an investment 
destination and facilitate the entry of new investors. This could 
signiﬁcantly improve investment ﬂows if supported by a credible 
program to improve the business environment. Planned reviews of 
the investment law and tax code offer opportunities to ensure that tax 
incentives are clearly deﬁned and well targeted. Legal reform to ensure 
clear and straightforward access to land is another priority and there 
is scope to streamline business licensing and improve access to foreign 
skilled labor where needed.
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This chapter was written by Milovan Lucich of the Paciﬁ c Liaison and Coordination Offi  ce, 
ADB, Sydney.
Vanuatu
The economy grew in 2014 at its fastest rate in several years but will likely contract in 2015 
following a severe tropical cyclone in March. A rebound is expected in 2016 on reconstruction 
spending and recovery in agriculture and tourism. A medium-term development challenge is to 
find new revenue sources and control growth in government spending to free up fiscal resources 
for infrastructure projects and maintain fiscal sustainability.
Economic performance
Vanuatu has enjoyed over a decade of uninterrupted growth, though 
the economy slowed in the years after the global ﬁ nancial crisis. 
Growth accelerated in 2014 to 3.6%, the fastest rate since 2008. 
Government estimates show, however, that economic growth and output 
have languished below potential for the past 5 years.
Growth in 2014 was driven by commercial construction and projects 
funded by development partners. Expenditure on major projects is 
projected to quadruple from 2014 to 2016. Although visitor arrivals by 
air declined in 2014, the number of arrivals by cruise ship grew strongly. 
This contributed to growth related to tourism, notably in hotels and 
restaurants, transport, retail trade, and telecommunications. 
Real estate investment from abroad has slowed in recent years, 
reﬂ ecting developments in neighboring markets such as Australia. 
Meanwhile, government land sales have caused concern in aff ected 
communities.
Output stagnated in agriculture, ﬁ sheries, and forestry sector in 
2014, as growth in ﬁ sheries output was off set by declining livestock and 
crop production. Smallholder agriculture has been in long-term decline 
as rural populations have migrated to cities and coconut plantations 
have aged.
The current account deﬁ cit widened to an estimated 5.7% of GDP 
in 2014 from 3.3% in 2013. This reﬂ ected a deteriorating trade deﬁ cit 
as imports of goods for construction rose while total exports expanded 
only slightly on small gains in agricultural exports. Despite a widening 
current account deﬁ cit, foreign reserves remain high, bolstered by 
inﬂ ows of foreign direct investment and funding from development 
partners. In December 2014, reserves exceeded 6 months of cover for 
imports.
Inﬂ ation averaged 0.4% in 2014, down from 1.4% in 2013 (Figure 
3.36.1). The deceleration was caused by excess productive capacity and 
lower commodity prices, particularly for fuel. The Reserve Bank of 
Vanuatu, the central bank, has cut the policy rate only once since 2008, 
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from 6.0% to 5.5% in March 2013. The steady rate reﬂects continued low 
inﬂation despite a recovery in growth.
The government targeted a small surplus of current revenue over 
current expenditure for 2014, in line with a legal requirement that the 
budget not show a deﬁcit. Unbudgeted expenses, such as additional 
funding for health care, necessitated a supplementary budget in 
mid-2014. Spending restraint on other budget items and improved 
compliance with revenue collection generated an overall ﬁscal surplus 
equal to 1.2% of GDP for the year as a whole (Figure 3.36.2). 
Government debt has trended higher since 2010, the year it dipped 
below 20% of GDP. The government has increased its borrowing to fund 
a number of large infrastructure investments and now estimates that 
debt will equal 26% of GDP in 2015 and 30% in 2016. The debt position 
would be considerably worse if the government had gone ahead with a 
controversial airport infrastructure project that would have required 
the issuance of promissory notes equivalent to more than 40% of GDP.
Economic prospects
A category 5 cyclone struck Vanuatu in mid-March. Tropical Cyclone 
Pam reportedly destroyed or damaged 90% of buildings on Efate Island, 
which includes the capital, Port Vila. Damage is expected to severely 
disrupt economic activity and hinder growth in 2015. Early assessments 
suggest that agriculture output and tourism will suffer large declines.
Vanuatu’s economy is among the most dependent on tourism in the 
Paciﬁc. Tourism accounts for roughly 25% of GDP and is the principal 
source of foreign exchange and formal sector employment. Tourism is 
concentrated around the capital Port Vila, and only 10%–18% of tourists 
travel to the other islands. Over the past decade, Vanuatu has seen strong 
growth in tourist arrivals, particularly cruise ship arrivals (mainly from 
Australia), which have grown at the rate of 15% per year. In 2014, there 
were about 230 port calls by cruise ships in the country, with diminished 
numbers during Australia’s summer in December–March. 
Travel advisories, the indeﬁnite suspension of cruise ship visits, 
and extensive damage to infrastructure around Port Vila are expected 
to dramatically reduce the number of tourists in the second quarter 
of this year, with recovery likely in the third quarter at the earliest. 
Recent experience suggests that tourism generally takes 1–2 years to 
fully recover following a major natural disaster, depending on the time 
required to repair the infrastructure that underpins tourism and to 
salvage the country’s reputation as a safe destination.
Agriculture accounts for a quarter of GDP but engages some 80% 
of the population in subsistence farming or smallholder production of 
coconuts and other cash crops. Disruption to agriculture is expected 
from damage to crops and transport links. No detailed estimates were 
available in mid-March, but early indications are that agricultural 
output in 2015 will be steeply down from 2014.
Increased spending on cyclone recovery related construction and the 
planned implementation of a number of major infrastructure projects 
later in the year are expected to offset the shocks to agriculture and 
tourism. The economy is now expected to contract in 2015—reversing 
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a forecast of growth at about 4.0% made before the cyclone—but a 
detailed forecast will depend on ﬁ rmer information about cyclone 
damage and disaster response. If the economy does contract this year, 
it will be Vanuatu’s ﬁ rst annual GDP contraction since 2002. Growth 
is expected to rebound to 4.0% in 2016 as infrastructure works and 
recovery in tourism and agriculture continue. 
Inﬂ ation is expected to accelerate to 4% in 2015, with higher local 
food prices caused by cyclone-related supply disruption off setting low 
fuel prices. In 2016, inﬂ ation is expected to return to its long–run trend 
at about 2%. 
The government had planned to run small ﬁ scal surpluses, in 
line with legal requirements, for current revenue and expenditure in 
2015 and 2016. However, the need to increase expenditure for cyclone 
recovery will likely make these targets impossible to achieve without 
signiﬁ cantly higher assistance ﬂ ows from development partners. 
The current account deﬁ cit is expected to widen signiﬁ cantly in 2015 
as lost tourism revenue combines with higher imports for reconstruction 
and major infrastructure projects. This will likely narrow in 2016 as 
agriculture and tourism receipts recover (Figure 3.36.3). The deﬁ cit 
is expected to be ﬁ nanced through foreign direct investment and 
increased assistance from development partners. Foreign exchange 
reserves are expected to decline but still provide 5 months of cover 
for imports in 2015 and 2016, exceeding the central bank’s target of 4 
months.
Policy challenge—sustainably funding 
development investment
While recovery from Tropical Cyclone Pam is the priority in the short 
term, the government’s medium-term challenge is to sustainably 
fund development investment. Government revenue growth has been 
constrained by falls in external grants, which trended down from 
2009 to 2013 (Figure 3.36.4). Revenue growth over the period came 
from higher tax collections, mainly of the value-added tax. However, 
Vanuatu’s narrow tax base constrains the government’s ability to further 
increase revenues. As a percentage of GDP, revenue has declined from 
27.0% in 2008 to 21.6% in 2013. Revenue is estimated to have bounced 
back to 23.4% in 2014, mainly from higher grant receipts, which are 
counted as government revenue. Uncertainty over assistance inﬂ ows for 
cyclone recovery makes it diffi  cult to project revenue as a share of GDP 
in 2015, but before the cyclone it was expected to slide to 23.2%. 
Meanwhile, demand for government spending has expanded with 
rapid population growth. Capital expenditure growth is expected to 
outpace that of current expenditure as major construction projects are 
implemented. Recent developments in health care have highlighted the 
need for the government to adequately budget and plan for additional 
expenditure associated with major projects. The Vila Central Hospital, 
for example, exhausted its annual budget in the ﬁ rst 6 months of 2014, 
forcing the temporary closure of the country’s only intensive care unit 
and rendering largely unusable $14.6 million worth of newly modernized 
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facilities. The facility reopened when additional funds were allocated for 
health care in a supplementary budget. 
The government plans a large pipeline of major infrastructure 
projects for the next 5 years, and construction on some projects is 
already under way. The success of these projects will depend on having 
adequate resources set aside for both construction and maintenance.
Vanuatu’s ﬁscal law requires the government to avoid a budget deﬁcit. 
This requirement is likely to become increasingly difficult to satisfy if the 
government does not control expenditure growth and develop alternative 
revenue sources over the medium term.
Vanuatu has limited options for increasing revenue as it does not 
levy taxes on individual or corporate income. Its domestic revenue is 
low relative to its Paciﬁc island peers, suggesting scope for increase. 
The International Monetary Fund estimates that an income tax levied 
at modest rates on employees and employers alike could yield revenues 
equal to 3%–4% of GDP and raise revenues more equitably than through 
indirect taxes.
As well as exploring additional revenue-raising opportunities, the 
government needs to control and prioritize government expenditure 
more effectively. One area that warrants careful monitoring is 
scholarships for study at universities overseas. In addition to scholarships 
funded by Australia and New Zealand, the government ﬁnances 
scholarships for study at universities in Fiji and the Philippines. In 2014, 
a supplemental appropriation was needed to increase spending on 
government-funded scholarships to more than Vt345 million, more than 
double the initial budget of Vt163 million. More modest expenditure of 
Vt154 million is proposed in the 2015 budget, but these expenditures 
must be carefully monitored to keep spending within budgeted levels.
This chapter was written by Christopher Edmonds, Rommel Rabanal, and Cara Tinio of 
the Paciﬁ c Department, ADB, Manila; and Prince Cruz, consultant, Paciﬁ c Department, 
ADB, Manila.
North Paciﬁ c economies
Palau’s economy recovered strongly last year on record tourist arrivals, but the Republic of the 
Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia registered weak economic performance. 
Growth in the North Pacific is seen to accelerate in the near term because of favorable external 
conditions and stimulus from infrastructure projects, along with continued tourism growth in 
Palau. Rationalizing air links to the North Pacific would boost prospects for sustainable growth.
Economic performance
While economic growth in the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) 
and the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) was subdued amid 
problems implementing capital projects under their compacts of 
free association with the US, Palau grew strongly by 6.9% in FY2014 
(ended 30 September 2014 in all three economies). 
A surge in tourism and increased construction, particularly late 
in the ﬁ scal year, drove growth in Palau, which reversed economic 
contraction in the previous year (Figure 3.37.1). Following a 9.5% decline 
in FY2013, visitor arrivals rebounded by 13.2% to reach a record high 
of nearly 123,000. Particularly strong was growth in arrivals from 
the People’s Republic of China, which made it the largest tourist 
source in the last quarter of FY2014. Arrivals from two other major 
markets, Japan and Taipei,China, also improved. New air links with 
Hong Kong, China and expanded accommodation capacity boosted 
recovery in tourism arrivals. 
In the RMI and the FSM, the release of FY2014 sector grants was 
delayed because both countries had failed to update their plans to 
accommodate anticipated decreases in compact funding. After growing 
by 3.0% in FY2013, the RMI economy grew by a mere 0.5% in FY2014 
for lack of new infrastructure projects (Figure 3.37.2). This followed 
the completion in FY2013 of airport road realignment funded by the 
US Federal Aviation Authority and reﬂ ected unforeseen delays aff ecting 
other scheduled capital projects. Growth in FY2014 was driven mainly 
by strong ﬁ shery performance as domestic purse seiners landed larger 
catches. Weak construction, and lower compact grant disbursements for 
education and health care, suppressed demand for associated services 
such as transport, storage, and communications. 
 The FSM economy contracted by 3.4% in FY2014, extending the 
4.0% contraction in the previous year (Figure 3.37.3). Domestic ﬁ sheries 
recovered, but the absence of demand connected with new construction 
kept industry and services in decline. Capital expenditure shrank by 
57.9% in FY2014, while US Compact capital grants plunged by 80.5%. 
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Inﬂ ation slowed in the RMI and the FSM with lower import prices, 
which were in line with declining international commodity prices, 
and with the appreciating US dollar (the currency used by all three 
North Paciﬁ c economies). In the RMI, inﬂ ation eased to 1.3% from 
1.9% in FY2013, and in the FSM to 0.7% from 2.1%, reﬂ ecting weak 
demand and low import costs. Conversely, inﬂ ation accelerated to 4.0% 
from 2.8% in Palau, where increases in tobacco taxes and medical and 
educational fees, and a strong growth environment, more than off set 
lower import prices. 
The North Paciﬁ c economies all recorded ﬁ scal surpluses in FY2014. 
In the RMI, a decline in grants was off set by higher ﬁ shing license 
revenues and lower expenditure, generating a surplus equivalent to 3.2% 
of GDP. The FSM recorded its third consecutive year of rising surpluses. 
In FY2014, revisions to corporate tax regulations for foreign insurance 
companies brought a windfall of $20 million and a ﬁ scal surplus equal to 
11.1% of GDP. Without the windfall, the surplus would have been 4.4% of 
GDP, which is still higher than the FY2013 surplus of 2.9%. The windfall 
tax revenue was invested equally in FSM Social Security and the FSM 
Trust Fund. The large surplus also reﬂ ected higher ﬁ shing license 
revenues and capital grants left unspent because of inability to comply 
with compact requirements. Palau’s small surplus, equal to 1.2% of GDP, 
made FY2014 the fourth consecutive year with a positive ﬁ scal balance. 
Reductions in grant receipts and higher expenditure were more than 
off set by higher collections from the gross revenue tax, hotel taxes, and 
a higher tobacco tax rate. 
Current account positions in the North Paciﬁ c—which are heavily 
aff ected by large merchandise trade deﬁ cits—were generally helped 
by low international commodity prices and continued strong ﬁ shing 
license collections. In the FSM, smaller deﬁ cits in goods and services 
trade, together with the windfall from the corporate income tax paid 
by nonresidents, reversed the current account position from a deﬁ cit 
equivalent to 10.1% of GDP in FY2013 to a surplus of 14.2% in FY2014. 
Although Palau’s strong economic recovery translated into a larger 
merchandise trade deﬁ cit as demand for imports rose, this was partly 
off set by large tourism receipts arising from record visitor arrivals. 
Thus, Palau’s current account deﬁ cit narrowed to the equivalent of 5.1% 
of GDP in FY2014 from 8.8% in FY2013. In the RMI, lower imports of 
goods following the completion of airport road realignment off set lower 
grant inﬂ ows, leaving a current account deﬁ cit equal to 9.4% of GDP and 
improved from 12.4% in FY2013. All three economies have seen large 
swings in their current account positions caused by volatility in key 
foreign exchange receipts such as budget support grants, remittances, 
and ﬁ shing license revenues, as well as from periodic imports of costly 
durable machinery and equipment. 
Economic prospects
The outlook for growth in the near term is bright because of 
favorable external conditions and progress expected in infrastructure 
development across North Paciﬁ c economies. Lower international prices 
should ease governments’ substantial expenditures on imported diesel 
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for generating electricity. Transport savings, declining food prices, and 
a stronger US dollar are expected to further reduce expenditures on 
imports. Recovery in the US economy and sustained subregional eff orts 
to raise ﬁ shery access fees bode well for higher external income ﬂ ows. 
GDP growth in Palau is projected to accelerate to 8.0% in FY2015 
on increased tourism, hotel construction, stimulus from higher public 
infrastructure spending, and improvements in the external economic 
environment. Tourism stands to beneﬁ t from lower air transport costs as 
visitor arrivals continue to climb at double-digit rates. Tourist numbers 
from the People’s Republic of China in particular are seen to rise further 
after a second airline began off ering chartered ﬂ ights from Hong Kong, 
China in September 2014. Concerns are growing, however, about 
how many new visitors can be accommodated in the current stock of 
hotel rooms and about the carrying capacity of tourist sites and public 
infrastructure. Growth in visitor arrivals is expected to taper off  slightly 
in FY2016, but GDP growth is seen to remain strong at 6.0%, supported 
by ramped up public infrastructure construction. 
Progress in infrastructure project implementation is expected to 
stimulate the economies of the RMI and the FSM. Accelerated work 
on delayed projects and the commencement of new initiatives are 
projected to push RMI GDP growth to 3.5% in FY2015. Growth is then 
seen to slow again to 1.5% in FY2016 as projects near completion and 
construction winds down. Similarly, in the FSM the resumption of the 
Airport Improvement Program with the renovation of the runway at 
Chuuk should help reverse the economic downturn and support growth 
at 2.3% in FY2015. Growth is projected to accelerate to 5.1% in FY2016 
with scaled-up implementation of projects. 
Low inﬂ ation will likely continue as international commodity prices 
remain subdued. In the RMI, inﬂ ation is projected to stay steady at 
1.4% in FY2015 and 1.3% in FY2016. Economic recovery in the FSM 
is expected to push inﬂ ation to 2.4% in FY2015 and 2.6% in FY2016. 
Inﬂ ation in Palau is seen to ease in FY2015 as the one-off  impact of 
increased medical and school fees passes but will remain relatively high 
at 3.4% with the second phase of the tobacco tax hike taking eff ect in 
January 2015. Sustained strong economic growth is expected to keep 
inﬂ ation steady in FY2016 (Figure 3.37.4). 
The RMI current account deﬁ cit is projected to expand to the 
equivalent of 9.9% of GDP in FY2015 and 11.4% in FY2016 due to imports 
bolstered by demand from construction projects (Figure 3.37.5). With 
the one-off  corporate tax windfall gone, the FSM current account 
surplus is seen to narrow to 11.2% of GDP in FY2015 and 6.4% in 
FY2016, as rising ﬁ shing license revenues are off set by higher imports of 
goods and services related to airport upgrades. Palau’s current account 
deﬁ cit is projected to widen to the equivalent of 6.4% of GDP in 2015 
and 8.1% in 2016, partly because of the country’s declaration turning its 
entire exclusive economic zone into a marine sanctuary will eliminate 
ﬁ shing license revenues by FY2019. 
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Policy challenge—air links to the North Paciﬁ c
Tourism is important in many Paciﬁ c countries. In Palau, the sector 
has expanded rapidly, with a record number of visitors arriving in 
FY2014. Tourism receipts have amounted to more than half of GDP in 
recent years and tourism development has been facilitated by direct 
air links between Palau and several major Asian markets that have 
reduced travel time. However, recent growth in visitor arrivals, pushed 
by rapid expansion in the number of charter ﬂ ights from Hong Kong, 
China, is leading the Government of Palau to consider policy options to 
reduce the number of charter ﬂ ights in light of congestion and strain on 
infrastructure during peak periods.
In contrast, tourism in the RMI and the FSM remains underdeveloped. 
From 2004 to 2013, annual visitor arrivals to the RMI averaged only 
about 5,000, and to the FSM 15,000. Most visitors came from the US, with 
Japan being the largest Asian market for both countries and accounting 
for 20% of arrivals. It is clear that the RMI and the FSM could beneﬁ t, as 
Palau has, from expanded international air links. More frequent and less 
costly connections to international markets, particularly the fast-growing 
economies of East and Southeast Asia, would enhance the longer-term 
prospects for tourism, investment, and trade. At present, the FSM is 
accessed primarily through Guam or Hawaii, requiring clearance through 
US customs and immigration. The RMI also has twice-weekly ﬂ ights 
through Nauru. Flight services to the RMI and the FSM are among the 
lowest capacity in the Paciﬁ c (Figure 3.37.6). While limited air links inhibit 
the ﬂ ow of tourists and businesspeople alike, they also reﬂ ect lack of 
demand for ﬂ ights because tourist facilities are relatively undeveloped, and 
business and investment activity weak. Stimulating demand for greater 
air links therefore requires complementary eff orts to improve domestic 
infrastructure and the enabling environment for sustainable tourism.
The governments of the three North Paciﬁ c economies recently 
considered establishing a new airline that would off er direct connections 
to Asia, possibly using Singapore as a hub. Previous experience shows, 
however, that airlines owned and operated by governments are generally 
ineffi  cient and unsustainable. Air Marshall Islands, established in 1980 
to ﬂ y between the main and outer islands, has become a signiﬁ cant ﬁ scal 
drain. In the early 1970s, seven Paciﬁ c island governments held shares 
in the Air Paciﬁ c eff ort to develop a regional airline. However, the 
Government of Fiji came to own more of the company while investments 
from other countries faded, and the airline was rebranded as Fiji 
Airways in 2012.
The Government of the FSM is now seeking to expand links through 
bilateral air service agreements to allow existing airlines to assess 
demand and better respond to potential market opportunities. It is 
currently discussing air service agreements to connect member states 
with large markets in Asia such as the People’s Republic of China, 
the Philippines, and Singapore. FSM policy makers are also pursuing 
opportunities for arranging stopovers in the FSM on Fiji Airways’ 
Nadi–Honolulu ﬂ ight (as well as direct ﬂ ights between the FSM and Fiji) 
and Air Niugini’s Port Moresby–Narita ﬂ ight, to improve air links with 
South Paciﬁ c air transport hubs. Discussions are also under way for 
Nauru Airlines’ Nauru–Majuro ﬂ ight to include stops in the FSM.
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This chapter was written by Malie Lototele and Shiu Raj Singh of the South Paciﬁc 
Subregional Office, ADB, Suva; and Cara Tinio, Laisiasa Tora, and Johannes Wolff  of the 
Paciﬁc Department, ADB, Manila. 
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South Paciﬁc economies
These small and fragile economies still depend on tourism earnings and public infrastructure 
funded by development partners. Delays in implementing projects slowed economic expansion 
in the Cook Islands, while increased construction and steady tourism performance reversed 
downturns in Samoa and Tonga. Growth is expected to accelerate this year before slowing 
somewhat next year. To make growth sustainable, South Pacific governments should continue 
to improve the environment for private sector development.
Economic performance
Growth generally improved in FY2014 (ended 30 June 2014) in 
the South Paciﬁc (Figure 3.38.1). Samoa’s economy grew by 1.9% 
on spending to prepare for the 2014 United Nations Small Island 
Developing States Conference and continued reconstruction following 
Cyclone Evan in December 2012. Tonga—recovering from 2.7% 
contraction in FY2013 caused by a sharp decline in reconstruction 
after the end of loan-ﬁnanced projects—recorded growth at 2.1% in 
FY2014. Growth came from higher agricultural output in the ﬁrst half, 
before the arrival of Cyclone Ian in January 2014, and recovery in 
construction in the wake of that cyclone. 
In the Cook Islands, GDP declined by 1.2%, a slight improvement 
from 1.7% contraction in FY2013. Delays in implementing projects 
supported by development partners outweighed growth in visitor 
arrivals. Updated official ﬁgures have caused the latest growth 
estimates to differ signiﬁcantly from those reported in previous 
editions of Asian Development Outlook.
Tourism remains a key income source for these South Paciﬁc 
economies, and sector performance has stayed generally positive. In 
FY2014, Samoa welcomed about 127,000 visitors, close to the number 
received in FY2013. Visitor arrivals in Tonga are also estimated to have 
been stable, at about 59,000 visitors in FY2014, following slight declines 
in the previous 2 years. Visitors to the Cook Islands increased to about 
123,000 in FY2014, up by 1.6% over FY2013. Although visitor arrivals to 
the Cook Islands continue to increase, growth has slowed over the past 
few years. 
Inﬂation stayed moderate across the South Paciﬁc in FY2014 as 
international food and fuel prices continued to decline (Figure 3.38.3). 
Inﬂation in the Cook Islands averaged 1.6%, down from 2.6% in FY2013, 
because the economic slowdown reinforced the effects of international 
price movements. Prices in Samoa contracted further by 1.2% in 
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FY2014, following marginal deﬂation at 0.2% in FY2013. The continued 
decline in international food and fuel prices offset a slight increase 
in prices for locally produced goods to keep domestic prices subdued. 
Only Tonga experienced higher inﬂation in FY2014, which accelerated 
to 2.3% from 0.7% in the previous ﬁscal year because of improved 
domestic demand and the disruption to local supply networks caused by 
the cyclone. 
The Cook Islands and Samoa continue to run budget deﬁcits. The 
Cook Islands recorded a ﬁscal deﬁcit equal to 3.0% of GDP in FY2014, 
slightly narrower than the 3.8% deﬁcit incurred in FY2013. During 
the same period, Samoa’s ﬁscal deﬁcit expanded to 5.3% of GDP as 
the government ﬁnanced preparations to host the United Nations 
conference. This deﬁcit was ﬁnanced largely by soft loans from 
traditional development partners. 
Tonga recorded a budget surplus equal to 1.1% of GDP in FY2014 
as ﬁscal consolidation reversed relatively high deﬁcits in recent years. 
Tonga and the Cook Islands need to further consolidate their public 
sector operating costs. Expenditures on public sector wages, for 
example, are reportedly much lower in Samoa (Figure 3.38.5).
Monetary policy generally remained expansionary in Samoa and 
Tonga. The central banks of both have kept policy interest rates low to 
encourage lending to the private sector and promote economic activity. 
After years of decline, lending to the private sector in Samoa, and 
lending to households in Tonga, began to increase toward the end of 
FY2014. The Cook Islands does not have a central bank and uses the 
New Zealand dollar as its official currency.
Samoa and Tonga ran current account deﬁcits (Figure 3.38.6). Large 
imbalances in merchandise trade were partly offset by remittance 
inﬂows and capital grants from development partners, yet Samoa’s 
current account deﬁcit almost doubled to the equivalent of 12.2% of 
GDP in FY2014 from 5.9% in FY2013, mainly on higher goods imports. 
The country has implemented stronger exchange controls after seeing 
foreign reserves drained in recent months. Tonga‘s current account 
deﬁcit narrowed to an estimated 1.4% of GDP from 1.9% in FY2013. The 
Cook Islands does not report balance of payments estimates.
Remittances continue to be an important source of income for 
many dependents of Samoans and Tongans working abroad—mostly in 
Australia, New Zealand, and the US—but inﬂows to Samoa and Tonga 
declined in FY2014 (Figure 3.38.7). Remittances to Tonga decreased by 
4.5%. Samoa’s remittances declined by 8.1% in FY2014, reversing the 
12.0% increase in FY2013, as high unemployment, especially among 
Paciﬁc laborers, continued in New Zealand—the main host for Samoan 
workers overseas. Unlike the other two South Paciﬁc economies, the 
Cook Islands is a net remitter because it employs more than 3,000 
foreign workers, mostly from the Philippines and Fiji.
Economic prospects
Growth in the South Paciﬁc is expected to accelerate in FY2015 
before slowing slightly in FY2016. Tourism and public infrastructure 
development will continue to drive growth, but contributions from 
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agriculture should increase as projects implemented with development 
partners boost the sector in Samoa and Tonga.
In the Cook Islands, growth in FY2015 is forecast to improve 
but remain slow at 2.1%, driven largely by capital projects funded by 
development partners. A slight contraction of 0.3% is expected in 
FY2016 as large public investment projects end. Visitor arrivals in the 
Cook Islands are expected to stabilize in FY2015 and FY2016 after years 
of steady increase. Arrivals from New Zealand and Australia, the key 
source markets, began to soften in late FY2014. Capacity constraints 
loom in Rarotonga, the capital island, as the accommodation occupancy 
rate reached 74% in FY2014. 
The Samoan economy is expected to expand by 2.5% in FY2015 as 
tourism continues to recover. It is expected that visitor arrivals in FY 
2015 will be 5.0% higher than in the previous year largely because of 
the United Nations conference in September 2014. Samoa is expecting 
record visitor arrivals in FY2016 as it hosts the Commonwealth Youth 
Games in September 2015 and adds new accommodation capacity. 
Record visitor arrivals should propel growth, which is expected to reach 
2.2% in FY2016. 
Tonga is expected to grow by 2.4% in FY2015 as the airport 
runway upgrade ﬁnanced by development partners proceeds, along 
with preparations for the July 2015 coronation, and as major cyclone 
reconstruction carries over from 2014 into 2015. Following 2 years 
of decline, visitor arrivals in Tonga are seen to increase gradually in 
FY2015 and FY2016. Economic growth is forecast to accelerate to 2.6% 
with the expected ramping up of preparations for the 2019 South Paciﬁc 
Games, executed with continuing support from development partners, 
and with improved agricultural production and tourism performance. 
Inﬂation is forecast to stay low in the South Paciﬁc on expectations 
of lower international food and energy prices. Inﬂation in the Cook 
Islands is projected at 1.3% in FY2015 and 1.4% in FY2016, and in Tonga 
at 0.4% and 1.0%. Samoa will likely emerge from price contraction and 
record inﬂation at 2.5% in FY2015 and 2.0% in FY2016, reﬂecting higher 
growth and prices for local agricultural produce. 
Samoa and the Cook Islands are expected to maintain expansionary 
ﬁscal policies in the medium term, as evidenced by the relatively large 
capital expenditures planned for FY2015 and FY2016. The Cook Islands’ 
budget deﬁcit is forecast to jump to the equivalent of 7.3% of GDP in 
FY2015 before easing to 7.1% in the following ﬁscal year, while Samoa 
is expected to maintain a deﬁcit equal to 1.6% of GDP throughout the 
forecast period. Tonga intends to continue consolidation efforts to 
narrow the gap between domestic revenues and recurrent expenditures 
and improve its debt position. However, planned spending on post-
cyclone reconstruction and the upcoming coronation is seen to fuel a 
ﬁscal deﬁcit equal to 1.8% of GDP in FY2015. The deﬁcit is projected 
to narrow to 1.5% in FY2016. Fiscal consolidation remains a key 
development challenge in the South Paciﬁc, but slow economic growth 
in the subregion requires that efforts to create ﬁscal buffers be balanced 
with their anticipated drag on economic growth.
Monetary policy in Samoa and Tonga will likely remain 
accommodative to further promote domestic economic activity, taking 
3.38.1 Selected economic indicators (%)
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GDP growth 2.5 2.2
Inﬂation 2.5 2.0
Current account balance 
(share of GDP)
-10.9 -9.4
Tonga
GDP growth 2.4 2.6
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... = data not available.
Source: ADB estimates.
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into account expectations that inﬂation will remain below central bank 
targets. Low private sector lending remains a concern in both countries. 
Samoa’s current account deﬁcit is projected to widen to the 
equivalent of 10.9% of GDP in FY2015 despite expectations of lower 
prices for imports in the second half. Imports for the planned 
comprehensive upgrade of Samoa’s airport will keep the current account 
deﬁcit above 9.0% of GDP in FY2016. Without augmented support from 
development partners, Samoa will likely need macroeconomic policy 
adjustments to address growing external imbalances. Tonga’s current 
account deﬁcit is expected to widen to the equivalent of 4.5% of GDP in 
FY2015 and 6.0% in FY2016, driven by high imports for reconstruction, 
public investment projects, and preparations for the coronation and the 
2019 South Paciﬁc Games.
Policy challenge—pursuing structural and ﬁscal 
reforms
The domestic private sector needs to play a greater role in the 
economies of the South Paciﬁc to quell high economic volatility 
stemming from the outsized inﬂuence of such external factors 
as tourism, remittances, and development partners’ spending on 
infrastructure. Entrepreneurship, private investment, and private 
sector jobs are integral to achieving sustainable economic growth 
and reducing poverty. South Paciﬁc economies need to offset the 
disadvantages posed by their remote locations and small domestic 
markets through laws and policies that can stimulate business. 
Financial sector development to bring down the cost of capital, and 
public infrastructure investments to tame transaction costs are 
required if the private sector is to drive growth in the medium term. 
The Government of the Cook Islands is seeking to develop a deeper 
understanding of issues affecting broad-based private sector investment 
and sustainable growth. Some of the issues it is considering are the size 
of the public sector, the role of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and 
issues affecting business entry, and access to land and ﬁnance.
Samoa is taking steps, albeit slowly, to improve and formalize its 
existing leasing framework that allows land under customary ownership 
to be used for productive purposes while continuing to protect it from 
alienation.
With the launch of a new online business registry in 2014, Tonga  
improved its business environment relative to many of its Paciﬁc 
neighbors. In the World Bank’s Doing Business 2015 report, Tonga 
ranks as the second most business–friendly economy in the Paciﬁc, 
after Samoa. However, despite the high ranking and ongoing reform, 
inﬂows of foreign investment remain meager. To overcome natural 
constraints on growth, Tonga needs additional reform to improve its 
business environment and overcome existing constraints on private 
sector development. A foreign investment regime—with unambiguous 
regulatory frameworks for taxation and business incentives—is among 
the innovations necessary to take full advantage of the country’s natural 
assets through sustainable tourism, ﬁshing, agriculture, and possibly 
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seabed mining. Access to land and capital—key factors of production—
needs to improve to attract investment. Formal credit markets still 
lack foundational legislation, including appropriate receivership and 
bankruptcy frameworks. This hinders businesses’ access to ﬁnance. 
On the ﬁscal side, further reform to public ﬁnancial management, 
public administration, and SOEs is required to put ﬁnances on a 
more sustainable footing. Public wages remain high relative to GDP, 
contributing to deﬁcits in recurrent budgets and crowding out other 
government expenditure, especially in Tonga, where public service 
reform is urgently needed to prevent further hikes in salaries and cost-
of-living allowances that would be unsustainable. Additional SOE reform 
to improve governance and rationalization—or privatization—can reduce 
public subsidies, level the playing ﬁeld between SOEs and the private 
sector, and generate new business opportunities for the private sector. 
Continued reform to public ﬁnancial management will help make tax 
administration, expenditure management, and eventually public service 
delivery more effective. This is necessary to better allocate limited 
public resources and maximize their beneﬁts.  
To move this agenda forward, ﬁscal and structural reforms have 
been incorporated in joint policy action matrices agreed by South Paciﬁc 
governments with their development partners. However, much work 
remains to ensure actual progress.
This chapter was written by Milovan Lucich of the Paciﬁc Liaison and Coordination Office, 
ADB, Sydney; and Malie Lototele of the South Paciﬁc Subregional Office, ADB, Suva.
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Small island economies
For a third consecutive year, high fishing license revenues have spurred economic growth and 
improved fiscal balances in the small Pacific island economies of Kiribati, Nauru, and Tuvalu. 
Externally funded infrastructure projects have contributed to higher growth. Inflation has 
risen with currency depreciation. With higher revenues, all three economies have approved 
expansionary budgets for 2015. Access to finance remains a key challenge.
Economic performance
The economy of Nauru grew by 10.0% in 2014, outpacing more moderate 
growth at 3.0% in Kiribati and 2.0% in Tuvalu (Figure 3.39.1). Nauru’s 
growth was driven by construction following the recommencement of 
operations at the Regional Processing Centre for those seeking asylum 
in Australia and by the liquidation and payout of the Nauru Phosphate 
Royalties Trust, which boosted private consumption of goods and 
services—both local and imported. In Kiribati and Tuvalu, growth was 
sustained by construction projects funded by development partners 
and continuing high revenue from ﬁshing license fees. As parties to the 
Nauru Agreement, all three small island economies have beneﬁtted from 
rising rates under the vessel day scheme.
Revenues from ﬁshing licenses outperformed budget expectations 
for the third year running as they soared by 110% in Nauru over the 
previous year’s actual earnings and by 34% in Kiribati (Figure 3.39.2). 
Revenue collections have been boosted as well by improved tax 
collection in Kiribati and higher dividends paid out by a joint venture of 
the National Fishing Corporation of Tuvalu and overseas investors. 
With a weaker Australian dollar, which is the currency used in all 
three economies, inﬂation rose on higher import costs. In 2014, prices 
increased by 2.6% in Kiribati, driven by higher spending connected 
with projects, and by 3.3% in Tuvalu, where wage increases were large. 
Nauru experienced higher price inﬂation at 5.0% in FY2014 (ended 30 
June 2014) driven by a large increase in household income. 
Kiribati recorded a large current account deﬁcit in 2014 as the trade 
balance deteriorated because of high demand for imports associated 
with projects funded by development partners. Another large current 
account surplus is estimated for Tuvalu, reﬂecting inﬂows of official 
development assistance to support the budget and continuing high 
income from ﬁsh exports and ﬁshing licenses (Figure 3.39.3). Nauru does 
not compile current account statistics. 
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Economic prospects
Growth is expected to slow in Kiribati, moderate in Nauru, and remain 
the same in Tuvalu. Tropical Cyclone Pam caused tidal surges that 
damaged infrastructure and private property in Kiribati and Tuvalu in 
mid-March. About 45% of Tuvalu’s population was reportedly displaced, 
and the Betio-Tarawa causeway in Kiribati—a key transport link—was 
extensively damaged. Growth in Kiribati’s economy is projected to 
halve to 1.5% in both 2015 and 2016 as projects funded by development 
partners are completed. In Tuvalu, the airport upgrade funded by 
development partners and continued retail expansion are expected 
to maintain economic growth at around 2.0% in 2015 and 2016. In 
Nauru, growth will to come off its high, falling to 8.0% as household 
consumption is boosted by government debt repayments and the 
liquidation of the Nauru Phosphate Royalties Trust. Growth in Nauru 
is seen to moderate further in FY2016 to around 5.0% as the boost to 
household incomes wanes. 
Inﬂation in Nauru is expected to accelerate in FY2015 to 8.0% 
on strong underlying demand and to moderate to 3.0% in FY2016 as 
economic growth slows (Figure 3.39.4). Inﬂation is projected to slow to 
1.0% in Kiribati in 2015, edging up to 1.5% in 2016. In Tuvalu, inﬂation 
will likely ease to 1.0% in 2015 and 2016.
With improved revenue performance over recent years, all three 
island governments plan to adopt expansionary ﬁscal policies to help 
support economic growth in the near term. In Nauru, the FY2015 
budget provides for an increase in expenditure that triples expenditure 
from the level 3 years ago.  This will be used largely to repay debt, 
including salary arrears, and place $5 million in the new Nauru Trust 
Fund. The government forecasts a surplus of A$400,000 from visa fees 
and customs duties generated by the Regional Processing Centre and 
high ﬁshing revenues (Figure 3.39.5). Fiscal expansion in Kiribati and 
Tuvalu will see expenditure rise by 13% in Kiribati and 38% in Tuvalu. 
This is driven by planned increases in recurrent expenditures and 
capital spending. 
Policy challenges—managing windfall gains, and 
restoring bank services to Nauru
The value of national trust funds in Kiribati and Tuvalu has fallen in 
the years following the global ﬁnancial crisis. The Nauru Phosphate 
Royalties Trust, which was almost completely depleted in the 1970s and 
1980s, has been liquidated, and the remaining capital is being distributed 
to landowners. The recent windfall gains from ﬁshing license revenues 
have provided opportunities to rebuild the ﬁscal buffers in Tuvalu and 
Kiribati (Figure 3.39.6). Nauru is pursuing the establishment of a new 
trust fund with international standards of governance.
In Kiribati, higher revenue from ﬁshing licenses in 2012, 2013, and 
2014 enabled the government to contribute A$10 million to the Revenue 
Equalization Reserve Fund. However, it needs to enhance revenue 
collection and keep current expenditure in check to improve reserve 
fund dynamics over the long run. The real value of the fund per capita 
3.39.1 Selected economic indicators (%)
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... = data not available.
Source: ADB estimates.
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has been trending downward in recent years, falling well below the 
benchmark of A$4,500. 
For the ﬁrst time since 2008, the Government of Tuvalu received a 
distribution of A$6.5 million from the Tuvalu Trust Fund (TTF) to the 
Consolidated Investment Fund (CIF). When the market value of the 
TTF exceeds its maintained value (which is indexed to the Australian 
consumer price index), the difference becomes an automatic distribution 
to the CIF, through which the government ﬁnances its budget deﬁcits. 
Because there were no distributions for a number of years, the CIF  
became nearly exhausted in 2012. With assistance from development 
partners, the government has since restored the fund, the value of which 
rose from A$4.8 million in 2008 to $26.7 million at the end of 2014. 
While the current CIF balance is above the government’s target of 16% of 
the TTF (equivalent to A$22.4 million), prudence in the face of revenue 
volatility requires the government to continue to save windfall gains. As 
part of its commitment to build the value of the TTF, the government has 
included a $3 million contribution to it in its 2015 budget. 
Nauru has been without a ﬁnancial institution able to provide 
banking services since the collapse of the state-owned Bank of Nauru. 
The bank’s reserves were drawn down to the point that it could no 
longer meet its obligations to depositors, and it effectively ceased 
operating in 1998. Its facilities are now used for storing government 
cash. No formal system currently exists through which consumers 
and businesses can hold deposits or access credit. A cash economy is 
facilitated by an office for payments and receipts under the direction 
of the Ministry of Finance. International transactions are limited to a 
Western Union franchise and automatic teller machines operating at 
Menen Hotel and Eigigu Supermarket. The lack of a formal ﬁnancial 
system impedes the development of the private sector. Individuals have 
only limited incentive to save or avenues for investing surplus income. 
Fortunately, the government recently formalized an agreement with 
Bendigo and Adelaide Bank to establish a banking agency in Nauru, 
and  government has recruited a manager to act as its agent. Over 1,500 
Nauruans already have accounts with the bank.
3.39.5  Nauru major sources of domestic 
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STATISTICAL 
APPENDIX

Statistical notes and tables
The statistical appendix presents selected economic indicators for 
45 developing member economies of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
in 18 tables. The economies are grouped into ﬁve subregions: 
Central Asia, East Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Paciﬁc. 
Most of the tables contain historical data from 2010 to 2014; some have 
forecasts for 2015 and 2016.
The data were standardized to the degree possible to allow 
comparability over time and across economies, but differences in 
statistical methodology, deﬁnitions, coverage, and practices make full 
comparability impossible. The national income accounts section is 
based on the United Nations System of National Accounts, while the 
data on balance of payments are based on International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) accounting standards. Historical data were obtained from 
official sources, statistical publications and databases, and documents 
of ADB, the IMF, and the World Bank. Projections for 2015 and 2016 
are generally ADB estimates made on the bases of available quarterly or 
monthly data, though some projections are from governments.
Most economies report by calendar year. The following record their 
government ﬁnance data by ﬁscal year: Armenia; Azerbaijan; Brunei 
Darussalam; the Cook Islands; Hong Kong, China; Kazakhstan; the 
Kyrgyz Republic; the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR); 
Samoa; Singapore; Taipei,China; Tajikistan; Thailand; and Uzbekistan. 
The Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, the Republic of Marshall 
Islands, and Palau report government ﬁnance and balance-of-payments 
data by ﬁscal year. South Asian countries (except for the Maldives 
and Sri Lanka), Myanmar, Samoa, and Tonga report all variables by 
ﬁscal year.
Regional and subregional averages or totals are provided for seven 
tables (A1, A2, A6, A11, A12, A13, and A14). For tables A1, A2, A6, and 
A14, the averages are computed using weights derived from gross 
national income (GNI) in current US dollars following the World Bank 
Atlas method. The GNI data for 2009–2013 were obtained from the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators online. Weights for 2013 
were carried over through 2016. The GNI data for the Cook Islands 
were estimated using the Atlas conversion factor. Myanmar and Nauru 
have no GNI data. For tables A11 and A12, the regional and subregional 
averages were computed on the basis of a consistent sum, which 
means that if there are missing country data for a given year, the sum 
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of the prior year used for computing the growth rate excludes the 
corresponding country data. Data for Myanmar and Nauru are excluded 
from the computation of all subregional averages and totals.
Tables A1, A2, A3, A4, and A5. These tables show related data on 
output growth, production, and demand. Changes to the national income 
accounts series for some countries have been made to accommodate 
a change in source, methodology, and/or base year. The series for 
Afghanistan, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, and Pakistan reﬂect ﬁscal year 
data, rather than calendar year data, while those for Timor–Leste reﬂect 
the GDP excluding oil and United Nations inputs. 
Table A1: Growth rate of GDP (% per year). The table shows annual 
growth rates of GDP valued at constant market prices, factor costs, 
or basic prices. GDP at market prices is the aggregation of the value 
added of all resident producers at producers’ prices including taxes 
less subsidies on imports plus all nondeductible value-added or similar 
taxes. Constant factor cost measures differ from market price measures 
in that they exclude taxes on production and include subsidies. Basic 
price valuation is the factor cost plus some taxes on production, such 
as property and payroll taxes, and less some subsidies, such as labor-
related subsidies but not product-related subsidies. Most economies 
use constant market price valuation. Fiji, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka use 
constant factor costs, while the Maldives and Nepal use basic prices. 
The series for Taipei,China has been changed to accommodate its 
adoption of the chain-linking method.
Table A2: Growth rate of per capita GDP (% per year). The table 
provides the growth rates of real per capita GDP, which is deﬁned as 
GDP at constant prices divided by the population. The series for most 
of the Paciﬁc countries were revised to accommodate a change of 
source for population data. Data on per capita gross national product in 
US dollar terms for 2013 are also shown, sourced from the World Bank’s, 
World Development Indicators online. 
Table A3: Growth rate of value added in agriculture (% per year). 
The table shows the growth rates of value added in agriculture and 
its corresponding share in 2013. The agriculture sector comprises 
agricultural crops, livestock, poultry, ﬁsheries, and forestry. The series 
for Azerbaijan refers to only the ﬁrst 9 months of the year.
Table A4: Growth rate of value added in industry (% per year). 
The table provides the growth rates of value added in industry and its 
corresponding share in 2013. This sector comprises manufacturing, 
mining and quarrying, construction, and utilities. The series for 
Azerbaijan refers to only the ﬁrst 9 months of the year. 
Table A5: Growth rate of value added in services (% per year). 
The table gives the growth rates of value added in services and its 
corresponding share in 2013. Subsectors generally include trade, 
banking, ﬁnance, real estate, public administration, and other services. 
The series for Azerbaijan refers to only the ﬁrst 9 months of the year.
Table A6: Inﬂation (% per year). Data on inﬂation rates represent 
period averages. The inﬂation rates presented are based on consumer 
price indexes. The consumer price indexes of the following economies 
are for a given city or group of consumers only: Afghanistan is for 
Kabul (until 2011), Cambodia is for Phnom Penh, the Marshall Islands 
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is for Majuro, Solomon Islands is for Honiara, and Nepal is for urban 
consumers.
Table A7: Growth in money supply (% per year). This table tracks 
the annual percentage change in the end-of-period supply of broad 
money as represented by M2 for most countries. M2 is deﬁned as the 
sum of M1 and quasi-money, where M1 denotes currency in circulation 
plus demand deposits, and quasi-money consists of time and savings 
deposits including foreign currency deposits. 
Tables A8, A9, and A10: Government ﬁnance. These tables give 
the revenue and expenditure transactions and the ﬁscal balance of 
the central government expressed as a percentage of GDP in nominal 
terms. For Cambodia (since 2006), the People’s Republic of China, 
India, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Mongolia, and Tajikistan, 
transactions are those reported by the general government. 
Table A8: Central government revenues (% of GDP). Central 
government revenues comprise all nonrepayable receipts, both current 
and capital, plus grants. These amounts are computed as a percentage 
of GDP at current prices. For the Republic of Korea, revenues exclude 
social security contributions. For Singapore, revenues include the net 
investment returns contribution. For Kazakhstan, revenues include 
transfers from the national fund. Grants are excluded in Cambodia, 
the Lao PDR, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand; revenues from 
disinvestment are included for India; and only current revenues are 
included for Bangladesh. 
Table A9: Central government expenditures (% of GDP). 
Central government expenditures comprise all nonrepayable payments 
to both current and capital expenses, plus net lending. These amounts 
are computed as a share of GDP at current prices. For Thailand, 
expenditures refer to budgetary expenditures excluding externally 
ﬁnanced expenditures and corresponding borrowing. Those for 
Tajikistan include externally ﬁnanced public investment programs. 
One-time expenditures are excluded for Pakistan.
Table A10: Fiscal balance of central government (% of GDP). 
Fiscal balance is the difference between central government revenues 
and expenditures. The difference is also computed as a share of GDP at 
current prices. Data variations may arise from statistical discrepancies, 
e.g., balancing items for both central and local governments, and from 
differences in the concept used in the individual computations of 
revenues and expenditures as compared with the calculation of the 
ﬁscal balance. For Fiji, the ﬁscal balance excludes total loan repayments. 
For Thailand, the ﬁscal balance is a cash balance composed of the 
budgetary and nonbudgetary balances. Some off-budget accounts are 
included in the computation of the ﬁscal balance for Turkmenistan.
Tables A11, A12, A13, and A14: Balance of payments. These tables 
show selected international economic transactions of countries as 
recorded in the balance of payments. These items cover annual ﬂows. 
Tables A11 and A12: Growth rates of merchandise exports and 
imports (% per year). These tables show the annual growth rates of 
exports and imports of goods. Data are in million US dollars, primarily 
obtained from the balance-of-payments accounts of each economy. 
Exports are reported on a free-on-board. Import data are reported free-
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on-board, except for the following economies, which value them on the 
basis of cost, insurance, and freight: Afghanistan; Bhutan; Cambodia; 
Hong Kong, China; India; the Lao PDR; Myanmar; the Philippines; 
Samoa; Singapore; Solomon Islands; and Thailand. 
Table A13: Trade balance ($ million). The trade balance is the 
difference between merchandise exports and merchandise imports. 
Figures in this table are based on the exports and imports amounts used 
to generate tables A11 and A12.
Table A14: Current account balance (% of GDP). The current 
account balance is the sum of the balance of trade for merchandise, 
net trade in services and factor income, and net transfers. The values 
reported are divided by GDP at current prices in US dollars. In the case 
of Cambodia, the Lao PDR, and Viet Nam, official transfers are excluded 
from the current account balance. 
Table A15: Exchange rates to the US dollar (annual average). 
Annual average exchange rates are quoted as the local currencies per US 
dollar. 
Table A16: Gross international reserves ($ million). Gross 
international reserves are deﬁned as the US dollar value of holdings of 
foreign exchange, special drawing rights, reserve position in the IMF, 
and gold at the end of a given period. For the Marshall Islands and 
Taipei,China, this heading refers to foreign exchange reserves only. In 
some economies, the rubric is foreign assets and reserves of national 
monetary authorities and national oil funds, i.e., foreign assets of the 
Maldives Monetary Authority, net foreign reserves of the State Bank 
of Pakistan, assets of the National Oil Fund of Azerbaijan, and official 
external assets of Kiribati. The data for India are as of 6 February 2015.
Table A17: External debt outstanding ($ million). For most 
economies, external debt outstanding; public and private, includes 
medium- and long-term debt, short-term debt, and IMF credit. For 
Cambodia, Georgia, and the Lao PDR, only public external debt is 
reported. For Armenia, Azerbaijan, India, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz 
Republic, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore, the ﬁgures for 2014 
are as of the end of September.
Table A18: Debt service ratio (% of exports of goods and services). 
This table generally presents the total debt service payments of each 
economy, which comprise principal repayments (excluding on short-
term debt) and interest payments on outstanding external debt, as a 
percentage of exports of goods and services. For Cambodia and the 
Lao PDR, debt service refers to external public debt only. For Papua 
New Guinea, Samoa, and Viet Nam, exports of goods are used as 
the denominator in the calculation of the ratio; for the Philippines, 
exports of goods, services, and income are used as the denominator. 
For Bangladesh, the ratio represents debt service payments on 
medium- and long-term loans as a percentage of exports of goods, 
nonfactor services, and workers’ remittances; and for Azerbaijan, the 
ratio represents public and publicly guaranteed external debt service 
payments as a percentage of exports of goods and nonfactor services. 
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Table A1 Growth rate of GDP (% per year)
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Central Asia 6.8 6.8 5.6 6.6 5.1 3.5 4.5
Armenia 2.2 4.7 7.2 3.5 3.4 1.6 2.3
Azerbaijan 5.0 0.1 2.2 5.8 2.8 3.0 2.8
Georgia 6.3 7.2 6.4 3.3 4.7 2.0 2.5
Kazakhstan 7.3 7.5 5.0 6.0 4.3 1.9 3.8
Kyrgyz Republic –0.5 6.0 –0.1 10.9 3.6 1.7 2.0
Tajikistan 6.5 7.4 7.5 7.4 6.7 4.0 4.8
Turkmenistan 9.2 14.7 11.1 10.2 10.3 9.7 9.2
Uzbekistan 8.5 8.3 8.2 8.0 8.1 7.0 7.2
East Asia 9.8 8.1 6.6 6.8 6.6 6.5 6.3
China, People’s Rep. of 10.4 9.3 7.7 7.7 7.4 7.2 7.0
Hong Kong, China 6.8 4.8 1.7 2.9 2.3 2.8 2.9
Korea, Rep. of 6.5 3.7 2.3 3.0 3.3 3.5 3.7
Mongolia 6.4 17.3 12.3 11.6 7.8 3.0 5.0
Taipei,China 10.6 3.8 2.1 2.2 3.7 3.7 3.6
South Asia 9.1 6.4 5.1 6.5 6.9 7.2 7.6
Afghanistan 8.4 7.2 11.9 3.4 1.7 2.5 3.5
Bangladesh 5.6 6.5 6.5 6.0 6.1 6.1 6.4
Bhutan 9.3 9.7 6.4 3.5 4.0 6.8 7.0
India 10.3 6.7 5.1 6.9 7.4 7.8 8.2
Maldives 7.1 6.5 1.3 4.7 6.8 6.3 5.1
Nepal 4.3 3.8 4.6 3.5 5.2 4.6 5.1
Pakistan 2.6 3.6 3.8 3.7 4.1 4.2 4.5
Sri Lanka 8.0 8.3 6.3 7.2 7.4 7.0 7.3
Southeast Asia 8.1 4.7 5.8 5.1 4.4 4.9 5.3
Brunei Darussalam 2.6 3.7 0.9 –2.1 –1.2 –1.5 0.8
Cambodia 6.0 7.1 7.3 7.4 7.0 7.3 7.5
Indonesia 6.4 6.2 6.0 5.6 5.0 5.5 6.0
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 7.5 7.8 7.9 7.9 7.4 7.0 7.2
Malaysia 7.4 5.2 5.6 4.7 6.0 4.7 5.0
Myanmar 5.3 5.9 7.1 8.3 7.7 8.3 8.2
Philippines 7.6 3.7 6.8 7.2 6.1 6.4 6.3
Singapore 15.2 6.2 3.4 4.4 2.9 3.0 3.4
Thailand 7.8 0.1 6.5 2.9 0.7 3.6 4.1
Viet Nam 6.4 6.2 5.2 5.4 6.0 6.1 6.2
The Pacific 6.4 9.5 6.0 4.1 6.1 10.7 4.5
Cook Islands 2.1 –2.6 4.1 –1.7 –1.2 2.1 –0.3
Fiji 3.0 2.7 1.8 4.6 4.2 4.0 4.0
Kiribati –0.5 2.7 3.4 2.4 3.0 1.5 1.5
Marshall Islands 6.1 0.0 4.7 3.0 0.5 3.5 1.5
Micronesia, Fed. States of 3.2 1.8 0.1 –4.0 –3.4 2.3 5.1
Nauru –11.3 3.8 4.9 4.5 10.0 8.0 5.0
Palau 0.2 7.7 4.0 –1.7 6.9 8.0 6.0
Papua New Guinea 7.6 11.3 7.7 5.1 8.0 15.0 5.0
Samoa 4.9 6.2 1.2 –1.1 1.9 2.5 2.2
Solomon Islands 7.9 10.6 4.8 2.9 –0.2 3.0 3.5
Timor–Leste 9.6 14.4 7.8 5.6 7.1 6.2 6.6
Tonga 4.2 2.0 0.5 –2.7 2.1 2.4 2.6
Tuvalu –2.7 8.5 0.2 1.3 2.0 2.0 2.0
Vanuatu 1.6 1.2 1.8 2.0 3.6 –0.5 4.0
Average 9.3 7.3 6.2 6.5 6.3 6.3 6.3
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Table A2 Growth rate of per capita GDP (% per year)
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Per capita GNI, 
$, 2013
Central Asia 5.2 5.2 4.0 5.1 3.7 2.2 3.2
Armenia 1.9 4.2 6.8 3.2 3.1 1.3 2.3 3,800
Azerbaijan 3.8 –1.1 0.9 4.4 1.5 2.0 1.8 7,350
Georgia 5.0 6.4 6.3 3.6 4.5 1.8 2.5 3,570
Kazakhstan 5.5 5.9 3.5 4.5 2.8 0.4 2.3 11,550
Kyrgyz Republic –1.8 4.8 –1.4 8.7 1.6 –0.3 0.0 1,210
Tajikistan 5.5 7.4 4.7 5.8 5.1 2.4 2.3 990
Turkmenistan 7.4 12.9 9.3 8.5 8.6 8.0 7.5 6,880
Uzbekistan 6.8 5.3 5.6 6.3 6.3 5.3 5.5 1,880
East Asia 9.3 7.6 6.0 6.3 6.1 6.0 5.7
China, People’s Rep. of 9.9 8.8 7.2 7.2 6.8 6.6 6.2 6,560
Hong Kong, China 6.0 4.1 0.5 2.4 1.6 2.0 2.1 38,420
Korea, Rep. of 6.0 2.9 1.8 2.5 2.9 3.1 3.3 25,920
Mongolia 4.5 15.3 10.2 9.3 5.5 1.3 3.3 3,770
Taipei,China 10.4 3.5 1.7 2.0 3.6 3.5 3.5 21,620
South Asia 7.2 4.9 3.9 5.0 5.5 7.1 6.4
Afghanistan 6.3 5.2 9.7 1.4 –0.3 0.5 1.5 690
Bangladesh 4.1 5.1 5.2 4.6 4.7 4.7 5.0 1,010
Bhutan 7.3 7.8 4.6 1.8 2.3 5.1 5.4 2,330
India 8.8 5.3 3.8 5.5 6.1 8.0 6.9 1,570
Maldives 5.3 4.7 –0.4 2.9 5.3 4.6 3.4 5,600
Nepal 2.7 3.1 3.1 2.0 3.7 3.1 3.7 730
Pakistan –3.2 1.5 1.8 1.6 2.1 2.2 4.5 1,360
Sri Lanka 6.9 7.1 9.2 6.4 6.2 6.0 6.8 3,170
Southeast Asia 6.1 3.1 4.4 3.7 3.4 3.2 4.0
Brunei Darussalam 0.8 2.0 –0.7 –3.7 –5.2 –2.7 –0.4 43,923
Cambodia 4.8 5.2 5.1 6.6 5.6 5.9 6.1 950
Indonesia 3.6 4.3 4.5 4.1 3.6 4.0 4.8 3,580
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 5.3 5.7 6.5 5.7 5.3 2.8 4.2 1,450
Malaysia 5.5 3.7 4.6 2.6 4.6 3.5 3.5 10,430
Myanmar 4.2 4.9 6.0 … … … … …
Philippines 5.8 1.2 5.7 5.4 6.1 1.7 4.5 3,270
Singapore 13.2 4.0 0.9 2.8 1.6 1.5 1.9 54,040
Thailand 7.2 –0.4 6.0 2.3 0.2 3.1 3.6 5,340
Viet Nam 5.3 5.1 4.1 4.3 4.9 5.0 5.1 1,740
The Pacific 4.1 7.1 5.7 2.4 4.4 8.9 2.6
Cook Islands 14.1 –21.1 7.0 0.4 2.5 5.9 3.4 23,026
Fiji –0.6 1.4 12.4 4.3 3.7 3.3 2.5 4,370
Kiribati –3.7 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 –0.6 –0.6 2,620
Marshall Islands 5.4 2.3 3.8 2.2 –0.2 2.9 1.0 4,310
Micronesia, Fed. States of 3.9 2.4 –0.5 –4.0 –3.3 2.4 5.2 3,280
Nauru –10.9 –0.9 4.9 1.4 8.5 6.5 3.0 …
Palau –0.4 7.1 3.4 –2.4 6.3 7.3 5.4 10,970
Papua New Guinea 5.3 8.9 5.4 2.7 5.7 12.6 2.8 2,010
Samoa 4.6 3.8 1.1 –1.1 1.9 2.6 2.3 3,970
Solomon Islands 3.5 7.8 5.2 0.7 –2.5 0.7 1.3 1,600
Timor–Leste 6.7 11.4 5.0 3.1 4.6 3.7 4.1 3,940
Tonga 3.9 2.3 0.4 –2.8 2.1 2.4 2.7 4,490
Tuvalu –3.2 7.9 –0.3 4.7 0.2 0.2 0.5 5,840
Vanuatu –0.8 –0.9 –0.7 –0.3 1.3 –2.7 1.7 3,130
Average 8.3 6.4 5.4 5.7 5.5 5.6 5.5
... = data not available.
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Table A3 Growth rate of value added in agriculture (% per year)
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Sector share, 2013, %
Central Asia
Armenia –16.1 14.0 9.5 7.2 7.8 21.2
Azerbaijan –2.2 –8.0 5.8 4.9 –2.6 5.7
Georgia –4.8 8.0 –3.7 13.0 1.3 9.4
Kazakhstan –11.6 26.5 –17.4 11.2 0.8 4.9
Kyrgyz Republic –2.6 1.9 1.2 2.6 –0.6 17.0
Tajikistan 6.8 7.9 10.4 7.6 4.5 ...
Turkmenistan 7.8 0.1 8.1 10.0 4.2 10.0
Uzbekistan 6.8 6.6 7.0 6.8 6.9 19.1
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of 4.3 4.3 4.5 4.0 4.1 9.4
Hong Kong, China 3.8 0.8 –3.2 1.5 2.5 0.1
Korea, Rep. of –4.3 –2.0 –0.9 5.8 3.0 2.3
Mongolia –16.6 –0.3 21.1 19.3 14.4 15.4
Taipei,China 2.2 4.5 –3.2 3.4 3.5 1.8
South Asia
Afghanistan –6.4 –7.9 31.5 0.9 1.0 ...
Bangladesh 6.2 4.5 3.0 2.5 3.3 16.8
Bhutan 1.7 1.6 2.3 2.6 2.8 14.1
India 8.6 5.0 1.7 3.8 1.1 18.7
Maldives –0.9 1.1 0.0 5.1 –2.1 3.3
Nepal 2.0 4.5 4.6 1.1 4.7 34.3
Pakistan 0.2 2.0 3.6 2.9 2.1 25.1
Sri Lanka 7.0 1.4 5.2 4.7 0.3 10.8
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam –5.8 –2.6 8.1 –1.2 … 0.7
Cambodia 4.0 3.1 4.3 1.6 1.8 33.5
Indonesia ... 3.9 4.6 4.2 4.2 13.7
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 2.0 1.8 2.5 3.5 2.9 25.6
Malaysia 2.4 5.8 1.3 2.1 2.6 9.4
Myanmar –0.1 –2.0 1.5 … … 29.9
Philippines –0.2 2.6 2.8 1.1 1.9 11.2
Singapore 2.4 2.1 3.8 –1.0 1.6 0.0
Thailand –2.3 4.1 3.8 1.4 1.1 12.0
Viet Nam 3.3 4.0 2.7 2.6 3.5 18.4
The Pacific
Cook Islands 12.0 –7.3 7.7 2.3 18.0 5.5
Fiji –2.6 8.1 3.5 2.6 ... 12.5
Kiribati –2.5 5.7 ... ... ... ...
Marshall Islands 26.0 –0.4 23.6 6.2 4.2 22.0
Micronesia, Fed. States of 1.1 4.2 5.9 –6.2 2.3 28.1
Nauru ... ... ... ... ... ...
Palau –5.1 9.6 1.6 –8.0 –1.8 4.3
Papua New Guinea 2.9 8.6 –2.7 1.6 3.9 59.9
Samoa 2.2 2.5 –7.1 –2.4 9.6 9.6
Solomon Islands ... ... ... ... ... ...
Timor–Leste –2.6 –18.3 14.7 ... ... ...
Tonga 0.5 2.0 0.5 ... ... ...
Tuvalu 2.2 0.5 ... ... ... ...
Vanuatu 4.8 6.1 2.2 4.8 ... 26.7
... = data not available.
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Table A4 Growth rate of value added in industry (% per year)
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Sector share, 2013, %
Central Asia
Armenia 6.1 0.0 5.7 –1.5 –1.3 30.5
Azerbaijan 4.4 3.4 –0.6 4.9 0.5 61.1
Georgia 9.1 9.4 9.5 1.9 8.5 24.0
Kazakhstan 7.2 3.4 2.0 3.1 1.4 36.9
Kyrgyz Republic 2.5 7.0 –11.7 30.5 5.1 28.9
Tajikistan 9.7 5.9 10.4 3.9 5.1 ...
Turkmenistan 8.7 26.5 8.6 7.3 11.4 49.6
Uzbekistan 8.2 7.5 8.0 9.0 8.5 32.8
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of 12.3 10.3 7.9 7.8 7.3 43.7
Hong Kong, China 7.6 8.9 4.4 0.4 1.4 7.1
Korea, Rep. of 10.4 4.5 1.9 3.2 3.4 38.6
Mongolia 4.3 8.8 14.8 15.3 16.1 35.5
Taipei,China 20.3 6.0 3.3 1.6 5.7 34.2
South Asia
Afghanistan 6.3 9.8 7.2 2.5 1.3 ...
Bangladesh 7.0 9.0 9.4 9.6 8.4 29.0
Bhutan 8.0 8.0 5.4 5.1 7.3 46.2
India 7.6 7.8 2.3 4.4 5.9 31.7
Maldives 4.3 12.1 0.8 –1.5 13.2 14.1
Nepal 4.0 4.3 3.0 2.5 2.7 15.2
Pakistan 3.4 4.5 2.5 1.4 5.8 21.1
Sri Lanka 8.4 10.4 10.3 9.9 11.4 31.1
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam 1.7 3.2 –1.4 –5.6 … 68.7
Cambodia 13.6 14.5 9.3 11.0 9.8 25.6
Indonesia ... 6.3 5.3 4.2 4.2 43.6
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 14.5 14.2 13.7 9.7 8.5 31.6
Malaysia 8.5 2.1 5.1 3.6 6.1 38.6
Myanmar 13.2 17.5 8.1 … … 33.8
Philippines 11.6 1.9 7.3 9.3 7.5 31.1
Singapore 23.9 7.1 2.2 2.5 2.7 24.8
Thailand 12.8 –3.9 7.2 0.3 –0.9 42.5
Viet Nam 7.2 6.7 5.7 5.4 7.1 38.3
The Pacific
Cook Islands 6.0 –8.1 21.8 –16.4 –14.8 7.5
Fiji 6.5 2.0 1.1 5.1 ... 21.2
Kiribati –9.9 11.8 ... ... ... ...
Marshall Islands –5.9 –6.1 –1.2 8.4 –5.5 10.3
Micronesia, Fed. States of 18.0 11.8 –1.6 –19.6 –40.9 7.9
Nauru ... ... ... ... ... ...
Palau 3.6 5.3 –5.0 –15.8 7.4 9.0
Papua New Guinea 10.8 13.0 14.7 9.2 15.6 36.3
Samoa 10.9 8.0 0.3 –3.0 4.5 25.4
Solomon Islands ... ... ... ... ... ...
Timor–Leste –15.4 0.0 0.0 ... ... ...
Tonga 11.6 5.5 1.2 ... ... ...
Tuvalu –6.9 –28.7 ... ... ... ...
Vanuatu 12.6 –19.4 –22.2 9.8 ... 9.9
... = data not available.
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Table A5 Growth rate of value added in services (% per year)
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Sector share, 2013, %
Central Asia
Armenia 4.5 6.1 6.9 6.2 5.2 48.3
Azerbaijan 7.2 –2.1 6.9 7.2 7.4 33.1
Georgia 7.8 5.7 6.2 3.9 5.4 66.6
Kazakhstan 7.1 9.0 10.4 6.8 6.0 58.2
Kyrgyz Republic –1.1 6.9 6.5 4.7 4.1 54.1
Tajikistan 4.6 13.5 14.5 9.7 1.0 ...
Turkmenistan 9.9 8.3 14.7 12.7 10.6 40.4
Uzbekistan 11.7 11.8 10.4 13.7 15.4 48.0
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of 9.8 9.4 8.1 8.3 8.1 46.9
Hong Kong, China 6.9 5.2 1.8 3.0 4.0 92.9
Korea, Rep. of 4.4 3.1 2.8 2.9 3.2 59.1
Mongolia 9.8 17.8 10.3 6.8 4.8 49.1
Taipei,China 5.1 3.1 1.5 2.0 2.2 64.0
South Asia
Afghanistan 18.1 12.7 7.3 3.7 1.8 ...
Bangladesh 5.5 6.2 6.6 5.5 5.8 54.2
Bhutan 12.7 12.7 6.6 1.2 2.3 39.8
India 9.7 6.6 8.0 9.1 10.6 49.6
Maldives 8.0 5.8 1.5 5.9 6.2 82.6
Nepal 5.8 3.4 5.0 5.2 6.1 50.5
Pakistan 3.2 3.9 4.4 4.9 4.3 53.8
Sri Lanka 8.0 8.6 4.6 6.4 6.5 58.1
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam 3.8 4.9 5.5 4.7 … 30.6
Cambodia 3.3 5.0 8.1 8.7 7.9 40.8
Indonesia ... 8.4 6.8 6.5 6.1 42.6
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 8.0 8.5 8.0 9.7 9.0 42.9
Malaysia 7.4 7.1 6.4 5.9 6.3 52.0
Myanmar 6.4 6.4 12.1 … … 36.3
Philippines 7.2 4.9 7.4 7.2 6.0 57.7
Singapore 11.2 6.6 4.0 6.0 3.2 75.1
Thailand 4.6 3.8 6.2 5.9 2.2 45.5
Viet Nam 7.2 6.8 5.9 6.6 6.0 43.3
The Pacific
Cook Islands 1.7 –1.7 1.6 –0.3 –2.4 87.0
Fiji 2.9 2.0 1.8 4.9 ... 66.4
Kiribati 1.4 –1.2 ... ... ... ...
Marshall Islands 3.6 1.3 1.8 1.8 –0.1 67.7
Micronesia, Fed. States of 2.2 –0.1 –1.3 –0.8 –1.8 63.9
Nauru ... ... ... ... ... ...
Palau 0.2 7.0 4.6 –0.3 7.0 86.7
Papua New Guinea 8.5 11.5 9.7 3.0 3.7 3.8
Samoa 3.5 5.7 2.7 0.1 –0.2 65.1
Solomon Islands ... ... ... ... ... ...
Timor–Leste 10.1 18.5 4.1 ... ... ...
Tonga 1.0 1.8 0.5 ... ... ...
Tuvalu 2.5 6.4 ... ... ... ...
Vanuatu 3.0 3.2 4.4 0.1 ... 80.3
... = data not available.
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Table A6 Inflation (% per year)
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Central Asia 7.0 8.9 5.1 5.8 5.7 6.7 6.6
Armenia 8.2 7.7 2.6 5.8 3.0 4.6 4.1
Azerbaijan 5.7 7.9 1.1 2.4 1.4 6.0 5.5
Georgia 7.1 8.5 –0.9 –0.5 3.1 5.0 5.0
Kazakhstan 7.1 8.3 5.1 5.8 6.7 6.0 6.2
Kyrgyz Republic 7.8 16.6 2.8 6.6 7.5 10.5 10.0
Tajikistan 6.5 12.5 5.8 5.1 6.1 10.0 6.5
Turkmenistan 4.4 5.3 5.3 6.8 6.0 7.0 6.5
Uzbekistan 9.4 12.8 12.1 11.2 8.4 9.5 10.0
East Asia 3.1 5.0 2.6 2.4 1.9 1.7 2.2
China, People’s Rep. of 3.3 5.4 2.6 2.6 2.0 1.8 2.3
Hong Kong, China 2.3 5.3 4.1 4.3 4.4 3.3 3.4
Korea, Rep. of 3.0 4.0 2.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 2.1
Mongolia 10.1 9.2 14.3 9.9 12.8 8.9 7.7
Taipei,China 1.0 1.4 1.9 0.8 1.2 0.5 1.0
South Asia 9.3 9.9 10.1 9.0 7.1 5.1 5.6
Afghanistan 7.7 11.8 6.2 7.4 5.0 5.0 5.0
Bangladesh 6.8 10.9 8.7 6.8 7.4 6.5 6.2
Bhutan 4.8 8.6 10.2 8.8 9.6 7.0 6.8
India 9.5 9.5 10.2 9.5 7.0 5.0 5.5
Maldives 6.1 11.3 10.9 4.0 2.4 3.0 2.5
Nepal 9.6 9.6 8.3 9.9 9.1 7.7 7.3
Pakistan 10.1 13.7 11.0 7.4 8.6 5.8 5.8
Sri Lanka 6.2 6.7 7.9 6.9 3.3 2.0 5.0
Southeast Asia 4.1 5.5 3.8 4.2 4.1 3.1 3.1
Brunei Darussalam 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.4 –0.2 –0.2 0.4
Cambodia 4.0 5.5 2.9 2.9 3.9 1.6 2.7
Indonesia 5.1 5.3 4.0 6.4 6.4 5.5 4.0
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 6.0 7.6 4.3 6.4 4.2 3.5 4.0
Malaysia 1.7 3.2 1.7 2.1 3.1 3.2 2.9
Myanmar 8.2 2.8 2.8 5.7 5.9 8.4 6.6
Philippines 3.8 4.6 3.2 3.0 4.1 2.8 3.3
Singapore 2.8 5.2 4.6 2.4 1.0 0.2 1.5
Thailand 3.2 3.8 3.0 2.2 1.9 0.2 2.0
Viet Nam 9.2 18.7 9.1 6.6 4.1 2.5 4.0
The Pacific 4.6 8.5 4.3 3.4 5.8 5.5 4.1
Cook Islands –0.3 0.9 2.8 2.6 1.6 1.3 1.4
Fiji 3.7 7.3 3.4 2.9 0.5 2.5 2.5
Kiribati –3.9 1.5 –3.0 –1.5 2.6 1.0 1.5
Marshall Islands 1.8 5.4 4.3 1.9 1.3 1.4 1.3
Micronesia, Fed. States of 3.7 4.3 6.3 2.1 0.7 2.4 2.6
Nauru –0.6 –3.5 –0.5 1.4 5.0 8.0 3.0
Palau 1.1 2.6 5.4 2.8 4.0 3.4 3.4
Papua New Guinea 6.0 8.4 2.2 4.0 8.3 7.0 5.0
Samoa –0.2 2.9 6.2 –0.2 –1.2 2.5 2.0
Solomon Islands 1.0 7.4 5.9 5.4 6.0 5.0 5.5
Timor–Leste 5.2 13.2 10.9 9.5 0.7 2.8 4.0
Tonga 1.7 6.0 3.3 0.7 2.3 0.4 1.0
Tuvalu –1.9 0.5 1.4 2.0 3.3 1.0 1.0
Vanuatu 2.8 0.9 1.4 1.4 0.4 4.0 2.0
Average 4.4 6.0 4.1 3.8 3.1 2.6 3.0
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Table A7 Change in money supply (% per year)
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Central Asia
Armenia 11.8 23.7 19.5 14.8 8.3
Azerbaijan 24.3 32.1 20.7 15.4 11.4
Georgia 33.1 14.5 11.4 24.5 13.8
Kazakhstan 13.3 15.0 7.9 10.2 10.5
Kyrgyz Republic 21.1 14.9 23.8 22.8 3.0
Tajikistan 18.6 33.1 20.1 20.1 7.0
Turkmenistan 43.4 36.3 35.6 31.1 22.6
Uzbekistan 52.4 32.3 27.5 26.4 25.7
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of 19.7 17.3 14.4 13.6 11.0
Hong Kong, China 8.1 12.9 11.1 12.4 9.5
Korea, Rep. of 6.0 5.5 4.8 4.6 8.1
Mongolia 62.5 37.0 18.7 24.2 12.5
Taipei,China 5.4 4.8 3.5 5.8 6.1
South Asia
Afghanistan 26.9 21.3 8.8 9.4 8.3
Bangladesh 22.4 21.3 17.4 16.7 16.1
Bhutan 30.1 21.2 –1.0 18.6 6.6
India 16.0 13.2 13.9 13.3 7.9
Maldives 14.6 20.0 5.0 18.4 14.7
Nepal 30.5 12.3 22.6 16.4 19.1
Pakistan 23.6 15.9 14.1 15.9 12.5
Sri Lanka 15.8 19.1 17.6 16.7 11.0
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam 4.8 10.1 0.9 1.5 3.2
Cambodia 20.0 21.4 20.9 14.6 29.9
Indonesia 15.4 16.4 15.0 12.8 11.8
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 39.5 28.7 31.0 22.7 23.7
Malaysia 9.8 14.3 9.0 7.3 7.0
Myanmar 36.3 26.3 46.6 32.7 30.6
Philippines 10.0 7.1 9.4 31.8 11.3
Singapore 8.6 10.0 7.2 4.3 3.3
Thailand 10.9 15.1 10.4 7.3 4.7
Viet Nam 33.3 12.1 18.5 18.8 16.0
The Pacific
Cook Islands –2.3 –13.4 19.2 –25.6 3.0
Fiji 4.2 14.8 6.3 21.2 5.2
Kiribati ... ... ... ... ...
Marshall Islands ... ... ... ... ...
Micronesia, Fed. States of ... ... ... ... ...
Nauru ... ... ... ... ...
Palau ... ... ... ... ...
Papua New Guinea 12.0 15.5 11.0 6.7 0.6
Samoa 10.9 –0.8 –4.0 –0.8 6.7
Solomon Islands 13.3 25.8 17.4 12.4 3.2
Timor–Leste 18.2 9.3 26.2 22.9 ...
Tonga 5.6 3.3 7.2 6.1 7.2
Tuvalu ... ... ... ... ...
Vanuatu –6.0 1.3 –0.6 –5.5 1.5
... = data not available.
294  Asian Development Outlook 2015
Table A8 Central government revenues (% of GDP)
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Central Asia
Armenia 22.6 23.3 23.7 25.1 25.1
Azerbaijan 26.9 30.1 31.6 32.9 31.2
Georgia 28.3 28.2 28.9 27.7 28.0
Kazakhstan 19.7 19.5 19.2 18.1 19.2
Kyrgyz Republic 30.5 31.8 34.2 29.0 31.4
Tajikistan 23.2 24.9 25.1 28.5 29.3
Turkmenistan 16.1 18.3 21.0 17.6 16.4
Uzbekistan 32.4 32.0 32.8 32.2 32.5
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of 20.7 22.0 22.0 22.0 22.1
Hong Kong, China 21.2 22.6 21.7 21.5 20.5
Korea, Rep. of 19.0 19.4 19.9 19.5 20.2
Mongolia 32.0 33.9 29.7 31.3 28.1
Taipei,China 10.6 11.7 11.4 11.4 10.6
South Asia
Afghanistan 22.0 21.4 25.4 26.3 23.3
Bangladesh 9.5 10.2 10.9 10.7 11.6
Bhutan 46.4 35.8 35.8 30.4 29.7
India 20.7 19.7 20.0 21.0 21.2
Maldives 21.9 27.6 26.0 28.6 32.0
Nepal 18.2 17.9 18.6 19.5 20.8
Pakistan 14.0 12.3 12.8 13.3 14.0
Sri Lanka 14.9 14.5 14.1 13.9 14.2
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam 51.8 60.4 52.6 46.7 …
Cambodia 13.2 13.2 15.2 15.0 15.7
Indonesia 14.5 15.5 15.5 15.0 15.5
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 15.7 16.4 17.7 18.1 17.2
Malaysia 20.0 20.9 22.1 21.6 20.6
Myanmar 11.4 12.0 23.3 23.2 24.2
Philippines 13.4 14.0 14.5 14.9 15.1
Singapore 14.3 14.7 15.4 15.1 15.7
Thailand 17.3 18.0 18.3 18.1 17.1
Viet Nam 27.6 26.1 22.7 22.1 21.5
The Pacific
Cook Islands 33.0 32.4 41.2 43.0 41.8
Fiji 25.5 27.6 28.1 28.2 30.2
Kiribati 72.5 62.1 90.4 112.8 83.8
Marshall Islands 60.3 57.1 50.1 52.6 50.3
Micronesia, Fed. States of 68.2 65.0 66.0 62.9 65.3
Nauru 49.5 62.1 85.4 110.9 141.4
Palau 47.4 44.1 44.7 41.0 41.2
Papua New Guinea 31.4 30.4 29.8 29.8 31.8
Samoa 32.4 32.1 25.3 26.8 29.9
Solomon Islands 57.5 63.8 51.8 49.1 40.4
Timor–Leste 293.1 349.7 352.0 318.1 188.3
Tonga 27.3 26.8 27.8 25.5 29.0
Tuvalu 71.8 69.1 84.6 109.3 121.4
Vanuatu 24.6 22.3 21.8 21.6 23.4
... = data not available.
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Table A9 Central government expenditures (% of GDP)
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Central Asia
Armenia 27.6 26.1 25.1 26.7 27.2
Azerbaijan 27.7 29.6 31.8 34.1 31.7
Georgia 34.9 31.8 31.7 30.3 31.0
Kazakhstan 22.1 21.5 22.1 20.1 22.2
Kyrgyz Republic 36.6 36.4 39.6 33.0 35.7
Tajikistan 26.1 27.0 24.7 28.2 29.0
Turkmenistan 14.1 14.6 14.7 16.1 15.6
Uzbekistan 32.0 31.9 32.7 32.0 32.3
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of 22.4 23.1 23.6 23.8 23.8
Hong Kong, China 17.0 18.8 18.5 20.4 17.7
Korea, Rep. of 20.1 20.5 21.3 21.0 22.0
Mongolia 31.6 37.9 35.9 32.2 32.2
Taipei,China 13.5 13.4 12.9 12.2 11.9
South Asia
Afghanistan 21.1 22.0 24.9 24.3 25.1
Bangladesh 12.7 14.0 14.4 14.5 16.0
Bhutan 44.7 37.9 37.0 34.6 33.8
India 27.6 27.4 26.9 28.0 27.1
Maldives 36.2 34.1 33.7 32.5 35.1
Nepal 20.1 20.2 20.9 18.9 20.9
Pakistan 20.2 18.9 19.6 21.4 20.4
Sri Lanka 22.8 21.4 20.5 19.8 19.4
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam 35.3 32.4 34.9 37.4 …
Cambodia 21.3 20.7 21.6 20.8 19.8
Indonesia 15.2 16.5 17.3 17.2 17.8
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 24.6 24.4 24.6 29.4 27.6
Malaysia 25.5 25.7 26.5 25.5 24.1
Myanmar 16.9 16.6 25.0 25.2 28.7
Philippines 16.9 16.0 16.8 16.3 15.7
Singapore 14.1 13.4 13.5 13.7 14.7
Thailand 16.6 16.4 19.6 18.2 17.3
Viet Nam 27.2 25.4 28.2 26.0 25.9
The Pacific
Cook Islands 35.1 37.2 43.4 46.8 44.8
Fiji 27.7 29.0 29.2 28.8 32.2
Kiribati 85.2 83.3 97.2 102.6 109.7
Marshall Islands 58.2 55.7 52.2 53.2 47.1
Micronesia, Fed. States of 67.7 65.6 65.1 60.1 54.2
Nauru 43.5 61.4 86.5 110.5 141.3
Palau 48.3 42.9 43.7 39.7 40.0
Papua New Guinea 30.7 28.1 34.1 38.5 37.7
Samoa 38.3 36.7 32.5 30.6 35.2
Solomon Islands 51.8 54.2 46.6 42.3 42.5
Timor–Leste 114.5 125.2 117.4 98.8 110.5
Tonga 32.7 34.4 30.6 26.8 28.0
Tuvalu 95.7 78.0 76.2 81.8 86.4
Vanuatu 22.2 24.5 23.3 21.7 22.3
... = data not available.
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Table A10 Fiscal balance of central government (% of GDP)
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Central Asia
Armenia –5.0 –2.8 –1.5 –1.7 –2.0
Azerbaijan –0.9 0.6 –0.2 –1.2 –0.5
Georgia –6.6 –3.6 –2.8 –2.6 –3.0
Kazakhstan –2.4 –2.1 –2.9 –2.0 –3.0
Kyrgyz Republic –6.3 –4.6 –5.4 –4.0 –4.3
Tajikistan –3.7 –2.5 0.4 0.3 0.3
Turkmenistan 2.0 3.6 6.4 1.5 0.8
Uzbekistan 2.0 2.0 0.1 0.2 0.2
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of –1.7 –1.1 –1.6 –1.9 –1.8
Hong Kong, China 4.2 3.8 3.2 1.0 2.8
Korea, Rep. of –1.1 –1.1 –1.4 –1.5 –1.8
Mongolia 0.4 –4.0 –6.2 –0.9 –4.1
Taipei,China –2.9 –1.7 –1.6 –0.9 –1.3
South Asia
Afghanistan 0.9 –0.6 1.1 2.0 –1.8
Bangladesh –3.2 –3.9 –3.6 –3.8 –4.4
Bhutan 1.6 –2.1 –1.1 –4.2 –4.1
India –6.9 –7.8 –6.8 –7.1 –5.9
Maldives –14.3 –6.6 –7.6 –3.9 –3.2
Nepal –1.9 –2.4 –2.2 0.7 –0.1
Pakistan –6.2 –6.5 –6.8 –8.2 –6.3
Sri Lanka –8.0 –6.9 –6.5 –5.9 –5.2
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam 16.5 28.0 17.7 9.3 …
Cambodia –8.1 –7.5 –6.3 –5.8 –4.1
Indonesia –0.7 –1.1 –1.8 –2.2 –2.3
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. –8.9 –7.9 –6.9 –5.6 –4.6
Malaysia –5.4 –4.8 –4.5 –3.9 –3.5
Myanmar –5.5 –4.6 –3.9 –4.9 –4.3
Philippines –3.5 –2.0 –2.3 –1.4 –0.6
Singapore 0.3 1.2 1.6 1.3 0.0
Thailand –2.6 –0.9 –4.1 –2.0 –2.5
Viet Nam 0.5 0.7 –5.5 –3.9 –4.4
The Pacific
Cook Islands –2.1 –4.8 –2.1 –3.8 –3.0
Fiji –2.2 –1.4 –1.1 –0.5 –2.0
Kiribati –12.7 –21.2 –6.8 10.3 –25.8
Marshall Islands 2.1 1.4 –2.0 –0.5 3.2
Micronesia, Fed. States of 0.5 –0.6 0.9 2.9 11.1
Nauru 6.0 0.6 –1.2 0.4 0.1
Palau –1.0 1.2 1.0 1.2 1.2
Papua New Guinea 0.7 2.3 –4.3 –8.7 –5.8
Samoa –5.9 –4.5 –7.2 –3.8 –5.3
Solomon Islands 5.7 9.6 5.1 6.8 –2.1
Timor–Leste 178.5 224.5 234.6 219.3 77.8
Tonga –5.4 –7.5 –2.8 –1.3 1.1
Tuvalu –23.9 –8.9 8.4 27.5 35.0
Vanuatu 2.4 –2.2 –1.5 –0.1 1.2
... = data not available.
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Table A11 Growth rate of merchandise exports (% per year)
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Central Asia 28.4 37.1 1.5 –0.9 –5.4 –21.1 4.6
Armenia 54.8 19.5 5.9 7.9 2.7 3.6 2.3
Azerbaijan 25.5 30.3 –6.1 –1.8 –4.7 –15.0 6.0
Georgia 30.0 32.2 7.6 21.3 –1.6 1.3 4.1
Kazakhstan 39.8 38.8 2.0 –1.5 –8.6 –32.0 3.1
Kyrgyz Republic 5.0 27.7 –13.1 3.8 –6.3 10.0 10.0
Tajikistan 18.3 5.2 41.0 –14.4 3.6 14.0 13.0
Turkmenistan 8.0 73.0 18.9 –4.7 3.3 –13.2 7.3
Uzbekistan 6.0 20.3 –7.6 6.5 –2.0 1.3 3.0
East Asia 29.7 19.5 6.0 6.4 4.6 5.1 6.6
China, People’s Rep. of 31.4 20.4 8.0 7.9 6.1 5.5 7.0
Hong Kong, China 22.8 12.5 7.0 8.1 4.3 6.5 6.7
Korea, Rep. of 27.4 26.6 2.8 2.4 0.5 2.0 5.0
Mongolia 54.3 65.6 –9.0 –2.6 35.3 5.0 0.0
Taipei,China 34.6 11.7 –2.3 1.4 2.7 6.7 6.7
South Asia 31.1 24.6 –0.9 2.9 3.0 3.4 7.3
Afghanistan 12.3 –5.1 2.7 –5.2 3.0 3.0 3.5
Bangladesh 4.2 39.2 6.2 10.7 12.0 6.0 10.0
Bhutan 3.0 26.8 –7.3 –11.5 –2.0 13.8 9.6
India 37.3 23.7 –1.0 2.6 2.3 3.2 7.0
Maldives 16.8 75.4 –9.2 5.3 –1.7 6.7 4.0
Nepal –6.3 11.7 5.7 –2.9 5.1 5.0 6.0
Pakistan 2.9 28.9 –2.6 0.3 1.1 –0.3 5.0
Sri Lanka 21.0 23.2 –7.4 6.3 7.0 11.0 15.0
Southeast Asia 28.5 16.4 2.2 0.4 1.4 1.4 5.4
Brunei Darussalam 30.3 33.2 3.5 –11.2 –6.7 –6.8 6.2
Cambodia 24.4 29.0 11.8 16.0 13.4 16.0 15.3
Indonesia 25.3 27.4 –2.0 –2.8 –3.7 1.2 3.5
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 57.5 43.2 6.1 9.5 10.0 9.5 13.0
Malaysia 26.9 14.9 –2.9 –3.0 2.9 –1.5 6.6
Myanmar 16.5 16.0 1.0 18.0 22.6 11.4 …
Philippines 26.2 4.1 21.2 –4.0 9.0 6.3 6.8
Singapore 31.7 11.1 0.8 0.5 –1.0 –1.8 3.0
Thailand 27.1 14.3 3.1 –0.2 –0.3 3.0 5.5
Viet Nam 26.5 34.2 18.2 15.3 13.7 11.0 11.2
The Pacific 31.3 24.7 –4.4 –7.1 –58.7 289.0 10.1
Cook Islands 8.5 –3.5 –21.6 139.9 141.3 –0.4 ...
Fiji 34.3 29.0 12.0 –12.1 9.4 0.7 2.1
Kiribati –38.1 121.8 –17.8 –1.1 –0.5 –1.6 13.9
Marshall Islands 54.4 58.6 14.8 –7.6 5.7 –18.6 4.6
Micronesia, Fed. States of 19.5 27.7 42.4 –16.9 4.0 3.2 2.9
Nauru ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Palau 48.7 5.9 18.8 –8.1 33.8 –30.9 18.2
Papua New Guinea 30.9 21.8 –9.1 –6.5 –76.8 667.9 10.7
Samoa 53.7 25.8 38.9 97.4 –9.7 –42.0 ...
Solomon Islands 35.6 85.6 18.7 –10.7 –20.1 15.2 18.5
Timor–Leste 93.3 –13.8 32.0 30.3 25.6 25.9 13.2
Tonga 9.7 36.7 65.7 –22.9 8.7 0.0 15.3
Tuvalu ... 5.2 95.1 –3.0 –4.5 –6.3 8.5
Vanuatu –8.4 24.9 –13.9 –18.1 –30.3 72.7 1.0
Average 29.5 19.6 4.4 4.5 3.4 3.6 6.4
... = data not available.
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Table A12 Growth rate of merchandise imports (% per year)
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Central Asia 7.1 27.9 16.8 6.4 –9.4 –4.6 4.8
Armenia 14.0 8.5 2.4 2.8 1.4 0.0 1.9
Azerbaijan 3.6 50.7 0.3 9.4 –17.6 –16.7 –7.1
Georgia 17.7 33.6 14.3 0.3 7.1 9.1 6.9
Kazakhstan 13.7 22.7 20.9 4.1 –18.9 –10.0 5.0
Kyrgyz Republic 5.9 32.0 26.2 13.0 –4.3 10.0 10.0
Tajikistan 3.5 19.9 16.8 9.1 7.3 –16.0 6.0
Turkmenistan –8.0 40.6 27.6 11.7 1.8 –6.0 8.0
Uzbekistan –4.8 23.4 8.2 9.0 3.0 2.0 4.0
East Asia 36.1 24.0 3.5 4.6 1.5 4.1 10.2
China, People’s Rep. of 39.1 25.1 4.5 7.1 1.2 4.2 12.3
Hong Kong, China 27.1 15.4 9.5 7.7 5.7 8.1 7.5
Korea, Rep. of 31.6 34.2 –0.7 –3.4 –1.3 –1.5 7.0
Mongolia 49.7 106.2 2.1 –17.0 –14.4 –20.0 25.0
Taipei,China 43.1 13.0 –3.7 –0.5 0.9 7.1 6.5
South Asia 23.1 30.7 1.3 –8.6 2.8 0.2 6.1
Afghanistan 11.6 3.3 11.2 –4.1 –1.8 –0.5 0.5
Bangladesh 5.4 52.1 2.4 0.8 8.9 11.0 13.0
Bhutan 36.1 41.7 –10.0 –6.4 –5.0 17.2 14.1
India 26.7 31.1 0.5 –10.4 2.0 –1.1 5.0
Maldives 16.2 36.6 –8.2 8.1 16.8 9.7 8.0
Nepal 35.5 8.9 4.7 10.9 13.9 10.0 10.0
Pakistan –1.7 15.0 12.8 –0.5 3.7 1.2 8.0
Sri Lanka 31.8 50.7 –5.3 –6.2 7.9 3.0 15.0
Southeast Asia 31.0 18.8 6.4 0.7 –1.1 3.5 6.3
Brunei Darussalam 2.0 9.8 61.1 –12.3 –5.1 –3.4 3.9
Cambodia 18.0 24.7 13.4 19.7 10.1 13.0 13.0
Indonesia 34.1 32.2 13.6 –1.3 –4.5 1.0 3.1
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 21.2 31.7 34.5 17.4 5.0 2.0 5.0
Malaysia 33.8 14.4 1.4 –0.2 1.3 2.5 6.0
Myanmar 15.8 27.5 19.4 19.4 17.2 13.9 …
Philippines 24.7 9.5 11.3 –4.7 2.4 4.0 7.2
Singapore 30.5 12.7 2.1 –1.3 –1.7 –0.5 2.8
Thailand 37.0 24.9 8.8 –0.5 –8.5 6.0 8.5
Viet Nam 19.6 25.8 8.7 16.5 12.1 14.0 14.3
The Pacific 19.8 19.1 12.2 12.1 –47.5 64.7 –2.9
Cook Islands 1.3 17.2 11.3 –2.8 6.1 –1.7 ...
Fiji 25.6 23.0 3.2 20.5 –6.8 2.3 1.0
Kiribati 5.7 25.2 18.3 –2.6 –0.6 –8.1 1.4
Marshall Islands 40.5 –11.6 3.4 10.6 –5.7 –6.4 3.4
Micronesia, Fed. States of 4.3 9.0 5.0 –2.3 –11.8 –7.0 7.8
Nauru ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Palau 10.9 19.5 6.8 4.2 4.6 –1.2 10.3
Papua New Guinea 23.0 21.5 11.5 13.4 –87.4 493.5 –10.7
Samoa 10.8 1.7 19.8 0.7 11.3 3.2 ...
Solomon Islands 50.8 16.9 5.8 3.9 5.0 6.6 9.0
Timor–Leste –8.7 22.2 79.7 6.3 6.2 6.3 7.9
Tonga –0.1 17.0 17.5 –2.1 0.1 11.6 8.8
Tuvalu ... 14.3 –5.1 7.7 8.3 44.9 –16.3
Vanuatu –2.7 1.7 2.8 5.7 –56.0 122.7 3.5
Average 32.5 23.6 4.1 2.1 0.7 3.4 8.7
... = data not available.
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Table A13 Trade balance ($ million)
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Central Asia 46,147 69,613 57,146 49,150 50,844 23,740 24,668
Armenia –2,066 –2,110 –2,112 –2,092 –2,100 –2,040 –2,070
Azerbaijan 19,730 24,328 22,182 20,621 21,088 18,083 20,167
Georgia –2,590 –3,494 –4,214 –3,493 –4,108 –4,806 –5,254
Kazakhstan 28,500 44,844 38,145 34,792 37,025 16,087 15,883
Kyrgyz Republic –1,202 –1,665 –2,993 –3,565 –3,453 –3,798 –4,178
Tajikistan –1,463 –1,930 –1,949 –2,543 –2,785 –3,200 –3,280
Turkmenistan 2,232 6,272 6,527 4,030 4,385 2,704 2,790
Uzbekistan 3,005 3,367 1,561 1,400 792 710 610
East Asia 331,607 289,926 379,646 458,001 579,781 642,095 564,791
China, People’s Rep. of 254,180 243,549 321,595 359,890 471,900 521,614 453,788
Hong Kong, China 3,291 –7,477 –18,917 –18,801 –27,288 –37,987 –45,219
Korea, Rep. of 47,915 29,090 49,406 82,781 92,688 113,043 108,281
Mongolia –292 –1,781 –2,354 –1,321 993 2,238 1,282
Taipei,China 26,513 26,545 29,916 35,452 41,488 43,187 46,659
South Asia –164,564 –233,622 –244,932 –181,088 –185,345 –172,974 –178,004
Afghanistan –7,070 –7,539 –8,609 –8,281 –8,008 –7,877 –7,830
Bangladesh –5,155 –9,935 –9,320 –7,009 –6,806 –9,043 –11,165
Bhutan –269 –460 –396 –402 –365 –446 –536
India –130,593 –189,759 –195,656 –135,798 –137,571 –122,227 –121,699
Maldives –1,059 –1,370 –1,261 –1,372 –1,663 –1,835 –1,995
Nepal –4,084 –4,422 –4,623 –5,263 –6,079 –6,738 –7,455
Pakistan –11,452 –10,427 –15,652 –15,355 –16,555 –17,150 –18,516
Sri Lanka –4,881 –9,710 –9,416 –7,609 –8,299 –7,659 –8,808
Southeast Asia 154,499 157,570 116,189 113,670 143,441 122,201 118,571
Brunei Darussalam 7,014 9,884 8,762 7,823 7,242 7,264 7,264
Cambodia –1,851 –2,142 –2,506 –3,210 –3,321 –3,530 –3,791
Indonesia 31,003 33,825 8,680 5,833 6,902 7,322 8,258
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. –1,109 –1,185 –2,567 –3,299 –3,265 –3,002 –2,768
Malaysia 42,455 49,531 40,530 34,349 38,213 30,295 33,423
Myanmar 645 –195 –2,120 –2,677 –2,473 –3,197 …
Philippines –16,859 –20,429 –18,926 –17,702 –15,189 –14,701 –15,987
Singapore 69,232 71,547 67,487 74,501 76,365 70,165 72,958
Thailand 29,751 16,989 6,015 6,661 24,582 19,313 14,009
Viet Nam –5,136 –450 8,714 8,713 11,913 9,075 5,205
The Pacific 21 419 –982 –2,705 –2,292 3,411 5,273
Cook Islands –84 –99 –111 –104 –100 ... ...
Fiji –732 –851 –786 –1,334 –1,075 –1,119 –1,117
Kiribati –69 –83 –102 –99 –98 –90 –90
Marshall Islands –100 –66 –63 –80 –69 –72 –74
Micronesia, Fed. States of –128 –134 –126 –131 –108 –96 –106
Nauru ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Palau –93 –113 –119 –126 –128 –132 –144
Papua New Guinea 2,221 2,712 1,578 523 694 6,529 8,100
Samoa –260 –260 –306 –277 –322 –358 0
Solomon Islands –137 –6 47 –23 –134 –113 –85
Timor–Leste –277 –349 –639 –671 –704 –738 –793
Tonga –123 –142 –161 –162 –161 –181 –196
Tuvalu –6 –8 3 1 –1 –11 –5
Vanuatu –191 –183 –198 –223 –87 –208 –217
Total 367,709 283,905 307,067 437,027 586,429 618,474 535,298
... = data not available.
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Table A14 Current account balance (% of GDP)
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Central Asia 4.6 7.0 3.2 2.0 2.4 –0.2 0.2
Armenia –14.2 –11.1 –11.1 –8.0 –8.5 –9.2 –8.3
Azerbaijan 28.4 25.7 21.4 16.6 16.0 12.0 13.4
Georgia –10.2 –12.7 –11.4 –5.7 –9.7 –12.0 –10.5
Kazakhstan 0.9 5.4 0.5 0.5 1.8 –1.0 –1.3
Kyrgyz Republic –7.2 –6.1 –15.1 –14.1 –15.0 –16.0 –15.0
Tajikistan –1.2 –4.7 –2.4 –2.6 –7.9 –5.9 –4.8
Turkmenistan –10.6 2.0 0.0 –6.3 –4.4 –8.4 –6.2
Uzbekistan 6.1 5.8 1.2 1.6 1.2 0.9 1.1
East Asia 4.2 2.3 3.1 2.8 3.0 3.3 3.0
China, People’s Rep. of 4.0 1.9 2.5 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.0
Hong Kong, China 7.0 5.6 1.6 1.5 0.2 2.6 2.5
Korea, Rep. of 2.6 1.6 4.2 6.2 6.3 7.0 6.3
Mongolia –12.2 –26.5 –27.4 –25.4 –12.5 –8.0 –15.0
Taipei,China 8.9 8.2 9.9 10.8 12.3 12.5 13.0
South Asia –2.2 –3.7 –4.2 –1.4 –1.3 –1.0 –1.3
Afghanistan 3.9 3.2 3.9 3.6 3.8 1.4 –1.0
Bangladesh 3.2 –1.3 –0.3 1.6 0.8 –0.5 0.5
Bhutan –22.2 –30.0 –21.7 –27.3 –25.5 –30.6 –30.6
India –2.7 –4.2 –4.8 –1.7 –1.5 –1.1 –1.5
Maldives –15.3 –17.2 –10.6 –6.5 –9.6 –6.3 –6.1
Nepal –2.3 –0.9 5.0 3.4 4.7 2.7 3.5
Pakistan –2.2 0.1 –2.1 –1.1 –1.3 –1.0 –1.3
Sri Lanka –2.2 –7.8 –6.7 –3.9 –3.5 –1.4 –1.5
Southeast Asia 6.2 5.5 2.6 2.2 3.2 3.1 2.9
Brunei Darussalam 43.8 47.2 29.8 28.2 26.4 25.0 26.5
Cambodia –11.6 –8.9 –9.6 –14.2 –12.5 –12.9 –12.7
Indonesia 0.7 0.2 –2.7 –3.2 –3.0 –2.8 –2.4
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. –18.3 –15.8 –28.5 –30.6 –25.0 –21.2 –17.3
Malaysia 10.9 11.6 5.8 4.0 4.6 3.3 4.5
Myanmar –1.2 –1.9 –4.3 –5.1 –7.1 –6.8 –5.0
Philippines 3.6 2.5 2.8 3.8 3.6 4.0 3.6
Singapore 26.6 22.0 17.2 17.9 19.1 18.9 19.3
Thailand 3.1 2.6 –0.4 –0.7 3.8 4.0 1.5
Viet Nam –3.7 0.2 5.9 4.2 4.4 3.1 1.5
The Pacific 25.3 42.1 31.4 –18.4 –10.7 5.0 6.3
Cook Islands ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Fiji –4.4 –5.3 –1.8 –14.9 –8.9 –9.8 –8.7
Kiribati –16.7 –32.3 –26.3 –27.3 –53.2 –53.0 –48.4
Marshall Islands –25.9 –4.5 –7.8 –12.4 –9.4 –9.9 –11.4
Micronesia, Fed. States of –15.1 –17.9 –12.6 –10.1 14.2 11.2 6.4
Nauru ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Palau –10.2 –13.1 –10.1 –8.8 –5.1 –6.4 –8.1
Papua New Guinea –6.5 –1.3 –14.9 –22.6 –11.4 13.5 15.0
Samoa –6.5 –6.8 –14.0 –5.9 –12.2 –10.9 –9.4
Solomon Islands –28.3 –7.4 –0.2 –3.6 –14.7 –15.5 –15.0
Timor–Leste 179.6 212.1 221.5 246.7 87.9 55.0 51.6
Tonga –6.4 –6.1 –8.8 –1.9 –1.4 –4.5 –6.0
Tuvalu –11.8 –36.5 25.5 26.2 27.3 –37.2 –21.4
Vanuatu –5.4 –8.1 –6.5 –3.3 –5.7 –10.0 –7.0
Average 3.4 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.3 2.5 2.3
... = data not available.
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Table A15 Exchange rates to the United States dollar (annual average)
Currency Symbol 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Central Asia
Armenia Dram AMD 373.7 372.5 401.8 409.6 418.0
Azerbaijan Azerbaijan new manat AZN 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
Georgia Lari GEL 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.8
Kazakhstan Tenge T 147.4 146.6 149.1 152.1 179.2
Kyrgyz Republic Som Som 46.0 46.1 47.0 48.4 53.7
Tajikistan Somoni TJS 4.4 4.6 4.8 4.8 4.9
Turkmenistan Turkmen manat TMM 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9
Uzbekistan Sum SUM 1,576.8 1,710.9 1,885.4 2,095.0 2,311.2
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of Yuan CNY 6.8 6.5 6.3 6.2 6.1
Hong Kong, China Hong Kong dollar HK$ 7.8 7.8 7.8 7.7 7.7
Korea, Rep. of Won W 1,155.4 1,107.4 1,125.7 1,094.2 1,053.1
Mongolia Togrog MNT 1,347.2 1,265.2 1,359.2 1,523.9 1,817.3
Taipei,China NT dollar NT$ 31.6 29.5 29.6 29.8 30.4
South Asia
Afghanistan Afghani AF 45.8 47.7 50.9 55.5 57.1
Bangladesh Taka Tk 69.2 71.2 79.1 79.9 77.7
Bhutan Ngultrum Nu 46.7 45.3 50.3 54.9 61.5
India Indian rupee/s Re/Rs 45.6 47.9 54.4 60.5 61.0
Maldives Rufiyaa Rf 12.8 14.6 15.4 15.4 15.4
Nepal Nepalese rupee/s NRe/NRs 74.2 72.1 80.7 87.7 98.0
Pakistan Pakistan rupee/s PRe/PRs 83.8 85.5 89.2 96.7 102.0
Sri Lanka Sri Lanka rupee/s SLRe/SLRs 113.1 110.6 127.6 129.1 130.6
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam Brunei dollar B$ 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.3
Cambodia Riel KR 4,188.5 4,065.9 4,033.0 4,027.0 4,038.0
Indonesia Rupiah Rp 9,086.9 8,776.0 9,384.2 10,460.5 11,868.7
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. Kip KN 8,248.6 8,011.4 7,994.0 7,818.0 8,150.0
Malaysia Ringgit RM 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.3
Myanmar Kyat MK 5.6 5.6 855.2 964.6 994.3
Philippines Peso P 45.1 43.3 42.2 42.4 44.4
Singapore Singapore dollar S$ 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.3
Thailand Baht B 31.7 30.5 31.1 30.7 32.5
Viet Nam Dong D 18,621.3 20,489.6 20,828.0 20,934.6 21,148.8
The Pacific
Cook Islands New Zealand dollar NZ$ 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2
Fiji Fiji dollar F$ 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9
Kiribati Australian dollar A$ 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1
Marshall Islands US dollar US$ 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Micronesia, Fed. States of US dollar US$ 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Nauru Australian dollar A$ 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1
Palau US dollar US$ 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Papua New Guinea Kina K 2.7 2.3 2.1 2.2 2.5
Samoa Tala ST 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.3
Solomon Islands Sol. Islands dollar SI$ 8.1 7.6 7.4 7.3 7.3
Timor–Leste US dollar US$ 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Tonga Pa'anga T$ 1.9 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.8
Tuvalu Australian dollar A$ 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1
Vanuatu Vatu Vt 97.2 94.6 92.6 94.5 97.2
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Table A16 Gross international reserves ($ million)
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Central Asia
Armenia 1,866 1,933 1,799 2,252 1,489
Azerbaijan 6,409 10,274 11,277 14,401 14,646
Georgia 2,264 2,818 2,873 2,823 2,699
Kazakhstan 28,275 29,328 28,269 24,715 28,919
Kyrgyz Republic 1,719 1,835 2,067 … …
Tajikistan 476 572 650 500 400
Turkmenistan 18,800 22,400 26,400 29,300 32,400
Uzbekistan 14,579 18,049 22,100 22,500 23,900
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of 2,914,184 3,255,786 3,387,863 3,880,383 3,952,130
Hong Kong, China 268,731 285,408 317,336 311,185 328,510
Korea, Rep. of 291,571 306,402 326,968 346,460 363,593
Mongolia 2,197 2,457 4,126 2,248 1,650
Taipei,China 382,005 385,547 403,169 416,811 418,980
South Asia
Afghanistan 5,403 6,208 7,150 7,100 7,370
Bangladesh 10,750 10,912 10,364 15,315 21,508
Bhutan 759 796 674 917 998
India 304,818 294,397 292,046 304,223 330,213
Maldives 350 335 305 368 615
Nepal 2,759 3,836 4,960 5,614 6,939
Pakistan 13,953 16,614 11,905 7,198 10,509
Sri Lanka 6,610 5,958 6,877 7,200 8,200
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam 1,563 2,487 3,285 3,399 3,471
Cambodia 2,653 3,032 3,463 3,643 4,391
Indonesia 96,207 110,123 112,781 99,387 111,862
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 727 679 740 666 816
Malaysia 106,590 133,257 139,698 134,658 116,035
Myanmar 850 922 3,062 4,546 4,751
Philippines 62,373 75,302 83,831 83,187 79,541
Singapore 225,754 237,737 259,307 273,065 256,860
Thailand 172,129 175,124 181,608 167,289 157,108
Viet Nam 12,382 13,531 25,399 25,745 34,125
The Pacific
Cook Islands ... ... ... ... ...
Fiji 716 831 915 755 750
Kiribati ... ... ... ... ...
Marshall Islands ... ... ... ... ...
Micronesia, Fed. States of … … … … …
Nauru ... ... ... ... ...
Palau … … … … …
Papua New Guinea 3,092 4,323 4,001 2,814 2,624
Samoa 176 158 158 163 161
Solomon Islands 266 412 500 528 484
Timor–Leste 406 462 884 687 1,124
Tonga 88 121 141 145 153
Tuvalu 27 24 28 37 49
Vanuatu 155 172 180 184 183
... = data not available.
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Table A17 External debt outstanding ($ million)
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Central Asia
Armenia 3,299 3,568 3,739 3,899 3,785
Azerbaijan 3,734 4,841 5,470 6,059 6,478
Georgia 4,219 4,507 4,829 4,523 ...
Kazakhstan 118,223 125,321 136,918 149,895 157,656
Kyrgyz Republic 4,381 4,872 5,403 5,929 6,371
Tajikistan 1,911 2,093 2,260 2,149 ...
Turkmenistan 908 2,923 6,365 8,654 8,053
Uzbekistan 5,804 6,090 6,660 7,383 8,084
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of 548,938 694,997 736,986 863,167 890,000
Hong Kong, China 879,034 985,042 1,030,583 1,160,738 1,264,065
Korea, Rep. of 355,911 400,034 408,928 423,505 425,449
Mongolia 5,928 9,628 15,386 15,387 15,388
Taipei,China 101,581 122,528 130,821 170,134 177,945
South Asia
Afghanistan 1,303 1,242 1,320 1,260 1,290
Bangladesh 20,336 22,086 22,095 22,381 23,626
Bhutan 874 1,289 1,334 1,607 1,759
India 317,891 360,766 409,484 442,261 455,900
Maldives 962 913 815 793 836
Nepal 3,442 3,658 3,491 3,510 3,617
Pakistan 61,567 66,366 65,478 60,899 65,533
Sri Lanka 21,438 32,748 37,098 39,741 ...
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam ... ... ... ... ...
Cambodia 3,152 3,645 4,274 4,828 5,264
Indonesia 202,413 225,375 252,364 266,120 292,579
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 2,809 2,990 3,037 4,611 …
Malaysia 140,839 169,171 196,195 212,281 213,076
Myanmar 14,400 15,300 13,700 10,600 11,000
Philippines 60,048 60,442 60,337 58,506 57,730
Singapore 1,343,053 1,415,335 1,437,268 1,527,241 1,708,393
Thailand 100,561 104,334 130,747 141,933 140,900
Viet Nam 32,741 37,644 42,158 45,243 …
The Pacific
Cook Islands ... ... 67 79 82
Fiji 286 465 523 588 618
Kiribati 18 14 14 14 19
Marshall Islands 103 100 97 98 108
Micronesia, Fed. States of 84 87 87 87 ...
Nauru 63 ... ... ... ...
Palau 66 63 69 65 67
Papua New Guinea 922 979 1,142 1,355 1,525
Samoa 280 294 341 427 449
Solomon Islands 147 125 141 ... ...
Timor–Leste 0 0 0 44 60
Tonga 118 153 201 205 192
Tuvalu 11 10 10 9 8
Vanuatu 101 111 108 105 103
... = data not available.
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Table A18 Debt service ratio (% of exports of goods and services)
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Central Asia
Armenia 4.6 4.1 9.4 31.5 9.1
Azerbaijan ... ... ... ... ...
Georgia 4.9 7.5 4.6 ... ...
Kazakhstan 38.8 33.1 34.8 35.1 10.2
Kyrgyz Republic 25.9 11.5 … … …
Tajikistan 7.5 5.1 ... ... ...
Turkmenistan 2.3 1.6 1.8 2.3 …
Uzbekistan 4.1 3.6 6.4 3.5 4.6
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.6 2.1
Hong Kong, China 48.9 50.5 49.1 48.9 …
Korea, Rep. of 2.9 7.9 7.5 7.1 7.3
Mongolia 11.0 29.4 24.7 46.4 43.9
Taipei,China 0.7 3.5 0.5 2.2 1.9
South Asia
Afghanistan 1.1 1.3 1.1 1.9 2.5
Bangladesh 2.9 2.5 2.4 2.5 2.6
Bhutan 30.7 51.7 127.1 229.2 26.8
India 4.3 6.0 5.9 5.9 7.5
Maldives 2.7 2.7 3.3 2.1 2.7
Nepal 11.5 11.1 10.6 9.5 8.6
Pakistan 18.5 12.7 15.2 20.6 27.9
Sri Lanka 16.7 13.2 19.7 25.3 ...
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam ... ... ... ... ...
Cambodia 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.2
Indonesia 19.8 21.7 34.9 42.7 46.2
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 4.4 4.4 4.3 5.0 ...
Malaysia 7.5 10.4 10.3 10.4 10.8
Myanmar 5.6 9.1 2.2 2.2 …
Philippines 9.9 9.9 7.3 7.6 …
Singapore … … … … …
Thailand 4.7 3.5 4.2 4.0 4.4
Viet Nam 3.4 3.5 3.5 4.3 …
The Pacific
Cook Islands ... ... ... ... ...
Fiji 1.2 8.4 1.5 1.7 1.7
Kiribati 3.7 2.8 3.3 2.8 2.8
Marshall Islands 18.6 23.2 9.6 8.8 9.1
Micronesia, Fed. States of 6.3 6.7 5.3 6.7 ...
Nauru ... ... ... ... ...
Palau 7.0 5.7 5.1 4.9 4.4
Papua New Guinea 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 4.3
Samoa 50.3 0.8 5.3 0.0 0.0
Solomon Islands 3.0 1.3 0.7 ... ...
Timor–Leste 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
Tonga 10.1 7.0 7.3 8.4 10.1
Tuvalu 3.9 3.5 0.8 2.4 2.3
Vanuatu 1.4 1.4 –0.6 1.9 1.8
... = data not available.
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